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Abstract 
Falsified and substandard medicines (poor-quality medicines) represent a pressing global 
health threat that necessitates a stronger policy response. They pose a considerable threat to 
human lives and an obstacle to infectious disease control, also due to the associated risk of 
antimicrobial resistance. Policy efforts against poor-quality medicines include strengthening 
national drug regulation systems and countering the illicit trade in falsified medicines. Current 
global policy endeavours to improve access quality medicines however form an array of 
initiatives rather than a coordinated global response. Since the 1990s, academics and policy 
actors recognise that the circulation of poor-quality medicines represents a pressing global 
public health concern. This has generated widespread debate in the literature on the drivers 
and determinants of this policy issue. While past studies highlight widespread disagreement 
on definitions of the problem of poor-quality medicines, the existing body of literature pays 
little attention to the way that the problem is understood among policy actors across national 
and institutional settings. This thesis seeks to explore varying interpretations of this problem 
among policy actors in three low and middle-income countries. It explores the role of ideas in 
policy processes by evaluating the variations in perceptions of the problem and the policy 
developments against poor-quality medicines. The problem of poor-quality antimalarial 
medicines in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) offers an interesting case study. Despite 
notable national policy efforts against poor-quality antimalarial medicines in the GMS, 
evidence suggests that the problem of poor-quality antimalarials persists. As trade 
liberalization in the region intensifies, there are concerns that reduced custom controls and 
higher mobility of people and goods may cause further increase in this illicit trade. Through 
framing analysis, I analyse variations in perceptions of this threat across institutional and 
national settings. A social constructivist approach to policy analysis guides the analysis of 
interpretations of this problem and how these interpretations influence policy developments. 
This study then compares similarities and differences in framings of the problem and in policy 
processes across countries. I reflect on the dominant frames across the three case countries (the 
security, health systems and regulatory frames) and on the potential for policy coordination 
against poor-quality essential medicines in Southeast-Asia. To operationalize this approach, 
this study relies on three methods of data collection, namely; a stakeholder map, a document 
analysis and semi-structured interviews with key policy actors. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
‘Poor-quality medicines’1 represent an important global public health challenge (Newton et al. 
2011a). By definition, poor-quality medicines do not meet therapeutic standards set by national 
or international pharmacopeia 2 , and contain either sub-optimal doses of the active 
pharmaceutical ingredient3 (API) or no API, or may contain harmful ingredients which can 
lead to treatment failure or even death. There is evidence of poor-quality medicines across all 
drug categories, from lifesaving drugs such as antimicrobials to lifestyle drugs such as erectile 
dysfunction treatments or dieting pills (Karunamoorthi 2014). Poor-quality essential 
medicines are of particular concern as essential medicines satisfy ‘the priority health care 
needs of a population’, evidenced by disease prevalence and public health relevance (World 
Health Organization 2016a). Additionally, there are concerns that poor-quality medicines may 
contribute to antimicrobial resistance4 (O’Neill 2016; WHO 2015). Poor-quality medicines 
therefore represent a real obstacle to infectious disease control worldwide.  
1.1 Defining substandard and falsified medicines 
The term ‘poor-quality medicines’ (Newton et al. 2010) here encompasses both substandard 
and falsified medicines (or SFs), as medicines that do not meet the therapeutic standards and 
therefore may pose a threat to health. A substandard medicine is a genuine drug (produced by 
either an innovator or generic manufacturer) that does not meet therapeutic standards, either 
due to a manufacturing error, poor storage conditions or other unintentional circumstances 
along the supply chain (World Health Organization 2010b). A falsified medicine (sometimes 
referred to as ‘fake’) is also substandard but is the result of criminal activity. This legal term 
proposed by Attaran and colleagues (2012) instead of  ‘counterfeit’, encompasses the notion 
of ‘intent to deceive’ or wilful obliviousness of the perpetrator to the harm caused to patients 
                                                     
1 Medicine: a substance or preparation intended for the treatment or prevention of disease (Merriam-
Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary n.d.). This thesis refers to medicines as either medicines or drugs 
interchangeably. 
2 Pharmacopeia: official reference standards published by governments on medicinal products with their 
formulas, methods of preparations, intended effects, and directions for use (United States Pharmacopeia 
2011). 
3 Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API): ‘Any substance or combination of substances used in a 
finished pharmaceutical product (or medicine), intended to furnish pharmacological activity or to 
otherwise have direct effect in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or to 
have direct effect in restoring, correcting or modifying physiological functions in human beings.’ 
(World Health Organization 2011b, p.1) 
4 Poor-quality drugs with insufficient quantities of an Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) may 
contribute to drug resistance due to low clearance of microorganisms (such as bacteria, parasites, 
bacteria or viruses). The microorganisms that survive then multiply rapidly and can create strains that 
are resistant to the drug (Morris & Stevens 2006; Park 2010). 
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by the poor-quality drug. In this thesis, I choose to avoid using the term ‘counterfeit’ so as not 
to reduce the debate to the intellectual property dimension of the problem (Kuehn 2013).  
1.2 The policy problem of poor-quality medicines 
The circulation in poor-quality medicines, which has reportedly taken place since the 1600s 
(Newton et al. 2010; Fernández et al. 2011), affects nations of all income categories and is 
exacerbated by globalization, the frequency of cross-border exchanges, and the presence of 
complex trading networks, making it a truly global health policy problem. While the problem 
of poor-quality drugs has reached a global scale and impact, it tends to be concentrated in 
regional clusters of countries characterized by intense cross-border movement, a high demand 
for cheaper drugs, and inadequate regulatory mechanisms. Since the 1990s, there has been 
growing attention towards the problem of poor-quality medicines within the global health 
community. In parallel, there has been an increasing amount of resources dedicated to 
regulatory strengthening to improve access to quality-assured medicines as stipulated under 
the Millennium Development Goals (goal 8) and the Sustainable Development Goals (target 
3.8).  
The mainstream policy response to the problem of access to poor-quality medicines is two-
fold. It consists of both efforts to improve access to quality-assured medicines through the 
formal supply chain, as well as efforts to reduce the illegal circulation of poor-quality 
medicines. At the national level, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) are responsible for 
guaranteeing the quality, safety and efficacy of health products. NRA activities fall under two 
broad categories, including pre-marketing regulation (drug registration, licensing of 
manufacturing companies, of pharmacies, etc.) and post-marketing surveillance 
(pharmacovigilance5, batch quality control, inspection of establishments, etc.) (WHO 2007). 
In addition to the role of NRAs, it has been suggested that efforts against the circulation of 
poor-quality medicines and to improve access to quality-assured medicines, require multi-
sector cooperation at the national, regional and the global level. To illustrate this point, Table 
21 (Appendix 1 page 301) summarizes the key global policy actors involved in policy making 
to reduce the circulation of substandard medicines. Despite growing global attention to the 
issue of poor-quality medicines, the problem persists. While there is limited systematically 
collected data to quantify the scale of the trade in poor-quality medicines globally (Kelesidis 
& Falagas 2015; Shah et al. 2015), the World Health Organization (WHO) suggests that a total 
                                                     
5 Pharmacovigilance: ‘the science and activities relating to the detection, assessment, understanding and 
prevention of adverse effects or any other drug-related problem’ (World Health Organization 2004b, 
p.1) 
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of 30% of medicines in low-income settings are of poor-quality (IMPACT 2008). 
Additionally, the global market in poor-quality medicines is estimated to be between US$ 35 
billion (Cockburn et al. 2005) and US$ 75 billion (WHO 2010). 
1.3 Rationale  
It is clear that the problem of poor-quality medicines transcends national borders (Hamburg 
2015; The Lancet Editorial 2012; Seear 2012, 2013), yet there are few comparative analyses 
available on perceptions of the problem or the nature of policy responses across two or more 
countries. The literature suggests that while national efforts are insufficient to tackle such a 
complex cross-border threat (Seear 2013; Lee et al. 2015), the current global policy 
endeavours resemble an array of overlapping efforts with weak global leadership, rather than 
a coherent policy response (Mackey 2013). Despite efforts by the inter-governmental and 
donor organisations, such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), to support global policy making to reduce 
the circulation of poor-quality medicines, these have had a limited impact on the capacity for 
NRAs to regulate pharmaceutical supply chains effectively. Moreover, cross-border 
coordination of efforts in response to the problem of poor-quality medicines remains limited. 
There is a gap in the literature as to why there is no effective, coordinated response although 
numerous studies point to the lack of a common agreement on the definition of poor-quality 
drugs as an impediment to a coordinated policy response (Khan et al. 2011; Dégardin et al. 
2014; Newton et al. 2011b). Past studies on the policy problem of poor-quality medicines are 
predominantly normative in nature, highlighting the debate around this threat from an 
economic, socio-cultural, medical or political perspective (Karunamoorthi 2014; Dégardin et 
al. 2014; Wertheimer & Norris 2009; Fried 2011; Caudron et al. 2008; Bird 2007; Cahoy 2007; 
Outterson & Smith 2006). There is a shortage of empirical research analysing the policy 
implications of poor-quality medicines. Empirical work to understand the variations in how 
the policy problem is interpreted across national settings, can provide some explanation for 
the currently fragmented global policy response to the circulation of poor-quality medicines, 
which remains a threat to the health of populations.  
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this thesis is to analyse and compare how the policy problem of poor-quality 
medicines is framed by policy actors across national settings. Four objectives guide this study: 
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1. Examine policy developments to reduce access to poor-quality medicines 6  in 
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand and evaluate the role of policy actors in shaping the 
policy process; 
2. Explore how the problem of poor-quality medicines is framed by stakeholders across 
institutional settings in these three countries; 
3. Compare the similarities and differences in framings of the policy problem across the 
three countries; 
4. Discuss challenges and opportunities for cross-border policy coordination to reduce 
access to poor-quality medicines in Southeast Asia.  
1.5 Case Study 
One example of the cross-border problem of poor-quality essential medicines is the circulation 
of poor-quality antimalarials7 (AMLs) in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS, also referred 
to as Mekong Region)8. Evidence indicates that the circulation of poor-quality AMLs in this 
region has been a key driver of artemisinin-resistance, creating further challenges to malaria 
control and elimination (Dondorp et al. 2004; White et al. 1999). The WHO and key experts 
from the Lao-Mahosot Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (LOMWRU) were among the 
first to raise awareness in the late 1990s towards the regional challenge posed by poor-quality 
AMLs (Rozendaal 2001a; Newton et al. 2001; Newton et al. 2003), subsequently calling for 
international action against this problem and attracting international donor support (Newton et 
al. 2002). Appendix 2 page 303 summarises the evidence around the circulation of poor-
quality medicines in the GMS.  
Recent studies suggest that the prevalence of poor-quality AMLs in some Mekong countries 
has now declined9, but poor-quality essential medicines remain a concern especially in remote 
rural areas (Tabernero, Newton, et al. 2014; Krech et al. 2014). The complex policy issue of 
poor-quality AMLs in the Mekong Region therefore provides a critical case to explore policy 
making in this area, including stakeholders’ perceptions of the problem and how these may 
                                                     
6 and to improve access to quality assured medicines. 
7 Antimalarials (AMLs): A drug (including artemisinin-based combination therapy (ACTs)) intended 
for the treatment of malaria, a life-threatening disease caused by parasites that are transmitted to people 
through the bites of infected female Anopheles mosquitoes (World Health Organization 2017a). 
8 The Greater Mekong Subregion is a ‘natural economic area bound together by the Mekong River’, a 
regional construct named by the Asian Development Bank and commonly referred to as the GMS or the 
Mekong Region (Asian Development Bank n.d.). The Greater Mekong Subregion encompasses the 
following six countries and provinces: Cambodia, the People's Republic of China (specifically Yunnan 
Province and Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region), Lao People's Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam 
9 Failure rates of AMLs in Cambodia have dropped from 7.4% to 0.7% between 2006 and 2011. 
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influence policy developments and programme implementation. Specifically, this study is 
structured around three neighbouring countries (namely, Cambodia, Laos and Thailand) that 
are faced with similar challenges, including evidence of poor-quality AMLs, the presence of 
unlicensed pharmaceutical outlets, and evidence of artemisinin resistance at border areas. All 
three countries share borders, are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), have close-knit histories yet have different political and institutional systems and 
economies. While this thesis focuses on the case of poor-quality AMLs, respondents 
interviewed for this study frequently referred to the wider problem of poor-quality essential 
medicines. For this reason, the discussion of findings across the three countries extends beyond 
the problem of AMLs, to the wider problem of poor-quality essential medicines. 
1.6 Approach 
I adopt a social sciences approach to the study of a global health policy challenge. My study 
is anchored in social constructivism and based on the assumption that ideas play an important 
role in shaping policy processes. To study ideas, or the perceptions of policy actors, I use 
framing analysis. Frames are understood as a ‘predominant mode of thinking and speaking 
about an issue’ (Rein & Schön 1996, p.89). Frames are interpretations of a social phenomenon 
and a way of selecting information as an act of analysis or as an act of persuasion in politics 
(Rein & Schön 1996). While framing analysis has been predominantly used in the study of 
media representations, this thesis demonstrates the value of this approach in exploring how a 
problem is understood and defined in policy documents and by policy actors. I explore 
variations in framings across institutional and national settings, and analyse how different 
interpretations and perceptions may influence policy developments at the national and regional 
level. Frames are context-dependent and influenced by domestic political culture as well as 
global health narratives. For this reason, framings of an issue may vary between countries. I 
therefore compare the similarities and differences in framings of the policy issue and observe 
which frames are dominant across national settings. I then reflect on how each frame has been 
articulated differently across institutional and national settings, and discuss the implications of 
these frames for policy developments and for cross-border cooperation. 
In this thesis, I refer to the health policy making process. This can be understood as the 
development of a health policy, from the emergence of a health policy issue within a policy 
community to the debate around the parameters of the policy problem, and finally to the policy 
solution or plan of action. Health policies10 are defined as intentions to act and courses of 
                                                     
10 Policies can take the form of laws or policy guidelines. 
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action (and inaction) driven by a set of actors in a given context that affect the institutions, 
organizations and services in response to a health policy issue (Walt & Gilson 1994; Buse et 
al. 2005, p.6). For each case country, I explore how the ‘issue’ around poor-quality medicines 
as a policy concern emerges and how framings of this issue have triggered (or not) policy 
interest to address the problem of poor-quality AMLs. I do not seek to analyse the effectiveness 
of existing policies or to evaluate the success of their implementation. Instead, this study 
explores how policy changes occur over time, evaluates framings of the policy issue in 
different contexts and the implications of these framings for future policy development. I 
reflect on the similarities and differences in the policy processes in the three case countries 
and the opportunities for policy coherence to improve access to quality medicines in the region. 
This thesis argues for the need for more convergence in understandings and policy efforts 
against this regional and global health threat. 
1.7 Thesis structure 
The thesis is written in a monograph format and consists of nine chapters. It is structured in a 
manner that allows both an in depth understanding of each country situation, and paves the 
way for relevant discussion on the implications of framing in policy analysis, and on the 
potential for cross-border coordination to address the problem of poor-quality medicine in 
Southeast Asia. Following this introduction, Chapter 2 provides an overview of the policy 
debate on the problem of poor-quality medicines and its definition. Chapter 3 presents the 
results of a cross-disciplinary literature review on the determinants and the policy challenges 
linked to the issue of poor-quality medicines. In this chapter, I also identify the main thematic 
categories to explore during data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 details the analytical 
framework for this thesis and Chapter 5 details the methods I adopted to conduct my study. 
After a short section introducing the results from my fieldwork, chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the 
three case countries and the results of the analysis of policy processes and dominant frames 
among policy actors in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand respectively. Each results chapter begins 
with a brief introduction to the political, economic and health system context for each country. 
In chapter 9, I reflect on variations in framings and policy developments across the three 
national settings through a comparative analysis of the results. I discuss the dominant frames 
around the problem of poor-quality medicines and the implications of my research for policy 
developments and for cross-border policy coordination. I conclude this thesis with a short 
discussion of the limitations of this study, after which I offer suggestions for further research.  
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Chapter 2 The policy debate on poor-quality medicines  
In this chapter, I explore the parameters of the policy debate around the problem of poor-
quality medicines. Delineating the parameters of this debate is a first step towards 
understanding what is a complex policy problem. I outline the development of the normative 
discourse around poor-quality medicines as a policy problem since the 1990s, when it first 
received sustained attention at the global level. I then summarise the development of the debate 
around poor-quality medicines as a health policy problem, and the contribution of international 
stakeholders (including the role of global institutions11) in introducing ‘access to quality 
medicines’ (ATM) as a global policy goal. This chapter includes studies that focus on the 
problem of ‘counterfeit’, ‘falsified’, ‘substandard’, ‘fake’ or ‘poor-quality’ medicines, and that 
provide a wider understanding of this policy challenge encompassing trademark infringement 
and public health considerations.  
2.1 The emergence of poor-quality medicines as a global health policy issue 
The circulation of poor-quality medicines has gradually been recognised as a global health 
policy issue since the early 1990s. Both the WHO and the International Federation of 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Associations (IFPMA) have played a key role in gathering 
global support around the importance of improving access to quality and safe medicines, in 
the initial stages of the debate (WHO 1992). While the problem of poor-quality medicines is 
not new, the challenge of ‘counterfeit’ medicines was first addressed in the global health policy 
arena in 1985, at the Conference of Experts on the Rationale use of Drugs in Nairobi. The 
World Health Assembly Resolution WHA41.16 (1988) subsequently requested the initiation 
of programmes for the prevention and detection of ‘falsely labelled, counterfeited or 
substandard pharmaceutical preparations’ (WHO 1999). Since the 1990s, high-level meetings 
among global health institutions, debates among experts in pharmaceutical policy, legally-
binding resolutions as well as non-binding declarations, have shaped and re-shaped the debate 
around poor-quality medicines. In 1994, a WHO Resolution (WHO 1994) followed the first 
international meeting on ‘counterfeit’ drugs held in Geneva (in 1992) by the IFPMA. This 
resolution was aimed at gathering cross-sectoral support to address the problem of poor-quality 
medicines (WHO 1999). In 1999, the WHO issued the first official recommendations on policy 
response to the circulation of  ‘counterfeit medicines’ at the national level (WHO 1999).  
                                                     
11 A table summary of the global policy actors and their contribution to the ATM goal is available at 
Appendix 1 on page 301. 
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The WHO spearheaded guidelines to strengthen the regulation of pharmaceuticals. For 
example, the WHO pre-qualification (WHO PQ) system established in 2001, offers a 
comprehensive evaluation and certification mechanism for medicines to guide National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) in their registration processes for new, quality-approved 
essential medicines. It provides a unified standard of acceptable quality, safety and efficacy 
across all medical products, and offers a comprehensive evaluation system and certification 
mechanism. The WHO PQ system also streamlines the pre-marketing quality control efforts 
for drug manufacturers, NRAs and donor organisations funding the procurement of essential 
medicines in low-middle income countries. The WHO PQ system was one of the first 
mechanisms aimed at improving access to quality medicines globally, and coincided with 
rising global awareness of the importance of guaranteeing the quality and safety of essential 
medicines. The WHO’s subsequent initiatives reinforced its role in guiding policy efforts in 
this space. The Safety and Vigilance team at the WHO Essential Medicines and Health 
Products Department, for example, established the WHO Rapid Alert System (WHO RAS) to 
monitor poor-quality medicines. Through the WHO RAS, nation states are encouraged to share 
information globally about seizures of poor-quality medicines. Tabernero and colleagues 
(2014) note, however, that only 5-15% of member states regularly report seizures to the WHO.  
2.1.1  Poor quality medicines as a trademark infringement  
2.1.1.1 Intellectual Property law and trademark infringement  
Since the problem of poor-quality medicines was first brought to the attention of the global 
health community by the WHO and IFPMA, the policy debate has changed in form and 
content. The problem of poor-quality medicines was first introduced as a trademark 
infringement before it was acknowledged as a public health issue (Clift 2010). The initial focus 
of the debate was on the infringement of Intellectual Property (IP) rights and the threat that 
this poses to pharmaceutical innovation and innovator brands, due to the diversion of profits 
to criminals (Outterson & Smith 2006). In addition to the WHO, other important policy actors 
influencing this development included the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) (Timmermans 2004). In response to the debate on 
the economic consequences of the trade in poor-quality medicines and the links with trademark 
infringement and IP protection, the WHO, the WTO and WIPO actively collaborated on 
surveillance and monitoring activities to understand the scale of the phenomenon. Poor-quality 
medicines were perceived first and foremost as a threat to the industry. Pharmaceutical 
companies regularly withhold information on evidence of falsified products from their brand, 
in order to safeguard the reputation of their products (Cockburn et al. 2005). The 
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pharmaceutical industry has advocated for tighter controls on patented products. Innovator 
pharmaceutical companies12 have been accused of using actions against falsified medicines as 
a guise to target the generic industry, advocating for stronger laws against trademark 
infringement with definitions of ‘falsified’ medicines that can be interpreted broadly and risk 
impeding the ability of generic companies to produce cheaper versions of their branded 
products. This development is one illustration of how trade interests have traditionally 
prevailed over public health matters when it comes to the problem of poor-quality medicines 
(Blouin 2007; Bigdeli et al. 2012; Newton, Amin, et al. 2011; Liberman 2012).  
2.1.1.2 Poor-quality medicines as ‘counterfeit medicines’  
WHO’s definition of poor-quality medicines was initially centred on ‘counterfeit medicines’, 
defined as medicines that are deliberately and fraudulently mislabeled with respect to identity 
and/or source (WHO 1999). By referring to identity and/or source, this definition focuses 
predominantly on trademark infringement, classifying counterfeit medicines as copies of a 
branded product. This definition could inadvertently run the risk of encompassing generic 
medicines (non-branded and cheaper reproductions of an innovator drug), which could hinder 
access to more affordable generic medicines. This focus on trademark law could be attributed 
to the political influence of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS 1995) and the introduction of IP law to the international trading system, 
designed to preserve the rights of the innovator industries. 
Most national laws since the 1990s also focus on IP protection for branded medicines, and fall 
short of addressing the pharmaceutical crime of falsified medicines (Newton, Amin, et al. 
2011). The anti-drug-counterfeiting law introduced in Kenya in 2008 for example, was 
criticised as being drafted exclusively as a trademark concern, and thus posing a threat to the 
generic industry (Fried 2011; Cohn et al. 2013). In 2012, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) introduced the acronym SSFFCs (Substandard/ Spurious/ Falsely-Labelled/  Falsified/ 
Counterfeit) which encompassed all definitions of poor-quality medicines (WHO 2012). One 
shortcoming of this definition is that it amalgamated substandard, falsified and counterfeit 
medicines; all of which, however, would require distinct policy solutions. The definition has 
been revised to Substandard and Falsified medicines (SFs) following the recommendation of 
the WHO executive board (WHO 2017), with the aim of reducing confusion around the 
terminology.  
                                                     
12 Pharmaceutical companies investing in research and development of new drugs. 
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2.1.1.3 The limitations of intellectual property law 
Global policy makers gradually realised that while protecting trademark infringements is 
important, a sole focus on IP law had important repercussions for access to affordable, quality 
medicines. IP law was seen as threatening access to cheaper quality medicines by erecting 
barriers to the production and trade of generic medicines, therefore creating a demand for more 
affordable medicines that counterfeiters exploit by offering cheaper alternatives of doubtful 
quality (Blouin 2007; Outterson & Smith 2006; Kamal, Smith & Tickell 2003; Ambroise-
Thomas 2012; Karunamoorthi 2014; Pecoul et al. 1999). The shift in the debate coincided with 
the 2001 Doha Declaration on TRIPS and public health, and the introduction of flexibility 
mechanisms to the TRIPS Agreement. Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration established 
governance mechanisms for more inclusive trade that sought to expand access to medicines 
for LMICs lacking pharmaceutical capacity (WHO 2001). Such mechanisms included for 
example, Compulsory Licensing (CL), enabling governments to license domestic generic 
manufacturers to produce medicines without approval from patent holders for a royalty fee. 
Furthermore, policy makers gradually acknowledged the shortcomings of IP law, which fails 
to protect unbranded generic medicines prone to falsification. IP law cannot be used to 
prosecute falsified drug manufacturers operating under a bogus factory name, for example. 
International organisations such as Oxfam advocated for a shift in definition away from 
intellectual property law and more focused on improving national regulatory capacity for 
medicine quality assurance and control (Oxfam 2011). 
2.1.2  Poor-quality medicines as a public health concern 
2.1.2.1 Improving the affordability of medicines 
Policy makers gradually noted the primacy of public health considerations over trade 
considerations with regards to the problem of poor-quality medicines. The debate shifted to 
encourage action by public health institutions to improve access to medicines (Newton et al. 
2011; Akinyandenu 201). Arguably, the introduction of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) and Goal 8 (Target 8.E) on improving access to affordable medicines13, played an 
important part in advocating for the need to improve access to quality, affordable medicines. 
Actors emphasized the need to protect the health of vulnerable populations, especially poorer 
communities, against cheaper poor-quality medicines in low and middle income countries 
(LMICs), where patients are disproportionately affected by the proliferation of poor-quality 
                                                     
13 MDG Target 8.E “to provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries”. 
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medicines (Cahoy 2007; Caudron et al. 2008; Dorlo et al. 2012). It was gradually understood 
that the high price of genuine medicines, as well as the lack of public health insurance nets in 
LMICs, where patients rely predominantly on out-of-pocket payments for medicines, drove 
demand for cheaper medicines (Krech et al. 2014; Wertheimer & Norris 2009; Erhun et al. 
2001; Akinyandenu 2013; Alfadl et al. 2013; Kelesidis et al. 2007; Glass 2014; Dégardin et 
al. 2014; Bird 2007; WHO 1999). This emphasis on the economic drivers of the demand for 
cheaper, poor-quality medicines and the trade barriers to access quality medicines, triggered 
international organisations such as Oxfam to steer the debate on improving access to 
affordable medicines. Oxfam and Médecins Sans Frontières through their ‘Access Campaign’ 
advocated for better access to affordable medicines (Medecins Sans Frontieres n.d.).  
2.1.2.2 Access to Medicines beyond affordability 
At the same time, in addition to the issue of affordability, stakeholders gradually 
acknowledged the need to consider other elements of the supply chain, when informing a 
policy response aimed at improving ‘access to safe, effective, quality and affordable essential 
medicines and vaccines for all’ 14 . Scholars concurred that the problem of poor-quality 
medicines goes beyond ensuring affordability and is intrinsically linked to the poor 
management of complex pharmaceutical supply chains and distribution networks (Buowari 
2012; Burns 2006; Akinyandenu 2013; Erhun et al. 2001). At a consultative meeting held in 
2000, the WHO and Management Sciences for Health (MSH) first introduced the ‘4As’ 
(Availability, Accessibility, Acceptability, Affordability - see Figure 1 page 32) as a 
framework to illustrate the main supply chain dimensions of improving ATM (Center for 
Pharmaceutical Management 2003).  
                                                     
14 As stipulated in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target 3.8 in 2015. 
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Figure 1 Access to Medicines Framework: The 4As by WHO-MSH (Center for Pharmaceutical 
Management 2003) 
Availability relates to the upstream research, development, manufacturing (upstream 
availability), and the distribution of pharmaceutical products down the supply chain, from 
manufacturing establishments to pharmacy outlets (downstream availability). Under 
Accessibility, the WHO-MSH ATM framework highlights the importance of having pharmacy 
outlets geographically located within reach of patients. Affordability relates to the price of 
medicines. Finally, under Acceptability, the framework refers to the quality of medicines and 
the rational use15 of medicines by patients, to ensure their safety and efficiency. Various 
iterations of this ATM Framework were subsequently developed16. In a publication entitled 
‘Equitable access to essential medicines: a framework for collective action’  (WHO 2004a), 
the WHO introduced a revised framework which addresses supply chain constraints, as well 
as affordability and financing for medicines in four main categories (1. rational selection, 2. 
affordable prices, 3. sustainable financing, and 4. reliable health and supply systems), with 
considerations of quality assurance underpinning these four dimensions. This second ATM 
framework differs from the original WHO-MSH ATM framework, as it focuses predominantly 
on financing and the rational use of medicines and less on issues of accessibility. The last 
category of this framework only broadly encompasses constraints related to supply and 
demand of medicines. Beyond issues of supply and demand, stakeholders progressively 
acknowledged that the problem of poor-quality medicines was a wider health systems issue, 
related to access to health services, the state of health infrastructure and the political context. 
                                                     
15 The rational use of medicine requires that ‘patients receive medications appropriate to their clinical 
needs, in doses that meet their own individual requirements, for an adequate period of time, and at the 
lowest cost to them and their community’ (World Health Organization 2015d, p.1) 
16 Another version of the ATM framework was developed later by Frost and Reich (2008). The Frost 
and Reich ATM framework (2008) is built around the 4As model and refers to Availability, 
Affordability but includes two different As, namely; Adoption (related to the demand for medicines) 
and Architecture (the international actors at play). 
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This shift was triggered by a key publication that will be detailed in the literature review 
(Chapter 3). Beyond the affordability of genuine medicines, stakeholders also realised the 
intrinsically global nature of the problem of poor-quality medicines. 
2.2 Improving access to quality medicines as a global policy goal 
2.2.1 A policy response against poor-quality medicines 
Poor-quality medicines produced in one country can easily affect the health of patients in 
another. For this reason, the problem of poor-quality medicines has gradually been recognized 
as a global health threat, requiring a multi-level policy response adapted to the specificities of 
a national context, and that successfully address the cross-border determinants of the problem. 
In 2012, the WHO recognised the importance of efforts ‘to prevent and control (and decrease) 
medicines with compromised quality, safety, and efficacy’ (WHO 2012b). As described in the 
introductory chapter to this study, the policy response can be described as two-fold: 1) 
improving access to good quality medicines, and 2) tackling the illicit circulation of poor-
quality medicines. Both responses address the problem of substandard and falsified medicines, 
although arguably a response to tackle the illicit circulation of poor-quality medicines needs 
to address the crime of medicine falsification; while the former focuses on strengthening 
pharmaceutical regulatory systems to monitor the quality of registered medicines on the 
market, and to reduce the production and circulation of substandard medicines.  
2.2.2 National and global actors driving this policy response  
Considering the nature of the problem of poor-quality medicines as a cross-border policy issue, 
it has been suggested that a successful response to improve access to good quality medicines 
and to strengthen drug regulatory systems involves an array of policy actors, across and beyond 
the national realm and the sole responsibility of NRAs. Several global and regional health 
institutions have been involved in steering the global policy response to address the problem 
of poor-quality medicines. With the 2006 Declaration of Rome, the WHO first established an 
International Medical Products Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce (IMPACT)17 between member 
state representatives to address the problem of poor-quality medicines. This mechanism was 
weakened by conflicting national interests and a flawed debate around the definition of 
‘counterfeit medicines’, which was seen as impeding on the generics trade and thus on access 
to affordable medicines (Mackey 2013). By 2012, the WHO’s Resolution WHA65.19 
                                                     
17 IMPACT was established as an inter-state mechanism spearheaded by representatives from the WHO 
member states to discuss the problem of poor-quality medicines within the WHO.  
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established the Member State Mechanism to replace IMPACT (WHO 2012b) and in 2014, 
resolution WHA67.20 agreed on at the 67th World Health Assembly, discussed the need to 
strengthen pharmaceutical regulatory systems to address the problem of poor-quality 
medicines. 
Beyond the role of inter-governmental negotiations, the wider global health community 
including research institutions, industry associations and donor organisations, recognised the 
need to build stronger drug regulatory systems to address this issue with the help of technical 
agencies. International agencies, such as the United States Pharmacopeia (USP)18, entered the 
scene at the beginning of the new millennium to strengthen the capacity of national 
pharmaceutical regulatory systems. USP has played an important role globally in improving 
the capacity of NRAs to monitor the quality of pharmaceutical products. Donor organizations 
and global health partnerships, including the Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and 
Malaria (GF), have also demonstrated an interest in promoting health systems strengthening 
to improve the regulation of pharmaceuticals and to support efforts against infectious diseases 
such as malaria. Through the Regional Artemisinin Initiative (RAI) announced in 2013 for 
example, the GF provides financial support to improve the regulatory capacity of NRAs in the 
Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), and to ensure an adequate supply of quality ACTs. These 
efforts have contributed to reducing the circulation of no-longer recommended treatments to 
counter the growing threat of multi-drug resistant malaria.  
2.2.3 International declarations on falsified medicines 
Aside from the World Health Assembly resolutions, other non-binding declarations and 
conventions contributed to the international communities’ growing technical knowledge 
around the policy goal of improving access to quality medicines. Global actors gradually 
acknowledged the complexity of reducing the circulation of falsified medicines specifically. 
As a result, several conventions and declarations were aimed at addressing the problem of 
falsified medicines as an internationally organized crime. The Medicrime Convention 19 
drafted in 2011 by the Council of Europe (CoE), for example, was designed to provide law 
enforcers with a common legal framework to prosecute pharmaceutical crime (Mackey 2013). 
                                                     
18 USP is a non-profit organization providing technical support to nation states to improve national 
standards for monitoring the quality of medicines. USP operates sentinel sites with the use of the 
minilab, supporting the development of Standard Operating Procedures and working towards ISO 
certification for national pharmaceutical testing laboratories. USP also hosts a network of reference 
laboratories for medicine quality testing. 
19 Council of Europe Convention on counterfeiting of medical products and similar crimes involving 
threats to public health. 
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Its aim was to reinforce efforts against the intentional manufacturing of ‘counterfeit’ drugs. 
This convention guides lawmakers on how to address the crime of drug counterfeiting or 
falsification. The Medicrime Convention only entered into force in January 2016; however, to 
date there are still few signatories20. Regardless, the Medicrime Convention does reinforce the 
policy goal of ATM, adding to the body of existing conventions which can be applied to the 
crime of drug falsification21.  
The introduction of falsified medicines as a ‘pharmaceutical crime’ prompted the involvement 
of other organizations, including law enforcement agencies at the national (Customs and police 
officials at ports of entry or through the inspection of unlicensed drug outlets) and international 
level, including the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) but also the 
International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). UNODC, empowered by the 
Criminal Justice Resolution 20/6 (2011), is engaged in the global movement against poor-
quality medicines, labelled ‘fraudulent medicines’ under its mandate to fight global organized 
crime. INTERPOL harnesses the skills and resources of police officials and customs officers 
in relevant countries through yearly operations to seize falsified batches and containers of 
poor-quality medicines. These activities are often reported in the media as ‘success stories’, 
and used to raise awareness about the circulation of poor-quality medicines, both among 
consumers and policy makers. Finally, The UNODC Model Legislative Provisions on Drug 
Control, adopted in 2016, were designed to guide member states’ justice systems to legislate 
against pharmaceutical crime. These documents guide the reform of national legal frameworks 
in response to the problem of falsified medicines, although the extent to which they have been 
used and translated into national law is unclear. The conventions and resolutions around the 
problem of poor-quality medicines are part of the development of the policy goal of improving 
access to quality medicines.  
This overview of how the problem of poor-quality medicines has emerged as a global health 
policy issue, provides an initial understanding of the evolving debate among policy makers. It 
also places the problem of poor-quality medicines within the wider debate around ‘access to 
medicines’, and introduces current efforts at the global level to reduce the circulation of SFs 
and improve access to quality medicines.  The next chapter reviews the literature to discern 
how the problem is presented in academia. 
  
                                                     
20 27 and 10 ratifications of the convention as of 2nd August 2018. 
21Other conventions include the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs, or the Convention on Cybercrime 2001. 
 36 
Chapter 3 Determinants of the trade in poor-quality medicines 
In parallel to the policy debate described in Chapter 2, the problem of poor-quality medicines 
has been the focus of many studies. In this chapter, I review the determinants and drivers of 
the illicit trade in poor-quality medicines, as well as the challenges to forming a policy 
response, as presented in the literature. Past studies have served to raise awareness about 
substandard and falsified medicines as a global health policy problem (Sipahi et al. 2014). The 
majority of studies on poor-quality medicines to date focus on the medical and statistical 
aspects of poor-quality medicines and their circulation, providing information on the 
prevalence of poor-quality medicines from small batches of sampled medicines or describing 
the chemical content of tested samples (Liu & Lundin 2016).  
In this review, I have included studies that refer to poor-quality, substandard, falsified or 
counterfeit medicines for a wider understanding of the challenge of poor-quality medicines. I 
examine studies across disciplines, beyond the purely medical and including papers written 
from an economic and legal perspective that describe the problem of poor-quality medicines, 
its determinants and challenges. In their recent study, Liu and Lundin (2016) provide an 
insightful review of the determinants, drivers and key challenges around the problem of 
falsified medicines. No single peer-reviewed study, however, offers a comprehensive analysis 
of these factors for both falsified and substandard medicines. Throughout this chapter, I present 
a list of key themes and sub-themes emerging from the literature. This list of themes can be 
used to guide research on the problem of poor-quality medicines from a policy perspective. 
The last section explains how the results of this literature review and the themes emerging 
from the literature, inform the conceptual framework for this thesis. I also reflect more broadly 
on the gaps in the literature that this thesis seeks to address.  
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Figure 2 Flow diagram on scoping of relevant studies 
The papers analysed in this chapter were sourced from four databases: MedLine, PubMed, 
BASE22 and Global Health. While the problem of poor-quality medicines is not a recent 
phenomenon, concerns about the health and economic implications of poor-quality medicines 
rose and attracted the attention of academia, the pharmaceutical industry and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) from the 1990s onwards. The body of literature on this topic is limited 
in size and the intention was to be as inclusive as possible.  For this reason, date limits for this 
search were set from 1990-2016. The search was performed in January 2016, using the 
following key words in various combinations: (counterfeit OR fake OR falsified) AND 
(medicine* OR drug*). The search was limited to references published in English. The 
diagram above (see Figure 2, page 37) illustrates the scoping of relevant studies from this 
search. 689 records were initially identified through the database search and, after removing 
all duplicates, a remaining 559 records were screened by title and abstract for relevance. Below 
is a summary of the exclusion and inclusion criteria for the title and abstract review (see Table 
1 on page 38). 
 
                                                     
22 BASE: A multi-disciplinary database which searches freely-available academic websites, including 
institutional online depositories, e-journal providers, and e-books. 
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Exclusion Criteria Inclusion Criteria 
News articles Journal articles 
Book reviews Reports 
Published before 1990 Opinion Editorials 
Non-English Books 
No clear focus on health Public health angle 
Medical studies exclusively on prevalence 
rates of poor-quality medicines or on quaity 
detection methods. 
 
Table 1 Criteria for selecting articles for full review 
A total of 114 studies published between 1991 and 2016 are included in this review. The list 
of studies is available in Appendix 3 on page 308. For this review, I identified key themes 
discussed by author(s) under which they describe the determinants, drivers and challenges 
linked to the problem of poor-quality medicines in various geographical settings. Through a 
thematic content analysis, I extract the ‘reason’ or explanation given by the author(s) as to why 
the trade in poor-quality medicines emerges or persists in various geographical settings. The 
reviewed papers point towards both factors contributing to the trade and discrepancies in 
addressing the problem, as factors that allow this trade to persist – both of which contribute to 
scaling up this phenomena to the global scale. The emerging themes from these studies were 
coded iteratively using Nvivo, and converged under three main thematic categories: the 
economic drivers of the illicit trade in poor-quality medicines; the socio-cultural determinants 
of the policy problem; and the legal and regulatory challenges to a policy response. The 
relevant sub-themes were tabulated under each thematic category. These themes are 
summarised in Table 2 on Page 39 and detailed later in this chapter.  
  
 39 
 
Theme Subthemes 
Socio-economic drivers Globalization and trade 
Demand and supply 
Consumer perception and awareness of risk 
Health systems issues Health service delivery and infrastructure 
Health-seeking behaviour  
Capacity and capability of NRAs 
Supply chain of pharmaceuticals 
Legal and regulatory 
challenges 
Definition of poor-quality medicine  
Laws and policies regulating medicines  
Organized crime 
Enforcement 
Politics and vested interests 
Table 2 Issues around the problem of poor-quality medicines emerging from the literature 
review 
3.1.1 Socio-economic drivers  
3.1.1.1 Globalisation and trade 
Various authors point to economic and trade factors as driving the trade in poor-quality 
medicines (Bird 2007; Cahoy 2007; Yao 2006; Worsley & Wong 2013). They argue that 
increased globalization, the movement of goods and people across borders and an emphasis 
on global trade interests, have contributed to the circulation of poor-quality medicines via 
transnational supply networks. Trade liberalization and the freer movement of goods, they 
argue, facilitate the international impact of pharmaceutical crime (Shah et al. 2015; Dégardin 
et al. 2014; Glass 2014; Newton, McGready, Fernández, et al. 2006). Free trade zones resulting 
in lower custom controls on exports, have been identified as a specific factor contributing to 
the trade in poor-quality medicines (WHO 1999; Bate 2012). These can circulate more freely 
through Singapore or Hong Kong, on their way from China or India for example, to other 
Southeast Asian nations where there is a higher demand for cheap medicines (Worsley & 
Wong 2013). The literature also suggests that globalization adds complex layers in the supply 
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chain of pharmaceuticals which may be exploited by criminals (Dégardin et al. 2014). Raw 
ingredients may be produced in one country, pills made in another, packaged in a third and 
sold in a fourth country or online (Kuehn 2013), making it difficult to trace the source of an 
illicit product (World Health Organization 2010a). Globalization has also increased instances 
of re-importation and parallel trade, creating further opportunities for poor-quality goods to 
infiltrate the legitimate supply chain (Ahmed 2013; Dégardin et al. 2014; Moken 2003). Re-
importation of excess stock is considered dangerous when and if the products are altered or 
repackaged. Falsified goods, whose original version is registered in a country, can re-enter the 
market without being picked up by border control. Similarly, the parallel trade23 of medicines 
is considered as one of the main threats in developed markets, such as the United States of 
America (USA) or the EU (Dégardin et al. 2014; Moken 2003).  
3.1.1.2 Demand and supply  
Cahoy (2007), in his economic study of the trade in counterfeit medicines, refers to the 
discrepancy between Higher Income Countries (HICs) and LMICs as the ‘North/South divide’, 
arguing that the problem of counterfeit drugs ‘is vastly different in developed nations than it 
is in developing nations’ (Cahoy 2007, p.411). The disproportionate effect of poor-quality 
medicines on LMICs is attributed to slow economic development affecting the demand for 
cheaper medicines, as well as to a lack of awareness of the risks posed by falsified medicines 
or to different perceptions of quality. The literature suggests that this demand for cheaper 
medicines creates an exploitable business opportunity, with the production and supply of 
falsified medicines representing a profitable venture and attracting criminal organizations 
(Chaudhry & Stumpf 2013; Outterson & Smith 2006; Park 2010). Substandard and falsified 
medicines are reportedly sold at a cheaper price through official and unofficial channels after 
being stolen or diverted or produced at a lesser cost. Additionally, in his book on the global 
trafficking of poor-quality medicines, Bate (2012) argues that the price differential between 
genuine and falsified medicines is one of the main reasons why falsified drugs enter a market, 
as illustrated by the case of Russia during the economic crisis of 1997, when the demand for 
cheaper medicines was high.  
High profits on the production of poor-quality medicines is one clear incentive for criminals 
to falsify medicines. These high profit margins may be explained by the fact that counterfeiters 
avoid costs related to research and development activities or licensing, that are normally 
                                                     
23 Parallel trade occurs when governments allow the trade of patented products across borders without 
the permission of the patent holder due to significant price differentials. 
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factored into the innovator brand’s selling price, using cheaper raw ingredients in the 
fabrication process instead (Liang 2006; Dégardin et al. 2014; Park 2010). Dégardin et al. 
(2014) refer to the existence of large pharmaceutical manufacturing hubs in emerging 
economies such as China and India, where the workforce is cheaper and production costs are 
lower, allowing the production of cheaper medicines. It is also suggested that such sites may 
attract counterfeiters who are able to find genuine products in nearby factories as models to 
replicate (Yao 2006; Cahoy 2007), therefore facilitating the production of falsified goods in 
such settings. An additional challenge identified in the literature is new technology, the web, 
and how it facilitates the trade in poor-quality medicines. Cheap medicines made readily 
available online, is a growing global trend that attracts patients particularly in developing 
countries, where most consumers have ready access to the internet (Sipahi et al. 2014).  
3.1.1.3 Consumer perception and awareness of risk 
Various authors allude to a society’s perception and attitude towards counterfeit products as a 
driver of this trade. Understanding the ‘temporal, social and psychological conditions’ that 
influence the consumer, is essential to explaining the determinants of the demand (Bird 2007, 
p. 388). One factor thought to influence consumer’s willingness to buy a counterfeit product 
is the perceived quality (Bigdeli et al. 2012) and the perceived similarity of the counterfeit to 
the genuine product (Bird 2007). This is relevant in the case of fake drugs, as patients that see 
no difference between one or the other, sometimes due to the lack of information about the 
product, and may therefore buy the counterfeit drug – which is likely to be cheaper – out of 
economic necessity. Yao (2006) suggests that consumers, as rational decision makers seeking 
economic benefit, would therefore choose to obtain the same product at a better value, the 
cheaper medicine also more likely to be counterfeit. While such insights are helpful, most 
studies addressing consumers' perceptions focus on LMIC settings and rarely account for 
consumers’ attitudes to poor-quality medicines in HICs.   
Some authors also argue that a general lack of awareness of the risks of purchasing medicines 
from unlicensed outlets, means that the less educated and often poorer communities are the 
primary victims of this trade (Sawminath 2008; Kelesidis and Falagas 2015; Siphali et al. 
2014; Glass 2014; Krech et al. 2014). Additionally, the perceived scarcity or lack of access to 
the genuine product in licensed outlets, provides an additional reason for the consumer to 
purchase it from alternative outlets, even if unlicensed (Eisend and Schuchert-Guler 2006). 
Attitudes and perceptions have a direct influence on consumer behavior towards fake products 
in general, including fake drugs. Patients buying a fake drug may knowingly believe that the 
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harm they incur from the fake product, may be less than the harm incurred from not taking any 
medication (Bird 2007; Gaudiano et al. 2007). Further studies suggest that a higher income 
and higher levels of education have a negative impact on one’s willingness to buy counterfeit 
products (Alfadl et al. 2013). Yao (2006) further argues that by heightening consumer 
awareness, the demand for fake drugs would subside. In a study on the purchase of fake 
Tylenol (a painkiller), however, it was found that neither the perceived legal risk nor the 
societal consequences influence the intent of the participants to buy this counterfeit good (Bird 
2007). This may be explained by the fact that Tylenol is not a lifesaving drug and, thus, the 
consequences incurred if it was not efficacious are considered minimal. 
3.1.2 Health systems issues 
3.1.2.1 Health service delivery and infrastructure  
The literature on poor-quality medicines also demonstrates the need to focus on wider health 
systems strengthening in order to improve access to quality medicines (Newton et al. 2011).  
Access to medicines and medicine quality are two sides of the same coin...The 
problems of poor quality medicines cannot be viewed in isolation, as they are 
enmeshed with many other complex health system problems, especially the 
affordability and accessibility of medicines and the (often limited) capacity of 
Medicine Regulatory Authorities [NRAs] (Newton et al. 2011, p.3)  
The literature argues that weak health systems and drug regulatory capacity fuels the 
circulation of poor-quality medicines. Some argue that weak health service delivery in general 
and poor health infrastructure, may render access to quality pharmaceuticals difficult and 
encourage the trade in poor-quality medicines through alternative channels (Hosseini et al. 
2011). It is suggested that the presence of poorly trained health workers with a lack of vigilance 
or awareness about the origin and quality of medicines they dispense, create risks of poor-
quality medicines going undetected even in the formal, public health sector (Chika et al. 2011; 
Khan, Okumura, et al. 2011). Weak health systems and poor health infrastructure may 
engender a lack of trust in the public health sector (Brhlikova et al. 2011), and encourage 
patients to seek treatment in alternative unlicensed outlets where poor-quality medicines are 
more likely to be found and distributed, thereby encouraging the trade (Bigdeli et al. 2012; 
Liang 2006; Aldhous 2005; Dégardin et al. 2014; Karunamoorthi 2014; Bate 2012; Tipke et 
al. 2008; European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM) 2008).  
 43 
3.1.2.2 Health seeking behaviour 
Individual preferences shaped by socio-cultural constraints influence general health seeking 
behaviour and might further explain why a patient may end up buying a counterfeit drug 
(Bigdeli et al. 2012). This was illustrated by Lalani and colleagues (2015) in the case of 
Afghanistan, where patients seek treatment from the private sector and often purchase 
medicines from private outlets (including unlicensed outlets), where lower regulations mean a 
greater risk of obtaining medicines of poor-quality. The tendency to self-diagnose and self-
medicate could be explained by patients’ higher levels of trust towards friends, relatives and 
neighbors selling medicines, rather doctors and pharmacists (Bird 2007; Alfadl, Ibrahim, et al. 
2013). Patients in more remote areas with no access to a public health facilities or pharmacies, 
may feel more inclined to buy their medication from the local store which might also be selling 
drugs (without a license to do so). Moreover, some authors point to the risks of dispensing 
medicines in plastic bags or as a cocktail of drugs (Yuk et al. 2015; Gaudiano et al. 2007), as 
this removes the possibility to verify the nature and quality of the medicines or its packaging 
and to consult treatment recommendations. Others argue that the irrational use and over-
prescription of medicines may lead to shortages in the public sector, and create a gap in the 
market that counterfeiters can thereafter exploit (Bigdeli et al. 2012; Bate 2012). The literature 
suggests that health-seeking behaviour has an impact on access to medicines, thereby 
favouring the trade in poor-quality drugs. 
3.1.2.3 Capacity and capability of NRAs  
The literature also argues that LMICs are generally faced with a lack of financial and human 
resources to tackle the problem of poor-quality medicines, leading to poor capacity within 
NRAs for the regulation of pharmaceuticals (Karunamoorthi 2014; Aldhous 2005; Ahmed 
2013). Kelesidis and Falagas (2015) argue, for example, that inadequate resources and 
expertise makes it challenging for some NRAs to establish stringent Good Manufacturing 
Practices (GMP) for the domestic pharmaceutical industry. Another consequence of 
inadequate resources within NRAs is the lack of well-equipped national laboratories as 
medicine quality testing facilities24 (Nayyar et al. 2015; Bate et al. 2009). NRAs may also be 
weakened in their operations without the appropriate mandate to carry out random controls, to 
confiscate stocks from unlicensed outlets, to close down illegal outlets, or even to arrest 
presumed counterfeiters (Aldhous 2005; DeKieffer 2006; Caudron et al. 2008; Bigdeli et al. 
                                                     
24 Laboratories are not always ISO 17025 certified, an accreditation which guarantees that the right 
procedures are in place for testing health commodities.  
 44 
2012; Liberman 2012). The lack of resources might also affect their capacity to operate high-
end laboratories and to implement the screening technology required to screen fake drugs (Bate 
et al. 2008; Mukhopadhyay 2007; Johnston & Holt 2014; Lalani et al. 2015; Andreotti 2005; 
P. Newton et al. 2008). Additionally, authors argue that the technology is not up to date, or if 
it is available in the field (such as the hand-held CD3 or the mini-lab scan to test the quality 
medicines) it is unaffordable for NRAs with meagre resources (Marini et al. 2010; Wertheimer 
& Norris 2009). The literature argues therefore that NRAs alone are ill-equiped to tackle a 
problem of this scale.  
3.1.2.4 Complex pharmaceutical supply chains 
Authors acknowledge the complexity of the legitimate drug supply chain and the challenges 
of proliferating unlicensed drug distribution networks (Kelesidis & Falagas 2015; Krech et al. 
2014). It is argued that unlicensed pharmacy outlets (beyond the jurisdiction of the NRAs) are 
most likely to sell poor-quality drugs (knowingly or not). It is through this grey market that 
criminals make most profits on their falsified drug batches (Akinyandenu 2013; Edwards 
2011). Studies add that unlicensed drug outlets are often operated by untrained drug sellers 
who provide vague treatment recommendations, possibly encouraging irrational drug use, and 
who are unaware of the quality or health implications of the products they sell (Erhun et al. 
2001; Foster 1991; Aldhous 2005; Palafox et al. 2014; Bigdeli et al. 2012; Buowari 2012). 
Palafox and colleagues (2014) describe the case of AMLs in Southeast Asia, where unlicensed 
outlets might encourage patients to purchase no-longer recommended Oral Artemisinin 
Monotherapies (oAMTs) as a malaria treatment instead of the recommended ACTs, because 
those are cheaper and still available through informal supply chains. The unregulated 
distribution network fuels the trade in poor-quality medicines as stocks of medicines sold in 
unlicensed outlets are sometimes stolen batches of medicines that could be substandard or 
falsified. As Gaudiano and colleagues (2007) point out, poorer patients have no choice but to 
obtain their medicines from these unlicensed outlets, either for financial reasons or because 
they are constrained by issues of accessibility to licensed outlets.  
As well as physical unlicensed outlets, the literature argues that the rise of unlicensed internet 
pharmacies, adds to the risk of poor-quality medicines infiltrating both the legal and illegal 
supply chains (Dégardin et al. 2014; Ahmed 2013; Smith et al. 2014; Feldschreiber 2009). The 
proliferation of e-pharmacies is a cause for concern, as many are not licensed to sell medicines 
and their stocks are not quality-controlled and could therefore be of poor-quality. The trend of 
buying medicines online is seen as easy, speedy and convenient (EAASM 2008; Sipahi et al. 
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2014). Two studies point to the low cost and time investment for setting up a website and the 
effective e-commerce marketing strategies that make online pharmacies a profitable affair 
(Mackey & Liang 2011; EAASM 2008). Traynor (2010) explains that online pharmacies add 
to the complexity of the supply chain by blurring the source and trajectory of products, and 
selling medicines directly to both patients and healthcare professionals. Moken (2003) cites 
the example of fake Viagra produced in Chinese factories but sold via online wholesalers in 
Nevada and Colorado in 2002. Mackey and Liang (2011) estimate that 96% of online 
pharmacies are unlicensed. It is argued that unregulated online pharmacies are the main vector 
through which poor-quality medicines have reached higher income markets, where consumers 
have regular access to the internet (Liu & Lundin 2016; Kuehn 2013).  
Poorly managed and complex supply chains for medicines increase the health system’s 
‘vulnerability to substitution of diverted products’, providing an outlet for the illicit trade in 
poor-quality medicines (DeKieffer 2006, p.344). The complexity of medicine supply chains 
may also arise from the high number of intermediaries in a typical pharmaceutical supply chain 
(DeKieffer 2006; World Health Organization 1999; Ahmed 2013; Gostin et al. 2013; Khan, 
Okumura, et al. 2011; Young 2004; Christian et al. 2012; Vastag 2003; Palafox et al. 2014). 
A higher number of entry points along the supply chain, allow counterfeiters to infiltrate poor-
quality products or to repackage medicines and replace genuine ones with falsified batches 
(Akinyandenu 2013; Hamburg 2015; Rudolf & Bernstein 2004). At all stages in the production 
and supply chain, from raw material to the patient, products can be stolen or diverted and 
evidence of falsification can be ingested, making it difficult for anyone to pinpoint the fraud 
(DeKieffer 2006; EAASM 2008). Bate (2012) cites the example of Coartem (an AML 
treatment produced by Novartis) batches diverted from the airport in Angola between 2008 
and 2011, leaving 534,000 patients without treatments. DeKieffer (2006) adds that 
counterfeiters can ‘salt’ shipments with their falsified drugs and can easily replace license 
documents while going unnoticed. These complex distribution channels make it difficult to 
identify the source of manufacture of a given product and to verify its quality (Wertheimer & 
Norris 2009; Rudolf & Bernstein 2004).  
Others add that globalisation and the sheer number of brands on the global market, has made 
it even more difficult to know which manufacturers, distributors or products can be trusted 
(Nsimba 2008; Newton, McGready, Fernandez, et al. 2006; Liu & Lundin 2016). The 
increasing complexity of pharmaceutical supply chains are made up of various ‘decision 
points’ which are all arguably susceptible to corruption (Cohen et al. 2007). Corruption in the 
pharmaceutical sector can take the form of forging license documents, diverting donated drugs, 
 46 
or even bribing officials and health professionals (Cockburn et al. 2005; Mackey & Liang 
2012). It is estimated that billions of dollars are lost annually to corruption and fraud in the 
global health sector (Mackey & Liang 2012; Wertheimer & Norris 2009). 
3.2 Challenges of a response to poor-quality medicines  
This literature refers to key legal and regulatory constraints to policy reforms aimed at 
improving access to quality medicines and reducing the circulation of poor-quality ones. These 
legal and regulatory issues pertain to both national and global policy and legal frameworks and 
should be studied in context. A thorough understanding of these challenges, as presented in 
the literature and summarised in this section, is crucial to understanding why the problem of 
poor-quality medicines persists. 
3.2.1 Legal & regulatory challenges  
3.2.1.1 No common definition and an uncoordinated policy response 
The definition of poor-quality medicines has been a cause for debate for over a decade (Fried 
2011; Liberman 2012; Clift 2010). Despite the contributions of various international 
organizations to policy efforts against poor-quality medicines, the global response remains 
fragmented, with no clear leadership (Mackey 2013; Bigdeli et al. 2012; Mackey & Liang 
2013). This, the literature argues, is partly because of the lack of a common definition and 
understanding of poor-quality medicines among these institutions, both in national laws, in 
policies and guidelines for NRAs, or across international institutions (Attaran, Barry, et al. 
2012; Newton, Amin, et al. 2011). Policy actors frame the problem of poor-quality medicines 
differently across national and institutional settings, and this, authors argue, is as an 
impediment to coordinated cross-border action (Newton, Green, et al. 2011; Dégardin et al. 
2014; Alfadl, Ibrahim, et al. 2013; Clift 2010; Park 2010; Bate 2012; Seear 2013; Fried 2011; 
Attaran et al. 2011; Mackey et al. 2015; Worsley & Wong 2013; Newton et al. 2014; DeCola 
2010; Khan, Akazawa, et al. 2011; Glass 2014).  
The literature is also divided on the terminology around poor-quality medicines. For example, 
in an economic study of drug counterfeiting, Cahoy (2007) suggests that one way to avoid 
confusion is to only label ‘counterfeit’ drugs that are produced out of an intentional act of 
deception, and frame others as mere IP infringements. Attaran and colleagues (2011), on the 
other hand, argue that the legal term of ‘falsified’ drugs fits more adequately with cases of 
pharmaceutical crime where the intent to deceive is present, while cases of drug 
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‘counterfeiting’ fit under IP law exclusively. Furthermore, authors note that the notion of 
‘intent to deceive’ mentioned in the legal definition of falsified medicines above and which 
differentiates a criminal act of drug falsification from a trademark infringement is hard to prove 
legally (Hall, Newton, Green, Veij, et al. 2006; Newton, Green, et al. 2011). A clear 
demarcation between falsified and substandard medicines is therefore hard to discern in 
practice25, making it challenging for law and policy makers to devise adequate and robust 
regulatory frameworks, knowing that falsified and substandard cases would require different 
legal and regulatory solutions (Newton, Amin, et al. 2011; Zhang & Zhang 2014). For some 
authors, the lack of a common definition also creates challenges for homogenous data 
collection and information sharing on the global prevalence of poor-quality medicines (World 
Health Organization 2010a; Shah et al. 2015; Glass 2014; Kelesidis & Falagas 2015). 
3.2.1.2 Inadequate laws and policies for the regulation of medicines 
The literature discusses the shortfalls of current national pharmaceutical regulatory 
frameworks, most of which focus primarily on trademark protection and fail to address the 
cross-border organized criminal threat of falsified medicines. As mentioned in the first 
comprehensive WHO report published on the threat of poor-quality medicines (WHO 1999), 
one main challenge to addressing the problem is the general lack of adequate, targeted national 
and international laws and policies to regulate against poor-quality medicines, and the crime 
of medicine falsification in particular. Firstly, it is estimated that only 20% of all WHO 
member states have well-developed pharmaceutical regulatory frameworks (Jack 2012), with 
the remaining 80%, weakened by poor management of the supply chain of pharmaceuticals 
and heightened risks of both substandard and falsified medicines reaching patients. The 
literature argues more specifically that NRA’s capacity to register priority medicines rapidly 
or their pharmacovigilance and post-marketing surveillance capacity, remains weak (Nwokike 
et al. 2013).  
Another viewpoint from the literature is that discrepancies between, as well as within, national 
regulatory frameworks and the lack of cooperation between national stakeholders, are 
detrimental to a policy response to reduce the circulation of poor-quality medicines (Newton, 
McGready, Fernandez, et al. 2006; Shah et al. 2015; World Health Organization 1999; Blouin 
2007; Newton, Green, et al. 2006). Authors imply that cooperation between health policy 
makers, police and customs officials, health professionals, the pharmaceutical industry, and 
                                                     
25 There is undeniably some overlap between falsified and substandard medicines (Seiter 2009) and it 
is essential to consider both in parallel; as ‘poor-quality medicines’.  
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international organizations, is crucial yet not always regular and rarely institutionalised. The 
lack of a systematic and compulsory reporting system is yet another limitation to addressing 
this phenomenon (Cockburn et al. 2005; Newton et al. 2014). To illustrate this point, Newton 
and colleagues (2014) explain that when poor-quality batches of AMLs were seized in Angola 
in 2012, the issue was reported via Facebook to responsible authorities after a 5-month delay. 
Reporting and information sharing mechanisms are deemed essential, and Newton et al. (2014) 
argue that existing mechanisms such as the WHO Rapid Alert System (RAS) should be made 
mandatory in this respect.  
Legal studies addressing the challenge of drug counterfeiting such as those published by 
Rierson (2007) and Rudolf & Bernstein (2004), suggest that current national legal frameworks 
pay more attention to penalizing the counterfeiting of other, more harmful products, such as 
counterfeit tobacco products, over falsified pharmaceuticals. In the few countries where 
penalties against the pharmaceutical crime of medicine falsification do exist, however, these 
are not commensurate to the severity of the crime and are disproportionately low when 
compared to those incurred by narcotics criminals (Akinyandenu 2013; Gautam et al. 2009; 
Hosseini et al. 2011; Chika et al. 2011; Liang 2006). Existing regulatory frameworks offer 
few legal deterrents against the falsification of medicines (Cahoy 2007; Outterson & Smith 
2006; Chaudhry & Stumpf 2013; UNODC 2010; Mackey & Liang 2011; Buowari 2012; 
Nsimba 2008), making it an ‘opportunistic crime’ for which the financial rewards far outweigh 
the risks of prosecution (Interpol et al. 2008; Stevens & Mydin 2013; Gautam et al. 2009). 
Smith and colleagues (2014), in their account of the value of the EU Falsified Medicine 
Directive, add that no national regulatory framework against poor-quality medicines is 
complete without strong laws regulating the sale of medicines online as a rising threat, yet, 
they state that these are scarcely a part of national regulatory frameworks. 
Studies concur that nations cannot tackle the threat of poor-quality medicines in isolation, and 
that inter-sectoral and cross-border cooperation is necessary to address this challenge (WHO 
2010; Foster 1991). Authors add that an adequate policy response would require a shift from 
single to multipolar policy making, and from national to bloc policy level (Caudron et al. 2008; 
Gaudiano et al. 2007; Gastrow 2013). The literature also reports a lack of a coordinated global 
policy response to the issue of poor-quality medicines. Authors argue that no global framework 
to date successfully harnesses the expertise of all key institutions to steer a coordinated global 
policy response against the circulation of poor-quality medicines (Gostin et al. 2013; Mackey 
& Liang 2013). In their study of global efforts against ‘counterfeit’ medicines, Mackey & 
Liang (2011) argue that while the WHO may seem like an obvious global institution to 
 49 
spearhead the fight against falsified medicines, it has been criticized for its inefficiency in 
leading the response against such a complex public health challenge. In his paper on the 
governance of poor-quality medicines, Mackey (2013) reviews the role of key global 
institutions around the problem of ‘counterfeit’ medicines, highlighting the discrepancies of 
WHO’s role in guiding a global response. The same author proposes a new governance 
framework to address this issue, arguing that the UNODC is in the best position to guide policy 
making against the falsification of medicines. Authors note the absence of an international 
legal framework and a treaty to regulate on the issue of poor-quality medicines. They argue 
that this impedes the ability of policy actors to tackle this trend globally and to prosecute 
criminals across borders (Dégardin et al. 2014; Binagwaho et al. 2013; Newton et al. 2014). 
While international institutions to enforce IP laws, such as the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS, 2001), have been in place (Dégardin et al. 
2014), a coordinated response against drug falsification as an organized crime is almost 
nonexistent (Bate 2012; Mackey & Liang 2011).  
3.2.1.3 Complex organised crime 
Various authors point out that medicine falsification is an organized criminal activity of a 
global nature, which is hard to dismantle because it is highly complex, often underground, and 
transcends borders and legal frameworks (Cahoy 2007; United Nations Office for Drugs and 
Crime 2010; Gastrow 2013; Andreotti 2005; Reynolds & McKee 2010; Gillespie & McBride 
2013). Hosseini and colleagues (2011, p.166) illustrate the complexity of these organized 
criminal networks, and describe the case of Iran as a transit country for the narcotics trade and 
the trade of other illegal goods, including falsified medicines. Organized criminal groups have 
taken advantage of the technological advances and rapid methods of communication to run 
their businesses internationally (Dégardin et al. 2014; Ambroise-Thomas 2012; Gautam et al. 
2009; Mackey & Liang 2011). The complexity of these networks makes it hard to track the 
criminals and arrest the culprits. According to the literature, the fact that criminal organizations 
involved in drug counterfeiting may also be linked with the narcotics trade only complicates 
the situation further, by blurring and expanding the supply chain networks for these poor-
quality medicines (Dégardin et al. 2014; Aldhous 2005; Newton et al. 2002; Burns 2006). 
Moreover, it is believed that some groups have direct links with terrorist organizations such as 
Hezbollah or Al Qaeda, which facilitates access to a grey zone (a parallel economy such as the 
‘black market’) (Bate et al. 2008; Liang 2006), where drug falsifiers can go undetected along 
the supply chain (Liu & Lundin 2016).  
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3.2.1.4 Enforcement capacity 
Morris & Stevens (2006) argue that where laws and policies are in place, they are poorly 
enforced. The literatures suggests that the poor capacity of NRAs is one explanation for the 
poor enforcement of pharmaceutical management laws (WHO 1999; Johnston & Holt 2014; 
Yao 2006; Karunamoorthi 2014; Caudron et al. 2008; Kelesidis & Falagas 2015; Krech et al. 
2014; Erhun et al. 2001; Rudolf & Bernstein 2004; Newton et al. 2006; Po 2001; Newton et 
al. 2011). One example cited by Skerrit and colleagues (2014), touches on the issue of poor-
qualiy AMLs as evidence for bans against the production and distribution of oAMTs, are 
ineffectively enforced in the Asia-Pacific region, complicating efforts against unregistered, 
substandard or falsified AMLs in Southeast Asia. Weak rule of law and low prosecution rates 
are also attributed to poor training of the justice personnel, or poorly equipped law enforcement 
units (DeKieffer 2006; Chika et al. 2011). Without a consistently enforced legal framework, 
the prosecution rates remain low and low prosecution means no effective deterrent against 
pharmaceutical crime (Ahmed 2013; Gautam et al. 2009).   
Morris & Stevens (2006) argue that the inability of patients to obtain redress for harmful 
products through civil liability mechanisms, is yet another contributing factor to the circualtion 
of poor-quality medicines, as civil liability clauses could discourage manufacturers from 
selling falsified drugs, or incentivise wholesalers to verify their stocks more thoroughly. 
According to Bate and colleagues (2009), discrepancies in enforcement within national legal 
systems represent a major challenge, as illustrated in the case of India where state regulation 
is often inconsistent with national (central) regulation. This means, for example, that drug 
manufacturers can seek registration in any Indian state where law enforcement is weaker. 
Bikoff et al. (2015) add that this discrepancy between central and federal enforcement, makes 
tackling a crime that respects no borders a difficult task. Various authors also point to the 
unfair consequences of double standards in drug export regulation, whereby products produced 
locally but intended for export are subject to a less stringent set of quality checks compared to 
drugs produced for local consumption (Chika et al. 2011; Caudron et al. 2008; Dégardin et al. 
2014). This allows potentially poor-quality batches of medicines to reach countries with 
weaker regulatory systems without being detected.  
3.2.1.5 Politics and vested interests 
The literature argues that challenges linked to enforcing existing laws and policies, may be 
linked to the wider political system and the lack of accountability mechanisms, as well as 
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instances of corruption (Dyer 2014). The circulation of poor-quality medicines is a politically 
sensitive issue (Dégardin et al. 2014), and the literature suggests that weak regulation could 
be attributed to a general lack of political will, due to vested interests in the manufacturing or 
distribution of these medicines (Jack 2012; Burns 2006; Chika et al. 2011). Authors argue that 
governments have knowingly refused to act against counterfeiters out of ‘willful ignorance’ 
(Bate et al. 2008; Andreotti 2005), or for fear of seeing their country’s reputation ‘tarnished’ 
by the public discovery and announcement of substandard drugs in their markets (Po 2001; 
Bate 2012; Cockburn et al. 2005).  
Newton and colleagues (2014) suggest, however, that it seems illogical at whatever stage of 
national development not to prioritize stringent controls on costly products, such as 
pharmaceuticals that are so crucial to the welfare and the productivity of a population. The 
literature also argues that despite acknowledging the global challenges posed by poor-quality 
medicines, national stakeholders sometimes fail to recognize their responsibility towards the 
problem of poor-quality medicines (Sipahi et al. 2014; Amon 2008). Some may not 
acknowledge that the circulation of poor-quality medicines could be due to weak national 
pharmaceutical regulatory capacity within their borders, and instead shift the blame to 
neighbouring nations (Bate 2012). Besides a lack of political will to recognize part of their 
blame in this cross-border problem, policy makers and law enforcement officials may have 
direct vested interests in this trade, impeding the successful enforcement of existing laws 
(Akinyandenu 2013; Swaminath 2008; Bate 2012; Aldhous 2005; Bird 2007; DeKieffer 2006; 
WHO 1999).  
Bigdeli et al. (2012) and Mackey & Liang (2012) add that in countries where public 
accountability is low and the social policy sector is not a priority, corruption can have an 
important impact on access to health services and medicines. Akinyandenu (2013) illustrates 
this point with the case of Nigeria, where corruption allows for the manipulation of regulatory 
procedures. Stevens and Mydin (2013) point to the difficulty of dealing with corruption, 
whereby more stringent penalties on drug counterfeiting could drive illegal activities further 
underground and encourage criminal groups to ‘infiltrate law-enforcement agencies’ for 
protection. Various authors refer to the case of China and explain that local government 
officials have been known to shelter such illegal activities under their watch, sometimes with 
the support of the People’s Liberation Army in China, using their hospitals as distribution 
outlets for the falsified drugs (Lewis 2009; Bate et al. 2008; Zimmerman et al. 2014). Bird 
(2007) encourages us to look at the bigger picture however – illustrating that counterfeiting in 
China also represents an important source of employment in certain communities, which might 
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explain why efforts to enforce laws against these criminals are weak. Corruption and vested 
interest also act as a barrier to policy reforms to address the circulation of both substandard 
and falsified medicines. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework for further research  
The literature on poor-quality medicines represents an eclectic mix of studies from different 
disciplines that provide insights on the drivers, determinants and key concerns around this 
illicit trade. Through these combined insights, I note the complexity of what has been 
recognised as a global public health policy issue, and the emergence and development of the 
debate on ‘access to medicines’ as a policy goal. Based on this review, I reflect on the policy 
goal of improving access to quality medicines and how the themes described above can inform 
a conceptual framework for further research on the problem of poor-quality medicines as a 
public health concern. The list of themes emerging from the literature demonstrates the 
importance of considering health systems constraints, including health infrastructure and 
health seeking behaviour, as well as the socio-cultural fabric and political economy, to fully 
apprehend the complexity of the problem of poor-quality medicines in context. The literature 
also develops on the ATM framework first introduced into the policy debate by the WHO in 
2000, to encompass more dimensions of access. Bigdeli et al. (2012) suggest that the main 
limitations of previous ATM frameworks26 is that they were too linear, limited to supply chain 
constraints and focused solely on the pharmaceutical product rather than the patient. In 
response, Bigdeli et al. (2012) introduce a more dynamic ATM Framework, which 
incorporates a health systems approach to improving access for all patients (see Figure 3 
below). 
                                                     
26 Such as the WHO-MSH (2000), the WHO (2004) and the Frost and Reich (2008). 
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Figure 3 ATM from a health systems perspective (by Bigdeli et al. 2012) 
This revised ‘ATM from a health systems perspective’ framework, reflects the complexity of 
considerations around ATM and the interaction between all systems constraints related to 
accessing medicines. The framework they propose includes five levels of constraints that 
impact access to quality medicines and reflects the dynamics of a systems approach to ATM, 
within which these constraints are inter-connected across the national, regional and global 
levels. While previous ATM frameworks acknowledged the role of international actors (e.g., 
in the ‘Architecture’ of ATM by Frost and Reich (2008)), Bigdeli and colleagues’ framework 
goes a step further to recognize the impact of legal and regulatory constraints and the nature 
of national politics, as well as the influence of international donor agendas. It addresses the 
impact of the international and national economic landscape on access to medicines; referring, 
for example, to the challenge of globalization and the impact of economic development on 
ATM. Their framework also considers socio-cultural constraints affecting health systems 
(under ‘individuals and communities’), such as health seeking behaviour. This framework 
recognises poor-quality medicines as a wider public health concern that can only be addressed 
by strengthening the health system at large.  
The themes emerging from the literature review describing the determinants and challenges of 
the trade in poor-quality medicines, can be conceptualised within this ATM framework. For 
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this thesis, I have adapted and simplified Bigdeli and colleagues’ (2012) framework to 
encompass these themes (see Figure 4 page 54). The conceptual ATM framework proposed 
below offers a dynamic approach to understanding the problem of poor-quality medicines, in 
which I consider the national and global/regional context and its influence on the policy 
response to the problem of substandard and falsified medicines. This conceptual framework 
suggests that the supply and delivery elements impacting access (the 4As) should be 
considered within the wider health systems constraints, the health service delivery and health 
system architecture of a country. These health systems constraints are represented in the central 
black-coloured box as an inherent part of the national context. In light grey, I include the 
determinants and challenges related to access; the economic drivers (including pharmaceutical 
industry interests, globalisation and trade) that impact both the political context; as well as the 
socio-cultural factors that inform our understanding of the national context and explain the 
social constraints related to health service delivery. The legal and regulatory challenges to a 
policy response are also encompassed within this framework, and occur both at the global and 
the national levels. 
 
Figure 4 Access to Medicines Conceptual Framework 
This conceptual ATM framework provides a systematic approach to understanding a complex 
phenomenon (the policy problem of poor-quality medicines) in context. It encourages a 
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reflection on all thematic elements contributing to the policy problem, while considering the 
nature of national politics and the socio-economic context of the country or region under study. 
An effective policy response to poor-quality medicines starts with a thorough understanding 
of the economic drivers, social practices and cultural factors that might impact the supply and 
demand for cheaper medicines, as well as the health systems constraints that impact the supply 
and delivery of quality pharmaceuticals and allow for poor-quality medicines to circulate. This 
conceptual framework informs the analytical approach for this thesis, which is aimed at 
addressing some of the main gaps in the literature that are outlined in the next section. 
3.4 Research gaps 
Four main observations can be made concerning the research gaps around the problem of poor-
quality medicines. Firstly, despite noting the widespread disagreements on the definition of 
the problem of poor-quality medicines, there is a need for further research to understand how 
the problem is framed among policy actors. Secondly, there is an apparent lack of empirical 
research anchored in social sciences to explain interpretations of the policy problem of poor-
quality medicines as well as to explain variations in policy pathways of response to improve 
access to quality medicines. Third, there is a need for comparative analyses of frames across 
borders to explain the challenges and opportunities for cross-border cooperation against poor-
quality medicines. Finally, few studies have explored the problem of poor-quality medicines 
in an LMIC context, despite noting the disproportionate consequences of their circulation 
among vulnerable populations. This calls for further research on the problem of poor-quality 
medicines across LMIC settings.  
3.4.1 Framing the problem of poor-quality medicines 
Over half of the studies reviewed suggest that the lack of an agreed upon definition of the 
problem of poor-quality medicines is the main challenge to a coordinated policy response. The 
literature highlights the difficulty of differentiating between falsified and substandard 
medicines and proving the notion of ‘intent’ to guide policy response. For this reason, this 
thesis looks at both substandard and falsified drugs to understand the problem of poor-quality 
medicines all together. Beyond the choice of terminology, however, no studies explore the 
relationship between variations in perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines among 
policy actors and the variations in policy developments. The literature suggests that context 
and social norms impact stakeholders’ understandings of what constitutes ‘poor quality’ 
(Alfadl, Hassali, et al. 2013). However, few studies to date have explored policy actors’ 
perceptions of the problem across policy sectors and national settings. A few single-country 
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studies have previously explored global consumers’ opinions of falsified medicines, as did 
Bird (2007) through an economic lens. Others have explored opinions of health care 
professionals (Ahmed 2013) or manufacturers and wholesalers (Khan et al. 2011) on the 
problem of poor-quality medicines. Finally, two single country studies on Sudan (Alfadl et al. 
2013) and Nigeria (Erhun et al. 2001) explore a range of stakeholders’ understandings, of the 
drivers and determinants of the illicit trade in poor-quality medicines and include policy actors 
in the sample of respondents. Neither of the two studies, however, offer an analysis of how 
policy actors’ perceptions vary across institutional and national settings, and how these 
perceptions might affect policy coherence. Understanding variations in how the phenomenon 
is perceived across institutions and national settings can explain policy choices and variations 
in policy pathways of response.  
Definitions of poor-quality medicines are seen as inherently socially constructed and it is 
implied that perceptions of the problem are likely to vary across institutional networks and 
across national borders. To understand the nature of these social constructions, empirical 
qualitative research into how the policy issue is framed is deemed appropriate. This justifies a 
closer examination of how policy actors present the issue, the factors they prioritize in their 
descriptions and the main challenges they identify over others – all of which provide some 
indication of their perception of this phenomenon.  
3.4.2 Empirical research: analysing frames and policies process in context 
The studies reviewed in this thesis are largely informed by a normative stance (Fried 2011; 
Caudron et al. 2008; Reynolds & McKee 2010; Wertheimer & Norris 2009; Christian et al. 
2012; Dégardin et al. 2014; Glass 2014; Seear 2013). They provide a general delineation of 
the contributing factors to this trade, without providing in-depth accounts of this multi-faceted 
policy challenge and detailing why it persists in specific contexts through empirical research 
(Dégardin et al. 2014; Wertheimer & Norris 2009; Fried 2011; Caudron et al. 2008). Although 
these normative contributions are crucial to raise awareness among academia and policy actors 
about this health policy issue, there is a lack of in-depth empirical qualitative research on the 
topic (Liu & Lundin 2016). Many studies also review the scientific evidence on the prevalence 
of poor-quality medicines. However, there are few studies from a social sciences perspective 
that explore the determinants (economic, social, political and legal) of the problem of poor-
quality medicines, in a given national or regional context (Karunamoorthi 2014; Christian et 
al. 2012; Kelesidis et al. 2007).  
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While the literature refers to numerous legal and regulatory challenges at the policy response 
against poor-quality medicines, few studies explore the national, regional and global policy 
efforts currently in effect to address this policy problem, or provide a thorough context-based 
analysis of where the policy and regulatory gaps might lie to address a public health challenge 
that is inherently transnational. Several single-country studies acknowledge regulatory 
shortfalls (Erhun et al. 2001; Krech et al. 2014), but none of the reviewed papers provide an 
in-depth analysis of these regulatory challenges. Additionally, the few single-country studies 
that partly analyse policy responses to reduce the circulation of poor-quality medicines, do not 
do so from a social sciences perspective (Krech et al. 2014; Erhun et al. 2001; Moken 2003; 
Abdoulaye et al. 2006; Rudolf & Bernstein 2004). More empirical research from a social 
sciences perspective is required to explain policy developments against the challenges posed 
by poor-quality medicines. 
3.4.3 Comparing frames and policy processes across borders 
Authors concur that cross-sectoral and cross-border coordination is essential to addressing a 
cross-border phenomenon exacerbated by trade liberalization (Bigdeli et al. 2012; Gastrow 
2013; Yao 2006; Dégardin et al. 2014; Newton et al. 2014; Seear 2013). Regardless, none of 
the studies reviewed in this chapter offer comparative observations of how the problem is 
understood across countries. More empirical research is required to compare variations in how 
this policy issue is understood among policy actors. Further investigation is also required on 
policy developments across national settings and to explain the challenges and opportunities 
for more systematic policy coordination across countries. Christian and colleagues (2012) 
provide a brief overview of regulatory challenges in six LMICs and emerging economies; 
however, none of the studies reviewed offer an in-depth comparative multi-country analysis 
of frames and policy processes. More specifically, there has not yet been a comparative 
analysis of frames and policy processes in a regional context where cross-border circulation 
of poor-quality medicines is an immediate challenge. This supports the choice of case study 
for this thesis, in which I compare understandings of the policy problem and the development 
of a policy response to poor-quality medicines in three countries that share borders and belong 
to a common regional construct – the GMS.  
3.4.4 In context: poor-quality medicines in LMICs 
Few of the studies reviewed explore the problem of poor-quality medicines in LMICs. Results 
suggest a lack of empirical research on the problem of poor-quality medicines in LMIC 
settings. Authors do note the asymmetrical impact of the poor-quality drug trade on LMICs 
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vs. HICs, arguing that it perpetuates the cycle of poverty in resource-poor settings, due to 
higher rates of illiteracy or to general information asymmetries (Christian et al. 2012; Khan, 
Okumura, et al. 2011; Sipahi et al. 2014; DeKieffer 2006; Karunamoorthi 2014; Ahmed 2013; 
Bird 2007). Despite these insights, the studies reviewed provide little understanding as to 
whether the drivers and determinants summarized in this review are valid across LMIC 
settings, and how these might vary depending on their level of infrastructure and economic 
status. Further empirical research on the problem of poor-quality medicines in different LMICs 
and how the problem is perceived in these settings, could enhance our understanding of this 
asymmetrical impact. Interestingly, the literature discusses the relation between the high price 
of authentic medicines, the attraction it creates for counterfeiters in view of high profit margins 
(Chika et al. 2011), and the demand this engenders for cheaper alternatives in LMICs 
(Kelesidis & Falagas 2015). However, few authors discuss the reasons why essential 
medicines available for free or at a subsidized price in LMIC health facilities or generic 
medicines, are also at risk of being falsified. More empirical research is required to understand 
these links, and, to do so, this thesis explores the case of antimalarial medicines (AMLs) in 
three specific national contexts: Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. 
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Chapter 4 Analytical Framework  
In this first section, I detail how the themes that emerged from the literature review and the 
conceptual framework introduced in Chapter 3, inform the analytical approach employed in 
this study. Empirical research allows for the exploration of policy actors’ interpretations of 
policy issues across national contexts. In this thesis, I adopt a framing analysis approach to 
depict actors’ interpretations of the policy problem of poor-quality medicines, their 
understanding of its determinants and how these may shape policy outcomes. Framing analysis 
facilitates a process of interpretation of policy actors’ perceptions and explores the cognitive 
basis for policy decisions and actions (Druckman 2004). Studying frames helps the researcher 
in social sciences and health policy understand and explain the underlying role of ideas in 
refocusing the debate on a policy issue and subsequently in shaping the response to that issue 
(Medrano 2003).  
I start with an introduction on the role of ‘ideas’ in shaping interpretations of policy problems 
and in shaping policy responses. I then define what is meant by ‘frame’ and introduce the 
framing analysis approach. Subsequently, I explore the interpretation of frames within a policy 
context, the role of policy actors in the promotion of one frame over another, and how certain 
frames are more salient than others. Finally, I explain the value of conducting a comparative 
study highlighting similarities and differences in the use of frames, across policy communities 
and across national settings, to explain variations in policy developments and the potential for 
cross-border policy coordination. 
4.1 Ideas in policy: the role of frames 
Politics itself is a ‘struggle of ideas’ (Stone 2001, p.11) and the basis of the analytical 
framework for this thesis rests on the assumption that ideas influence policy making processes. 
I borrow elements from social constructivism and, in particular, the premise that policy actors’ 
perceptions, policy decisions and their actions are shaped by ideas and social interactions 
rather than exclusively material interests (Wendt 1999; Ruggie 1998; Klotz & Lynch 1999; 
Béland & Cox 2011; Gofas & Hay 2010). Craig Parsons (2002, p.48) defines ideas as 
‘subjective claims about descriptions of the world, causal relationships, or the normative 
legitimacy of certain actions’. 
Social constructivists also argue that policy change is not exclusively driven by a top-down 
decision-making approach but instead by a dynamic exchange of ideas, extending the analysis 
of the role of ideas beyond the state-centric approach. It is the ideas of a variety of policy 
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actors, with influence on the policy process but not necessarily with executive decision-
making power that shape policy processes, rather than the ideas of policy makers alone. For 
example, non-government policy actors that work closely with policy makers are part of a 
policy community whose ideas may also influence the policy making process. Constructivists 
within the discipline of International Relations add that ideas are inherently dynamic and in 
constant evolution (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Wunderlich 2013), leading to continuous 
policy change. The dynamic and context-dependent nature of ideas means that they not only 
vary across time, but also between policy communities and across national settings (Wendt 
1987; Ruggie 1998). This study therefore explores interpretations of the policy problem of 
poor-quality medicines among policy actors, within different institutions and across countries.  
Considering the importance of the role of ideas in policy making, I adopt an interpretive 
approach to framing and policy analysis, one which focuses on analysing policy actors’ ideas 
or varying interpretations of policy problems and policy solutions as influenced by their values, 
beliefs and experiences (Yanow 1996; Fischer & Forester 1993; Fischer & Gottweis 2012). I 
examine the ideas on which policy actors’ understanding of the policy issue of poor-quality 
medicines are based, and analyse how these ideas are subsequently communicated within the 
policy realm (Fischer 2003; Yanow 1996).  
4.1.1 Frames as policy ideas  
The concept of frames was initially developed in the field of sociology by Erving Goffman 
(1974). The principal claim of this approach is that any interpretation of a social situation is 
built on actors’ experiences or, in other words, their subjective interpretation of events 
(Goffman 1974). A frame is a device used to convey a specific idea or understanding of an 
issue or event; it is an expression of both an actor’s interests and identity (Payne 2001, p.39; 
Barnett 1999, p.25). It is therefore a way of interpreting information and making sense of a 
complex reality (Entman 1993) and a way of ‘packaging and positioning an issue so that it 
conveys a certain meaning’ to a policy problem (Menashe & Siegel 1998, p.310).  
Frames are formed along pre-established sets of values and cultural concepts, also referred to 
as core principles (Fischer 2003; Iyengar 1991; Parkhurst 2012) or as ‘ideational paradigms’ 
(Rushton & Williams 2012). As Kathryn Sikkink argues, frames should be interpreted as part 
of an ideational context shaped by history: ‘new ideas do not enter an ideological vacuum. 
They are inserted into a political space already occupied by historically formed ideologies’ 
(Sikkink 1991, p.2). Frames may, for example, rest on wider global norms, such as the human 
rights norms. A norm may act as the core principle influencing policy actors’ interpretations 
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of reality, which in turn influence the policy process. The international norm against racial 
discrimination, for example, encouraged policy actors within the African National Congress 
to frame their interpretation of events in a segregated South Africa in the 1980s with the aim 
of advocating against apartheid (Klotz 1995). Payne (2001, p.39) explicitly draws the link 
between frames and norms arguing that frames are the ‘building blocks’ that promote the 
adoption or rejection of a norm. Norms are in turn reinforced by shared conceptions of a 
problem in line with policy actors’ beliefs and cultural preconceptions (Finnemore & Sikkink 
1998, p.894). Actors’ interpretations of a policy problem, therefore, can be seen as ‘cognitive 
frames’ (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p.897) built around a norm or a core principle, as well 
as on the experiences of a policy actor. 
4.1.2 Framing as a policy act 
Framing is the act of applying, reviewing, contesting, or aligning varying subjective 
interpretations of a problem in a dynamic fashion (van Hulst & Yanow 2016). Frames 
essentially set the parameters of a public policy debate (Nixon et al. 2015). The process of 
framing affects policy development in that it prioritises one interpretation of a policy issue 
over another. For example, actors may attribute blame or responsibly for the issue in a selective 
way, and therefore advocate for particular solutions to the policy problem (Iyengar 1991; Stone 
1989). The act of framing therefore cannot be dissociated from politics and framing is 
essentially a ‘political act’ (Hawkins & Holden 2013). Schön & Rein (1994, p.23) explain that 
frames are ‘structures of belief, perception and appreciation that underline policy positions’, 
highlighting the link between framing and policy development. Gusfield (1991) and Jasanoff 
(2005) explain how the problem of road accidents was re-framed in the United States in the 
1970s, leading to policy change. Road accidents were re-framed as a problem linked to drunk 
driving, prompting policy reforms to penalise drunk driving, alongside policies requiring 
obligatory use of seatbelts. Framing analysis therefore can provide insights into how 
stakeholders conceptualize a policy problem, and how their interpretations of the problem 
influences political will and subsequently shapes policy response.  
4.1.3 Frames in global health policy  
As demonstrated in their literature review of framing studies in public health literature, Koon 
and colleagues (2016) re-iterate that while frames do influence policy, few studies have 
analysed the influence of framing on health policy processes, especially in low and middle 
income countries (LMICs) (Koon et al. 2016; Parkhurst 2012). Framing analysis is useful to 
gain a better understanding of complex challenges in policy making, including in global health 
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policy (McInnes & Lee 2012a). For example, previous studies have explored the use of 
particular frames to interpret and define global health policy issues, such as pandemic 
influenza, HIV/AIDS or antimicrobial resistance (McInnes et al. 2012; Kamradt-Scott & 
McInnes 2012; Woodling et al. 2012; Reubi 2012). McInnes & Lee (2012) introduce these 
global health frames, all of which are applied to different global health policy issues, in 
subsequent articles of the same Global Public Health volume (Woodling et al. 2012; Rushton 
2012; Kamradt-Scott & McInnes 2012; Reubi 2012; McInnes et al. 2012; Williams 2012). 
Authors of this volume introduced the evidence-based medicine frame, the economics, 
development, human rights, and the security frames.  
The evidence-based medicine frame has been widely used in health policy to justify policy 
change, as medical decisions and quantitative data (such as mortality and morbidity rates) are 
seen as ‘neutral’ and more trustworthy (Parkhurst 2012). Another example is the emergence 
of global health security as a concept, and subsequently as a frame for infectious disease threats 
such as H1N1, H5N1 and SARS, which has served to gather financial and human resources, 
and to encourage cross-border coordination to tackle infectious disease pandemics. Framing 
the problem of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in terms of global health security, for example, 
may raise the issue to the highest political agenda and encourage cross-border cooperation. 
While framing AMR solely as a medical issue, with an emphasis on clinical evidence, may 
fail to harness political will for a coordinated response and to allocate resources to improving 
the rational use of antimicrobials within borders. Frames in global health have served to alter 
what communities perceive as a risk to national or international health. As another example, 
HIV/AIDS has been successfully framed as a global health priority, raising the importance of 
a coordinated response to HIV/AIDS on the global health agenda. This resulted in over a third 
of all major international funding for health in the 2000s being directed towards efforts against 
HIV/AIDS, despite the fact that the disease only accounted for around 5% of worldwide 
mortality and morbidity (Shiffman 2009; Lopez et al. 2006). Keeping an issue on the agenda 
can be crucial, for example in the case of malaria, to counter dwindling financial and human 
resources directed towards the disease and to ensure continuous support for efforts towards 
malaria elimination, and to prevent resurgence in the areas in which the disease is still endemic 
or where drug-resistant malaria is a concern. 
In this study, I refer to six global health frames used to discuss the health policy problem of 
poor-quality medicines, as summarised below (see Table 3 page 65). This list of frames was 
initially developed to reflect the themes that emerged from the literature review on the debate 
around the problem of poor-quality medicines, and refined according to the previously 
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identified global health frames in literature on framing analysis in global health policy 
(McInnes & Lee 2012a). It was then adjusted iteratively, during the analysis of the data 
collected. The frames listed are discernible from the accounts of all policy actors interviewed 
for this thesis.  
I refer to the evidence-based medicine frame as the medical frame in this research. I use the 
security frame as introduced in the literature on global health frames. I combine the economic 
and development frames to encompass all economic determinants of the trade in poor-quality 
medicines in LMICs: from issues of demand and supply to the price of medicines and the 
challenge of poverty. As we have seen in Chapter 3, the political context was deemed an 
important determinant of the trade in poor-quality medicines, as well as the legal and 
regulatory capacity of nations to monitor pharmaceutical supply chains. Issues relating to laws 
and policy frameworks are encompassed under the regulatory frame, while issues of vested 
interests, political power struggles or lack of transparency are encompassed under the political 
frame. As noted in the conceptual framework, issues around access to medicines as a 
component of the right to health are analysed in the wider context of health systems to reflect 
on the health infrastructure and the provision of health services and commodities in a given 
context. In this study, I use the health systems frame which encompasses components of the 
human rights frame as proposed in the literature on global health frames. This categorisation 
was decided iteratively based on observations from the data. None of the respondents 
interviewed framed the problem of poor-quality medicines as a human rights concern per se. 
There were no explicit references to human rights law or to the right to health during the 
interviews. Instead, respondents referred to challenges to access to medicines for vulnerable 
populations with respect to broader health systems constraints – including poor health 
infrastructure and service delivery and poor accessibility to health services and health products 
in remote and rural areas. While acknowledging the problem of access to medicines under the 
health systems frame, the human rights frame specifically did not emerge from the results of 
this study. This finding is not entirely surprising as the right to health has been gradually 
understood as “strengthening health systems”, and in return, the “building blocks” to a 
functioning health system relate to the determinants of health that are necessary to achieving 
the highest attainable standard of health (Hunt & Backman 2008).  For this reason, the ‘health 
systems frame’ in this study encompasses components that have been included under a human 
rights frame in previous framing analysis studies, including accessibility to services and 
commodities for all. I also note here that the socio-cultural determinants of the problem of 
poor-quality medicines was not a dominant frame in policy actors’ response and as such is not 
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included in this list. However, socio-cultural practices, beliefs and behaviours were considered 
throughout data analysis. 
Frame Description 
Medical 
References to evidence-based medicine or evidence of disease burden 
as influencing policy decisions; bio-medical data to highlight the 
danger to the health of patients, or other quantitative data such as 
prevalence rates, etc. This frame has been previously used to inform 
policy responses against the influenza epidemic (Kamradt-Scott 2012) 
and by anti-tobacco activists to promote tobacco control policies 
(Reubi 2012).  
In relation to poor-quality medicines, this frame encompasses issues 
around drug efficacy, drug resistance and the medical consequences of 
using drugs of susbtandard quality. 
Security 
References to the integrity of the state and protection of populations. 
This frame has been used to raise pandemic influenza on the global 
policy agenda (Kamradt-Scott & McInnes 2012) or to define 
HIV/AIDS (Rushton 2012) as a security threat, encouraging the cross-
border coordination of policy responses.  
In relation to poor-quality medicines, this frame refers to the threat to 
national security, concerns for the territorial integrity and matieral 
interests of the state, or to the threat to the wellbeing of a population. It 
also encompasses references to regional or global security threat; a 
phenomenon that extends beyond national borders.  
Economic 
References to trade interests and globalisation, as well as the impact on 
economic development. The economic frame is also used in the 
promotion of tobacco control policies to highlight the economic costs 
of smoking for the nation (Reubi 2012).  
In relation to poor-quality medicines, this frame encompasses issues 
around demand and supply, the lucrative nature of drug falsification as 
an activity. It is considered a dominant frame in the debate around the 
protection of intellectual property rights and patenting in support of 
drug development. 
Health Systems 
References to the health infrastructure, the organisation of people and 
resources to deliver health services and commodities to meet the 
population’s health needs. The health systems frame for this thesis 
encompasses principles of equity and universal health coverage for all. 
In relation to the problem of poor-quality, this frame encompasses the 
ATM debate around making affordable, generic medicines more 
widely available to improve access to quality medicines for all. It also 
encompasses issues around the procurement and distribution of 
medicines (Bigdeli et al. 2012; Frost & Reich 2008). 
Political References to political culture, corruption or vested interests – all of 
which can have a negative impact on the implementation and 
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enforcement of rules and regulations and lead to the inequitable 
distribution of resources (Mackey & Liang 2012). 
In relation to poor-quality medicines, this frame encompasses cases of 
vested interests from government officials in the production and 
distribution of substandard or falsified medicines. It can also refer to 
the untransparent management of procurement funds or of politically-
sensitive data on poor-quality medicines. 
Regulatory 
References to laws, policies and governance mechanisms in place to 
address health policy issues. 
In relation to poor-quality medicines, this frame encompasses the status 
of national medicine regulatory frameworks and how adapted these are 
to a complex, trans-border nature of this health policy problem. This 
frame also encompasses government’s capacity and capability to 
regulate in terms of the resources available to implement and enforce 
laws and policies (Attaran 2015b; Bate et al. 2012; Nayyar et al. 2015).  
Table 3 Description of the six health policy frames used in this study 
More than one of these frames can apply to the same global health issue (McInnes & Lee 
2012). In this thesis, I analyse policy actors’ perception of the health policy problem posed by 
poor-quality medicines in the national and regional context of the GMS. I juxtapose their 
responses against the six frames summarised above and evaluate which ones are more 
dominant across national settings and across categories of respondents. A systematic analysis 
of these six frames across three national settings allows for the comparison of variations in 
how the policy problem is interpreted across national settings, and what the implications of 
these variations are for cross-border policy coordination. 
4.1.4 What makes a frame successful 
Some frames are more salient than others – they resonate better with policy actors and shape 
policy responses, with a higher success at placing a given health policy issue on the agenda. 
McInnes & Lee (2012) propose the following criteria for evaluating the success of a frame: 
they assert that firstly, the power and authority of the policy actor is what makes one frame 
dominant over another (Shiffman & Smith 2007; Rushton 2012; McInnes & Lee 2012a). 
Rushton (2012) highlights the pivotal role of civil society organisations in the global debate 
over HIV-related travel restrictions. The power and authority of a policy actor depends on his 
or her position within policy communities, the notoriety of the individual, or the strength of 
the guiding institution in which he or she operates (Shiffman & Smith 2007). The second 
element is the ability for a frame to draw on the material world (McInnes & Lee 2012a); to 
refer to events and specific developments in the global realm or in society (for example, the 
Ebola Virus epidemic). The third element relates to the (socio economic or political) context 
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in which a frame is introduced and how receptive an audience is to that frame (McInnes & Lee 
2012a). McInnes & Lee (2012) refer to a study by Kamradt-Scott & McInnes (2012), which 
argues that the security frame around pandemic influenza was only successful after the end of 
the cold war, when the political audience became less concerned with security matters related 
to nuclear proliferation and more receptive to the problem the health threat of influenza. 
Shiffman & Smith (2007a) add that the nature of political contexts in which a frame is 
promoted matters, that is, the governance structure of the political environment and the 
opportunities for policy change that develop in favour or against a frame.  
McInnes & Lee (2012) add that a frame is sometimes only successful after a ‘tipping point’ 
leading to its acceptance. They cite Rushton (2012), whose study of travel-restrictions on HIV 
positive individuals suggests that the change of policy in the US against these travel restrictions 
was a tipping point to convince other nations of the validity of the human rights frame 
advocating against these restrictions. Finally, a frame only becomes dominant if it is able to 
adapt to changing contexts over time (McInnes & Lee 2012a). A flexible frame can draw on 
multiple material events and to leverage different audiences at once.  
Beyond the criteria of a successful frame proposed by McInnes and Lee, Menashe & Siegel 
(1998) explain that frames becomes dominant when they rest on core principles that resonate 
well among policy communities such as fairness, equity, autonomy, freedom or the protection 
of human rights. Additionally, a frame may be successful because of the issue characteristics 
of the problem it presents; either the severity of the problem, or the plausibility of the policy 
solutions proposed in this frame (Shiffman & Smith 2007). Shiffman (2009) encourages a 
more systematic use of framing analysis to understand why certain interpretations of a policy 
problem prevail over others. For this reason, I conduct an analysis of frames used by policy 
actors on the problem of poor-quality medicines, with the help of a dynamic model of policy 
analysis, as will be introduced in the following section (4.2) of this chapter. The success of 
one problem definition over another therefore depends on all the elements introduced above. 
These elements are explored throughout this chapter when reflecting on the role of policy 
actors (section 4.2.2), on the policy context (section 4.2.3), and on processes of frame 
alignment (section 4.2.4).  
4.2 Framing analysis and policy development 
In this thesis, I analyse variations of frames used by policy actors and their implications for 
policy development. I adopt an interpretive policy analysis approach which focuses on ‘the 
construction of social reality and the symbolic use of language within policy debates’ 
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(Hawkins & Holden 2013; Edelman 1988). This entails a reflection on how frames shape 
policy processes (Hawkins & Holden 2013) and necessitates a preliminary understanding of 
the policy context in which these frames are being promoted. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
(1993) introduce three stages to guide policy analysis, from problem identification, to policy 
formulation and, subsequently, policy implementation. The stages approach is useful as a 
heuristic tool to guide the analytical process along the phases of policy making. However, the 
policy process is better described as cyclical rather than linear (Fischer et al. 2007) and as a 
dynamic process where the problem definition becomes part of the policy solution, and the 
outcome of policy implementation will subsequently contribute to the redefinition of that 
problem, feeding back in the policy cycle in a continuous loop (Parsons 1995). 
In this thesis, I study the processes through which ‘frames emerge and are maintained’ 
(Hawkins and Holden 2003) or in other words, the process of issue formation. The policy 
process is understood here as ‘the way in which policies are initiated, developed or formulated, 
negotiated, communicated, implemented and evaluated’ (Buse et al. 2005, p.4). For this thesis, 
I borrow elements from the policy triangle model (Walt & Gilson 1994) and the multiple 
streams model (Kingdon 1984; Kingdon 1995) to reflect on the role of framing in policy 
making. Throughout the analysis of frames, I reflect on the policy process around the goal of 
improving access to quality medicines. Weible et al. (2012, p.3) explain that studying the 
policy process involves studying ‘the development of public policy over time and the context, 
events and individuals surrounding this development’. I therefore reflect on four elements of 
the policy process introduced by Walt & Gilson (1994), namely: the content of the policy 
problem; the role of actors; the policy context; and the policy process – as outlined in the 
diagram below. The multiple streams model (Kingdon 1984; Kingdon 1995) provides further 
insights into how a particular policy issue reaches the policy agenda and focuses specifically 
on policy issue formation and definition. This model helps us understand how policy issues 
come to the attention of policy actors (Kingdon 1984). It consists of three main streams – the 
problem, the politics and the policy stream – which contribute to shaping the definition of a 
policy issue and its perceived policy solutions. 
 68 
 
Figure 5 Combined frameworks for framing analysis in policy context 
The proposed combined analytical framework encouraged a more dynamic interpretation of 
the role of policy ‘actors’ at the centre of this model, with the iterative process of framing and 
reframing of the policy problem. It also encouraged a more careful awareness of the ‘context’ 
in which this policy problem is interpreted. It guided the analysis of frames within a dynamic 
policy process and facilitated the systematic analysis of empirical data on policy actors’ 
perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines in three national contexts, thereafter 
allowing a comparison of the results across these national settings. This section details the 
application of this model to the study of frames.  
4.2.1 Framing and problem definition  
In an introduction to the policy cycle, Parsons (1995 p. 88) argues that the ‘definition of the 
problem is part of the problem’, that perceptions and constructions of policy issues are 
important at all stages of the policy process. Delineating the content of a policy problem 
requires an understanding of actors’ perceptions of this problem, their stories around it, the 
themes they refer to and the meaning that they attribute to the policy problem (Fischer 2003). 
In this thesis, I analyse how the problem of poor-quality medicines is problematized by policy 
actors. Analysing policy frames is one way to study interpretations of a policy problem (Schön 
& Rein 1994). These interpretations may vary from one policy group to another, and it is 
relevant to study the competition for attention between different frames across institutional 
settings. Framing analysis therefore helped me understand ‘what is going on’ and what aspect 
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of a policy issue is considered a problem requiring a policy response (Goffman 1974; Koon et 
al. 2016). Through the analysis of frames, I explore the key determinants, indicators or 
‘focusing events’ that shape the perceptions of this policy problem among key policy actors. 
‘Focusing events’ can be understood as global or national events that generate public interest 
and trigger policy shifts, e.g., a financial crisis, natural disaster, terrorist attack, or an epidemic 
(Kingdon 1995). 
The way that a policy issue is defined influences the policy agenda27, i.e., framing influences 
what themes become foci of attention and which policies take priority over others (Rushton & 
Williams 2012). Issues that reach the policy agenda shape the development of policy solutions 
(Fischer et al. 2007). Framing a health phenomenon as a security concern28, for example, could 
work to raise attention towards this issue by classifying it as a matter of ‘high politics’, taking 
prime position on the national policy agenda (Labonté & Gagnon 2010). Different frames 
shape the policy process by generating variations in ‘pathways of response’ (Entman 1993; 
McInnes & Lee 2012a). Framing has also been used to keep health issues on the policy agenda; 
as demonstrated with the cases of HIV/AIDS. In this thesis, I analyse variations in problem 
definition and whether and how the problem of poor-quality medicines reaches the policy 
agenda. 
4.2.2 The role of policy actors  
Policy actors are understood here as actors with an influence on the policy process, be they 
government-level actors, civil society representatives, private sector representatives, or even 
international institutions (Buse et al. 2005). In this thesis, I explore the role of two categories 
of policy actors, namely government policy actors and non-government policy actors, and their 
varying interpretations of the problem of poor-quality medicines in three national settings. It 
is through policy actors’ interpretations of a policy problem and how the issue is framed and 
reframed and through their interactions, that policy pathways may change. Policy actors are 
policy entrepreneurs in that their actions, decisions and interactions influence the policy debate 
(Kingdon 1995). They promote ideas by investing time and effort at endorsing those ideas in 
political debate and promoting their uptake on the political agenda (Guldbrandsson & Fossum 
2009; Kingdon 1995). Policy actors promote certain frames over others by communicating 
meaning to a policy issue (Schön & Rein 1994; Edelman 1988). Among constructivists, policy 
                                                     
27 The policy agenda is understood as ‘the list of subjects or problems to which government officials, 
and people outside of government closely associated with those officials, are paying some serious 
attention to at any given time’ (Kingdon 1995, p.3). 
28 Also referred to as a process of ‘securitization’ (Kamradt-Scott & McInnes 2012). 
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actors are seen as agents of policy change through the construction of ‘cognitive frames’ 
around a policy problem or around a policy solution (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998, p.897). The 
act of framing by policy actors influences which topics reach the policy agenda, therefore 
shaping pathways of policy response. 
4.2.2.1 Issue formation 
Policy actors play an active part in a process of issue formation by steering a policy debate. 
Firstly, policy actors’ participation in the process of issue formation goes hand in hand with 
interest construction. In framing analysis, the main premise is that actors’ frames ‘determine 
what they see as being in their interests and, therefore, what interests they perceive as conflict’ 
(Schön & Rein 1994, p.29). Actors’ interests in this regard can be both material and ideational, 
and it is the interplay of both the material and ideational that influences policy actions (Fischer 
2003). Sheri Berman (2001) adds that frames can shape both political behaviour (by shaping 
policy actors’ interests) or shape the environment in which policy actors operate. In the latter 
case, a frame may exert influence on policy decisions because of the consequences of not 
taking this frame into account. This may occur when a global norm (such as the norm against 
apartheid) alters the wider political environment, in this case influencing South Africa’s 
decision to reform its policies on segregation.  
I argue here that rationality cannot be considered as the only driving force behind policy 
decision making, as it does not account for the interplay of policy controversies, the 
competition between interests and ideas, that are inherent in policy debate and in policy 
development. Habermas (1985), in his introduction of the theory of ‘communicative 
rationality’ suggests that actors’ policy decisions are anchored in interpersonal constructions 
of meaning. Wendt, a social constructivist, supports a similar notion, arguing that both 
ideational and material concepts are not mutually exclusive: ‘material forces are not 
constituted solely by social meanings, and social meanings are not immune to material effects’ 
(Wendt 1999, p.2). Gofas & Hay (2010) further argue that policy researchers should overcome 
the dualism in modes of inquiry between the material and ideational reality. They explain that 
‘ideas guide actors towards strategies for attaining their goals and realising their interests’ 
(Gofas & Hay 2010, p.23). Frames and interest formation therefore influence policy action: 
‘not ideas, but material and ideal interests directly govern men’s conduct […] “world images” 
that have been created by “ideas” have determined the tracks along which action has been 
pushed by the dynamic of interest’ (Weber 1947, p.280). Interest formation is a crucial element 
of analysis in studying the role of actors in shaping the policy process. 
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4.2.2.2 Framing and power 
Policy actors’ power to influence the policy debate depends on their level of authority and the 
success of their bargaining acts within a policy community. Policy actors who propose and 
promote these frames essentially make ideas evolve into policies, programmes of action or 
laws through mechanisms of agency. They do so by organizing information to create meaning, 
telling policy makers what information is deemed important and how thereafter it influences 
policy decisions (Mejia et al. 2014). Framing is a dynamic act of communication used to justify 
an interpretation of a policy problem which involves crafting and frames, a means to exert 
influence and lead policy communities towards a specific course of action. This is a process 
of frame manipulation whereby policy actors adapt their idea to the local policy context (Payne 
2001; Wiener & Puetter 2009). As seen previously, various factors influence the strength of a 
frame including: who is proposing the frame, which matters above all; the level of authority of 
the frame sponsor or the level of decision making power; as well as the actor’s legitimacy and 
expertise on the policy issue (Rushton & Williams 2012). Power in this sense is exercised 
through the spread of knowledge and values (Foucault 1980). Power can be measured in terms 
of resources (such as financial resources, membership and popular support or infrastructure), 
as well as intangible resources (such as expertise, legitimacy and access to decision makers) 
(Buse et al. 2005). Stephen Lukes (1974) conceptualizes ‘power as thought control’ in the 
sense that the power-holder can convince someone to do something that is not necessarily in 
his/her interest. In framing analysis, power takes the form of blocking or promoting certain 
policy interpretations and policy solutions over others by re-interpreting a policy problem. It 
is an essential component to understanding the role of framing in influencing policy 
developments. 
4.2.2.3 Actor interactions 
Exploring the role of policy actors and their power to influence the uptake of a frame also 
means observing the interactions between those actors. More than one actor influences policy 
processes, while not all will have the same understanding of the policy issue (Parsons 1995). 
Constructivists argue that social constructions of reality are inter-subjective and depend on a 
shared and common understanding of a phenomenon (Adler 1997; Finnemore 1996). Policy 
change occurs through interactions between actors and policy subsystems including policy 
communities, interest and expert groups, and groups of actors gathering around the same 
policy issue or strategic policy agenda (Marsh 1998). Looking at interactions between policy 
actors encourages us to analyse both agents and structures jointly (Wendt 1987; Marsh 1998). 
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Policy actors interact among each other and, in doing so, deliberate and contribute to the spread 
of information through expertise, resources and power. This crafting process determines the 
implications of a given frame on policy developments (Sabatier & Weible 2014; Dowding 
1995). Institutions are also relevant in that they accompany the development of frames and act 
as arenas for policy interaction. The President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR) or the Global Fund, for example, are relevant institutions for the 
mobilization of resources (both human and financial) against HIV/AIDS, and actively support 
the implementation of programmes and research initiatives in line with the idea that HIV/AIDS 
remains a global health priority (Shiffman 2009). Changes in the structure of the policy arena 
(the networks and the policy communities) affect the way that frames influence policy 
developments. For example, the active involvement of private sector networks representing 
the innovator pharmaceutical industry may impact policy processes to improve access to 
affordable medicines, due to a more likely emphasis on the intellectual property frame. 
Reflecting on the interactions among policy actors, therefore, helps us understand the salience 
of ideas or frames and the implications of these for policy pathways (Béland 2009; Béland 
2010). 
4.2.3 Framing in policy context 
Analysing frames and the influence of frames on policy developments is highly-context-
dependent (Wiener 2012). The analysis of frames is only possible with a thorough 
understanding of the wider political context in which frames are advanced and policy processes 
take place. Frames do not do the job at leading policy change alone, but they should be 
observed as part of a wider political context offering ‘policy windows’. A policy window 
represents an opportunity to ’facilitate policy change’ (Guldbrandsson & Fossum 2009, p.435) 
triggered by a policy reform, or a change in the configuration of domestic politics for example 
(i.e., a focusing event). For example, international aid funding to support access to anti-
retroviral treatments against HIV/AIDS provides a favourable context in recipient nations for 
frames aimed at prioritising the fight against HIV/AIDS, through strengthening the health 
system and the distribution supply chain of anti-retrovirals (Shiffman 2009; Woodling et al. 
2012; Hammonds & Ooms 2014). HIV/AIDS may become a lesser priority if more pressing 
security concerns affect a nation – such as war or famine. The researcher is therefore 
encouraged to take into consideration the national mood in which policy decisions are made. 
Roggeband and colleagues (2014, p.225) argue that the process of issue formation is about 
‘[negotiating] frames that are better adapted to context specific concerns and that build on 
regionally emerging commitments, legal frameworks and/or other traditions’. The policy 
 73 
context also refers to the systemic factors such as economic, geographic, social, and cultural 
factors specific to the country under study that might influence the policy process. These 
systemic factors can be observed both at the national and international level. Applied to the 
study of poor-quality medicines, the policy ‘context’ encompasses the socio-cultural and 
economic determinants and drivers of the problem of poor-quality medicines, as summarised 
in the themes that emerge from the review of literature in Chapter 3.  
Leichter (1979) in his study of health policy in four different nations, offers a classification of 
factors (albeit a very broad classification) that shape a policy context: namely, structural, 
situational, cultural, and international factors (see also Buse & Mays 2012). Under situational 
factors, key focusing events such as the seizure of fake medicines, the discovery of malaria-
resistant strains, or a global conference on the global threat of pandemic influenza, are likely 
to influence the policy process at a given point in time. Structural factors include the state of 
the economy, the political culture and system of a given country, or even its geographical and 
demographic features – all of which can impact the policy process. Cultural factors include the 
role of religion, education or illiteracy rates, and the presence of ethnic minorities or evidence 
of population trust in the political system. Leichter (1979) notes that international factors, 
including cross border phenomena such as migratory flows or the trafficking of illicit products, 
but also donor funding, are likely to influence national policy processes. For this reason, it is 
relevant not only to acknowledge the regional context within which a policy process takes 
place, but also to compare the policy contexts of more than one case study, to gauge the 
influence of frames on policy processes in different settings.  
4.2.4 Framing solutions and alternatives 
The analysis of frames also calls for reflection on the process of framing, re-framing, frame 
competition and frame alignment – or the process of negotiation among policy actors and 
between different interpretations of a policy problem. Reflecting on this process allows for an 
analysis of the implications of framing on policy pathways, the presentation of policy solutions 
and alternatives. Ideas promoted by policy actors act as ‘road maps’ for policy development 
(Goldstein & Keohane 1993; Berman 2001, p.235). Policy pathways are debated in line with 
specific definitions of the policy content, the policy context and according to policy windows 
that offer opportunities for policy actors to promote one policy solution over another.  
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4.2.4.1 Re-framing 
In this thesis, I reflect on processes of framing and re-framing, and the implications of 
variations in interpretations of the policy problem for policy outcomes. As Hawkins & Holden 
(2013, p.54) explain, frames are used to ‘open up certain policy responses whilst precluding 
others’. The process of framing and re-framing involves a change in narratives by which local 
stakeholders choose to define the problem and in turn generate or encourage particular patterns 
of behaviour (Stone 1989). As an example, one country’s re-framing of travel restrictions 
against people living with HIV/AIDS as a human rights infringement, as opposed to a 
necessary restriction for national security, may influence reforms in other nations that still 
impose such bans, triggering reforms aimed at removing such restrictions (Rushton 2012). 
This is an example of a positive outcome of cross-border re-framing. In this study, I observe 
how the policy problem of poor-quality medicines is framed or re-framed in the three case 
countries and I reflect on implications of this for policy developments aimed at improving 
access to quality medicines.  
Rein & Schön (1996, p.89) point out that there are two types of frames to explore – the 
rhetorical and the action frames – both of which influence policy decisions. Rhetorical frames 
form part of the political debate, often used verbally within policy communities, and aimed at 
convincing other policy actors of a specific angle and policy solution. Action frames, also 
referred to as prognostic (vs. diagnostic) frames (Gregorio et al. 2010), are articulations of 
concrete policy strategies, sometimes expressed through policy documents, laws or 
declarations. In this study, I explore both rhetorical and action frames. This continuous process 
of reframing, either through action or rhetorical frames, can take many forms including: frame 
blending, when discussions on particular topic are obscured by introducing a complex 
amalgam of additional frames or themes; frame shift, when the use of language steers away 
from one topic to another; frame bridging, when discussions on a topic allude to a different 
theme altogether; and finally frame alignment, when frames construct a meaning around a 
policy issue that is congruent with local ideas (Snow et al. 1986; Mah et al. 2014; Rein & 
Schön 1996; Benford & Snow 2000). Schön & Rein (1994) also discuss frame reflection as a 
mechanism by which policy actors themselves become aware of the non-linear negotiations 
and competition that occur between different frames of a policy problem.  
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4.2.4.2 Frame competition 
Frames compete with one another with the aim of influencing the policy process. While 
competing frames may advocate for different policy actions (Béland 2010) these can ultimately 
have the same policy outcome (L’Espérance 2013). Frame competition, also referred to as 
‘contestation’, takes the form of a debate of themes and counter-themes around a policy issue 
and led by policy actors (Gamson 1992). This can lead to disagreements between policy 
communities. This framing debate as a dynamic process of contestation does not necessarily 
occur between two opposing schools of thought but, rather, between policy actors who 
promote a different web of values to define a problem and its solutions (Menashe & Siegel 
1998). It is important to examine processes of frame competition and contestation, something 
which, as Payne (Payne 2001) points out, constructivist theory has often failed to encompass. 
Policy actors are engaged in a continuous, sometimes tacit, process of frame competition. This 
process is the outcome of struggles between different perceptions of reality and ‘meanings’ 
attributed to a policy problem (Snow & Benford 1992; Gamson 1992; Yanow 1996) related to 
a course of action which either solves or ignores this policy problem (Barnett 1999; Risse & 
Sikkink 1999; Payne 2001) and sometimes leading to policy controversies (Schön & Rein 
1994). Understanding the process of frame competition is necessary ‘to understand ideational 
change’ and to understand ‘the reasons why ideas are discredited, new ideas are advocated by 
important carriers’ while others are not (Berman 2001, p.236). This is only possible through a 
thorough analysis of the policy process – how ideas are promoted over time and by which 
actors (Payne 2001). In this study, I reflect on the interplay between salient frames and 
evidence of frame competition in each national context and between different categories of 
policy actors.  
4.2.4.3 Frame alignment 
Frame alignment occurs when a frame is congruent with policy actors’ preconceived ideas, 
values and interests of policy actors and in line with the wider policy context (Béland & Cox 
2011). Frame alignment occurs when an interpretation of a policy issue ‘resonates’ best with 
the political culture of local policy makers (Gamson 1992; Iyengar 1991) and deeply 
embedded ideas (Shiffman & Smith 2007; Sabatier & Weible 2014). Kingdon (1995) adds that 
proposed frames are successful if the policy solutions that the frame entails are judged feasible 
and if the resources are aligned for its implementation. Frames resonate internally if they unify 
policy communities around a common definition of a policy problem and they resonate 
externally, if they successfully move policy actors to action (Shiffman & Smith 2007). 
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Analysing instances of frame alignment can help understand which frames might lead policy 
change. 
In this study, I reflect on which frames are salient among the policy communities around access 
to medicines in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand; or, in other words, which frames are repeated 
and presented as important in the debate on access to quality antimalarial medicines. I reflect 
on which frames prevail over others and how those might influence policy efforts against poor-
quality antimalarial medicines. I observe which combinations of elements in the policy process 
– be it the actors, networks, the policy context or the nature of the problem definition – 
contribute to the policy developments against poor-quality antimalarial medicines. In doing 
so, I analyse instances of frame blending, shifting, bridging, and alignment where relevant. 
Framing analysis offers a lens through which I can explain the process of political contestation 
between actors with differing agendas and priorities. 
4.3 Logic of comparison 
I have introduced the concept of framing, frameworks for policy analysis, and how to explore 
the impact of frames on policy processes. This section explains the value of comparative 
analysis to explore variations in perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines across 
three Southeast Asian countries, and subsequently to reflect on the implication of these 
variations for regional cooperation. I detail the logic of comparison that drives the comparative 
qualitative analysis of this thesis.  
4.3.1 Comparative framing analysis 
Comparative qualitative research, Hokin (2010) explains, is well adapted to the study of ideas 
from a constructivist perspective as it allows the researcher to explore the links between more 
than one ideational factor and a process in various settings. Comparative analysis in qualitative 
research, combined with framing analysis, has been applied previously in studies by Juan Diez 
Medrano (2003) and Sheila Jasanoff (2005). Both authors adopt a comparative approach to 
study the role of ideas in policy making between three countries. Medrano (2003) explores 
attitudes among citizens of Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom towards European 
integration. Jasanoff (2005) explores frames and ideas in biotechnology and life sciences and 
variations in three different countries: Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
of America. Both studies are anchored in sociology but draw on elements of constructivism 
and framing analysis. Neither of these studies, however, offers a comparative approach to 
framing analysis in low-middle income countries. Nevertheless, the studies by both Medrano 
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and Jasanoff are a great source of inspiration for my own comparative work in framing analysis 
around the problem of poor-quality medicines. This thesis differs from their approaches in that 
it reflects on the implications of variations in framings of a cross-border health policy problem 
for cross-border policy coordination. 
The comparative case study approach enables the researcher to contextualise findings through 
in-depth case studies and, subsequently, to compare the main findings and depict salient 
concepts or frames across the case countries (Kalleberg 1966). This provides an opportunity 
to analyse a complex empirical problem in three different settings and to draw generalisations 
from the combined data (Dogan & Pelassy 1990; Lim 2010; Hargue & Harrop 2007). Such an 
approach improves the validity of empirical observations. Comparative analysis, therefore, 
provides an opportunity to understand a complex empirical problem within a wider regional 
context, and offers a way to interpret and assess findings across institutional and national 
settings. For my study, the comparative approach provides an opportunity to explore the nature 
of the problem of poor-quality medicines and how it is framed and addressed in three different 
settings, and to observe potential for cross-border cooperation for improving access to quality 
medicines. This approach offers a dynamic application of a theory level analysis (impact of 
frames on policy processes) and the empirical level (explaining the problem of poor-quality 
medicines) (Burnham et al. 2008).  
The three case-countries within the GMS were selected because they are comparable in that 
they have both important ‘shared’ and ‘non-shared’ attributes among them (Sartori 1994). All 
three case countries share borders within the GMS and are members of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The Mekong River flows through each of those countries, 
they share similar tropical-wet climates and have comparable epidemiological profiles for 
malaria. On the other hand, the countries selected belong to different income groups29 and have 
different political histories and systems. Despite these shared and non-shared attributes, the 
three cases are all affected by the same policy issue (the problem of poor-quality medicines) – 
although it is articulated differently in each national context. Combined, these three case 
countries provide comparative ground to analyse variations in how the problem of poor-quality 
medicines is framed across borders. 
                                                     
29 Lower Middle Income (Laos and Cambodia) to Upper-Middle Income (Thailand), 
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4.3.2 Comparing frames and policy developments 
The dependent variable in comparative research is the phenomenon under study which is 
common to all cases, while the independent variables are the factors that influence this 
phenomenon causally (Burnham et al. 2008). For this study, the dependent variable is the 
problem of poor-quality antimalarial medicines, while the frames used to define this 
phenomenon are the independent variables. While making general observations is useful to 
highlight trends and to understand common or divergent interpretations of the problem of poor-
quality medicines in the GMS, I remain aware of the fact that the data only represents reality 
as far as the data collected from the three out of six GMS countries or states are concerned. 
The comparative approach applies to this thesis in two ways. 1. To set the scene for the analysis 
of frames, I start with a brief overview of the policy processes for improving access to quality 
medicines and reducing the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand. This first step was useful to draw parallels between policy processes and the 
implications of framings for a policy response. Throughout this process, I acknowledge the 
similarities and discrepancies in policy across national settings. 2. I then proceeded to compare 
how the problem of poor-quality medicines is framed in each country, both within its legal and 
policy documents and among local policy actors; and observe the similarities and differences 
between interpretations of the problem of poor-quality medicines across institutional settings 
and between national settings. I base my analysis on a set of six pre-determined frames around 
the problem of poor-quality medicines. By comparing framings, I depict overlaps and reflect 
on the dominant frames used in the region to explain the determinants and the challenges 
linked to the problem of poor-quality medicines. I reflect on variations in how the same frame 
is articulated within different policy communities and across the three countries.  
4.3.3 Cross-border policy coordination 
In the discussion chapter for this thesis, I use the findings from my comparative analysis to 
reflect on the implications for regional policy coordination to address the common problem of 
poor-quality medicines. As the problem of poor-quality medicines extends beyond national 
borders, I reflect on whether definitions and interpretations of the problem affects the 
propensity for Mekong countries to work together to improve access to quality antimalarial 
medicines. Framing analysis provides the lens through which I reflect on shared ideas, that 
may be diffused, contested, or internalized within and between countries, and how those might 
influence responses to this policy challenge (Finnemore 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; 
Finnemore 1993; Risse & Sikkink 1999). Ideas transcend national borders through processes 
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of diffusion (Béland 2010), sometimes via frames promoted across different national settings 
by international organization such as the World Health Organization. This contributes to 
knowledge sharing and lesson drawing from policy initiatives between different national 
settings. Knowledge sharing involves a process of persuasion, whereby actors of a different 
policy setting acknowledge the relative advantage of a policy from a different time and place, 
and recognise its compatibility for their setting (Bissel et al. 2011).  
While discussing the results, I evaluate the potential for lessons to be drawn to enhance policy 
coherence between the three case countries. I reflect on evidence of strategies, policies, 
programs or tools adopted and applied in another policy context because of their perceived 
feasibility, validity and adaptability. Comparing policy processes provides an opportunity to 
reflect on cross-border knowledge generation and exchange. While variations in frames may 
imply differences in political culture which in turn may impede collective action, similarities 
in how an issue is framed may provide ideational grounds for it (McInnes & Lee 2012a).  
Shared understandings of the problem of poor-quality medicines between neighbouring 
countries may also lead to a common regional understanding of a policy issue, facilitating 
policy transfer and adoption. Exploring how policy actors across national settings interpret the 
problem of poor-quality medicines and whether their ideas are shared, could explain the 
presence of ‘collective intentionality’ for cooperative action (Khagram, Riker, & Sikkink 
2002).  Policy coherence occurs through knowledge and expertise sharing, and evidence of 
strategies, policies or programs being adapted and applied to a different policy context (Bissell 
et al. 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). Reflecting on policy coherence involves taking into 
consideration the processes of knowledge sharing, communication and persuasion between 
policy actors in different national settings, and to reflect on what factors may facilitate policy 
coordination across borders.  
The comparative approach, in which findings are juxtaposed to reflect on the wider, regional 
context, addresses Galton’s problem in comparative research, which notes the importance of 
studying the impact of external factors on empirical relationships (Burnham et al. 2008). In 
the discussion chapter (9) of this thesis, I raise important questions in line with cross-border 
cooperation, policy coherence and regional health governance. Results suggest, for example, 
that ASEAN, as the main supra-national platform for political debate, has a role to play in 
fostering policy coherence against the threat posed by poor-quality antimalarial medicines. For 
this reason, it is useful to explore the specific characteristics of cross-border and regional 
politics; such as differences in political culture, decision making processes and existing 
 80 
mechanisms for accountability (Acharya 2009; Khagram et al. 2002). This comparative 
approach offers a way to interpret similarities and differences in results across three national 
settings and to explore the interactions between framings of a policy problem in different 
policy contexts (Hokin 2010), as well as the implications of variations in framings for cross-
border cooperation. 
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Chapter 5 Methods 
The methods of qualitative research outlined in this chapter support the aim of this study, 
which is to analyse and compare framings of the policy issue of poor-quality medicines among 
policy actors in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Few studies have previously explored 
perceptions around the problem of poor-quality medicines and few studies on poor-quality 
medicines are qualitative in their approach (Alfadl, Ibrahim, et al. 2013). Qualitative research 
is particularly appropriate for this study, which seeks to explore the role of ideas in policy. 
Qualitative research consists of collecting data that describes a phenomenon of the social 
world and thereby helps construct explanations for a phenomenon. It offers the opportunity to 
analyse the perceptions and behaviours of stakeholders whose actions directly influence the 
phenomenon itself (Seale et al. 2004). 
5.1 Three methods of data collection and analysis 
In this thesis, I use three methods to analyse the framings around the issue of poor-quality 
medicines in three countries (Hawkins and Holden 2013): (1) stakeholder mapping (Method 
A) to identify the key policy actors and institutions involved in policy efforts to address the 
problem of poor-quality medicines; (2) document analysis (Method B) as a method commonly 
used in the analysis of policy processes, as well as in the analysis of action frames; and  (3) 
semi-structured interviews (Method C) to uncover the dominant frames used among policy 
actors to define the policy problem in each country and to obtain information on the policy 
context. The three methods, used jointly, allow the exploration of the interplay between frames 
and policy developments. Figure 6 on page 82 illustrates how each method builds upon the 
analytical framework defined in Chapter 4. In this chapter, I explain how each method supports 
the analysis of frames of the problem of poor-quality medicines, and the implications of 
variations in framings cross-border policy coordination. I detail the processes of data collection 
and data analysis (thematic content analysis and comparative analysis), and how the results 
are presented in this thesis.  
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Figure 6 Methods and the analytical framework 
The policy triangle developed for health policy analysis by Walt & Gilson (1994) has regularly 
been applied as a framework to study health policy process around public health issues (Walt 
et al. 2008). The four components (policy actors, content, context and process) of the Policy 
Triangle have guided both the collection and analysis of data for my thesis, as well as the 
analysis of the policy processes for each case country. Kingdon’s multi streams model focuses 
on how a policy issue reaches the policy agenda through the intersections of three streams: the 
problem, politics and policy streams (Kingdon 1984; Kingdon 1995). Both models were useful 
to analyse how ‘frames emerge and are maintained’ in three policy contexts (Hawkins & 
Holden 2013).  
5.1.1 Method A Stakeholder Mapping 
As a first step in the investigation of the use of frames and policy developments for each 
country, I identified key policy actors and institutions involved in the policy process through 
a stakeholder mapping exercise (Method A). This method is placed at the centre of the diagram 
above, as it informed the rest of the framing analysis process. ‘Stakeholders’ are understood 
here as the policy actors or institutions whose activities have a direct impact on policy 
developments (Morgan & Taschereau 1996). As Buse and colleagues (2005) argue, the first 
stage of analysis of policy processes involves identifying who plays a role in shaping and 
implementing a policy, and what the interactions between those actors are. Stakeholder 
mapping is not only a useful tool to identify the key policy actors, but also to map the main 
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relationships between these actors, the recurring interactions or the key networks for the 
exchange of information (Ostrom 2009; Aligica 2006). It offers the possibility to evaluate 
which policy actors have most influence on the policy process, as frame sponsors, policy 
entrepreneurs or leaders of a policy change. This mapping exercise allowed me to explore 
notions of power as well as agency, and to reflect on the accountability of stakeholders to each 
other, in addition to the sustainability of their interactions; or in other words, whether an 
initiative is locally-led or whether it was part of a donor-dependent and time-restrained 
initiative spearheaded by an international institution (McGinnis 2011). Mapping stakeholders 
was a useful tool both for identifying key documents for analysis (Method B) and to identify 
participants for the semi-structured interviews (Method C). In return, the findings from 
Methods B and C provided additional information that fed back into this mapping exercise.  
5.1.2 Method B Document Analysis 
This second method was useful to uncover the official definitions of the problem of poor-
quality medicines as stipulated in legal and policy documents, to study policy processes and 
to inform my analysis of the wider context for each case country. Analysing key policy and 
legal documents provided an opportunity to explore how the policy issue of poor-quality 
medicines is defined in official documents. As Hawkins and Holden (2013) point out, framing 
analysis has been conducted predominantly through the analysis of official written documents, 
such as the outcomes of policy consultations, laws, regulations and policies. This is useful 
material to uncover the action frames within official documents – i.e., the proposed policy 
solutions that interpret a policy problem and propose a pathway of consequential response. 
The definitions, terminology and the references to evidence used in these documents all 
contribute to the analysis of how the policy issue is framed. The analysis of policy and legal 
documents also unveiled key policy solutions and pathways of response to how a policy issue 
may have been framed and reframed over time. This method also served to define the problem 
content and the policy process – in other words, to trace the development of issue formation 
around the problem of poor-quality medicines.  
The document analysis permitted a chronological review of policy developments aimed at 
addressing the problem of poor-quality antimalarial medicines, and improving access to 
quality essential medicines in the three national settings. Analysing the content of official 
policy documents provided an overview of the prioritisation of actions, and a reference point 
as to which pieces of evidence are deemed important or relevant in the policy making process 
(Hawkins & Holden 2013). The analysis of these documents helped to uncover the key steps 
of the policy process and the policy solutions proposed. During the analysis of documents, I 
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paid attention to the timeline and the authors of these documents, bearing in mind that 
documents are ‘social facts’ rather than ‘representations of organization routines, decision 
making processes or professional dialogues’ (Atkinson & Coffey 2008, p.58). I supplemented 
the analysis of documents with information on the policy process obtained through Method C 
– the semi-structured interviews. This helped to evaluate the importance of events and policy 
outcomes, and the role of policy actors on the policy process. The results of the document 
analysis provide evidence to explain the process of policy change: the occurrence of key 
focusing events and of key policy shifts over time. Thus, a clearer understanding of the policy 
process set the scene for the analysis of frames among policy actors.  
5.1.3 Method C Semi-structured interviews 
The third method consisted of a series of face to face semi-structured interviews with policy 
actors in three national settings and across institutions, as well as with global policy actors 
working in Access to Medicines. These semi-structured interviews were the predominant 
method used in the analysis of frames around the problem of poor-quality medicines (Mah et 
al. 2014; Hawkins & Holden 2013). The data from the semi-structured interviews helped to 
understand how the problem of poor-quality medicines was interpreted by key policy actors in 
each country, including their perceptions of determinants and challenges of this policy issue. 
This contributed to the delineation of the policy content and informed my analysis of the 
processes of issue formation around the problem of poor-quality medicines. The frames that 
emerged from the data also informed my understanding of the role and position of policy 
actors, and of the different policy solutions promoted in line with those frames. As a data 
collection tool, semi-structured interviews helped to explore the underlying assumptions 
behind actors’ policy positions (Hawkins & Holden 2013) and to elucidate their perceptions, 
attitudes and behaviours in relation to the policy problem of poor-quality medicines (Robson 
2011). By analysing how policy actors communicated their understanding of a policy problem 
verbally, I could reflect on what shaped their policy interests and how these interests might 
inform policy developments. The data also helped to understand the nature and frequency of 
policy actors’ interactions in the policy space (Hawkins & Holden 2013). Data from these 
interviews was used to refine observations of the nature of the policy process and key policy 
shifts, and wherever possible, to source key information that supported my analysis of these 
processes in relation to the context. The interviews also fed into my analysis of the policy 
context for each case country, providing insights that would otherwise be difficult to obtain 
from policy documents alone.  
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5.2 Data collection 
The data collection process occurred in three steps, repeated for each of the three case 
countries. For the stakeholder mapping phase (Method A), I first identified global policy actors 
involved in policy efforts against poor-quality antimalarial medicines from the literature 
review. I then identified respondents from national regulatory authorities in Cambodia, Laos 
and Thailand, with the help of my supervisors, advisors and partner non-governmental 
organisations or international organisations working on access to medicines in these three 
countries (Method A). Using Excel, I mapped all policy actors (individuals) and institutions 
involved in improving access to quality medicines in each country, including local government 
stakeholders, local non-governmental stakeholders and international or regional stakeholders 
in the three case countries. In applying this method, I used a simplified version of a stakeholder 
mapping exercise first introduced by Kiser & Ostrom (1982) as a method anchored in 
sociology. This method was then adapted by Elinor Ostrom and Paul Dragos Aligica to include 
terminology on policy intuitions and policy stakeholders, for its application to the study of 
policy developments (Aligica 2006; Ostrom 2009). The stakeholder mapping exercise was 
conducted in 6 steps detailed below: 
1) Identifying stakeholders through literature review and expert consultation; 
2) Identifying the institutional mandate of each stakeholder; 
3) Positioning stakeholders within the policy space (as a local government, local 
non-governmental, or international and regional actors or institutions); 
4) Drawing relationships and interactions between stakeholders; 
5) Highlighting existing outcomes of interactions between stakeholders; 
6) Refining stakeholder maps based on results from Methods B and C. 
This stakeholder mapping exercise was iterative in process, as during my fieldwork I retrieved 
further information on policy actors, networks and their interactions from key interview 
respondents, building on the initial version of this map – both through the analysis of 
documents and the semi-structured interviews.  
For the document analysis (Method B), I collected a total of 32 documents from the main 
institutions involved in improving access to quality medicines in Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand. The criteria for the selection were as follows: 
1) Policy or legal document pertaining to national or regional regulatory efforts for 
improving access to quality pharmaceuticals; 
 86 
2) Documents publically available online since establishment of a national drug 
regulatory entity; 
3) Documents through respondents; 
4) Documents written in or translated into English.  
I chose to analyse documents translated into English for feasibility reasons, and due to the 
limited financial resources available for translation support. Most documents were sourced 
from the websites of institutions identified via Method A. As it was not always possible to find 
up to date English translations of the relevant official policy and legal documents online, I 
obtained some documents from respondents during fieldwork.  I crosschecked whether each 
document was up to date and valid with respondents during the semi-structured interviews. 
The types of documents analysed were:  
• Policy documents: guidelines on drug quality control, or supply chain management;  
• Legal documents: national drug laws;  
• Public records: white papers, strategy documents, annual reports, official guidelines, 
progress reports. 
 Cambodia Laos Thailand 
Policy documents 1 2 1 
Legal documents 7 7 5 
Public records 7 0 2 
Total 15 9 8 
Table 4 Summary of documents collated per case country. 
The third step of the data collection process involved travelling to Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand to conduct locally-based semi-structured interviews (Method C). While in depth-
interviews rely on more open-ended questions, semi-structured interviews using a pre-
determined topic guide helped to steer the conversations around the specific topic of poor-
quality medicines as a policy problem. Key questions were selected to guide the exploration 
of the problem of poor-quality medicines, in line with determinants and challenges previously 
identified in the literature review (Chapter 3) (The template topic guide is available at 
Appendix 4 on page 319). This topic guide permitted a targeted exploration of this complex 
policy issue.  
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The nature of the questions asked was occasionally altered along the data collection process, 
to reflect a deeper exploration of emerging themes, to clarify information, or to reflect the role 
and position of the interviewee. This permitted both concept-driven (using the topic guide) and 
data-driven data collection approaches, allowing for the identification of context-dependent 
themes (Green & Thorogood 2014). In essence, the topic guide provided an initial charted area 
of inquiry forming the basis for more exploratory discussions (Kvale & Brinkmann 2008). It 
also served as a checklist, with default wording and a default order of questions that varied 
slightly according to the country of study and the flow of the interview, in order to harness 
emerging themes (Robson 2011). Before leaving for fieldwork, my supervisors and advisory 
committee validated the topic guide by verifying the adequacy of the formulation of questions, 
limitations to the risk of bias, and the cultural appropriateness of the questions. I then 
conducted a pilot interview with a previous colleague working for the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) Regulatory Compliance Team. The colleague in 
question advised on the content and delivery of the topic guide and of the interview for a more 
adapted approach to future interviews. 
As an additional tool during the semi-structured interviews, I used a map of the region to 
facilitate discussions on the flow of poor-quality medicines with local stakeholders. This was 
useful to circumvent any political sensitivity and reluctance to speak openly about the sources 
or the trafficking routes of these illicit goods. Participants were more comfortable when 
pointing towards areas at risk without explicitly voicing the trafficking routes while being 
recorded, and this gave them the opportunity to point and to illustrate the problem as a regional 
concern through visual rather than verbal means. For a politically sensitive topic, the careful 
choice of wording often limits their illustration of the topic.   
5.2.1 Ethics 
Before leaving for fieldwork, I requested ethical clearance from the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicines (LSHTM) Research Ethics Committee and from the health research 
ethics committees of the respective case countries. Ethical clearance in Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand was obtained between January and August 2015 with the help of locally-based host 
organizations, as summarised in Table 5 below (See Appendix 5 page 320 for ethical clearance 
documents). 
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Country Body Host organization Date granted 
Cambodia National Ethical 
Committee for 
Health Research 
National Malaria Centre of 
Cambodia and Malaria 
Consortium in Phnom Penh 
January 2015 
Laos National Institute of 
Public Health, 
Vientiane 
Lao-Oxford-Mahosot Hospital-
Wellcome Trust Research Unit 
in Vientiane 
March 2015 
Thailand National Research 
Council of Thailand 
Malaria Consortium in 
Bangkok 
August 2015 
Table 5 Summary of ethical committee applications per country. 
5.2.2 Fieldwork 
Data collection in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand took place in three stages throughout the year 
2015. The first leg took place in March and April 2015, the second leg in June 2015 and the 
final leg in September 2015. I stayed in the capital cities of each country (Phnom Penh, 
Vientiane and Bangkok), where the administrative and political centres of activity are located. 
Collecting data at time intervals offered the possibility to analyse data in between each leg of 
fieldwork and to triangulate preliminary findings through additional interviews, testing 
emerging themes with new respondents, as well as to explore unanswered questions and fill 
information gaps during my subsequent visits.  
The scope of respondents approached in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand included actors with a 
policy mandate related to the regulation of medicines across the pharmaceutical supply chain, 
or actors with a mandate for law enforcement on pharmaceutical quality. I first reached out to 
policy actors identified through the stakeholder map, and with the help of global experts or 
project advisors. Before the scheduled interviews, pre-identified policy actors were sent an 
information sheet and consent form (in English) by email, with four anonymity options to 
choose from (see Appendix 6 page 324 for these documents). Further respondents were then 
identified and contacted while in-country through a snow-balling technique and following the 
recommendations of initial policy actors interviewed for this thesis. At the start of each 
interview, I provided a formal standardised introduction to the project (both verbally and in 
writing – with the information sheet). I offered to take the respondent through the consent 
form, if required, explaining the four levels of anonymity available to them. The level of 
anonymity selected by the participant dictated how I could use and quote the content of a 
transcript during the analysis and write up phase.  
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The interviews were audio-recorded for full transcription whenever the respondents consented. 
When the respondent declined to be audio-recorded, extensive field notes were taken during 
and/or immediately after the interview. Field notes also served to record impressions of the 
attitude of the respondent, the tone of the conversation and other observations about the speech, 
behaviour or gestures of the respondent useful to the process of data interpretation and analysis 
(Silverman 2013). While I had pre-identified locally based translators in the event that a 
respondent requested the interview to be in their native language, all respondents were 
interviewed in either English or French, without need for a translator. As I am fluent in both 
English and French, it was possible for me to translate interviews recorded in French during 
the transcription process. As French or English was often not the respondent’s first language, 
however, the occasional lack of proficiency made the transcription process more challenging, 
and at times compromised the quality and perspicuity of the interview material. 
5.3 Data Analysis 
The process of data analysis occurred in two phases involving thematic content analysis and 
comparative analysis. The analysis of themes emerging from the data served as a first step to 
elucidate the frames that emerged both from the official documents and from the respondents’ 
interview data. The aim was thereafter to elaborate on the dominant frames around the problem 
of poor-quality medicines in each country and to analyse those in view of my understanding 
of the policy developments before engaging in a comparative analysis of the results.  
5.3.1 Thematic content analysis 
I first conducted a thematic analysis of the documents collected. Each document was scanned 
for main themes as identified from the literature review in Chapter 3. The analysis of themes 
was used to identify elements of the policy process and the official definition of poor-quality 
medicines. I extracted key information on how poor-quality medicines were defined, on the 
main policy outcomes of actors’ interactions as well, as information about key focusing events 
leading to policy changes and reforms. I note here the potential discrepancies when analysing 
the framings and definitions of poor-quality medicines from translated English version rather 
than original documents. To do so, I read each document in full twice, highlighting relevant 
clauses or sections of these documents that detailed the structure of the regulatory framework 
to improve access to quality medicines for each country. Then, I coded the content of the 
available legal and policy documents using an excel sheet in which I recorded recurring themes 
iteratively, re-arranging those throughout the process of thematic content analysis. I took note 
of policy developments and focusing events leading to policy change. At this stage, I was able 
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to cross-reference the findings from this thematic analysis with the map of stakeholders, 
highlighting where and how actors and networks influenced policy developments. The 
findings gathered from this phase of the analysis are represented in each results chapter as a 
chronological narrative of the policy process, and illustrated through a timeline. I also paid 
specific attention to the use of terminology in each document, making note of the definitions 
of poor-quality medicines. This process provided an indication of how the problem for poor-
quality medicines was conceptualized in official documents, as material for reflection on how 
the official definitions might influence policy developments. The outcome of this analysis is 
represented in the form of a table of official definitions for each country.  
I then conducted a thematic content analysis of the data from the semi-structured interviews 
against the themes emerging from Chapter 3. The analysis of themes here served to identify 
key determinants and challenges of the issue of poor-quality medicines as perceived by policy 
actors, and to discern contextual factors that might influence policy developments. I followed 
five main steps in the thematic content analysis process, from data familiarization, coding, 
indexing, charting and mapping to data interpretation (Ritchie & Spencer 1994). Recordings 
of interviews were first converted into time-stamped transcripts that were uploaded into a 
Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis software (Nvivo 10), along with word-
processed field notes. After the transcription process, which served as a phase of data 
familiarization, the main themes were coded along a pre-determined coding framework, 
created from the list of themes and the conceptual framework emanating from the literature 
review (See Appendix 7 on page 328 for coding framework). This coding stage involved a 
tagging process using highlighting tools to identify key themes from the data (Pierce 2008). 
While the initial coding framework was based on the themes identified in the literature review, 
the analysis phase gave special attention to themes that emerged from the data as ‘free nodes’ 
(Glaser & Strauss 2008).  
To identify key themes and causality references in this coding stage, I paid specific attention 
to key terms such as ‘because’, ‘after’, ‘then’, ‘same as’, where participants shared their 
perceptions and experiences of the policy issue (Green & Thorogood 2014). This information 
also contributed to my understanding of the policy process and the policy context. Nvivo 10 
software facilitated the management of data permitting easier navigation between cluster of 
themes (Spencer et al. 2014; Green & Thorogood 2014). I conducted a comprehensive analysis 
of the data until no new themes emerged that had not already been taken into consideration 
(Silverman 2011). This stage of the thematic content analysis process served to highlight what 
determinants and challenges policy actors attribute to the policy issue of poor-quality 
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antimalarial medicines. These findings were then coded as a final list of themes and sub-
themes for each country. 
The indexing phase involved a deeper theoretical reading of these emerging themes (Kvale & 
Brinkmann 2008), during which I was able to draw key observations on stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the policy issue. I matched the emerging themes to the pre-determined list of 
frames. To do so, I used the pre-set list of six ‘master’ frames (as identified in Chapter 4), 
which allowed for a more systematic and meaningful comparison of framings of the problem 
of poor-quality medicines across countries. This process helped to refine the list of frames 
iteratively and in accordance with the themes emerging from the data. During this indexing 
phase, I applied a method of ‘constant comparison’ in order to spot patterns in the data (Glaser 
1999; Pierce 2008; Green & Thorogood 2014). As a result, I identified salient themes among 
all three categories of respondents and paid specific attention to those that bore the most 
references. From the data, I depicted both rhetorical frames (the debates and stories in relation 
to the policy issue) and action frames (evidence of practice, policy solutions, laws or policy) 
(Schön & Rein 1994). I referred to both the content of the transcripts and my field notes in 
order to depict the specific attitudes of local stakeholders towards the policy problem (Chong 
& Druckman 2007). This helped to capture the tone of the discussion and elements of the social 
context that may influence the data. I paid particular attention to the terminology used by 
respondents, their specific definition of the problem and the rationales used repeatedly by local 
respondents from each country to explain this problem. I created a separate coding scheme in 
Nvivo for these dominant or ‘master frames’ used across and within all three categories of 
respondents. 
The fourth stage (charting) involved drawing linkages between the master frames, and the 
dominant themes emerging from the data that describe the substance of each dominant frame. 
I charted different interpretations of the policy issue across institutional settings (across the 
three categories of respondents) within the same frames. By juxtaposing the framings that 
emerged from the document analysis and the interview data, I was able to explore the 
implications of perceptions of the problem for policy developments to improve access to 
quality medicines within each country. The results from the thematic analysis of the interview 
data are presented separately for each case country, as a thematic narrative describing the six 
frames in detail and acknowledging variations in interpretations of the policy issue across 
institutional setting, while reflecting on analogies between actors’ perceptions and recent 
policy developments.  
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The limitation of thematic content analysis for the study of frames is that the classification of 
frames by the researcher is itself a subjective process – a limitation which I have sought to 
address through a reflexive data collection and analysis process. More specifically, I followed 
an iterative process of data collection and analysis based on the Spiralling Research Approach 
by Berg & Lune (2012), as illustrated in Figure 7 on page 92. This approach is particularly 
adapted to the nature of this study which required a strong awareness of the socio-political 
context, as it provided an opportunity to adapt data collection tools throughout the data 
collection process (Green & Thorogood 2014; Berg & Lune 2012). The Spiralling Research 
Approach is inherently reflexive and allowed for Methods A, B and C to feed into one another 
throughout the data analysis process. For example, while the stakeholder mapping (Method A) 
supported the data collection process for Methods B and C, both the data from the analysis of 
documents (Method B) and from the interviews (Method C) helped to refine the maps of 
stakeholders.  
 
Figure 7: Research methods in a reflexive research process 
Cross-feeding between the findings of Methods B and C was useful to triangulate findings and 
develop my observations of the level of enforcement of written policies and laws. The data 
from the interviews helped to verify the findings from the analysis of official documents – 
enhancing my understanding of the policy process. I ensured that the research design per se 
remained unchanged through maintaining careful awareness of the data collection and a 
systematic process of data analysis. In practice, therefore, the spiralling research approach 
allowed for the refinement of the criteria for the document analysis and the topic guides for 
subsequent semi-structured interviews, with the aim of delving deeper into emerging themes 
without drastically altering the systematic application of each method.  
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5.3.2 Comparative analysis  
After the analysis of the main themes emerging from the document analysis and the semi-
structured interviews, and exploring how these inform our understanding of the policy process 
and the analysis of frames of the problem of poor-quality medicines, I proceeded to undertake 
a comparative analysis of the policy processes and frames used by respondents across the three 
case countries. This was conducted in two phases.   
First, I reflected on the similarities and differences in the policy development processes and 
how comparable the policy solutions to address the issue of poor-quality medicines were. I 
noted whether, in the chronological progression of policy efforts between these three countries, 
there was evidence of policy coherence, overlaps of initiatives, or evidence of policy transfer 
between one context to another. I also reflected on potential gaps in policy processes from one 
country to the next, and the role of policy actors and how different categories of actors, or actor 
configurations influence the policy process in the three countries. The comparative analysis 
process was made easier with the visualisation of the policy processes in a timeline format. I 
then compared the dominant framings of the problem of poor-quality antimalarial medicines 
in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. Through the mapping & interpretation stage of the thematic 
content analysis approach, I charted the similarities and differences between the five dominant 
frames and the sub-themes emerging from the data across the three countries. I noted the 
similarities and differences in official definitions of ‘poor-quality medicines’ across the three 
countries in the policy and legal documents. I compared how different policy actors, across 
institutional and national settings, defined the policy issue and if relevant, I depicted variations 
in how the same frame was articulated across the three countries. This was done by juxtaposing 
the list of themes and subthemes that emerged from the data, and investigating how these 
reflect different articulations of each frame.  
Comparative analysis offered the opportunity to improve the reliability of my observations 
from the data. I compared these observations across national contexts to uncover any 
discrepancies in my empirical analysis. In this process, I also referred to the data from global 
expert interviews to inform the arguments in the final discussion of findings.  Besides these 
triangulation methods, I sought to improve the reliability of my findings by cross-referencing 
them across the three methods. Respondents’ contributions cannot be considered to be flawless 
reflections of reality, and their accounts had to be interpreted carefully and in light of other 
information obtained through document analysis, or from the literature.  
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I also made sure that all of the data was coded comprehensively, ensuring that disconfirming 
evidence and deviant cases are addressed and included in the analysis (Green & Thorogood 
2014; Silverman 2011). Additionally, I consulted my supervisors and the advisory committee 
on certain batches of data and their coding structures. This ensured the reliability of my 
analytical framework and demonstrated that the codes and thematic structure that emerged 
from the data were not solely reliant on my subjective analysis (Green & Thorogood 2014). 
To ensure the validity of my findings, I also sought to obtain validation of my findings from 
respondents whenever possible, by going back to participants and asking them if findings 
seemed relevant and accurate (Green & Thorogood 2014). This was a useful approach, 
especially as it provided an opportunity to verify elements of confidentiality with the 
participants who could approve or reject quotations extracted from their accounts, when 
applicable. This method also offered the possibility to share some key findings and 
recommendations with the decision makers that were interviewed in the data collection phase 
of this study, as an organic reporting mechanism.  
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Introduction to results 
Respondents 
A total of 51 respondents30 were interviewed during my fieldwork in Cambodia, Laos and 
Thailand. Before leaving London, 23 key informants were first identified through the 
stakeholder map exercise and some initial contacts on the ground were made with the help of 
my research advisors based in Southeast Asia. A further 30 were recruited while in the field, 
identified through snowballing technique following recommendations from interviewees. This 
respondent-driven approach was iterative and largely driven by data refinement (Ritchie et al. 
2014). It offered the possibility to address information gaps when required and was well-suited 
to the exploratory nature of this study which delves into a politically-sensitive and complex, 
multi-faceted phenomenon.  
Table 6 on page 96 summarises the number of respondents per country and for each category 
of respondent. Under ‘government-level respondents’, I include representatives from the 
Ministry of Health, National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), national malaria control 
programs and law enforcement institutions such as customs or police. ‘Non-government 
respondents’ include local civil society, local representatives from academia or from the 
industry, in-country representatives from donor organisation, inter-governmental 
organisations or international non-government organisations based locally, some of which 
were key implementing partners in the policy process. Under non-government respondents, I 
was also able to interview three industry representatives. They were included in the sample of 
respondents so far as they were involved in the agenda-setting process, and because the 
opportunity presented itself by referral. The sample of respondents did not include patients. 
However, respondents in each country shared interpretations of consumer behaviour as a 
contributing factor to the illicit trade in poor-quality antimalarial medicines. 
Country Respondents No.  Total  
Cambodia Government-level 2 17 
Non-government  15 
Laos Government-level 9 17 
Non-government  8 
                                                     
30 A full list of respondents is available in Appendix 8 on page 330 
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Thailand Government-level 7 17 
Non-government 10 
Table 6 Number of local respondents per sector, per country. 
Simultaneously, in the course of the year 2015 and 2016, I conducted semi-structured 
interviews with 23 international experts on access to quality essential medicines, in order to 
gauge their opinion on the complexity of the issue and on the factors they believe contribute 
to the prevalence of falsified essential medicines globally. Most of interviews with experts 
were conducted by tele-conference, although five of those were conducted in person. As 
summarised in Table 7 (page 96), the sample of expert respondents included senior members 
of international non-government, inter-governmental and donor organisations, representatives 
from the pharmaceutical industry, as well as academics and one respondent from the media. 
The results from these interviews served to inform the research design and triangulate findings 
in the discussion chapter. 
Category of Expert Respondents No. of Respondents 
International Non-Governmental 
Organisations 
6 
Inter-Governmental Organisations 2 
Donor Organisations 2 
Pharmaceutical Industry 5 
Academia 7 
Other (media) 1 
Total 23 
Table 7 Number of expert respondents per sector 
Interviews were conducted in English and a few in French. All local policy actors were 
proficient in either language. Medical or pharmaceutical studies in Laos for example are 
offered mainly in French. In their role, most local policy actors re are required to work 
collaboratively with counterparts from other countries, in English. For these reasons, no 
interpreter was required for the interviews. As a French educated in English speaking 
countries, I was comfortable conducting interviews in either language.  
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Data management and anonymity 
Various respondents clearly expressed their fear at associating their name or that of their 
organization to this sensitive topic, as this might affect their professional relations or personal 
safety. For this reason, effective data management and preservation of anonymity were key 
concerns through the data collection and analysis process. there were four categories of 
anonymity as described in the consent forms shared with respondents ahead of the scheduled 
interview. A total of only 25 respondents provided full consent, and a total of 12 respondents 
refused for the information to be cited directly. The reasons provided for refusing to be cited 
as part of this study were to preserve close working ties with government officials in country, 
because of non-disclosure agreements under donor polices, or because of fears of disapproval 
from senior management. As most respondents requested that their contributions anonymized 
and only few agreed to be quoted directly, I chose to anonymise all quotations in the results 
chapters. 
Color Code Consent Type 
GREEN 1 
BLUE 2 
ORANGE 3 
RED 4 
 
Consent type 1. Respondent agrees to take part in this interview and for quotes and other 
material arising from his/her participation to be used and attributed by name. (Note some 
individual statements were still requested to remain anonymous during the interview.) 
Consent type 2. Respondent agrees that material from my interview may be quoted, but would 
like his/her name to be anonymised. 
Consent type 3. Respondent agrees that material from my interview may be quoted, but would 
like his/her name to be anonymised as well as any other information that might be used to 
identify him/her, including the organisation that employs him/her. 
Consent type 4. Respondent does not agree for any material from the interview to be quoted 
but the researcher may use the information from the interview to inform her analysis. 
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To guarantee the anonymity of respondents and respect confidentiality levels, each respondent 
is attributed a unique code, used to reference quotations and statements in the results chapters. 
The master sheet with the respondent codes and corresponding respondent information is kept 
in a secure password-protected folder on my computer. The information about respondents has 
been omitted from all published documents when anonymity was requested, ensuring that no 
additional information could accidentally reveal the identity of the respondents (i.e. institution, 
name of department etc.). Additionally, each interview recording was re-named with the 
numerical code assigned to the respondent. To keep track of anonymity requirement, each 
respondent and matching transcript was given an anonymity colour code. In the numerical 
code for each respondent, STK stands for locally based policy actors across all categories. 
EXP stands for expert respondents interviewed outside the three countries. Each stakeholder 
and expert respondent was then given a number from 01 onwards, in chronological order. 
References for each respondent’s contribution includes the category of the respondent and the 
date of the interview. For example, the seventh stakeholder interviewed (07) was a respondent 
from a national regulatory authority, interviewed on the 1st of April 2015. The code attributed 
was therefore STK07G_NRA20150401. I use this numerical code structure to reference inputs 
from respondents in the results chapters. 
All recordings were stored in a password-protected folder and removed from the recording 
device. The data collected is stored in a secure encrypted folder, using the software 7-zip. Data 
which was stored on my personal laptop during fieldwork was immediately transferred to the 
secure LSHTM server upon my return to London. To ensure that no data was accidentally lost, 
it was also stored on a password protected folder on Filr and on an external hard-drive securely 
stowed in a locked drawer at LSHTM. This data will be stored on a secure platform for a 
minimum of ten years following study completion, in accordance with the Retention and 
Disposal schedule of LSHTM.  
The categories of respondents are attributed as follows:  
G – Government 
NG – Non-Government 
NRA - National Regulatory Agency  
NMCP - National Malaria Control Program  
MoH - Ministry of Health 
LEA - Law Enforcement Agency  
IGO - Inter-Governmental Organisation 
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INGO - International Non-Governmental Organisation  
LNGO - Local Non-Governmental Organisation  
Donor - Donor Organisation (or Country) 
Academia – Academia 
Consult - Consultant  
Pharma - Pharmaceutical Manufacturer (or Association) 
Country Category Organisation 
Type 
Organisation Names 
Cambodia G NRA Department of Drugs and Food (1) 
NMCP Cambodia National Malaria Center (1) 
NG IGO World Health Organisation Country Office (2), 
United Nations United Nations Office for Project 
Services (1) 
INGO Malaria Consortium (1), Clinton Health Access 
Initiative (1), Population Services International 
(1), United States Pharmacopeia (1), ACT Watch 
(1) 
LNGO Cap Malaria (1). University Research Cambodia 
(1) 
Donor Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (1), United States Agency for International 
Development (2), France Fond Solidaire 
Prioritaire Mékong (1) 
Consult Independent health consultant (1) 
Laos G NRA Food and Drug Department of Lao (6) 
NMCP National Center of Malariology, Parasitology 
and Entomology (1) 
 
MoH (1) 
LEA Customs (1) 
NG IGO World Health Organisation Country Office (2) 
INGO United States Pharmacopeia (1) 
 100 
Academia Lao-Oxford Mahosoty Medical Research Unit (2), 
Worldwide Antimalarial Resistance Network (1) 
Donor Anonymous (1) 
Pharma Domestic Manufacturer (1) 
Thailand G NRA Thai Food and Drug Administration (2) 
NMCP Bureau of Vector-Borne Diseases (1) 
MoH Bureau of Drugs and Narcotics (1) 
LEA Customs (2), Police (1) 
NG IGO United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (1) 
INGO International Organisation for Migration (2) 
LNGO PhraRed (1) 
Academia Chulalongkorn University (3) 
Pharma PreMa (1), Local Manufacturer (2) 
Presentation of results 
The next three chapters present the results for Cambodia, Laos and Thailand in three separate 
chapters (6-8). Each empirical chapter starts with an introduction to the historical and political 
context of the country. This background section provides a brief overview of the health system 
in each country of recent reforms and of the main policy documents regulating 
pharmaceuticals. It also provides a short introduction to the malaria burden situation in each 
country. The second section of the empirical chapters offers a chronological overview of the 
policy processes to improve access to quality medicines and to reduce the circulation of poor-
quality AMLs in Cambodia. This is represented in the form of a timeline. The narrative around 
this timeline is informed by the results of the document analysis and supplemented, where 
necessary, with data from interviews and from the literature. For each country, I include more 
information about the regulatory system for each country – by regulatory function. This 
information is available in the Appendices (Appendices 9, 12, 15). The stakeholder mapping 
provides an overview of a dynamic network of actors. I present information on these policy 
actors in a table format which is available in the Appendix section (Appendices 10, 13, 16). 
Gathering information on all the partners was useful for both the data collection and analysis 
processes of the thesis. The relationships between the policy actors were too complex to 
represent visually. However, where relevant, I do include a diagram of their interactions over 
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a specific program (as in the case of Cambodia). These visual representations only represent a 
snap shot in time however and the network of policy actors is as dynamic as the issue of poor-
quality medicines is complex. The third section of the empirical chapters presents the results 
from the semi-structured interviews conducted with policy actors on site. I present the main 
themes alluded to by government and non-government level respondents under each of the six 
frames that reflect policy actors’ perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines - its 
drivers and challenges. For each country, this section provides an overview of which frames 
were most prevalent among government and non-government respondents. The last section of 
each empirical chapter summarises respondents’ interpretations of the challenges and main 
contributing factors to the problem of poor-quality AMLs. In this last section, I reflect on the 
implication of findings for policy development in each country. 
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Chapter 6 Cambodia Results 
6.1 Background  
 
Figure 8 Map of Cambodia (Source: World Health Organization & MoH Cambodia, 2012) 
Cambodia, officially known as the Kingdom of Cambodia, is a constitutional monarchy 
bordering Thailand, Laos and Vietnam, with coastlines to the south-west on the Gulf of 
Thailand (see Figure 8). Both the Tonle Sap and the Mekong River flow through Phnom Penh, 
the capital city, where most government institutions reside, including the Ministry of Health 
(MoH). Currently, there are 25 provinces divided into 163 districts (srok), that are in turn made 
up of communes (khum). Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953. The 
Communist Party of Kampuchea (whose followers were known as Khmer Rouge) ruled 
between 1975 and 1979, marking a period of total social transformation of the country into a  
‘prison farm’ (Chandler 1991, p.239). The initiation of the Khmer Rouge regime led by Pol 
Pot, caused extreme suffering under a highly centralized ruling system, resulting in up to 2 
million deaths from warfare, overwork, executions, disease, and starvation (Chandler 1991). 
And then, following the fall of the Khmer Rouge regime and the Vietnamese occupation, came 
a period of civil war. It is only after decades of social disruption that Cambodia has recently 
entered a period of economic growth and more political stability. The foundations of the 
current political system were established in 1993, when the first elected government drafted 
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the Constitution of the Kingdom of Cambodia. The political system remains largely 
centralized, although some efforts to introduce administrative and political decentralization 
are underway (World Bank 2005). 
Indicator  Value Year (Source) 
Total Population (million) 15.6  2015 (WB) 
Gross Domestic Product - 
Purchasing Power Parity 
(International $) 
3,483 2015 (WB) 
Human Development Index (HDI) 0.555 
(Rank 143) 
2015 (UNDP)  
Table 8 Cambodia economic and development indicators 
Cambodia has been a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 
1999, and a member of the World Health Organization (WHO). It falls within the lower-middle 
income country (LMIC) category as defined by the World Bank, although its economic 
expansion has been relatively robust of late, with yearly growth at an estimated 7% relying 
predominantly on its textile industry, the tourism industry, as well as the construction sector 
(Asian Development Bank 2015a). While poverty rates halved between 2007 and 2012 (from 
47.8 to 18.9%), there is still high income inequality, especially between urban and rural 
populations (BMI Research 2016). Cambodia ranks 143rd on the Human Development Index. 
The working population of Cambodia is highly mobile, with migrant workers’ movement 
driven by economic concerns towards border areas, where land development projects in 
farming and mining abound (Bourdier 2010).  
6.1.1 The Cambodian health sector 
Early efforts to introduce public health and sanitation in Cambodia date back to the French 
colonial period. During the Khmer rouge regime, however, the healthcare system was severely 
weakened. Significant reforms took place from 1990s onwards to strengthen the system anew. 
Since the 1990s, Cambodia operates a de-centralized governance health service delivery 
approach, through 24 Provincial Health Departments and 81 health Operational Districts 
(Annear et al. 2015). Despite substantial reforms and a relatively high health expenditure in 
part due to external support of donor organizations (at 5.7% of GDP), life expectancy in 
Cambodia remains below the East Asia and Pacific regional average of 74, at 68 years (World 
Bank 2014a). Moreover, despite health financing mechanisms introduced in the early 2000s, 
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Cambodia still has one of the largest out-of-pocket expenditures in Southeast Asia, including 
for medicines (ACTwatch Group & PSK 2014). 
Indicator  Value Year (Source) 
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 5.7 2013 (WB) 
Heath expenditure per capita (current US$) 61 2014 (WB) 
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure (% of Total 
Health Expenditure) 
74 2014 (WB) 
Physicians per 1000 population 0.2 2012 (WB) 
Pharmacist per 1000 population 0.01 2012 (IFP 2012) 
Life expectancy  68 2014 (WB) 
Table 9 Cambodia health indicators 
The Cambodia Heath Strategic Plan II (HSP II 2008-2015) drove the recent health sector 
reforms, and was designed to improve primary healthcare coverage (MoH Cambodia 2008), 
by promoting equitable access to health services and optimizing the allocation of resources to 
provincial health departments (WHO 2011). Despite the reforms planned under HSP II, access 
to quality healthcare and medicines currently remains patchy. Low salaries in the public health 
sector mean that many health workers seek to supplement their incomes by working in the 
private sector. This dual practice affects the quality of care available, as public health facilities 
suffer from recurrent unavailability of staff and long waiting times (Annear et al. 2015). Rural 
and remote communities have a significant shortage of certified medical personnel (Annear et 
al. 2015). This has been one of the various factors that have influenced patients’ negative 
perception of the quality of public health services. It is estimated that over 67% of patients 
first seek treatment from the private sector including private pharmacies (Kosal et al. 2015). 
Traditional healers are also widely respected in Cambodia and 50% of the Cambodian 
population relies on traditional medicines for treatment of less serious illnesses (Sokhieng 
2011; WHO & MoH Cambodia 2012). With regards to the pharmaceutical sector, there is 
currently a reported low density of licensed pharmacies per 1000 population (0.1) 
(International Pharmaceutical Federation 2012). Most pharmacies are run by non-pharmacists 
(Khan, Okumura, et al. 2011; Fougeres 2011) and unlicensed private sector drug outlets are 
largely prevalent in provinces outside Phnom Penh (ACTwatch Group & PSK 2014).  
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6.1.2 Regulating antimalarial medicines in Cambodia 
The main laws regulating pharmaceuticals in Cambodia are the Royal Kram (Law) on the 
Management of Pharmaceuticals (1996) and its Amendment (2007). Appendix 11, page 350 
summarizes information retrieved from a thematic content analysis of 15 Khmer law and 
policy documents translated into English. The MoH is responsible for the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals through the Department of Drugs and Food (DDF). The DDF has five separate 
bureaus with different functions, as summarized below (see Table 10 p.106). The Drug 
Regulation bureau and its provincial counterparts hold the mandate for the licensing of 
pharmaceutical outlets. There are three types of public sector pharmaceutical outlets in 
Cambodia, including Pharmacies, Depot A and Depot B outlets. In theory, Depots A and B 
pharmacies are set up when and where there is a lack of licensed pharmacy outlets in any given 
area. The Prakas on the Formalities and Conditions for Opening /Closing /Relocation of a 
Pharmaceutical Selling Establishment (2009) briefly addresses the problem of poor-quality 
medicines, and states in Article 25 that pharmacists are not allowed to ‘display medicines from 
illegal sources for sale; display medicines with no label for sale’. By using the word ‘display’, 
the implementation of this clause is uncertain, as medicines from illegal sources could be kept 
hidden and brought out on request without infringing on the law. Control agents within the 
MoH are responsible for inspecting and seizing poor-quality medicines in pharmacy outlets. 
The (2011) Prakas on Roles and Responsibilities of Control Agent (Article 8) mandates MoH 
control agents to seize ‘counterfeit medicines, medicines which are banned by MoH, medicines 
without license… and other suspicious exhibits’. This Prakas places counterfeit, expired, 
unauthorized, and unlicensed medicines (such as oAMTs) under the same definition. The term 
‘other suspicious exhibits’ adds ambiguity as it might also encompass substandard medicines. 
The Prakas does not specify how ‘counterfeit’ or ‘suspicious’ exhibits are to be differentiated 
or tested for. For more information on Cambodia’s pharmaceutical regulatory system, refer to 
Appendix 9 on page 340. 
Departments Functions and Roles 
Narcotic Control and 
Pharmaceutical Trade 
Bureau 
Licensing of pharmaceutical companies 
Registration of import/export companies 
Registration of traditional medicines 
Drug Regulation 
Bureau 
Development of drug legislation, regulations, policies and 
guidelines (e.g GMP) 
Conducts regulatory inspections 
Control drug advertisements 
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Registration and 
Cosmetic Bureau 
Oversees drug registration process 
Essential Drugs 
Bureau 
Promotes rational drug use 
Ensures adequate supplies for public sector 
Food Safety Bureau Regulates food products 
Table 10 Functions of the Cambodia Department of Drugs and Food 
The National Centre for Entomology, Parasitology and Malaria Control (CNM) is responsible 
for Cambodia’s malaria program and is involved in the procurement of ACTs in Cambodia. 
CNM decides on the required quantity of ACTs at a given time. The medicines procurement 
process is rarely made public in Cambodia, thus enabling only limited operational transparency 
within the Essential Drugs Bureau (WHO, 2008). This may have been part of the reason why 
CNM was audited for mismanagement of GF funds and thereafter lost its status as principal 
recipient of the grant to UNOPs. Additionally, there are reported gaps in the process of 
medicine distribution. Further studies suggest that the current supply chain of AMLs is 
complex and therefore difficult to regulate, making it challenging to monitor the quality of 
health products. With regards to the sale of AMLs for example, ACTwatch (ACTw 2014) 
reports that 60% of all AMLs outlets surveyed came from private sector outlets including 
pharmacies (20%), itinerant drug vendors (14%) and private for-profit facilities (12%). Adding 
to this busy landscape of pharmaceutical outlets, national malaria treatment guidelines change 
regularly, thus making it hard for licensed outlets to follow the regulations, procure and 
dispense the right treatments. The same ACTw report (2014) also suggests that the supply 
chain for essential medicines is heavy on wholesalers who trade among themselves, therefore 
creating a complex multi-entry-point supply chain. This makes the task of regulating the 
entirety of the formal and informal supply chain for AMLs a complex one. 
With regards to malaria, while Cambodia has been successful at reducing incidence rates of 
malaria between 2000-2015 by 50–75% – from 76,000 cases in 2003 to 25,152 confirmed 
cases in 2015 (WHO, 2015) – disease transmission persists in the hard-to-reach tropical forest 
areas. Although malaria no longer represents a major health concern in central Cambodia, 
transmission zones remain in border and forest areas which represent about 48% of 
Cambodia’s land mass despite extensive deforestation (Open development 2016). Both 
Plasmodium falciparum (61%), Plasmodium vivax (39%) malaria are present in Cambodia 
(WHO 2016).  Malaria, known as ‘forest fever’31 in Cambodia, is transmitted by mosquitoes 
                                                     
31 Another local term used in Cambodia is ‘krun chanh’ or ‘fever with chill’. 
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that breed in forests and jungles (Guyant et al. 2015). An estimated 44% of the population, or 
approximately 6.3 million people, live in high transmission areas (ACTwatch Group & PSK 
2014).  
The population most at risk are mobile and migrant populations (MMPs), including ‘forest-
goers’ – that is people who travel to and may stay overnight in the deep forest while doing 
activities such as logging, bamboo cutting, charcoaling, and foraging (Bhumiratana et al. 2013; 
Guyant et al. 2015). MMPs are also at higher risk as they are generally socially, geographically 
and economically marginalized with limited access to health services and medicines (United 
States Agency of International Development 2014). Resistance to artemisinin-based malaria 
treatments was first found along the Thai-Cambodia border in 2006 and reported in 2008 
(Noedl et al. 2008), although the WHO Global Malaria Programme suggests that resistance 
likely emerged as early as 2001 (WHO 2014). This region was also the epicentre of resistance 
to chloroquine in the 1960s (Bhumiratana et al. 2013). According to ACT Watch (2014), the 
unregulated sale of oAMTs, the limited access to ACTs and the availability of poor-quality 
AMLs might have contributed to the rise in artemisinin resistance. Artemisinin resistance is 
an added dimension to the complicated landscape of malaria control and elimination in 
Cambodia.  
The Global Fund to Fight Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GF) has disbursed over USD 121 
million to date in support of the malaria program (The Global Fund 2015). The United Nations 
Office for Project Services (UNOPS) Cambodia office manages the GF grant as the principal 
recipient (PR) and a main actor in the procurement of ACTs along with CNM.  Cambodia was 
the first to make a country-wide switch to ACTs as the first-line treatment for uncomplicated 
malaria in 2000, and to implement a national ban on the import and distribution of oAMTs in 
2008 (WHO 2015). The current first-line treatment for malaria in Cambodia is Artesunate 
Mefloquine (AS+MQ) and Dihydroartemisinin Piperaquine (DHA-PPQ+PQ). In case of 
treatment failure, Quinine Tetracycline (QN+T) is used (WHO 2015). ACTs funded by the GF 
are available for free from public health providers which include public health facilities, 
pharmacies as well as VMWs. However, private providers still play an important role in the 
treatment of malaria (Patouillard et al. 2011).  
6.2 Policy developments against poor-quality AMLs 
From my analysis, I discern three distinct phases in the policy process against poor-quality 
AMLs in Cambodia. Between 2000 and 2005 was a phase of issue formation around the 
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problem of poor-quality AMLs, whereby policy actors32 collaborated to gather evidence about 
the prevalence of poor-quality AMLs. The problem of poor-quality medicines had reached the 
policy agenda by 2005. Then followed a period of capacity building efforts, spearheaded by 
international implementing organizations offering technical assistance. Subsequently, policy 
developments around poor-quality medicines have largely been guided and influenced by 
growing concerns with the emergence of artemisinin resistance in Cambodia’s border 
provinces. There was a clear shift in policy approach in the year 2010, leading to greater 
emphasis on post-marketing surveillance (PMS) and pharmacovigilance (PV) efforts. This was 
mainly to enforce the ban on Oral Artemisinin Monotherapies (oAMTs), which contribute to 
the spread of artemisinin-resistant malaria. The timeline available on page 109 (see Figure 9) 
provides a chronological overview of the laws and policies introduced over time to regulate 
pharmaceuticals and their quality in Cambodia.
                                                     
32 For an overview of policy actors in Cambodia please refer to Appendix 10 page 343 
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Figure 9 Timeline of policy developments for pharmaceutical regulation in Cambodia
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6.2.1 Phase I: Evidence gathering and issue formation (2000-2005) 
6.2.1.1 The role of evidence  
Evidence of poor-quality AMLs in Cambodia contributed to the initial process of issue 
formation. The presence of poor-quality AMLs in Cambodia was first reported in 1999 in a 
survey by the European Commission-Cambodia Malaria Control Project on artesunate in the 
private sector. This survey highlighted that 71% of artesunate tablets and 60% of mefloquine 
tablets from 133 drug outlets in 8 provinces were of poor-quality (Rozendaal 2001a). In 
another study, Newton and colleagues (2001) reported that 25% of artesunate tablets collected 
in Phnom Penh and Seam Reap contained no active ingredient. In response to this new 
evidence, Cambodia introduced its very first ACTs by packaging Artesunate and Mefloquine 
tablets in-country (A+M) and distributing those to patients (Yeung et al. 2015). The WHO in 
Cambodia, the United States Pharmacopeia (USP) and the MoH of Cambodia conducted two 
surveys to better understand the nature of this threat. In 2001 and 2004, the MoH and the WHO 
conducted studies on ‘counterfeit and substandard drugs in Cambodia’ and reported a 
prevalence of 10.43% (2001) and 21.13% (2004) in ‘counterfeit’ essential medicines, 
including oAMTs as well as analgesics and antibiotics (MoH Cambodia 2001, 2004). It is 
unclear how and to what extent these pieces of evidence have been used in policy making and 
programme implementation. However, a number of developments in the early 2000s indicate 
increasing attention to this problem. For example, from 2003 onwards, technical assistance 
partners including Population Services International (PSI) and United States Pharmacopeia 
(USP), set up two initiatives in 2003 onwards that would prove crucial in supporting the 
Cambodian government’s efforts against poor-quality AMLs.  Arguably, this information 
might have contributed to an initial process of issue formation, where government officials 
progressively came to the realization that poor-quality AMLs were of concern in Cambodia.  
6.2.1.2 Technical assistance partners 
PSI and USP both actively contributed to raising awareness about the importance of drug 
quality monitoring, and proposed tangible policy initiatives to prevent the circulation of poor-
quality medicines and improve access to quality assured ACTs. USP supports the DDF on 
quality control operations of key AML samples since 2003 through the Drug Quality and 
Information (DQI) program, which was renamed the Promoting Quality of medicines (PQM) 
Program in 2009. Backed by USAID, USP uses the Global Pharma Health Fund (GPHF) 
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Minilab33 to perform field quality checks in 13 sentinel sites. It also provides training and 
equipment to strengthen the capacity of the national quality control laboratory as a concrete 
step towards strengthening the government’s capacity to control the quality of essential 
medicines. The PQM program provides technical assistance for post-marketing surveillance 
activities (Krech et al. 2014) and is implemented in collaboration with DDF, the MoH, the 
IMC, and other international partners including the WHO, the French Foreign Affairs’ Fonds 
de Solidarité Prioritaire (FSP Mekong), INTERPOL, and the Global Fund (Krech et al. 2014). 
As a result of quality control activities under the PQM program, the MoH released official 
bans on the importation and sale of products from manufacturers whose products were deemed 
of poor-quality (Krech et al. 2014).  
PSI works hand in hand with CNM and DDF on harnessing the private sector as a legitimate 
distribution channel for quality AMLs through their social marketing scheme (the PPM 
program). The Public-Private Mix Strategy (PPM by PSI) was first set up in 2003 by CNM, 
with the help of the international health organization and product development partnership 
PATH and Management Sciences for Health (MSH). PPM was set up to encourage 
certification of private drug sellers and to strengthen malaria diagnosis and treatment options 
in Cambodia’s private sector. PSI now works in close cooperation with CNM to implement 
the PPM Strategy. Malarine (Artesunate Mefloquine) is now sold at subsidized prices in 
private outlets trained through the PPM program. Considering the high percentage of patients 
seeking treatment from the private sector in Cambodia, respondents agree that the PPM 
strategy has been an important initiative since 2003 to improve access to more affordable 
quality medicines in the private sector, and to reduce the number of poor-quality medicines 
reaching patients. Through both the PPM and the PQM initiatives, PSI and USP were key 
policy actors in this first phase of issue formation and eventually, interest formation. 
6.2.2 Phase II: Interest formation around artemisinin resistance (2005-2010)  
6.2.2.1 The IMC: institutionalizing efforts against counterfeit and substandard medicines 
This second phase starts with a network configuration change and the establishment of the 
Inter-Ministerial Committee to Fight against Counterfeit and Substandard Medicines (IMC) 
in 2005. Further evidence emerged in 2003 and 2006 confirming that poor-quality 
antimalarials were still a problem in Cambodia. Lon and colleagues (2006) reported that 57.9% 
                                                     
33 The GPHF minilab: Developed by the Global Pharma Health Fund E.V., the minilab was designed to 
provide all the basic testing tools of a laboratory in one suitcase. It is used to test the quality of medicine 
samples in resource-constrained and remote areas, where laboratory access is limited. 
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of antimalarial tablets surveyed from licensed outlets and 75.2% from unlicensed outlets were 
found to be of poor-quality, with products labelled as being from Thailand, China, Cambodia 
and Vietnam, amongst others. The IMC was established as a coordination hub for the exchange 
of information across ten ministries for targeted efforts against poor-quality medicines (see 
Figure 10 page 113 for a visual representation of the committee membership). It was intended 
to serve as a platform to raise awareness across departments about this threat and facilitates 
the cooperation of health control agents, police and customs officials in fighting against the 
trade of poor-quality and unauthorized pharmaceuticals. Respondents suggest that the 
Ministry of Economy and Finance (MoEF) has a strong influence in this coalition, due to the 
power that it holds over approving the budget of the MoH. Aside from the MoH and the MoEF, 
the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) plays an important role in harnessing support against 
‘counterfeit’ medicines through the IMC, as it oversees criminal law against pharmaceutical 
crimes. There is no evidence in this study of any such penalties being implemented, however. 
The Ministry of Interior (MoI) within the IMC, coordinates the involvement of customs and 
police officials in the fight against poor-quality medicines in general. The IMC represents an 
important network configuration change to trigger regulatory responses against poor-quality 
medicines. The establishment of the IMC evidences that by 2005, the problem of poor-quality 
medicines had reached the policy agenda in Cambodia. 
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Figure 10 Cambodia Map of Stakeholders 
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Figure 11 Legend for Map of Stakeholders 
 
*The landscape of policy actors represented above is an attempt to visually represent complex and dynamic interactions between several actors, whose 
professional links are not limited to those represented here. These interactions change over time and this map only captures a snapshot in time to support the 
reader’s understanding of the position of the IMC.  
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6.2.2.2 A focus on artemisinin resistance and oAMTs 
Following the establishment of the IMC, the main focusing event in line with this second phase 
has been the increasing evidence of artemisinin resistance at the Thai-Cambodian border. This 
marked a phase of capacity building for efforts against substandard medicines in particular, by 
streamlining the distribution of ACTs and reducing access to banned oAMTs. The Good 
Pharmacy Practices Guide (2006), for example, has a specific section on AMLs, specifying 
that the sale of oAMTs is prohibited, that diagnostics should be performed first, and that 
serious cases should be referred to closest public health service. This provides instructions on 
the sale of pharmaceutical products from labelling instructions to adequate warehousing and 
storage facilities. It also discusses how to deal with ‘spurious’ or ‘expired’ medicines – to be 
kept separately for destruction. It does not, however, define what constitutes a ‘spurious’ 
medicine. By 2007, the WHO had banned the use and production of oAMTs and the 
Cambodian government followed suit in 2008, by officially banning the use, production and 
sale of oAMTs in Cambodia.  
6.2.2.3 Revised legal framework for pharmacovigilance  
Fears regarding the spread of artemisinin resistance and the ban on oAMTs coincided with a 
second window for pharmaceutical policy change and the introduction of the 2007 
Amendment to the 1996 Law.  The problem of poor-quality medicines was first mentioned in 
the Law on Management of Pharmaceuticals (1996). Article 12 of this law defined the scope 
of a penalty for medicines that are ‘counterfeit’ or of ‘non-quality’, as well as for ‘expired’ or 
‘unauthorized’ medicines. Here, the definition of poor-quality medicines revolved 
predominantly around trademark infringement and non-registration. The falsification of 
pharmaceutical products was addressed exclusively as a commercial fraud (for example in the 
Law on the Management of Quality and Safety of Products and Services (2000)) or as a 
trademark infringement, rather than a crime. The 2007 Amendment clarifies the definition of 
a ‘counterfeit’ medicine (Article 2.2), but alludes first and foremost to the substandard nature 
of the product with a dose of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) below the required 
threshold for drug efficacy. This definition does not encompass the notion of ‘intent’, which 
would qualify a poor-quality medicine as ‘falsified’. Once again, there is an amalgam of 
definitions between substandard, unregistered/unauthorized/expired, as well as counterfeit 
medicines. More specifically, the 2007 Amendment emphasizes the importance of addressing 
Adverse Drug Reactions (ADR) and improving pharmacovigilance (PV), in line with fears of 
rising resistance. The Amendment granted the MoH a mandate to recall batches in case of 
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reported ADR. The recall procedure does not refer to terminology of ‘falsified’ medicines but 
discusses pharmaceutical products that are ‘dangerous to health’. This suggests an emphasis 
on monitoring ADR rather than addressing the threat of pharmaceutical crime. The Good 
Pharmacy Practices Guide (2006) highlights the role of pharmaceutical outlets in ADR 
reporting and product recall. In parallel to this renewed emphasis on PV activities, in 2008 the 
Cambodian PV centre was established 34  with a Medicines Safety Advisory Committee. 
Despite the establishment of a PV centre, the electronic reporting database and national 
pharmacovigilance guidelines were only introduced in 2012 and ADR reporting still remains 
low – at 3% in 2011 (Nwokike et al. 2013).  
The 2007 Amendment also introduced changes regarding the penalties incurred for the import, 
distribution or sale of poor-quality medicines, which suggests a more conciliatory response to 
such unlawful activities. The 2007 Amendment outlines penalties for the production, import, 
export, and trade of ‘counterfeit drugs’, as well as pharmaceuticals of ‘non-quality’ (at Article 
12), and imposes a lower fine35 than stipulated in the 1996 Royal Kram. Furthermore, the 2007 
Amendment reduces the severity of the punishment for accomplices to an ‘administrative 
penalty’ instead of a fine (at Article 13). These revisions deter efforts towards a more 
transparent inspection process and suggest limited political will to penalise activity around 
counterfeit or non-quality drugs. Instead, the focus of policy efforts appeared to be on 
containing the threat of artemisinin resistance and enforcing the 2008 ban on oAMTs. The 
focus shifted away from poor-quality medicines as a pharmaceutical crime towards the 
challenge of substandard and unregistered medicines (oAMTs in particular), and the risks that 
these pose for the spread of artemisinin resistant malaria.  
6.2.3 Phase III: Strengthening post-marketing surveillance against oAMTs (2010-
2016) 
6.2.3.1 Enforcing the ban on oAMTs 
In the third phase of the policy development process, the introduction of a Medicines Policy 
(2010) offered a window of opportunity to align the role of the DDF and the MoH with the 
Health Strategy Plan (2008-2015) and the National Strategic Plan for Elimination of Malaria 
(2011-2015). As reported by Yeung et al. (2011), access to quality subsided malaria 
commodities in remote areas of Cambodia remained poor. In line with such evidence, the 
Medicines Policy focuses more specifically on the promotion of equitable access to good 
                                                     
34 The PV Centre is housed within the DDF, under the Essential Drugs Bureau. 
35 A fine of 2-10 million Cambodian Riels instead of 20-50 in the 1996 Royal Kram. 
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quality, safe and efficacious medicines and on promoting the rational use of medicines 
(including AMLs). It also calls for stronger PV efforts by encouraging health workers to report 
ADRs more systematically, and by strengthening the national laboratory known as the 
National Health Products Quality Control Centre (NHQC) to reach international standards, 
calling for a re-organization of its functions. This policy aims to reinforce quality monitoring 
activities, more specifically, through the enforcement of the ban on oAMTs. The MoH Control 
Agents, whose authority falls under the Drug Regulation Bureau of the DDF, have a mandate 
to seize ‘counterfeit medicines’ and ‘other suspicious exhibits’, as stipulated in the (2011) 
Prakas on Roles and Responsibilities of Control Agent. In 2010, the MoH led a crackdown on 
unlicensed pharmaceutical outlets to enforce the ban on oAMTs, as well as licensing 
procedures. This initiative marked a turning point when MoH Control Agents raided several 
pharmaceutical outlets including informal outlets at the Olympic Market (central market) of 
Phnom Penh. This initiative led to encouraging results (Yeung et al. 2015), including the 
reduced circulation of unauthorized oAMTs (some of which were of poor-quality) and the 
closure of numerous unlicensed outlets predominantly in urban zones. According to various 
respondents, government actors capitalized on this successful initiative, which also received a 
lot of attention in the media and from the international community.  
In this third phase, USP and PQM programs also continued their support of the DDF’s quality 
monitoring efforts for AMLs, and supported the enforcement of the ban on oAMTs. As a result 
of combined sampling and quality testing activities, 22 tons of falsified medicines were seized 
and destroyed between December 2010 and January 2011 (Fougeres 2011). Despite the 
support of technical partners, it appears that the focus of the MoH was predominantly on 
implementing the ban on oAMTs to strive towards malaria elimination in accordance with 
donor priorities, rather than strengthening post-marketing surveillance activities altogether. In 
fact, there is no further record in this third phase of concrete initiatives taken by the IMC since 
the ban on oAMTs. The FSP Mekong (a French government initiative which ended in 2015) 
did provide funding to facilitate more cross-sectoral cooperation against falsified medicines – 
but according to respondents’ feedback, this initiative has had limited success beyond the ban 
on oAMTs. Government officials’ focusing on the success of the 2010 crack down for 
example, diverted attention to the broader issue of poor-quality AMLs, including the 
pharmaceutical crime of medicines falsification and the illicit trade in falsified drugs. 
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6.2.3.2 Malaria elimination and the ban on oAMTs 
The focus on the ban and the enforcement of licensing procedures, results suggest, may have 
been motivated by the desire to ‘contain’ the threat of artemisinin resistance to support malaria 
elimination efforts. Arguably, the driving principle behind this third phase of the policy 
process seems to be malaria elimination and efforts against artemisinin resistance. Several 
donors, such as the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF), have provided substantial funding in support of 
malaria control efforts in Cambodia. As suggested by respondents, the bulk of international 
aid for health in Cambodia is aimed at malaria control and elimination rather than improving 
medicine quality per se. Donors’ interests are geared towards addressing the threat of 
artemisinin resistance, through initiatives such as the region-wide Emergency Response to 
Artemisinin Resistance (ERAR) led by the WHO or the Global Fund’s Regional Artemisinin-
resistance Initiative (RAI). This may explain the government’s focus on the ban on oAMTs, 
as oAMTs are perceived as directly contributing to artemisinin-resistance.  
When discussing the policy process and the key policy actors involved against poor-quality 
antimalarial medicines in Cambodia, respondents regularly mentioned Village Malaria 
Workers (VMWs)36  as having played an important role in the fight against poor-quality 
medicines, by providing information on health seeking behaviour and promoting the rational 
use of AMLs. ACT watch and Malaria Consortium were also identified as key organizations 
providing essential data on AML distribution methods. The mandate of these organizations, 
however, is towards malaria control rather than directly reducing the prevalence of poor-
quality antimalarials – although the latter objective can be acknowledged as part of the former. 
With increasing media attention and sustained donor support for efforts against artemisinin 
resistance (and therefore against the circulation of unauthorized, poor-quality oAMTs), the 
government-level representatives emphasize the success of these operations, failing in return 
to acknowledge the current weaknesses that remain in the drug regulatory system to address 
the broader threat of poor-quality medicines. 
6.2.3.3 Cross-border cooperation 
With regards to cross-border cooperation against poor-quality medicines in this third phase, 
the Medicines Policy (MoH 2010) does demonstrate Cambodia’s willingness to engage with 
                                                     
36 VHWs are funded through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and 
managed by Cap-Malaria (Cap-M) and the National Malaria Program (CNM). 
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ASEAN-wide harmonization efforts. Since March 2010, applications for medicine 
registrations are made using the ASEAN ACTD and ACTR forms as part of the harmonization 
of pharmaceutical regulatory procedures in Southeast Asia. While official intentions to 
cooperate regionally are clearer within official documents of the Ministry of Commerce (such 
as the 2000 Law on the Management of Quality and Safety of products and Services), which 
institutionalizes the exchange of information with regional associations and international 
agencies, the Medicines Policy calls for the facilitation of regional cooperation and for sharing 
common procedures and experiences among ASEAN member states. Although a less 
systematic commitment, it is an important one nevertheless which suggests an intention to 
address a threat that is inherently regional (the threat of artemisinin resistance).  
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6.3 Perceptions of the problem of poor-quality AMLs 
In this section, I present the findings from 17 stakeholder interviews conducted in 2015 in 
Phnom Penh, with representatives from the government, members of implementing partner 
organizations, donor organizations, as well as external consultants to the Cambodian health 
sector. These findings are summarized in Table 11 on page 120. While most participants 
seemed open to addressing the topic of medicine regulation and the problem of poor-quality 
medicines, there remained a notable degree of political sensitivity around the topic among 
government-level representatives, which many non-government interviewees were quick to 
warn me about.  Some mentioned that this sensitivity might be due to government-linked 
vested interests in what has been described as a rather opaque procurement process. Due to 
the political sensitivity, many government officials refused to be interviewed. In some cases, 
I had to shift the focus of the interviews with some respondents to ‘access to medicines’ as a 
general topic before addressing the perceived threat of loosely termed ‘poor-quality 
medicines’, including both falsified and substandard medicines. For the Ministry of Interior 
representatives (in charge of the inspection of medicines for example), a lengthy bureaucratic 
process to request an interview made it impossible to interview a representative before the end 
of my fieldwork. Thus, I was only able to interview two government-level respondents in 
Cambodia. Due to the difficulty of obtaining open accounts regarding the situation of poor-
quality medicines, many more interviews were conducted with implementing partner (IP) 
organizations and International Organizations (IOs) working with the Cambodian Ministry of 
Health (MoH), and whose views served to provide additional information on the Cambodian 
situation.
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Frame Description 
Medical Government respondents dismiss the challenge of poor-quality AMLs and emphasize the 
problem of oAMTs for malaria elimination. 
Political Non government respondents highlight the lack of transparency in policy processes, the 
supply chain of pharmaceuticals and quality monitoring efforts, linking the problem of 
vested interests to the low political commitment to the problem of poor-quality medicines. 
Regulatory Both categories of respondents refer to the lack of financial and human capacity and poor 
cross-sectoral cooperation efforts to regulate pharmaceutical effectively. 
Health Systems Non-government respondents explain that the patchy access to health services and the 
distribution of cocktails of drugs through unqualified pharmacy personnel, are health 
system challenges that impact access to quality medicines. Patchy access to health services 
and lack of enforcement of health practitioner licenses. 
Security Government respondents describe the problem of poor-quality medicines as a problem 
coming from the region and posing a national security concern, while both categories of 
respondents stated that the demand for cheaper accessible treatments among MMPs 
remains a challenge that requires better cross-border cooperation.  
Economic Few references were made to the economic frame, however, respondents expressed 
concern at the increased flow of illicit goods following the AEC 2015 and discuss the 
affordability of AML treatments. 
Table 11 Summary of frames detailing stakeholder perception of factors contributing to the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Cambodia 
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6.3.1 Medical Frame 
6.3.1.1 Focus on unauthorised medicines 
A common viewpoint among government-level respondents including representatives from 
the DDF, was that poor-quality medicines were ‘no longer a problem’ in Cambodia, especially 
since the 2010 crackdown on unlicensed outlets to enforce the ban on oAMTs. Government 
respondents largely framed the case of Cambodia as a concern for rising artemisinin resistance, 
and regularly diverted our discussions on falsified and substandard medicines towards risks of 
substandard or unauthorised medicines including oAMTs for rising resistance to artemisinin. 
Respondents often placed issues related to unauthorized medicines and poor-quality medicines 
in the same basket: 
The issue of oAMTs, poor-quality, and substandard, fake medicines and so on, 
[all] this is a business. (STK08NG_LNGO20150402) 
During our interviews, it was common for government officials to steer the discussion away 
from the topic of falsified medicines and re-centre the debate around oAMTs, as illustrated in 
this response on poor-quality medicines:  
Until today we have very good results that suggest that […] it's hard to find 
monotherapies [in] private outlets. But we cannot say zero, we have to assess 
further if possible. (STK08NG_LNGO20150402) 
In a process of frame shifting, respondents shifted the focus of discussions away from the 
problem of poor-quality medicines and towards unauthorised medicines. Instead, government 
level respondents alluded to the fact that poor-quality medicines, even if they may be smuggled 
into Cambodia, ‘could not be sold in the country’ (STK10G_NMCP20150402); therefore 
dismissing the existence of unlicensed providers and the informal supply chain, through which 
these products might reach patients. The respondents interviewed were quick to highlight the 
success of Cambodia’s efforts against unregistered oAMTs as a treatment no longer 
recommended by the WHO and unauthorised for sale in Cambodia. Government respondents 
referred to three key initiatives including the IMC in support of the ban on oAMTs, as well as 
the PPM program, to illustrate Cambodia’s efforts against unauthorised medicines.   
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6.3.1.2 Malaria elimination 
Through this process of frame shifting, respondents re-centred the discussion on malaria 
control efforts, rather than efforts against poor-quality essential medicines in general. The 
focus on malaria elimination efforts was a common tendency among other non-government 
respondents. The results suggest consensus among government-level and non-government 
respondents on the fact that the policy initiatives detailed above have successfully contributed 
to improving access to quality AMLs. Some respondents shifted the discussions on to the 
VMWs, arguing that they had been instrumental in preventing patients in hard to reach areas 
from seeking care from unlicensed outlets. This is yet another example of how respondents 
framed the issue of poor-quality medicines in terms of malaria elimination. 
Most government respondents shifted the focus away from the pharmaceutical crime of 
falsification to emphasize the success of Cambodia’s efforts towards banning unauthorized 
medicines including oAMTs, in support of efforts towards malaria control and elimination 
efforts. By shifting the narrative to oAMTs and unauthorized medicines, respondents highlight 
the importance of malaria control efforts in Cambodia as a key policy priority, rather than 
efforts against the pharmaceutical crime of medicines falsification. While most government-
level respondents refrained from using the terms ‘counterfeit’ or ‘falsified’, many refocused 
our discussions on the issue of ‘substandard’ medicines, as well as oAMTs. A local staff 
member from the principal recipient organization for example, clearly steered the discussion 
away from the topic of ‘counterfeit’ medicines towards substandard medicines: 
In terms of the word that you used: ‘counterfeit’ drugs, another word that is also 
used is ‘substandard’ drugs. So, this kind of drugs is the link to the word 
‘resistance’ or drug resistance. (STK05NG_IGO20150401) 
Local respondents often insisted on the problem of substandard medicines in so far as they 
have been found to contribute to the problem of artemisinin resistance, perceived as the main 
public health challenge in Cambodia’s border provinces. While shying away from terminology 
linked to medicine falsification, most respondents used medical language to emphasize the 
dangers of substandard medicines, talking about ‘failure rates’ and ‘drug efficacy’ as a threat 
to malaria elimination efforts.  
6.3.2 Political Frame 
There is a discrepancy between the government narrative and that of non-government 
respondents, as the latter were quick to highlight the political barriers to efforts against poor-
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quality medicines, including AMLs. Most non-government respondents’ narrative referred to 
the political frame with three key themes: transparency and corruption; a lack of political will, 
and the influence of donor organizations on the policy process. Non-government respondents 
argued that barriers of a political nature hinder the sustainability and ownership of policy 
efforts against poor-quality medicines including AMLs.  
6.3.2.1 Transparency and corruption 
The issue of ‘transparency’ in Cambodian politics, was largely brought to my attention by 
non-governmental respondents. Under this theme, respondents referred to the wider problem 
of poor-quality medicines beyond AMLs and beyond malaria control efforts. Non-
government-level respondents detailed the lack of transparency in policy processes, the supply 
chain of pharmaceuticals and quality monitoring efforts, as well as the unreliability of the 
official data on the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Cambodia. PSI acknowledged that 
data flow was a challenge in Cambodia, with figures on the prevalence of poor-quality 
medicines from DDF often being unavailable or kept hidden (STK04NG_INGO20150321). 
Many respondents suggested that it is indeed difficult to obtain open accounts on issues of 
access to medicines from government officials, that there is high sensitivity around malaria 
control efforts and that malaria treatment guidelines in Cambodia are ‘a very political matter’. 
One respondent also referred to the problem of ‘pharmaceutical procurement efficiency’, 
insinuating a lack of transparency regarding the MoH budget as a potential driver of the 
problem of poor-quality medicines (STK06NG_Donor20150401). Other respondents argued 
that the bidding process for imported medicines was often skewed and that the government 
would sometimes ‘push down’ cheaper medicines of compromised quality or shorter shelf life. 
It was also mentioned that the procurement budget is very tricky to delve into with government 
representatives, who are aware that it could uncover unfair practices along the supply chain of 
pharmaceuticals. Considering the highly sensitive nature of these claims, it was therefore not 
possible to verify this information with the DDF. No government respondent mentioned the 
procurement budget or alluded to the report by the GF Office of the Investigator General on 
allegations of malaria grant mismanagement and the loss of PR status by CNM. 
Respondents explained that the lack of transparency and instances of corruption inevitably 
affect the implementation and effectiveness of existing rules and regulations to prevent the 
circulation of poor-quality medicines. Additionally, respondents argued that current national 
penalties against the manufacture, sale and distribution of poor-quality medicines remain too 
weak to act as a deterrent as the enforcement of existing rules and regulations has been reported 
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to be uneven across Cambodia. Other non-government respondents added that existing policy 
efforts against poor-quality AMLs may not be sustained in the long-term, due to vested 
interests among MoH control agents and law enforcers. One respondent said that, due to their 
low salaries, enforcement officials tend to seek extra income as wholesalers or suppliers of 
pharmaceuticals. For example, some control agents from the DDF have been reported to own 
pharmacies or manufacturing sites. Respondents also indicated that with a vested interest in 
the industry, some control agents might refrain from enforcing regulatory inspections across 
the supply chain or from surveying their own manufacturing sites. Respondents alluded to 
other events that suggest a lack of transparent decision-making within the DDF, including the 
sudden loss of lease of an internationally operated drug testing facility following the discovery 
of poor-quality medicine products in Cambodia – requiring costly equipment to be moved 
from one day to the next.  
6.3.2.2 Political will and accountability 
Respondents from non-government organizations also argued that the sustainability of existing 
policy initiatives and the commitment they represent against poor-quality medicines, was 
challenged by a lack of political will. The common argument was that there was both a lack 
of will to recognize the problem and to tackle it in the long term, through the regular 
inspections of drug outlets or through the prosecution of wholesalers and retailers found to 
distribute poor-quality medicines. It was mentioned that political commitment was more 
evident at the central level – in Phnom Penh – and more diffuse in the rural areas of the country, 
mainly because of the lack of accountability mechanisms for health inspectors in rural areas. 
One respondent added that community mobilization systems would be required to ensure that 
what is agreed upon in Phnom Penh is applied across all provinces.  While most respondents 
– both from the government and others – agreed that it was ultimately the responsibility of the 
DDF to tackle the problem of poor-quality medicines, many also argued that multi-sectoral 
cooperation was necessary to leverage resources and combine expertise for effective policy 
making against the circulation of poor-quality medicines. 
Respondents also referred to power strife among government-level policy actors, as one 
important dimension of the problem of poor-quality medicines in Cambodia. They argued that 
efforts to improve access to quality medicines are spearheaded by strong political figures with 
little accountability. One anonymous non-government respondent stated that:  
The MoH is not one thing, it is a collection of various strong people and they 
have their ‘fiefdoms’ and they protect it. (STK09NG_LNGO20150402) 
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The reported lack of synergy within and across departments provides no checks and balances 
for the effective implementation of regulation of the pharmaceutical supply chain.  Other 
respondents referred to a government-wide political power-strife impeding policy processes 
within the MoH. One respondent detailed the control of the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
(MoEF) over the MoH procurement budget, illustrating the case when MoEF had cut the 
procurement budget by USD 30-40 million to match the amount which was estimated missing 
from the procurement budget. Issues of power and accountability within the government were 
described as factors mitigating the success of current policy initiatives and impeding 
stakeholder cooperation. 
6.3.2.3 Donor priorities 
Numerous government-level respondents also emphasized the importance of cooperation with 
implementing partners and international organizations, to support policy making for 
improving the quality of pharmaceuticals. Despite strong partnerships with USP and PSI, 
however, many respondents referred to the divergence in health partners’ expectations and 
priorities. The varying mandates of these organizations are dictated first and foremost by donor 
organizations’ funding priorities, as an external health consultant pointed out during our 
interview:  
There’s a danger that a lot of donor funding is driven by external pressure as 
opposed to demand or need-driven priorities. (STK03NG_Consult20150331)  
Some explained that activities for improving access to quality medicines tend to be 
encompassed within wider yet more tangible objectives, such as malaria elimination or the 
containment of artemisinin resistance. Respondents explained that the issue of resistance has 
attracted many donors to Cambodia, resulting in a crowded and a reportedly largely 
fragmented landscape of initiatives.    
6.3.3 Regulatory Frame 
Beyond the political frame, issues of policy-making, transparency and cooperation, the 
narratives from several respondents from non-government organizations predominantly fit 
within the ‘regulatory frame’, encompassing issues related to the legal and regulatory 
frameworks and the implementation of existing policy mechanisms for securing the supply 
chain of pharmaceuticals.  
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6.3.3.1 Surveillance and Enforcement capacity 
Results show that the rules and regulations stipulated in policy or legal documents are not 
necessarily enforced on the ground. Most respondents, including some government-level 
respondents, highlighted a lack of institutional capacity – linked to low financial and human 
resources within the MoH – leading to a dearth in de facto regulation along the pharmaceutical 
supply chain. Even the enforcement of the ban on the sale and distribution of oAMTs was 
more patchy in peripheral rural areas of the country where unlicensed outlets selling oAMTs 
continue to operate (Khan, Akazawa, et al. 2011; Krech et al. 2014). A common viewpoint 
among respondents was that the lack of enforcement of pre-marketing regulations, including 
the licensing procedures on suppliers or importers for example, presents an added risk for the 
circulation of poor-quality medicines, as the government fails to address the problem at its 
source. In practice, one interviewee explained, any overseas manufacturer of generic 
medicines (from India for example) obtains a license based on a single sample batch of ‘good 
quality’ products, while subsequent batches are no longer quality-checked, therefore leaving 
room for poor-quality medicines to infiltrate the market. While the Medicines Policy (2010) 
encourages manufacturers to obtain GMP certification, respondents maintain that this 
requirement is not enforced as manufacturers are issued licenses to produce medicines 
regardless. Studies suggest a high rate of non-compliance with rules and regulations among 
wholesalers and distributors. One study in particular, suggests that only 10% of wholesalers 
interviewed had an up-to-date license to produce medicines (Yeung et al. 2011). For AMLs, 
DDF reportedly requires AML manufacturers to be both GMP certified and WHO pre-
qualified. In practice, however, respondents reported that due to the lack of WHO-prequalified 
suppliers for certain ACTs, CNM has reportedly procured antimalarials from non-WHO 
prequalified manufacturers, with pre-approval from the GF. 
Respondents explained that many pharmacies operate without a license, and fall beyond the 
regulation mandate of the DDF. Some mentioned the high number of requirements on licensed 
outlets, insinuating that this might dissuade drug vendors from obtaining or renewing their 
licenses. A major weakness in efforts to regulate the supply chain of medicines, according to 
a respondent from PSI, is that the private and public sector outlets are not addressed 
collectively: 
You either look at just the private sector or the public sector, but it’s very rare 
that both of these things are being viewed collectively. 
(STK04NG_INGO20150321) 
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Respondents also perceived post-marketing surveillance and quality monitoring activities as 
being inefficient and irregular. To illustrate this argument, some respondents also mentioned 
a general lack of capacity for quality monitoring activities. They reported that control agents 
with the mandate to conduct these operations are stretched out too thin, their mandate 
including a wide scope of responsibilities ranging from enforcement of manufacturing 
regulation, import and export rules, as well as the opening / closing of pharmacies. As 
stipulated in Prakas on Roles and Responsibilities of Control Agents (2011), control agents 
are also in charge of food and hygiene issues. Respondents also mentioned the GF’s parallel 
post-marketing surveillance system for AMLs, arguing that without GF budget, the 
government does not conduct sampling procedures to an acceptable standard. As another 
example, respondents from implementing organizations point out that efforts to close down 
unlicensed pharmaceutical outlets in 2010, may have been a one-off albeit successful effort, 
but that it remains unclear whether the control agents conducted operations of this scale since 
2010:  
There have been statements about […] clamping down on pharmacies that don't 
have an actual pharmacist sitting behind the desk. It rarely seems to turn into 
more than just one action […] it is not a systematic thing. But when something 
real happens which is international news - suddenly local doctors are on the run. 
(STK09NG_LNGO20150402) 
Respondents added that the current pharmaceutical regulatory system needs to be strengthened 
and requires a more proactive, rather than a predominantly reactive, approach to regulation. 
Numerous interviewees cited the incident in the Roka commune of Battambang Province 
where, in December 2015, an unlicensed village doctor inadvertently infected 200-300 patients 
with HIV/AIDS through intravenous treatments, due to poor medical practice. Triggered by 
the international media attention around this incident, the government took a strong stance 
against unlicensed practitioners, using this incident as a political showcase of their regulatory 
authority. As respondents pointed out, this is hardly evidence of systematically applied 
regulatory practice, but instead a ‘crisis driven theory of change’ 
(STK09NG_LNGO20150402). 
Other respondents explained the lack of capacity to implement thorough and systematic 
pharmacovigilance operations. While DDF is currently training to improve their reporting 
capabilities, pharmacovigilance reporting on adverse drug reactions remains very sporadic 
partly due, once again, to a shortage in human and financial resources. As indicated from the 
policy documents, this is not surprising considering there is no dedicated budget for 
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pharmacovigilance activities. Another illustration of this lack of capacity relates to the national 
laboratory, which is said to lack the necessary equipment and is largely understaffed: 
They [the laboratory] are under-resourced, under-funded and I think there’s 
only two or three people there. (STK03NG_Consult20150331) 
Because of the low capacity of the national laboratory, it is not able to test the quality of AMLs. 
The GF sends ACT samples for quality testing to an ISO-accredited laboratory in Nepal. The 
national laboratory is currently in a capacity building phase, with funding support from the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the World Bank, and with 
technical assistance by USP. The lab is to be ISO Certified and WHO-prequalified in the near 
future, although another respondent stated that this process has been dragging on over the 
years and it is unsure when it will be completed. While standard operating procedures are in 
place, weak technical capacity impedes the DDF’s ability to adequately monitor the quality of 
medicines.   
Another reason given for the lack of post-marketing surveillance is the relatively low salaries 
of MoH control agents. One respondent explains that in most countries, 75-80% of the MoH 
budget is typically dedicated to staff salaries. This figure is only about 45-55% in LICs.  
However, in the case of Cambodia the proportion of the budget reserved for staff salaries is 
18-20%, which indicates a proportionally low salary for law enforcers within the MoH (and a 
comparatively high budget for procurement representing over 50% of the total budget). 
Control Agents are therefore not incentivized to monitor the quality of services and products 
effectively. Respondents added that the large scope of their quality monitoring tasks across 
numerous outlets throughout the country is overwhelming, and that there are not enough 
agents or trained police officers to collect information, to report or to monitor the situation 
regularly.  
Respondents pointed to both the lack of policy enforcement, as well as the low prosecution 
rates for anyone involved in the circulation of poor-quality medicines, as reasons why the 
problem persists. One respondent explained that cases rarely make it to court, and that those 
sanctioned for pharmaceutical crimes are more likely to be the manufacturers or the smugglers 
rather than the producers themselves, suggesting that the existing laws are skewed in their 
scarce implementation and fail to address the problem of medicine falsification effectively. 
Finally, the regulatory frame, as one of the main frames in the narratives of interviewed 
respondents, explains why, because of the lack of capacity within the government to enforce 
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existing policy and legal mechanisms, multi-sectoral and stakeholder cooperation is a key 
prerequisite to harness the expertise and resources of each towards securing the supply chain. 
6.3.3.2 Lack of stakeholder cooperation 
Some non-government respondents reported that there is no synergy across functions within 
the MoH, and that most operations are spearheaded by strong political figures who use 
information to their advantage, and are reluctant to share the results of their activities with 
other parts of the ministry – therefore impeding on enforcement efforts. Government-level 
respondents (while generally dismissing it as problem in Cambodia) agreed that the global 
problem of poor-quality drugs goes beyond health and requires the involvement of customs, 
policy, justice departments – and highlighted the value of the IMC in this respect. Most 
government respondents referred to the IMC as the key initiative in Cambodia, harnessing 
cross-ministerial cooperation against poor-quality medicines. Regarding the enforcement of 
the ban on oAMTs, most respondents agreed that the 2010 crackdown on unlicensed pharmacy 
outlets had a positive impact on improving access to quality AMLs. Since then, respondents 
acknowledged that the number of unlicensed outlets had considerably reduced.  The common 
viewpoint was that the confiscation of stocks deemed of poor-quality, is indeed not possible 
without the preliminary intervention of police officials – thereby acknowledging a shared 
responsibility across the government for enforcing regulations to improve access to quality 
medicines. Nevertheless, respondents did report that the IMC meetings are irregular and that 
there have been few common operations since the nationwide implementation of the ban on 
oAMTs, as briefly mentioned in phase three of the policy process. This, respondents argued, 
may be due to a lack of political will to address a sensitive topic and a lack of funds to support 
further joint activities. Other respondents emphasized the need for sustained partnerships for 
health systems strengthening and access to medicines, beyond one-off mediatized efforts, such 
as the work of the Control Agents in 2010 in Cambodia or even INTERPOL-led Operations 
Storm. While these have had a notable impact and successfully led to the closure of illegal 
drug outlets in Cambodia and beyond, long-term initiatives with strong partnerships across 
borders are still lacking as a necessary way forward to improve access to quality medicines. 
6.3.4 Health Systems Frame 
The other predominant frame emerging from the discourses of non-government respondents 
primarily and some government-level respondents, is the Health Systems Frame. Here, 
respondents mentioned the weak health services in Cambodia and the impact this has on access 
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to quality medicines in general, and indirectly, on the circulation of poor-quality medicines 
including AMLs. 
6.3.4.1 Access to medicines 
Most non-government respondents referred to the overall structure of the public health care 
system, the patchy access to services, lack of enforcement of health practitioner licenses and 
the repercussions this has on access to quality AMLs and other essential medicines. While 
health insurance schemes, such as the health equity fund, are gradually reaching the population 
in the aim of improving universal health coverage, access to adequate health care remains a 
practical as well as financial issue in Cambodia. The fact that expenditure for medicines is 
mainly out-of-pocket explains why there might be a demand for cheaper alternatives. 
Historically, the aftermath of the Khmer rouge regime left very few qualified doctors in the 
public health sector. Since then, many perceive the private sector as being a more reliable and 
more efficient health care provider. One anonymous respondent working for an international 
organisation in Phnom Penh, mentioned that most public health facilities are dysfunctional or 
lack the necessary commodities, sometimes due to poor stock management of medicines: 
If there are facilities there [..] they're not functional or if they are functional, 
there are no commodities, that is a problem. If it [the medicines] is there but it's 
not the right one or it is out of stock, that is also a problem. 
(STK11NG_IGO20150403) 
In the most remote areas of the country, the only public health service available for the 
management of uncomplicated malaria is from health volunteers (also known as ‘village 
malaria workers’), who received basic training and are not certified health practitioners. Other 
non-government respondents added that health staff in the public sector are generally 
underpaid, and that the majority resort to dual careers in both public sector and private sector 
practices to earn extra income. This leads to a shortage of full-time qualified human resources 
in the public health sector, pushing patients to seek treatment in private sector outlets, 
including unlicensed ones. Respondents therefore linked weak public health services to 
general lack of trust among patients towards the system, explaining consumer behaviour and 
preferences to seek cheaper medicines from alternative sources among patients in the rural 
areas of Cambodia. The lack of access to quality public health services they reported, also has 
implications for access to quality subsidized essential medicines (including AMLs), as patients 
resort to private pharmacies, including unlicensed drug outlets, for diagnoses and treatment. 
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Respondents emphasized the need to strengthen the health system at large to improve access 
to health and medicines for all.  
6.3.4.2 Opaque procurement of medicines 
Numerous non-government-level participants referred to the patchy procurement process as 
another reason why poor-quality medicines may find their way into the market. Despite the 
structures for registration being in place, a recent USAID report suggests that 30% of 
medicines sampled on the market in Cambodia remain unregistered (Nwokike et al. 2013). 
Additionally, information on product registration outcomes are not available online. One 
respondent working hand in hand with the MoH, explained that the logistics management 
information system (LMIS) for the procurement of medicines was ‘leaky and un-transparent, 
in need of an overhaul’, and that procurement budget figures rarely added up – suggesting that 
the funds allocated to the procurement of medicines were not used efficiently 
(STK06NG_Donor20150401). The same respondent added that stock-outs and shortages of 
medicines remain despite the procurement budget having tripled over the last ten years. It was 
also reported that the complexity of treatment recommendations also affects the supply of 
quality AMLs. The treatment guidelines for malaria in Cambodia change regularly to adapt to 
the changing efficacy rates of treatment combinations for parasite clearance, and to mitigate 
the risks of artemisinin resistance. One informant at PSI explained that five provinces in 
Cambodia have recently changed to Artesunate Mefloquine, because DH Priperaquine was 
losing its efficacy. The same informant added that this complicates their task of distributing 
commodities nationally, especially when newly recommended treatments are not always 
immediately registered by the DDF. Respondents also reported that this change of 
recommendations generates confusion as to which commodities are authorized, and there is a 
clear gap in the availability of training to keep all distribution outlets up to speed on these 
changes. They added that it becomes tricky for drug vendors, as well as patients, to know 
whether the product they are buying from the private sector are authorized, recommended, or 
even of good quality – as falsifiers might exploit this complexity to create a market for their 
products. 
6.3.4.3 Distribution practices and unlicensed outlets 
The third theme under the health systems frame, relates to the proliferation of unlicensed drug 
outlets and dangerous distribution practices, as reported by both government and non-
government respondents. Respondents mentioned that a health care delivery system that 
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functions inconsistently, has inevitable repercussions on the continuous supply of quality 
assured medicines through the legitimate supply, leaving a demand for the recommended 
medicines that is not being fulfilled by legitimate suppliers. This is particularly true, they 
added, in remote areas where accessibility to the right services is a challenge. For these reasons 
it was reported that unlicensed outlets, with unqualified staff and inappropriate storage 
infrastructure, are more common in these areas despite the 2010 crackdown. This adds to the 
chaotic nature of the private informal drug supply chain or what one respondent referred to as 
‘pharmaceutical anarchy’. In fact, some government respondents avoided the topic of 
unlicensed outlets altogether, and re-centred our discussions on the quality monitoring 
activities of the government in the legitimate supply chain, suggesting that unlicensed private 
sector outlets fell beyond the mandate and responsibility of the DDF. Other respondents added 
that poverty in rural areas often comes hand in hand with a lack of education and awareness 
about the risks of purchasing medicines from unlicensed outlets. Some may be unaware of the 
existence of VMWs in villages, preferring to purchase their treatments from a familiar vendor 
who may offer a wider choice of medicines.  
Adding to the complexity of the supply chain and patchy procurement of essential medicines, 
the way that medicines are dispensed and distributed (especially in unlicensed outlets), has 
been identified by most respondents as another risk factor increasing the likelihood of poor-
quality medicines reaching patients. While guidelines for the dispensing of medicines exist 
(See the Good Pharmacy Practices Guide 2006), many respondents alluded to ad-hoc 
distribution methods as a risk factor for the circulation of poor-quality medicines. Even in 
licensed establishments, respondents added, the person selling the medicines is not always a 
registered pharmacist. In some cases, pharmacies are run by either a family member or friend 
of the registered pharmacist, doctor or nurse owning the shop. Unqualified personnel may be 
less weary of the risks of purchasing medicines from unlicensed wholesalers or itinerant drug 
sellers. Cambodian pharmacists traditionally provide a diagnosis based on the patient’s 
symptoms, and dispense medicines without packaging as a ‘cocktail’ of pills in a plastic bag 
referred to as ‘Tnam Psom’.  This ‘cocktail’ may include vitamin C or paracetamol for the 
least harmless, but also different types of antibiotics without issuing the correct dosage 
recommendations. Drug sellers in the central market of Phnom Penh ten years ago, a 
respondent added, would ask the patient whether they preferred the more expensive or cheaper 
alternative, and would prepare a concoction accordingly using medicines from various 
knowingly untrustworthy sources, potentially falsified, and obtained at a cheaper price. Other 
respondents noted that essential medicines including antibiotics and AMLs, can still be 
purchased without a prescription in both licensed and unlicensed outlets across the country.  
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6.3.5 Security Frame 
6.3.5.1 A cross-border threat 
Many government-level respondents perceived the problem of poor-quality medicines as a 
regional threat – a phenomenon reaching Cambodia from neighbouring countries along the 
Mekong region – suggesting that, if those countries strengthened their efforts against the 
circulation in poor-quality medicines, these medicines would never reach Cambodia.  
When you talk about fake or poor-quality medicines it is no longer country 
specific. This is a push and pull mechanism - if you have law enforcement in one 
country […] bad medicines will go to the border areas and cross the border -and 
that is a problem. (STK08NG_LNGO20150402) 
This frame links back to the ‘success story’, whereby government respondents dismissed poor-
quality medicines as a Cambodian problem, and tended to shift the blame to neighbouring 
countries for allowing such medicines to circulate across borders. A respondent from an 
implementing partner organization stated: 
It’s not Cambodia -its regional - if the neighbour[s] could manage strictly their 
drugs it could be better. (STK05NG_IGO20150401) 
Some respondents referred to the geographic proximity of Cambodia to areas known for their 
production of falsified medicine such as South-western China, or Vietnam – as stated by a 
respondent from the DDF below:  
In Cambodia, there are also some neighbour countries that import substandard 
or counterfeit drugs - for example some other drugs from Vietnam - and also 
from China. (STK05NG_IGO20150401) 
Another respondent added that poor-quality medicines might also flow in from Myanmar, 
where it is implied that the ban on oAMTs has not been successfully enforced yet and 
regulatory efforts for access to quality medicines in general are lagging behind. The recent 
establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) only exacerbates fears of poor-
quality medicines entering the country, through more porous borders and a more significant 
influx of goods and people into Cambodia. Many respondents also reported that the cross-
border circulation of poor-quality and unauthorized medicines is particularly dangerous for 
Cambodia because of the risks of increased artemisinin resistance. Once again, the ‘security 
frame’ bridges to the ‘medical frame’, with an emphasis on the risks of resistance.  
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6.3.5.2 Dynamics of migration 
Government-level respondents stated that the intense cross-border movement of Mobile 
Migrant Populations (MMPs) in Cambodia’s border areas, poses risks for national security 
due to the risks of smuggling in poor-quality products, including medicines. Bridging onto the 
‘medical frame’ once again, many added that this is an additional challenge for malaria control 
efforts.  
…[T]hey [MMPs] bring malaria from the side where they work or they bring 
malaria from their original country. You see the dynamic of spreading, 
particularly in terms of artemisinin resistance... and of course it has an impact on 
malaria elimination. (STK08NG_LNGO20150402) 
Cambodia is both a receiver country of migrants from Vietnam and Lao PDR and a sender 
country, with Cambodians travelling to Thailand for higher paid work. Illegal logging was a 
major activity at Cambodia’s borders in the 1990s but has now reduced. Nevertheless, the flow 
of migrants persists for other development projects in the area and the movement of seasonal 
workers is hard to track, as they follow plantations or mining projects. For fear of losing their 
temporary resident status, or due to their undocumented statuses, respondents reported that 
migrants are reluctant to seek treatment from public health services in Cambodia. Many 
therefore chose to self-medicate. Respondents added that migrants drive the demand for 
medicines from unlicensed vendors such as itinerant drug sellers, and contribute to the 
circulation of poor-quality medicines by bringing their own medicines from potentially 
dubious sources into the country, and sharing those with fellow migrant workers.  
[T]he people in this region, when they move around they cross the borders, they 
tend to keep some medicines with them, and those medicines they purchase from 
the private sector – that’s connecting very well to the quality or to whether it is 
the right medicine. (STK08NG_LNGO20150402) 
Respondents also mentioned a reluctance among migrant workers to seek free AMLs from 
public facilities, driving an irrational use of medicines and inciting migrant workers to also 
bring their own doctors. A health consultant based in Phnom Penh commented on the case of 
Vietnamese plantations along the border: 
They [Vietnamese plantation owners in Cambodia] bring in a doctor and they 
also bring their own drugs [to the plantations] – that is where we see a lot of the 
importation of substandard commodities. (STK04NG_INGO20150321) 
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MMPs bring in services and products that they might feel more familiar with but that escape 
the control of the DDF, thereby complicating the landscape of drug circulation. Policy actors 
in Cambodia acknowledged the threat that uncontrolled cross-border movement poses in 
regards to accessing quality antimalarial treatments, and agreed that migration representatives 
should be an integral part of both a national malaria program and discussions on how to reduce 
resistance, as well the circulation of unauthorized or poor-quality antimalarials.  
6.3.5.3 Importance of cross-border cooperation 
Taking into consideration the scale of this perceived regional challenge, both government and 
non-government respondents agreed that the challenge cannot be addressed without inter-
sectoral as well as cross-border cooperation and leveraging of expertise and resources. Some 
respondents mentioned current efforts to acknowledge MMP movements across borders, such 
as Cap Malaria’s twin city project and VMWs recruited among migrants working in 
plantations by PSI, to share information about the risks of poor-quality AMLs and to improve 
access to good quality treatments. Besides efforts to reach out to MMPs through the VMWs, 
some respondents emphasized the relevance of fostering regional cooperation by working 
through supra-national bodies or associations such as ASEAN or the Asia Pacific Leaders 
Malaria Alliance (APLMA), to coordinate efforts against poor-quality medicines. Both 
government and non-governments respondents expressed scepticism towards regional 
harmonization efforts, however, considering the differences in required malaria treatments 
across the region and the complexity this brings, and the fact that malaria control in Cambodia 
is a sensitive case due to the risks of resistance. Bridging with the ‘medical frame’, government 
respondents reiterated that Mekong countries have different malaria profiles and are at 
different stages of malaria elimination, making cooperation on the issue of antimalarial 
treatments challenging. Additionally, some respondents added that ASEAN’s role would be 
limited to fostering dialogue between countries, but the issue of poor-quality medicines was 
first and foremost the responsibility of the national NRAs.  
Regional bodies help dialogue and cooperation but it is not their responsibility. 
(STK02NG_INGO20150331) 
On the other hand, others spoke of regional harmonization as an essential step and alluded to 
the role of regional bodies such as ASEAN to spearhead this movement further, while 
maintaining that governments hold first responsibility to improve medicine quality. 
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6.3.6 Economic Frame 
Respondents in Cambodia scarcely alluded to themes under the economic frame. Although, 
the ASEAN economic integration process and the ASEAN Economic Community was 
perceived as an added challenge to monitoring the circulation of illicit products flowing from 
across Cambodia’s borders – including poor-quality medicines.  
ASEAN harmonization will only benefit the rich countries and Cambodia still 
needs to catch up. (STK02NG_INGO20150331) 
Other respondents alluded to the affordability of medicines. Many asserted that because 
antimalarial treatments are available free of charge from public sector outlets, there is no 
demand for cheaper antimalarial treatments. Such statements support those made under the 
medical frame; that poor-quality AMLs were not considered a major concern in Cambodia.  
There are no fake antimalarials because the ones available in the public health 
sector are heavily subsidized by the Global Fund, therefore there is no incentive 
for patients to get ‘cheaper’ medicines. (STK10G_NMCP20150402) 
Fakes are no longer an issue because the treatments are less expensive. Other 
medicines are still an issue though such as lifestyle medicines also antibiotics. 
(STK05NG_IGO20150401) 
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6.4 Frames and the policy process 
A few observations can be made about the implications of my findings for policy development 
in Cambodia. Firstly, both government and non-government respondents mention under the 
‘Regulatory Frame’, that despite many official laws and policies being introduced since 1996 
to strengthen the supply chain of pharmaceuticals, there remain gaps in the pharmaceutical 
regulatory framework, especially with regards to effective enforcement of these rules and 
regulations. The main reason put forth for this lack of enforcement is the stretched capacity – 
both human and financial - within the MoH. This lack of regulation, it is implied, may lead to 
exploitable gaps in the supply chain, driving the demand for medicines beyond the legitimate 
supply chain and heightening the risks of both substandard and falsified AMLs from reaching 
patients. Results suggest that most regulatory efforts have been in response to key focusing 
events – the initial evidence of poor-quality essential medicines, evidence of artemisinin 
resistance or media attention around a crisis linked to poor-quality health services in the Roka 
commune. Initiatives for systematic cooperation against poor-quality medicines, such as the 
IMC, have not been upheld over the long-term. Instead, government officials emphasize the 
success of one-off enforcement initiatives, such as the 2010 enforcement of the ban on oAMTs 
and crackdown on unlicensed pharmacy outlets. This shift of emphasis on unauthorised 
medicines suggests a lack of political interest towards the challenge of poor-quality medicines 
per se, and seems commensurate with the focus, from 2010 onwards, on less targeted efforts 
against falsified medicines and a stronger emphasis on efforts against oAMTs.  
Both government and non-government respondents framed the issue of poor-quality medicines 
as a security concern, especially with regards to rising artemisinin resistance at the Thai-
Cambodian border. Under the ‘Security Frame’, both categories of respondents concurred that 
the flow of MMPs across Cambodia’s borders contributes to the challenge of poor-quality 
medicines. The emphasis on migration and artemisinin resistance as a regional security threat, 
reflects the government’s emphasis on the role of the PPM scheme and the VMWs – to reach 
out to plantations and migrant workers and work to extend access to quality AMLs for these 
communities at risk. The geographical position of Cambodia as a hub for border development 
projects but also as the epicentre of artemisinin resistance, may therefore have shaped the 
priorities of the government, whose emphasis has been first and foremost on reducing 
resistance and working to control malaria in border areas.  Government representatives argued 
that poor-quality medicines including AMLs are a greater problem in neighbouring countries, 
and that these may enter Cambodian borders only through MMPs, thereby shifting the blame 
for the circulation of poor-quality medicines away from the government. While both categories 
of respondents recognized the regional threat that the circulation of poor-quality medicines 
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represents, there was a notable reluctance among respondents regarding the feasibility of 
cross-border efforts. Once again, government representatives expressed scepticism towards 
the role of supra-national bodies such as ASEAN but praised instead, the ground-level 
initiatives with cross-border ties such as the VMW and the PPM initiative. As the government 
respondents interviewed also represent Cambodia in international for a, such as the ASEAN 
Pharmaceutical Product Working Group, this scepticism could explain the lack of emphasis 
towards regional harmonization of efforts for the regulation of medicines. 
Among government respondents, the problem of poor-quality medicines was framed more as 
a medical concern. It was not framed as a criminal law issue, and the language used is 
predominantly clinical rather than legal. The ‘Medical Frame’ was the dominant frame among 
government-level policy actors interviewed, within which respondents refocused the issue of 
poor-quality medicines on the associated risks of artemisinin resistance and the need to 
strengthen efforts towards malaria elimination. This frame shift could be explained by the 
priorities set by the mandates of key donor organizations. Donor organizations may also 
emphasize technical approaches to dealing with poor-quality medicines, artemisinin resistance 
and to working towards malaria elimination, while avoiding the politically sensitive issue of 
poor-quality medicines. A common viewpoint among respondents was that Cambodia was a 
‘step ahead’ of its neighbours in terms of malaria control efforts. Focusing on artemisinin 
resistance and malaria elimination, however, does not bode well for the case of other 
therapeutic categories of potentially poor-quality medicines that may be circulating in the 
country, and for general efforts to improve access to quality medicines. 
Under the medical frame, government respondents also denied the problem of poor-quality 
medicines as a ‘Cambodian problem’, and shifted the responsibility for the issue to 
neighbouring nations and to the movement of migrant workers. Most government respondents 
deviated from the debate around ‘falsified’, ‘fake’ or ‘counterfeit medicines’, and re-centred 
the discussions around the problem of ‘substandard’ or ‘unauthorized’ medicines. The fact 
that ‘falsified’ was not a part of the local respondent’s discourse is not surprising in so far as 
it is not part of official definitions either.  Instead, many respondents focused on ‘drug 
efficacy’, once again mirroring the main frame that emanate from the primary law and policies 
focused on the regulation of pharmaceuticals. Both in the legal documents available as well as 
in the discourse of government-level respondents, there tends to be an amalgam of definitions 
between falsified, substandard and unauthorized medicines. This amalgam of definitions is 
problematic, since these categories require distinct policy solutions and legal sanctions. 
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Non-government respondents, while validating the success of Cambodia’s efforts to enforce 
the ban on oAMTS, discussed the lack of transparency and corruption to explain that the 
official discourse should be interpreted with caution. Under the ‘political frame’, however, 
non-government respondents argued that the reported successes against poor-quality 
medicines, although validated by some recent evidence of lower rates of poor-quality oAMTs, 
might also be explained by a lack of transparency on data held by the DDF regarding the 
quality of other types of medicines. Non-government respondents emphasized that the 
sensitivity around the issue of poor-quality medicines means that some government officials 
were not willing to address the topic. This resonates with an apparent lack of political will to 
target the problem of poor-quality medicines especially the pharmaceutical crime of falsified 
medicines, as well as with the 2010 policy shift towards improving pharmacovigilance, drug 
efficacy rates and adverse drug reactions reporting; rather than focusing on cross-sectoral 
cooperation against the potential production, smuggling and distribution of criminally 
produced poor-quality medicines. Instances of corruption, especially with regards to the 
procurement budget, or in the form of vested interests in the pharmaceutical industry, 
respondents argued, still pose a problem for accessing quality medicines in general. The 
arguments put forth under the political frame seem commensurate with the shift incurred by 
the 2007 Amendment towards lighter penalties for the circulation of poor-quality medicines 
and, in particular, for officials acting as accomplices in such activities.  
Non-government respondents also explained that weak enforcement of current regulations and 
political strife has an impact on the health system in general. Under the Health Systems Frame, 
they argued for the need to improve access to medicines through health systems strengthening 
and good governance. Non-government respondents pointed out that because of Cambodia’s 
tumultuous political past, the public health sector has been largely weakened. As a result, the 
private sector is still perceived among patients as a more trustworthy alternative. Government 
respondents agreed that the proliferation of unlicensed drug outlets is a challenge that only 
complicates the overall supply chain of medicines. This seems to correspond with the 
importance granted by government officials to the 2010 enforcement on the ban on oAMTs 
and the successful closure of unlicensed outlets. In the process of developing laws against the 
circulation of poor-quality AMLs, respondents alluded to the government’s intention to ban 
the sale of AMLs from the private sector altogether. This was presented as a source of policy 
controversy among policy makers, with some arguing that such a decision would impact 
access to medicines altogether, since a large proportion of the population still relies on the 
private sector for access to health and medicines. In this sense, respondents recognized the 
need to further incorporate the private sector under the regulation of the DDF to improve 
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access to quality AMLs, which is the purpose of the PPM program. The PPM program and 
PSI’s branded medicines were framed as an important initiative to improve access to quality 
AMLs through the licensed private sector – where most patients in Cambodia still seek 
treatment. The majority of respondents concurred that the patchy supply and distribution of 
pharmaceuticals and weak enforcement capacity (especially at the provincial level) of 
pharmaceutical regulations, still represent a challenge for access to essential medicines in 
general. Ultimately, non-government respondents conveyed that, while the availability of 
poor-quality antimalarials may indeed have reduced considerably since 2010, the problem is 
likely to persist for other substandard or falsified essential medicines. 
Recent studies suggest that the presence of poor-quality medicines and especially of oAMTs 
has considerably reduced since 2010. However, poor-quality medicines in general remain a 
problem in Cambodia. Krech and colleagues (2014) report that failure rates have fallen from 
7.4% in 2006 to 0.7 in 2011, but that poor-quality essential medicines can nevertheless still be 
found. Falsified lifesaving medicines like antibiotics are still found in community drug outlets, 
grocery stores, village shops as well as open markets (Khan, Okumura, et al. 2011; Yoshida 
et al. 2014; Krech et al. 2014; Lon et al. 2006; Phanouvong, Raymond, Krech, Dijiba, et al. 
2013; ACTwatch Group & PSK 2014). The literature suggests that the supposed source of 
these poor-quality medicines lies in India, China or Thailand, labelled with names of (often 
bogus) companies such as VKP Pharmaceutical Co (Thailand), Brainy Pharmaceuticals or 
Guilin Pharmaceuticals (China) (Krech et al. 2014). Gaps remain therefore in Cambodia’s 
drug regulatory framework to address the threat of poor-quality medicines. 
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Chapter 7 Laos Results 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Figure 12 Map of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Source: United Nations; available at 
www.un.org) 
Laos, officially known as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (Lao PDR), is a socialist 
republic with a President, Prime Minister and Ministers forming the main executive body, and 
a National Assembly as a legislative body (WHO 2011). Laos is a land-locked country which 
borders five other Mekong countries (see Figure 12): China to the north; Cambodia to the 
south; Thailand to the west with a long border of 1,800km; and Vietnam to the east with a 
2,000km border. Laos shares a small part of its north-western border with Myanmar, at a 
location commonly referred to as the ‘Golden Triangle’. Due to its long borders, Laos is known 
as a transit country for the circulation of goods and people in the region (Kerr et al. 2012; 
Stuart-fox 2006). Forest covers over 45% of a landscape which is predominantly mountainous, 
especially in the northern parts of the country. The Mekong River runs along the western 
border of Laos, with many rivers and streams flowing through the land, making Laos a target 
country for investments in hydroelectric power generation. Laos is also rich in natural 
resources such as iron, coal, zinc, copper, gold, and silver. The 6.8 million population of Laos 
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is diverse and predominantly rural, comprising of 49 ethnic groups. Ethnic Lao people 
represent just over half of the population (WHO & MoH Lao PDR 2012). 
Laos has had a tumultuous history with long periods of colonization throughout the 19th and 
20th centuries. The country was under French colonial rule from 1893-1953. The legacy of 
French colonialism for the health sector was minimal, as the system in place at the time catered 
mainly for the expats and the ruling elite (Stuart-Fox 1997). Soon after the end of the First 
Indochina War, and the Geneva Conference of 1954, Laos was drawn into further conflicts, 
including the Second Indochina War and Civil War between two factions – the royalists and 
the communist ‘Pathet Lao’ (Meessen et al. 2008). During the Vietnam War, from 1963 to 
1973, the north-eastern part of Laos was heavily bombed (Boupha 1997). The monarchy was 
subsequently defeated, resulting in the end of the Kingdom of Laos, and the establishment of 
the Lao People’s Democratic Republic in 1975 (UNDP 2016), with the first constitution signed 
in 1991. Laos is divided into 18 provinces, including the Nakhon Luang Viangchan Prefecture 
with Vientiane as its capital. As a single-party socialist country, Laos is governed 
predominantly by decrees. Since the establishment of the Republic, Laos has gone through 
various periods of de-centralization and re-centralization (Kongsap et al. 2014). The 
government is now working to further develop a de-centralized health-care system by 
strengthening district-level management, planning and budgeting in order to overcome 
difficulties, including the lack financial resources to train provincial level staff (Phommasack 
et al. 2016; Kongsap et al. 2014).  
Indicator  Value Year (Source) 
Total Population (million) 6.8 2015 (WB) 
Gross Domestic Product – per capita 
Purchasing Power Parity (International $) 
5,675 2015 (WB) 
Human Development Index (HDI) 0.575 (Rank 141) 2015 (UNDP)  
Table 12 Laos economic and development indicators 
Laos is a member of ASEAN since 1997 and a member of the WHO Western Pacific Region 
Office. It has been classified within the Lower-Middle Income Country (LMIC) income 
category of the World Bank (WB) since 2011, and has benefited from steady GDP growth of 
7% over the last ten years (WB 2016). Laos switched from a centrally planned to a market-
oriented economy in 1986 (Kyophilavong et al. 2014), and infrastructure developments 
including better regional road networks –referred to as ‘economic corridors’ – have increased 
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the connectivity between Laos and neighbouring countries and boosted trade (WHO & MoH 
Lao PDR 2012). The economy is driven predominantly by the agricultural sector, which 
employs up to 80% of the Lao workforce and represents a third of the GDP (Kongsap et al. 
2014). Laos has long been a large producer of opium, although there have been successful 
efforts to replace opium fields with crops and to reduce addiction to the drug in the country 
(WHO 2011). The rest of the economy is driven predominantly by foreign direct investment 
in natural resource extraction including mining, deforestation for timber and pulp, and in the 
generation of hydro-electric power (WHO and MoH Lao PDR 2012). While overall poverty 
has reduced in Laos, 23.2% of the population still live below the poverty line according to the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB 2014). Poverty primarily affects the remote highland areas 
and is linked to poor road infrastructure (Kongsap et al. 2014). One main challenge to the 
economic development of Laos, highlighted in the literature, is a reported lack of mechanisms 
for accountability in policy making and implementation. The literature suggests that that there 
is room for improvement in the transparency of operations for customs control and for the 
collection of taxes (Stuart-fox 2006; World Health Organization 2011c).  
7.1.1 The Lao health sector 
Indicator  Value Year (Source) 
Total Health Expenditure (% of GDP) 1.9 2014 (WB) 
Heath expenditure per capita (current US$) 33 2014 (WB) 
Out-of-Pocket Health Expenditure (% of Total 
Health Expenditure) 
39 2014 (WB) 
Physicians per 1000 population 0.27 2010 (WB) 
Life expectancy  66.1 2014 (WB) 
Table 13 Laos health indicators 
The division of Laos during the war led to the creation of two zones with different health 
systems, which lasted until 1975: a communist led ‘Pathet Lao’ with military hospitals and a 
second zone loyal to the royal government, but with few resources (Boupha 1997). The 
cooperative-based health system which followed did not last long, but assistance from the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as development 
aid funds from Sweden, France, Japan and Australia, helped in the re-construction of the health 
care system. It was not until the mid-1980s that health reforms became a priority in the political 
agenda (Boupha et al. 2005). The current government health budget serves mainly to support 
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salaries and administration costs (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011) and the Total Health 
Expenditure as a percentage of GDP, remains low (at 1.9% compared to 3.8% in 1995). While 
out-of-pocket payments, on the other hand, are still high at 39% of Total Health Expenditure 
(compared to 37.5% in 1995).  Despite recent reforms of the health sector, it remains a highly 
resource-constrained system and is insufficiently developed at all levels (Jönsson et al. 2015).  
The Ministry of Health (MoH) is responsible for the administration of health care services at 
the central level, with 18 health divisions at provincial level and health offices at the district 
level as the main implementers of laws and policies (Kongsap et al. 2014). Reports suggest, 
however, that the public health care system is largely under-utilized (Dodd et al. 2009; WHO 
& MoH Lao PDR 2012). This might be due to poor accessibility to health care services, with 
the number of hospital beds per 1000 people in Laos reaching just 0.8 (Kongsap et al. 2014). 
The private sector offers a combination of modern and traditional health services and 
medicines – through hospitals and medical clinics. Laotian traditional medicine, inspired by 
Indian and Buddhist traditions, still holds an important place in health-seeking practices of the 
Lao people. Recent reports suggest loose regulation of the private health care sector, which 
may impede on the quality of healthcare services available to the population (Kongsap et al. 
2014). Civil society organizations including non-governmental organizations, also play a role 
in health service delivery, such as the Lao Women Union and Lao Youth Unions (Jönsson et 
al. 2015). Until 1995, health services were free of charge (WHO & MoH Lao PDR 2012), but 
since 1995, the government established user fees and a referral system. This, however, has not 
been adequately implemented due to a lack of criteria to identify the poorer members of the 
population who would be exempt from fees, and a due to a lack of resources to support the 
system as a whole (Patcharanarumol et al. 2009). Four social health protection schemes37 were 
introduced in 2001 which were later merged into one National Health Insurance Authority 
(Ahmed et al. 2013; Alkenbrack et al. 2013), as Laos strived to achieve Universal Health 
Coverage by 2020 (Annear & Ahmed 2012). In 2012, however, reports suggest that these four 
schemes only covered 18.5% of the population (WHO & MoH Lao PDR 2012).  
Recent reforms were introduced along with the Seventh Five-year National Health Sector 
Development Plan (2011-2015) and the Health Sector Reform Strategy (endorsed in December 
                                                     
37 Social health protection schemes include: 1. the State Authority for Social Security scheme for civil 
servants; 2. the Community-based Health Insurance (CBHI) (for monks, members of the religious 
orders and students); 3. the Health Equity Funds (HEFs) to assist the poor through contributions from 
the state and international organizations; and, 4. the Social Security Office scheme for enterprise 
workers, (Annear & Ahmed 2012; National Assembly Lao PDR 2005). 
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2012). The main focus of health care reforms to date has been on improving access to primary 
health care services, and improving maternal and child health as well as nutrition as these 
represent key health priorities for Laos (Kongsap et al. 2014; WHO & MoH Lao PDR 2012; 
World Bank 2016). The main source of funding for the development of the health sector are 
international donor organisations and donor partners. The literature identifies a few remaining 
challenges to the health care sector in Laos, the first being the shortage of an adequately trained 
workforce, with only 2.17 health workers per 1,000 population (WHO & MoH Lao PDR 2012; 
Dodd et al. 2009). Many health care workers were trained in socialist countries prior to the 
1990s and this has led to different standards of health care delivery across the country. Low 
salaries are another reason for this shortage and for the poor productivity among the health 
care workforce (Dodd et al. 2009). Indeed, most health care workers are concentrated in 
Vientiane where they benefit from better pay. Another challenge is the discrepancy in access 
to quality health services and commodities for communities living in the rural parts of Laos. 
Some are required to travel up to three hours to the nearest health facility (Thomé & Pholsena 
2009). The mountainous landscape and lack of infrastructure in these areas present major 
obstacles. The communities that suffer most from this lack of access are usually ethnic 
minorities living in mountainous areas. Laos still suffers from a high burden of infectious 
diseases including tuberculosis, HIV AIDS and malaria. More recently, Acute Respiratory 
Infections also represent a high disease burden for the country (Kongsap et al. 2014). 
7.1.2 Regulating antimalarial medicines in Laos 
The main policy for strengthening the health and pharmaceutical sector in Laos is the National 
Medicine Policy (NMP), first approved in 1993 (NMP 1993) and revised in 2003 (NMP 2003). 
The Law on Drugs and Medical Products 01/NA (Law on Drugs 2000) and its 2011 
Amendment (Amended Law on Drugs 2011) outline the specific rules and regulations 
pertaining to the management of pharmaceuticals. Appendix 14 (page 364) summarizes 
information retrieved from a thematic content analysis of these four documents, along with 
another five policy documents translated into English. The Ministry of Health (MoH) is 
responsible for the regulation of pharmaceuticals. The Communicable Disease Control 
Department of the MoH is the principal recipient of Global Fund (GF) grants for the 
procurement of antimalarials (AMLs). Under the MoH, The Food and Drug Department 
(FDD) is in charge of monitoring the quality of AMLs and other essential medicines, along 
with the Bureau of Food and Drug Inspection (BFDI) in charge of inspecting pharmaceutical 
premises. The FDD is made up of seven divisions, as illustrated in Figure 13 on page 148. The 
main divisions for the regulation of pharmaceuticals – both modern and traditional medicines 
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– are the Drug Control Division, the Traditional Medicine and Supplements Control Division 
and the Public Pharmacy Control Division.  
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Figure 13 Divisions of the Food and Drug Department of Laos 
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The FDD’s Drug Control Division issues licenses to pharmaceutical outlets, of which there 
are three categories in Laos known as First, Second and Third Class Pharmacies. First Class 
Pharmacies can sell a wider range of medicines and are run by a qualified pharmacist, while 
Third Class Pharmacies may be operated by pharmacist assistants or nurses. These pharmacies 
are not allowed to sell medicines on the National Essential Medicines List (NEML). According 
to a researcher from Mahidol Hospital, Third Class Pharmacies no longer exist in Vientiane 
and such pharmacies are intended to be removed from the system in the near future. Only 
pharmaceutical outlets that are members of the PPM initiative, malaria clinics or malaria posts 
are entitled to dispense AMLs. The BFDI replaced the Inspection Department of the MoH in 
2014 as the main body responsible for inspecting all licensed premises (drug outlets, 
manufacturing sites), and to verify compliance with the main rules and regulations across the 
supply chain of pharmaceuticals. BFDI inspectors are also responsible for inspecting imported 
pharmaceuticals at formal entry points to verify the products’ compliance with quality 
standards. According to a respondent from the BFDI, there is evidence of law enforcement as 
demonstrated by the recent closure of eight pharmacies due to their inadequate licensing status. 
More information on Laos’ pharmaceutical regulatory system is available in Appendix 12 on 
page 356. 
The Centre for Malaria Parasitology and Entomology (CMPE) spearheads the malaria 
program, promotes access to quality ACTs and supports efforts to contain artemisinin-
resistance malaria and eliminate malaria all together. With regards to malaria incidence rates, 
while the general burden of the disease has considerably reduced, achieving the Millennium 
Development Goal of a 75% reduction (WHO 2016), there have been recent outbreaks in the 
southern provinces of Laos. Between 2012 and 2013, there were a number of reported malaria 
cases and deaths (44 deaths in 2012 and 28 in 2013) predominantly among migrant populations 
working near the southern border (WHO 2014). The main strains of malaria in Laos are 
Plasmodium falciparum (42%), Plasmodium vivax (58%) (WHO 2016). Malaria is generally 
perceived as a disease affecting forest-goers in border areas. 31% of the Lao population still 
lives in high transmission areas according to the recent Malaria Report (WHO 2016). Recent 
reports also suggest risks of growing artemisinin resistance endangering those entering Laos 
via the Thai-Cambodian border in the South (Dondorp et al. 2009; Dondorp et al. 2011; Ashley 
et al. 2014).  
The GF supports the MoH, the Centre for Malaria Parasitology and Entomology (CMPE) and 
the FDD in its efforts towards case management and to optimize the uninterrupted supply of 
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malaria commodities, including good-quality and affordable ACTs to vulnerable populations. 
The GF has been supporting Laos since 2008 from rounds 6 to 8 and disbursed a total of US$ 
25 million towards the fight against malaria. The World Bank (WB) and the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB) are also key donors to support social development programs in 
Laos. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) also plays an 
important role as a funder to support efforts at building capacity for the regulation of AMLs. 
USAID supports United States Pharmacopeia (USP) as one of the main implementing partners 
to the FDD and the BFDI in Laos.  ACTs were introduced onto the market in 2005 and oAMTs 
are no longer authorized since 2007 as a first line treatment of malaria. ACTs are available 
free-of-charge through public health facilities and in private pharmacies, through the Public-
Private Mix pilot (PPM) program since 2008. The pilot was expanded in 2014 to include a 
total of 12 provinces. The chosen first line treatment of uncomplicated malaria is Artemether 
Lumefantrine and the treatment for severe malaria cases is artesunate injection. 
7.2 Policy developments against poor-quality AMLs 
From my analysis, I discern three distinct phases in the policy process against poor-quality 
AMLs in Laos. From 1993 to 2003, the country worked to develop its drug management 
system, including the rules and regulations for drug registration and licensing procedures. By 
2003, evidence of poor-quality AMLs circulating in Laos triggered a period of interest 
formation around the threat of poor-quality medicines and prompted efforts to strengthen 
quality monitoring activities between 2003 and 2011, with the support of United States 
Pharmacopeia (USP) as an implementing partner in this process. From 2011 onwards, the main 
emphasis appears to be on fostering more cross-border cooperation and increasing 
transparency to support the implementation of planned efforts against poor-quality medicines. 
The policy process is illustrated in the timeline (see Figure 14 on page 151), which provides a 
chronological overview of the laws and policies introduced over time to regulate 
pharmaceuticals and their quality in Laos. For an overview of the policy actors involved in the 
regulation of medicines in Laos, see Appendix 13 (page 360). 
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Figure 14 Timeline of policy developments for pharmaceutical regulation in Laos 
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7.2.1 Phase I: Building a drug management system (1993-2003) 
7.2.1.1 SIDA and health sector reforms 
Driven by socioeconomic developments in the country since the 1990s, Laos undertook a 
process of reforming its health sector (Kongsap et al. 2014) with the support of international 
development partners. Simultaneously, there were continuous efforts to strengthen the drug 
regulatory system to improve access to quality medicines between 1993 to 2003. This included 
the development of rules and regulations for the registration of pharmaceuticals and the 
licensing of pharmaceutical manufacturers, importers and distributors. Before the National 
Medicines Policy was in place, the delivery of drugs to pharmacies was a challenge and there 
were reports of mismanagement of donated pharmaceutical stocks that expired before reaching 
patients, or that failed to reach the right patients altogether (Jönsson et al. 2015; Thomé & 
Pholsena 2009). Loosely regulated private pharmacy outlets proliferated following the switch 
to an open market economy in the late 1980s, which led to the smuggling of many 
pharmaceutical products (STK25). These challenges drove support for drafting a National 
Medicine Policy (NMP 1993). This was drafted and approved in 1993, with the help of the 
Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) as the main implementing 
partner in this first phase of the policy process. The NMP was aimed at guiding the general 
development of a young health and pharmaceutical sector.  
7.2.1.2 LOWMRU and the role of evidence  
As a key focusing event of this phase, the Lao-Oxford-Mahosot Hospital Wellcome Trust 
Research Unit (LOWMRU) was established in 2000. Professor Paul Newton at LOWMRU 
first officially reported the presence of poor-quality AMLs in Laos, and the public health 
danger this represents in 2001, in a study on the quality of artesunate samples from shops, 
pharmacies and hospitals in five countries across Southeast Asia (Newton et al. 2001). While 
a relatively small sample of eight tablets was collected in Laos, 38% of those were deemed 
‘fake’. This was the first reported evidence of poor-quality antimalarial medicines (AMLs) in 
Laos available in academic literature. LOWMRU continues to gather evidence on medicine 
quality in Laos, evidence that serves as guidance for policy makers and legislators. Subsequent 
publications by the research unit alerted to the urgency of cross-border action to prevent the 
spread of artemisinin resistance, potentially exacerbated by the availability of poor-quality 
AMLs.  The work of LOWMRU also served to uncover the source and smuggling routes of at 
least some poor-quality AMLs and raise attention among donor organizations, attracting 
funding and support from the development sector.  
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In Laos, LOWMRU benefits from a close working relationship with several state-level actors 
including the FDD. As a research unit, LOWMRU brings together a network of actors through 
knowledge sharing. In its capacity to raise awareness about this challenge and gather political 
support for action to improve access to quality medicines, LOWMRU acts as a policy 
entrepreneur. The work of LOWMRU triggered a phase of issue and interest formation in Laos 
by 2003. With regards to sharing knowledge and expertise to strengthen drug regulation, 
however, Jönsson et al. (2015) note that since the mid-1990s, Thailand and Laos set up a 
bilateral health sector cooperation committee to learn from Thai expertise in strengthening 
health systems. From early on, Laos has been open to using scientific evidence to guide policy 
reforms and to sharing technical knowledge with neighbouring countries in support of efforts 
to strengthen the health sector. While it is uncertain to what extent scientific evidence 
influenced policy developments, there may be a link between the evidence produced by 
LOWMRU and the increasing attention from the Lao government towards the policy problem 
of poor-quality medicines.  
7.2.1.3 Poor-quality medicines defined as counterfeit or unregistered 
The Law on Drugs and Medical Products was introduced in 2000 and outlined more 
specifically the principles of drug management. Additionally, the (2003) Regulation 
Governing Drug Registration no. 1441/MoH (2003) provides more detail on registration 
procedures for pharmaceutical products in Laos.  Regardless, poor-quality medicines were still 
defined predominantly as ‘counterfeit’ or ‘unregistered’ medicines. At the outset, the 
definition of what constitutes a poor-quality pharmaceutical product in Lao laws and 
regulations, remains unclear due to the inconsistent use of a variety of keywords related to 
medicine quality since 1993. The main term used in the definition of poor-quality medicines 
in the NMP was ‘counterfeit’ – a choice of terms that inadvertently emphasized the trade 
infringement aspect of the problem over its health implications. This may have been a 
deliberate choice, although the data collected does not suggest a strong inclination towards the 
protection of intellectual property rights for pharmaceutical products. More likely, the choice 
of term echoes the preferred terminology used in global communications around the problem 
of poor-quality medicines in the early 2000s.  
The definition of poor-quality medicines available in the Law on Drugs and the Regulation 
no. 1441, still refers to a ‘counterfeit drug’ as an ‘imitation of a drug product, which is 
produced, distributed and legally registered’. Regulation no. 1441 (section 6, article 17) also 
states that ‘it is prohibited for individual and juristic persons to counterfeit the registered drug 
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formulas, trade names or generic name’. This clause exclusively refers to drug counterfeiting 
and trademark infringement. These last two definitions not only focus on drug counterfeit but 
speak of imitations of registered drugs only, thereby omitting from the scope of these laws 
any falsified medicine circulating in the country whose original brand is not registered in Laos. 
Penalties were established against individuals who produce or sell counterfeit or unregistered 
medicines. Regulation no. 1441 (2003), for example, establishes incremental levels of 
penalties for violations of regulations concerning pharmaceutical management. Any individual 
who sells ‘counterfeit’ or ‘unregistered’ medicines will see all drugs confiscated after a first 
violation, receive an additional fine as well as confiscation on second offence, and will be 
fined at 200% of the total value of all drugs in stock on third offence, with permanent closure 
of premises. Additionally, the Provision on the Establishment of Drug and Medical Equipment 
Import-export Companies (1442/MoH 2003) establishes measures against importers of such 
medicines.  
7.2.2 Phase II: Interest formation and quality monitoring (2003-2011) 
7.2.2.1 Quality assurance 
Results from a study published by Dondorp and colleagues (Dondorp et al. 2004) found that 
samples of artesunate tablets in Laos were ‘counterfeit’ after both chemical testing and 
package verification. Additionally, this study highlights the use of sophisticated technology to 
replicate the genuine ‘Guilin Pharma’ hologram on the packaging from falsified artesunate 
tablets in southern Laos (Dondorp et al. 2004). Another investigation of fake artesunate 
samples, collected 115 further samples in Laos with a total of 49.9% fake artesunate with 
either no or insufficient quantities of the Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient (API) (P. Newton 
et al. 2008). While in a further study, 180 outlets in 12/18 province were surveyed in 2003 to 
record the presence of oral artesunate monotherapies (oAMTs) (Sengaloundeth et al. 2009). 
Out of 180 outlets, 25 sold banned oAMTs, and 22 of those were deemed ‘counterfeit’. 
Although these findings provide vague estimates of the scale of the problem, such evidence 
may have prompted the FDD and implementing partners to improve efforts against poor-
quality medicines in Laos. 
The revision of the National Medicines Policy in 2003 formed a window of opportunity to 
strengthen quality monitoring operations. The revised NMP (2003, Article 2.3) emphasizes 
first and foremost monitoring on drug safety and efficacy for consumer protection rather than 
addressing the crime of falsified medicines. The focus of this policy is primarily on quality 
assurance, stating that ‘Quality assurance is a wide-ranging concept covering all matters that 
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directly or indirectly influence the quality of a product’ (Article 4). The revised policy states 
that pharmaceutical products proven unsafe or ineffective will be recalled and that Marketing 
Authorizations may be withdrawn, if a product are subsequently deemed non-compliant with 
submitted quality standards or found to be unsafe for consumers. While the Law on Drugs 
(2000) already called for the establishment of Toxicology Information Centre, the revised 
NMP strengthens pharmacovigilance procedures. Article 4.5, for example, states that the MoH 
should use existing international networks for quality assurance such as the Electronic System 
or Drug Information Exchange in the Western Pacific Region, to share information on drug 
regulatory decisions in other countries and improve Laos’ efforts in the quality assurance of 
new drugs. Article 2.10 of the revised NMP also encouraged the government to ‘identify and 
to promote research activities, which will provide evidence based decisions for interventions 
for strengthening the implementation of the NMP’. This is testimony once again to a strong 
focus on evidence-based policy making, with an openness to research and external 
collaborations. This emphasis is potentially a legacy of the involvement of SIDA and the 
Karolinska Institute of Stockholm as international collaborators in the drafting of the NMPs 
(Jönsson et al. 2015). 
7.2.2.2 USP and drug quality monitoring activities 
To support the implementation of drug quality monitoring activities, USP has provided 
invaluable technical assistance to the FDD and the BFDI, since it started its operations in Laos 
in 2003. The USP Promoting the Quality of Medicines (PQM) program proved crucial in 
strengthening drug quality monitoring operations in Laos. In its role as a main technical partner 
to the FDD and the BFDI, USP acts as policy entrepreneur along with LOWMRU for efforts 
against poor-quality AMLs, raising awareness about the risks of poor-quality medicines in the 
supply chain and harnessing political will to improve quality control of medicines. More 
specifically, USP supports post-marketing surveillance efforts and the quality inspection of 
AMLs, for example through the development of laboratory standard operating procedures, as 
well as a clear testing and sampling methodology. A yearly average of 250 samples in each 
province are tested on site using the USP-sponsored minilab. All suspect samples are then 
forwarded to the national laboratory, known as the Food and Drug Quality Control Centre 
(FDQCC). If no samples are suspect, 10% of the initial sample is forwarded through 
regardless. USP supports capacity development for the national lab in preparation for a 
potential international ISO certification for its testing methodology in the future. It also 
supports laboratory staff in their learning of English to facilitate this process. The PQM 
program, as an initiative, is present in more than one country throughout the GMS, and not 
 156 
only supports the capacity of the Lao government to improve their quality monitoring 
activities, but creates a region-wide network among Mekong countries to share information 
and expertise on efforts against poor-quality medicines.  
As part of the government’s efforts to improve access to quality AMLs, the sale and 
distribution of oAMTs was banned in 2007. Since 2008, the Public-Private Mix (PPM) 
program led by the FDD, with technical support from the WHO and funding from the GF, has 
been a key initiative to improve access to good quality medicines and to exercise some control 
over the private sector distribution of essential medicines, as suggested by respondents from 
the CMPE. The first initiative within this PPM program was to map private health facilities 
and pharmacy outlets in Laos to subsequently invite them to a training course on the use of 
RDTs for malaria diagnosis and on effective reporting of malaria cases. After this course, 
private sector outlets were given the option to opt into the PPM scheme with the signature of 
a yearly contract. Those that agreed to the terms (approximately 250 pharmacies to date) were 
given permission to distribute first line treatments to confirmed malaria patients. Despite these 
initiatives, respondents suggested that oAMTs are reportedly still available through unofficial 
channels (Skerrit et al. 2014).  
7.2.2.3 Improving equitable access to quality medicines 
Most policy and legal documents in this second phase of the policy process emphasize 
improving access to medicines, focusing not just on safety and efficacy and consumer 
protection, but on key issues of equitable access to health services and access to medicines for 
vulnerable populations. This emphasis is important because it translates into a priority focus 
on strengthening health systems in support of the principle of universal health coverage. The 
first NMP (1993) already emphasized the goal of ‘ensuring availability and rational use of 
high quality medicines at low cost, with a focus on vulnerable populations in remote areas’. 
Additionally, the overall objective of the revised NMP (2003, Chapter 1) includes ensuring 
‘equitable availability and affordability of essential medicines’. Under Article 8.6, the NMP 
2003 focuses on ’economic strategies for medicines’ to finance access to essential drugs and 
encourage cost recovery by harnessing donor financing to provide essential medicines for all, 
including for remote and vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the Law on Health Care (2005), 
which details the health insurance system, reiterates the need to: ‘improve the quality of health 
care to ensure that the whole population and in particular women and children, poor citizens 
and those who live in remote or isolated areas, have a good state of health’ (Article 5). 
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Despite an interest in the problem of poor-quality medicines, definitions of poor-quality 
medicines in rules and regulations drafted between 2003 and 2011 remain vague. The 2003 
regulation on import-export companies, for example (Article 14.4), states that the ‘import-
export of unqualified drugs, counterfeit drugs, drugs from improper sources, incorrect 
packaging….and all types of banned drug are prohibited’; hereby using in its definition of 
poor-quality medicines a wide array of terms from ‘unqualified’ to ‘banned’ vs. ‘prohibited’, 
none of which are defined further in the document. The term ‘falsified’ still does not appear 
in this definition.  
7.2.3 Phase III: cooperation against substandard medicines (2011-2016) 
7.2.3.1 Cross-sectoral cooperation 
The third phase, from 2011 onwards, is characterised by a general intention to enhance cross-
border cooperation to improve efforts against poor-quality. The revised NMP already paved 
the way towards more cooperation for quality monitoring activities, by encouraging the MoH 
to act against poor-quality medicines in cooperation with police, customs and other relevant 
agency bodies. Following additional evidence of poor-quality AMLs circulating in Laos 
(including results from the study by Sengaloundeth 200938), there was an attempt to clarify the 
roles and responsibilities of relevant bodies within the drug regulatory framework, and to 
improve checks and balances and systems in place to enforce existing policies. The Amended 
Law on Drugs and Medical Products in 2011 was a second policy window of opportunity to 
do so, while strengthening post-marketing surveillance. In Article 37, the Amended Law on 
Drugs (2011, Article 37) specifies the obligations of suppliers to report any ‘harmful effects to 
the health of users resulting from the use of poor-quality, unsafe drugs and medical products’. 
Article 36 encourages users themselves to report ‘substandard or unsafe’ medicines, thereby 
placing the medical responsibility on the user. In Article 42, the Law reiterates the 
responsibility of the MoH to handle propositions related to drug quality standards and to 
support the enforcement of the regulatory framework, from the registration of medicines, the 
licensing of pharmaceutical business operators to quality control standards.  Subsequently, 
efforts to divide responsibilities on quality inspections led to the establishment of the BFDI as 
an independent inspection agency in 2014, marking an important structural change in quality 
monitoring of pharmaceuticals. We have yet to see the benefits of this change, and will have 
to wait for a future appraisal. Due to the vague terminology around poor-quality medicines in 
                                                     
38 Samples of oAMTs in this study were collected before the 2007 ban on oAMTs in Laos and may 
results published in 2009 may not be an accurate reflection of the situation in this third phase. 
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the Amended Law39, this law still falls short of attributing responsibility or accountability for 
the pharmaceutical crime of medicine falsification.  
7.2.3.2 Defining substandard medicines 
The Amended Law on Drugs (2011, Article 39.3) explicitly prohibits any pharmaceutical 
business operators from selling drugs that are ‘counterfeit, substandard, deteriorated or 
expired’, and details further penalties for the infringement of its clauses. While these penalties 
serve to strengthen the system against drugs of poor-quality medicines, the extent to which 
they are enforced is unknown. The Amended Law is first time that the term ‘substandard 
medicine’ is used instead of ‘non-standard drug’ (2011, Article 3.4.), where a substandard 
medicine is defined as ‘a modern drug or traditional medicine, the composition of which is not 
consistent with its registered formulae’. This reflects rising concern around the problem of 
substandard medicines, and the implications of these for rising antimicrobial resistance. A 
repeat study of antimalarial drug quality conducted in 2012 suggests that the presence of 
falsified AMLs in Laos has considerably reduced since 2003, with substandard AMLs 
remaining of concern (Tabernero, Newton, et al. 2014). This was the first study to measure the 
change in prevalence of poor-quality medicines over time, including AMLs and other 
medicines. From a sample of 1,200 tablets of 158 different AMLs collecting from 147 outlets 
in five southern provinces with a high malaria incidence, 6.3% of the outlets were found to 
sell oAMTs. All samples contained the correct API and had no evidence of falsification, 
however 9 samples were found to have a lower dosage of the API. Authors add that evidence 
of falsification is hard to discern and, for samples with lower dosages of API, it is difficult to 
tell whether those may be classified as substandard or degraded. This study, however, suggests 
that the situation in Laos had improved by 2012 in terms of access to good quality AMLs, with 
substandard AMLs being more of a problem than falsified AMLs. Such evidence, along with 
rising awareness about the threat of artemisinin resistance also present in the Southern 
                                                     
39 Previous definitions of poor-quality medicines are superseded by the definition available in the 
Amended Law on Drugs (2011). In Article 3.3, the revised law defines ‘counterfeit drugs’ as ‘any 
modern drugs, traditional medicines, medicinal natural resources, cosmetics, health supplement, 
medical devices, controlled chemicals and dangerous chemicals which are intentionally falsified or 
imitated or copied from the products which are produced, distributed and legally registered, for the trade 
benefit purpose’. This definition contains the term ‘imitated’, which refers to copies of a product and 
therefore alludes to Intellectual Property (IP) Infringement. Interestingly, however, this definition also 
refers to ‘intentionally falsified’ medicines and therefore refers to the notion of intent which is at the 
core of the definition of this pharmaceutical crime. In this clause, the definitions of ‘counterfeit’ and 
‘falsified’ medicines are merged into one. Despite a more encompassing use of terminology, the 
reference term remains ‘counterfeit medicines’ and leaves room for confusion. 
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Provinces of Laos, seems commensurate with the emphasis on promoting the rational use of 
medicines and strengthening efforts against substandard medicines including oAMTs.  
7.2.3.3 Regional challenge of substandard medicines 
Policy actors gradually realized, from the evidence submitted at the regional level, that the 
problem of poor-quality AMLs was a regional health challenge, requiring policy coordination 
across borders. The revised NMP already promotes ‘international technical cooperation’ 
through ASEAN working groups on technical cooperation in pharmaceutical or the ASEAN 
consultative Committee for Standards and Quality, with the objective of harmonizing policies 
across the region (Article 13). In the pursuit of improving stakeholder collaboration to 
strengthen the regulatory framework, the revised NMP (2003) also emphasizes the need for 
more data to inform the development of Laos’ health system. Despite these clauses 
encouraging cross-sectoral collaboration, however, results suggest a lack of a strong policy 
subsystem to facilitate cross-sectoral cooperation against poor-quality medicines. The 
Amended Law on drugs (2011, Article 7) further encourages international cooperation with 
foreign countries or regional organizations through the exchange of information, science, 
technology and through capacity building programs. Additionally, the revised Customs Law 
(2011, Article 75) encourages cooperation between the MoH and other government offices at 
border check points. This same law also refers to Agreements of Greater Mekong Sub-region 
countries to regulate the movement of boats on the Mekong to prevent smuggling of illegal 
goods by river transport (Article 71).  
Despite these various clauses promoting cross-sectoral and international cooperation, it is 
unknown how regularly suggested meetings and exchanges of information take place, and how 
these might have negatively or positively impacted on the regulatory capacity of the MoH on 
the quality of pharmaceuticals. This favourable approach towards more cross-border 
cooperation to learn from neighbouring countries, echoes government-level respondents’ 
concerns regarding the lack of funding and capacity or capability nationally to enforce existing 
laws. This also relates to an admitted reliance on development initiatives to improve access to 
health services and to strengthen the health regulatory system. In this respect, government-
level respondents often expressed the need for more scientific evidence to justify the allocation 
of further funding in support of government efforts to fight against poor-quality medicines. 
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7.3 Perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines  
In this section, I present the findings from 17 stakeholder interviews conducted in 2015 in 
Vientiane with representatives from the government (9), members of implementing partner 
organizations, donor organizations, as well as the owner of a domestic pharmaceutical 
manufacturing site. The main themes that emerged from the data under the six master frames 
are summarized in Table 14 on page 161. The process of data collection in Laos was facilitated 
by the Lao-Oxford-Mahosot Hospital Wellcome Trust Research Unit (LOMWRU). 
LOMWRU, headquartered at Mahosot Hospital in Vientiane, benefits from a close working 
relationship with the Ministry of Health (MoH) and the Food and Drug Department (FDD). 
With the help of Professor Paul Newton from LOMWRU, an advisor on this project, I was 
able to rapidly identify government-level respondents, all of whom were very willing to 
discuss this sensitive topic. I welcomed the openness with which most respondents shared 
information on the situation in Laos, some of whom did not shy away from being critical of 
the regulatory system or acknowledging the weaknesses in terms of capacity to implement 
existing laws. Most interviews, however, were not recorded. The interviewing process was 
conducted in English although some respondents were more at ease with French. It was an 
advantage to be able to switch from one language to the other during our discussions. With 
regards to accessing information on official laws and policies in Lao PDR, both the FDD 
website as well as the online Lao Trade Portal, provide access to English translations of most 
Lao Laws and Policies pertaining to the health sector. The article by Jönsson et al. (2015) 
provides useful supplementary information regarding the gaps and challenges of the 
pharmaceutical regulatory system in Laos.  
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Frame  Observations 
Regulatory Both categories of respondents pointed to the low capability and limited financial and human capacity within the 
NRA to regulate pharmaceuticals effectively. Government level respondents add that cross-sectoral cooperation is 
an added challenge to the implementation of rules and regulations. 
Political Non-government respondents suggest that there is still a lack of political commitment resulting from weak 
accountability mechanisms,  the untransparent management of supply chains and the uneven enforcement of rules 
and regulators, particular in provincial and district areas. Government respondents explain that low political will is 
due to the lack of  data on the problem of poor-quality medicines. 
Economic Some respondents referred to the economic status of Lao PDR , the challenge of foreign investment exacerbating 
income disparity, and the low public health sector budget as a challenge to guaranteeing access to quality medicines. 
Security Both categories of respondents refer to Laos' position as a transit country, prone to illegal smuggling, as a challenge 
for the circulation of poor-quality medicines. Government respondents clearly portray Laos as a 'victim' among its 
GMS neighbours. 
Medical Most references to this frame were indirectly made through the security or the health systems frame. Only a few 
respondents explicitly mentioned the  irrational use of medicines as a factor contributing to the problem of poor-
quality medicines and some referred to the challenge of drug resistant malaria as a concern.  
Health 
Systems 
Both categories of respondents suggest that stock-outs of medicines due to inefficient reporting and quantification 
processes, as well as poor health infrastructure, impact access to quality assured medicines, especially for MMPs. 
Non-government respondents add that the high number of unlicensed drug outlets or pharmacy outlets run by 
unqualified personnel with poor distribution practices, also contributes to the circulation of poor-quality medicines. 
 
Table 14 Summary of frames detailing stakeholder perception of factors contributing to the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Laos 
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7.3.1 Regulatory Frame 
7.3.1.1 Inadequate regulatory framework 
Both government and non-government respondents discussed the poorly adapted nature of the 
Lao regulatory framework for preventing the circulation of poor-quality medicines. Some 
mentioned discrepancies regarding drug registration requirements, stating that some products 
do not require registration in Lao PDR. These include donated drugs, which are also exempt 
from customs duties, as stipulated in the Revised Customs Law (2011, Article 56). GF-funded 
AMLs may bypass registration procedures if they are procured through WHO pre-qualified 
manufacturers. Although the drugs must still comply with the quality standards set by the 
(2011) Law on Drugs, these exemptions might make it more challenging to depict poor-quality 
stocks – especially of a falsified nature – at ports of entry. Both government and non-
government respondents referred to discrepancies regarding licensing requirements for 
domestic drug manufacturers in Laos. In principle, all licensed domestic manufacturers should 
be GMP certified, but in practice this is not a requirement for licensing. While there is a 
national GMP certification program in place, managed by the FDD, respondents pointed out 
that no domestic manufacturing site has achieved international GMP certification to date. The 
lack of enforcement of GMP requirements, respondents noted, might be problematic for the 
circulation of potentially substandard medicines other than AMLs (which are no longer 
produced or procured locally).  
Government respondents added that the regulation of medicines along the supply chain was 
sub-optimal, leading to the proliferation of substandard medicines:  
Sometimes, it's from the transportation…the storage condition(s) in the rural 
area(s) [are] very poor. (STK21G_NRA20150408) 
Additionally, it was mentioned numerous times that the lack of regulation of private sector 
outlets remains a danger for the continued circulation of poor-quality medicines:  
Poor-quality medicines cannot be stopped from reaching the private sector. 
(STK24G_NRA20150508) 
With regards to post-marketing surveillance activities, respondents also reported that the BFDI 
is largely under-resourced, both financial and in terms of human capacity, to carry out its 
mandate effectively. Despite incentives to enforce existing regulations, respondents noted that 
inspections are not regular, primarily due to a lack of human and financial capacity within the 
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BFDI and the FDD. Another respondent pointed out that the most common type of inspections 
is ‘by advance notice’ instead of routine or emergency (unannounced) inspections 
(STK24G_NRA20150508). This, the same respondent added, reduces the opportunity for 
inspectors to notice abnormal practices within pharmaceutical outlets or manufacturing sites. 
Such factors, respondents agreed, make it more difficult to pick up poor-quality medicines on 
the market. 
7.3.1.2 Enforcement capacity  
Both categories of respondents also alluded to the lack of enforcement capacity to successfully 
implement what was perceived as a comprehensive regulatory framework, on paper at least. 
Government respondents openly acknowledged the lack of human resources and financial 
capacity of the MoH, the FDD and the BFDI. When discussing evidence of inspections and 
enforcement with respondents, only one example came to light; the closure of a pharmacy in 
Attapeu province in 2010. The literature also refers to the weak planning and overseeing 
capacity and capability of government officials in implementing drug regulation (Ahmed et al. 
2013). A government representative admitted for example that penalties for unregistered 
medicines were not implemented effectively (STK24G_NRA20150508). Another added that: 
Laos has a lot of regulation, documentation, laws on the books, but enforcement 
is almost non-existent. (STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
This ‘lack of rigor’ as the respondent added (STK26NG_INGO20150409), creates an 
environment where poor-quality medicines are free to circulate. Respondents from the BFDI 
itself expressed despair at the challenge of regulating a complex supply chain of 
pharmaceuticals, with the currently limited human and financial capacity and technical 
capability of the Lao regulatory and inspection agencies. They also explained that regulatory 
agencies do not always have the authority to enforce the regulations accordingly. A respondent 
from BFDI for example, referred to this issue of mandates: 
It is very difficult to perform the enforcement… because our inspectors do not 
have enough power to inspect… (STK23G_NRA20150508) 
In terms of technical capacity, both government and non-government respondents added that 
while the FDQCC is currently working to improve its standard operating procedures, the 
laboratory capacity to test medicines samples within Laos remains limited, therefore 
narrowing the scope of post-marketing surveillance activities.  
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[I]f we were to just test the average drugs in the average pharmacy on a regular 
basis, we would find a lot more substandard medicines than we do find but we 
have these only rare once every couple of years funding to do testing and it's not 
enough testing, it's not a big enough sample and so we don't really know how 
poor the quality is in the average pharmacy - but I believe that it's quite poor. 
(STK26NG_INGO20150409)   
The FQCC is largely under-resourced and lacks the required SOPs. While it is currently 
certified for testing one pharmaceutical product only (an antibiotic), laboratory staff are 
currently working to improve its capacity with technical support from USP aiming achieve 
ISO 17025:2005 certification and subsequently WHO pre-qualification status. Respondents 
from the FDD explained, however, that the current lack of adequately trained staff is a 
challenge, partly caused by a high turnover of trained staff leaving the regulatory agency for 
better paid jobs with partner organizations.  
The BFDI added that the lack of financial resources to conduct joint investigations and to arrest 
violators of the law is also a challenge:  
We try to create activities together with the stakeholders, but we have limited 
financial support. Also, we have a plan, joined together to investigate but it's just 
a plan. The budget is not coming. (STK21G_NRA20150408) 
This point seemed to bear some weight in our discussions, as more than once government-
level interviewees sought my advice for potential funding opportunities to support their 
activities.  
Respondents also explained that enforcement efforts are uneven across the country; often more 
sustained at the central level, and more diffuse in provinces further away from Vientiane:  
We need to improve the capacity of the local staff to strengthen their competency 
in terms of regulation and control [of] such kinds of medicine. Until now we 
cannot delegate to the district to do on their own because of insufficient staff 
especially pharmacists in the district level - we just delegate to the provincial 
health office to help, therefore we cannot oversee everything in the country in 
terms of medicine control. (STK30G_MoH20150410) 
Enforcement efforts at the border areas are perceived as particularly patchy. During my visit, 
I travelled to the Thai-Lao Friendship Bridge, located 20 kilometres away from Vientiane, 
southwards along the Mekong River at the border with Thailand. The customs representative 
I interviewed at this spot, admitted that stocks from trucks coming into Laos and driving 
onwards to provincial destinations were not systematically controlled – this was also due to 
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the sheer number of vehicles and people crossing this bridge daily. In a further illustration of 
lack of enforcement of existing rules and regulations, another government respondent 
confirmed that there have been no arrests or confiscations of stocks so far in line with medicine 
quality issues (STK23G_NRA20150508). 
Considering these limitations, respondents argued for the need to prioritise regulatory efforts. 
One respondent explained that enforcement priorities for Laos over the last decade have been 
targeting opium production and trade – a huge public health concern in the country as well 
deviating funds for the management of the quality of AMLs. Other respondents argued for the 
need to focus on the implementation of the ban on oAMTs and to optimize the legal supply 
chain of pharmaceuticals before addressing the challenge of poor-quality essential medicines:  
How customs can do a good job in the checkpoint to really implement the 
regulation of banning monotherapies to this area. I am not talking about the 
substandard or counterfeit yet…we are now fighting oral monotherapy – which 
is banned, but can still be found. (STK31NG_IGO20150410) 
7.3.1.3 Stakeholder cooperation  
Having acknowledged the challenges to regulatory enforcement, government officials 
regularly referred to the necessity for more cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation to 
support access to quality medicines. Firstly, BFDI staff explained that current collaborations 
between BFDI inspection agents, police and customs are ad-hoc and unsystematic. 
Respondents expressed hope for this the institutionalization of cooperation efforts: 
But for the time being there is not structured mechanisms. Its meetings, 
discussion and maybe in the future a structured mechanism? 
(STK23G_NRA20150508) 
BFDI inspectors are only mandated to inspect licensed pharmacies. However, poor-quality 
medicines are perceived by all respondents as a problem that goes beyond the licensed outlets, 
and efforts to uncover the circulation of poor-quality AMLs therefore means working together 
with police and customs officials. Seeing as customs officials are not trained to recognize poor-
quality or unregistered medicines, the BFDI has an important role to play at border 
checkpoints. A law enforcement official further explained: 
Whether the products transported are counterfeit or not is difficult for a customs 
official to tell as it is not their specialism. (STK27G_LEA20150409) 
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Government respondents commented that unsystematic cooperation between health 
inspectors, police and customs fails to support enforcement efforts. They added that instances 
of cooperation are even more infrequent at the peripheral level:  
There needs to be cooperation with police and customs. At present cooperation is 
rare and only at the central level and not very regular at all. There is little 
cooperation at provincial or checkpoint level. (STK29G_NRA20150410) 
Government respondents also mentioned that Lao customs officials cannot control the borders 
on their own, but require support from the neighbouring countries at international checkpoints 
to address the smuggling of poor-quality medicines between Mekong countries. Cross-border 
cooperation at customs level could be useful, they argued, to obtain information on the routes 
of the poor-quality medicines. Such cooperation could therefore support crucial evidence 
gathering to steer future regulatory efforts at the regional level. Many highlighted numerous 
challenges to cross-border cooperation. Some explained the sensitivity around the problem of 
poor-quality medicines, which impedes on cross-border cooperation efforts with countries 
such as China, when it comes to uncovering trade routes. Having acknowledged limitations in 
enforcement capacity, government respondents also concurred that support from 
implementing partner organizations (USP for technical support in post-marketing surveillance 
for example) or regional bodies is crucial. USP facilitates cross-border cooperation on sample 
testing by encouraging cooperation for joint investigations with university laboratories at 
Chulalongkorn University. While there is evidence that government officials are aiming 
towards more cross-border cooperation, the outcomes of current policy coordination efforts 
through ASEAN are still perceived to have relatively insignificant impact or benefit for Laos, 
as stated in the following quote by a government respondent:  
We try to make a cooperation [through] the ASEAN [for] so many years 
ago…They organize meetings, they train us about the methodology and how to 
deal with the AMLs also, but the benefit from these activities we perform is not 
much. (STK23G_NRA20150508)  
Regardless, government respondents acknowledged the value of sharing the burden of 
registration procedures for new medicines with neighbouring countries through an ASEAN 
harmonized registration process. Such a system, respondents argued, could provide support to 
bear some of the burden for smaller economies like Laos. Such statements offer testimony to 
the perceived value of regional cooperation to improve access to quality medicines. 
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7.3.2 Political Frame 
7.3.2.1 Political will and accountability 
The political frame was dominant mainly amongst non-government respondents. Besides 
acknowledging weak capacity and capability to enforce existing regulations, respondents 
highlighted a lack of concrete political commitment to enforce policies and laws to monitor 
the quality of medicines. The literature suggests that the enforcement of existing laws and 
policies has not been without difficulties (Jönsson et al. 2015). The sustained support from 
SIDA and Swedish partners in monitoring the implementation phase of the NMP did help 
enforce some of the guidelines listed in this policy, while the implementation process for the 
Health Care Law for example has proven more challenging (Jönsson et al. 2015). Other 
suggested challenges that may have delayed the implementation process include weak 
financing and leadership, as well as the difficulty of accommodating the needs of minorities 
and managing the relationships between all the different health financing schemes (Annear & 
Ahmed 2012). Most government-level respondents did, however, demonstrate a strong 
awareness of the challenge of poor-quality medicines and the associated public health risks. 
Fake medicines are a big problem, mostly for essential medicines including 
antimalarials and antibiotics. (STK20G_NRA20150407)  
During the interviewing process, many respondents provided detailed information about the 
current laws, and the incremental penalty system, as evidence of a strong awareness of 
regulatory frameworks in place. A respondent from the BFDI carefully highlighted the 
difference between ‘fake’ and ‘substandard’ medicines, a distinction that was not always 
enforced in discussions. While this might be testimony to strong political interest towards the 
policy goal of access to medicines, discourse from non-government respondents suggest 
otherwise. One respondent emphasised that the weak enforcement of the regulatory framework 
is due to a lack of sustained political commitment, rather than a generalized financial 
constraint: 
It's not something about the level of the economy…If people commit to fight 
against the fake medicines I think it's possible… it is the willingness or 
the commitment of the government to cope with the problem. 
(STK36NG_Academia20150413) 
This same respondent commented that further advocacy at higher levels of the government is 
required to keep the momentum of efforts against poor-quality medicines. A respondent from 
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an implementing partner organization added that political culture and a lack of political will 
in Laos can stand in the way of implementing efforts for the effective regulation of 
pharmaceuticals:  
…Enforcement is almost non-existent. Some of that comes down to budget, and 
some of that comes down to just culture – nothing is really enforced if you don't 
want it to be enforced. (STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
Accounts from other government-level respondents pointed to a lack of willingness to shoulder 
accountability for the potential circulation of poor-quality medicine in private sector outlets, 
deemed to be beyond the responsibility of the FDD. As seen previously, a respondent from the 
FDD explained that while there is no hard evidence of falsified medicines circulating in Laos 
since 2005, the FDD cannot stop those from reaching the private sector outlets, thereby 
dismissing it as a problem under the FDD’s responsibility. A respondent from the BFDI also 
mentioned that regulators between the central and provincial levels of government shift the 
blame for the circulation of poor-quality medicines to one another: 
It is related to trust among the persons who perform the enforcement together – 
they may think that those products come from the capital for example – because 
the capital [has] lots of companies, why don't you manage or control them. Some 
people may say that these products come from the province who have the borders 
with other countries - they make that discussion [debate], never finish. 
(STK23G_NRA20150508) 
Government respondents also referred to the political sensitivity around this topic with regards 
to the reputation of the country, which may explain this lack of willingness to delve into this 
problem further: 
It affects politics by making other countries think that for example, if we find 
counterfeits in the country, other countries may think that we have low regulation 
or that law in those countries may be poor – or that there may be corruption or 
something, for the staff official to perform the enforcement. 
(STK21G_NRA20150408) 
Another non-government respondent added that reliance on external funding and support to 
enforce existing regulations, is dangerous as it leads to complacency within the government, 
where officials rely too much on the work of implementing partner organizations to answer 
their mandates. This may be commensurate with a reported lack of political will. 
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7.3.2.2 Transparency and corruption 
Various respondents concurred that the lack of commitment to tackle the problem of poor-
quality medicines is mainly due to a lack of evidence or information about the scale and nature 
of this challenge. Government respondents argued that this results in low priority granted to 
the efforts against poor-quality medicines and mediocre budget allocations for drug quality 
monitoring.  Government level respondents further argued that this lack of data transparency, 
hinders their ability to seek further funding to support post-marketing surveillance activities 
and to guide the regulators on where to invest their meagre resources. A respondent from the 
FDD noted that the current infrastructure does not allow for the systematic collection of 
samples, but that in return, the lack of evidence to show to regulatory authorities doesn’t help 
justify investments to strengthen the laboratory facilities.  
Under this same theme, non-government respondents pointed to a different issue. One 
respondent from an implementing partner organization mentioned that the information that is 
available is not always considered, arguing that decisions are driven by political preferences 
rather than evidence: 
Decision-making is by decree - it's a political process it's not necessarily based 
on information but rather what is politically wanted. 
(STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
Another respondent from an international organization explained that this lack of transparency 
is also apparent in the management of the available funds, that the ‘lack of traceability of 
funds’ is a problem and that the government ‘need[s] to solve the transparency issue’ 
(STK38NG_Academia20150413). Non-government respondents explained that the politically 
sensitive nature of this challenge leads to un-transparent management of funds, and impedes 
efforts to cooperate across borders.  This lack of transparency, it is argued, translates into a 
lack of information sharing with the public. One non-government respondent explained that 
despite awareness of the dangers of poor-quality AMLs, only one poster was made since 2001 
(STK32NG_IGO20150410).  
Some respondents also referred to instances of corruption within government, which could 
explain the lack of enforcement of existing regulations to improve access to medicines. 
Enforcement is almost non-existent. Some of that comes down to budget, some 
of that comes down to [political] culture – nothing is really enforced if you don't 
want it to be enforced. (STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
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The same respondent explained that vested interests and corruption (often driven by low 
salaries of enforcement officials) means that poor-quality medicines could easily be pushed 
into the formal supply chain of pharmaceuticals: 
If you want your drug to be allowed into the country, if you want your drug to be 
purchased by a national program, if you want those things to happen, there is a 
lot of corruption in that. (STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
Finally, both categories referred to Chinese vested interests in Laos as a challenge for the 
efficient management of the quality of medicines circulating in the country. Some reported 
that foreign-run hospitals bring in their own medicines and escape any form of official controls 
in doing so – leaving room for a parallel supply chain of potentially poor-quality products. 
7.3.3 Economic Frame 
7.3.3.1 Economic development and poverty 
Government-level respondents referred to issues of economic disparity between Laos and its 
neighbours, as well as the repercussions on infrastructure development and poverty in the 
country. This, they argued, impedes the country’s capacity to trade equally with its neighbours 
and to benefit from harmonization efforts. Respondents noted structural challenges to effective 
drug regulation, including economic disparity between urban and rural areas of the country, 
high rates of poverty, and the lack of resources at the government level. These structural 
challenges have impeded the government’s ability to enforce the ban on oAMTs, particularly 
in the more remote mountainous areas of the country where road access and general health 
infrastructure is poor. High rates of poverty among communities living in rural mountainous 
areas of Laos also affects health seeking practices; creating a demand for cheaper medicines 
which tentatively fuels the trade in poor-quality medicines.  
Additionally, the slow economic development of Laos, some have argued, leads to limited 
budget available to finance pharmaceutical regulators (STK21G_NRA20150408). This theme 
was echoed by a respondent from an implementing partner organization: 
One of the serious limitations for this region, particularly with Laos [is that] they 
just don’t have budget. So, there is a lot of work that doesn’t happen. 
[STK26NG_INGO20150409] 
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It was interesting to note that, towards the end of the interviews, various respondents asked me 
for recommendations as to how to obtain funding to support post-marketing surveillance 
activities or to train current staff members. 
Other government respondents mentioned that access to quality medicines also suffers from 
Laos’ position as a ‘small market’ for medicines on the global scale. Pharmaceutical 
companies, they argued, do not have an incentive to register their new products in Laos: 
[T]he market is small… many big [pharmaceutical] companies are not interested 
in registering their [health] products here in the country [Laos]. 
(STK25G_NRA20150508) 
7.3.3.2 Regional investments and inequity  
Both government and non-government respondents argued that the changing landscape of 
investments in the region is a complicating factor for Laos. The number of development 
projects in Laos, and the mobile migrant workers coming into Laos to support these projects, 
complicates the task of regulating against poor-quality medicines. Some MMPs, they added, 
might bring their own medicines, some of which could be of poor-quality. 
We now have a problem of falsified antimalarial drugs because of migration and 
project investments – especially in the agricultural and mining sectors. 
(STK30G_MoH20150410) 
Both government and non-government representatives argued that Laos is still trying to catch 
up with the level of infrastructure development in the region, to match its neighbours as equal 
partners. Respondents explained that Laos is still in the opening phase of market economy 
which was established in 1986, and that its pharmaceutical sector is weaker that its neighbours. 
In terms of pharmaceutical production capacity, Laos only has six manufacturing sites, some 
of which are controlled by the government and are poorly-funded. Additionally, respondents 
explained that Laos cannot compete as a pharmaceutical export country without adequate GMP 
certifications in place: 
There are various ASEAN level discussions on manufacturing issues but Lao is 
not a main producer, it is not easy to talk to other countries who are more 
advanced in terms of manufacturing. (STK29G_NRA20150410) 
For this reason, they argue, the MoH focuses primarily on improving GMP standards, perhaps 
at the expense of post-marketing surveillance efforts. Government respondents also expressed 
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concern at the growing ASEAN Economic Community (2015), which may result in increasing 
exchanges in goods and people in the region and negatively affect less developed countries 
such as Laos (STK30G_MoH20150410). 
Many government respondents also referred to the perceived threat of China: both in terms of 
the trafficking of illegal products including poor-quality medicines, or APIs from China; and 
in terms of the investments and money laundering activities by Chinese businesses in Laos. 
Respondents expressed fear of unbalanced economic investments as a threat to Laos.  A law 
enforcement official further explained that it is likely that Chinese businesses smuggle poor-
quality medicines into Laos, through newly built private hospitals in the North of the country. 
Many Chinese businessmen migrate to Lao and do business here, legally and 
illegally. They may import such kinds of medicines because recently the 
government policy is to allow private sector investment as private hospitals. 
(STK27G_LEA20150409) 
One official added that such investments are common in the Northern provinces of Laos, where 
Chinese-run hospitals tend to bring in their medicines from China without registration, with 
no appropriately translated labels and no quality controls (STK30). The role of China in Laos, 
as well as the movement of funds either in the form of development projects or money 
laundering in the region, is perceived to be a threat to Laos and a challenge to guaranteeing 
access to good-quality medicines. Most themes falling under the economic frame were 
expanded on further under the Security Frame, as detailed in the next section.  
7.3.4 Security Frame 
7.3.4.1 The risks of Laos as a transit country 
Under the Security Frame, both government and non-government respondents argued that 
Laos’ geographic position and landscape, placed Laos at a high risk from the smuggling of 
illegal products, including poor-quality medicines. One respondent from the government 
stated:  
Laos is a landlocked country with border with China, and Vietnam and 
Myanmar so poor-quality medicines can come in at any point. 
(STK37G_NCMP20150413) 
 173 
A respondent from an implementing partner organization confirmed that Laos is in fact prone 
to smuggling of illegal goods including narcotics – such as opium – but also to the illegal 
trafficking of wildlife:  
Laos is a hub for illegal wildlife, tiger bones all of that, it is an environment where 
things that are incredibly illegal in other countries and heavily watched there, it 
can still exist and flourish here because there is no control. 
(STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
A respondent from the FDD explained that it is therefore common for pharmaceutical products 
including poor-quality medicines to come in from other countries in the region into Laos 
unnoticed: 
Pharmaceutical products (fakes or not) can enter the country hidden within other 
merchandise in big trucks. (STK29G_NRA20150410) 
Respondents added that the length of Laos’ borders makes it particularly difficult to enforce 
border control at all entry points, with a respondent from the MoH stating: 
As our territory is very long with borders with the five neighbouring countries 
and many ports of entry where people and travel / migrate, such medicines can 
be hidden from the authority and easily cross the border. Our inspectors cannot 
inspect everywhere, every time. (STK30G_MoH20150410) 
Besides the geographical aspect of Lao’s position in the region, respondents referred to its 
neighbouring countries as representing a potential threat to the delivery of quality health 
services and commodities in Laos.  
7.3.4.2 Threat from the region 
In their discourse, government-level respondents referred to Laos as a ‘victim’ amongst its 
neighbouring countries. Besides alluding to the fact that Laos might be ‘lagging behind’ in 
terms of economic development in the region, some portrayed Laos as an ‘underdog’ facing 
disproportionate risks and challenges that it does not have the capacity or capability to address, 
thus placing the country at greater risk of the smuggling of illegal goods. Respondents also 
referred to the risks posed by neighbouring countries whose regulatory frameworks might 
differ from that of Laos, leading to the risk of unregistered AMLs infiltrating into Laos from 
Myanmar: 
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Poor-quality medicines cannot be stopped from reaching the private sector. The 
reasons for this are: the borders and the different policies in other countries. 
(STK24G_NRA20150508) 
This overflow into the Laos market, respondents argued, makes it difficult to discern good 
from poor-quality medicines. More specifically, respondents referred to the growing trade in 
the region – the increasing movement of goods and people – as a threat for Laos. They argued 
that the influx of goods of all kinds makes it difficult for regulators to pick out the illegal 
goods. One respondent from the BFDI asserted that more free trade means a greater risk of 
increased circulation of illegal products into Laos.  
I don’t know how we are going to make it, because free movement in terms of 
medicines for Laos I think… we are not at that level of competition. 
(STK31NG_IGO20150410) 
Respondents argued that the lower economic development status of Laos in relation to its 
neighbours and the fact that the government is ill-equipped to regulate the influx of trade, 
creates an exploitable gap for the circulation of poor-quality medicine. 
The threat of poor-quality medicines is exacerbated, government-level respondents noted, by 
the position of Laos in the Mekong region. In this regard, respondents also acknowledged the 
need for cross border cooperation to deal with this treat. Government respondents mentioned, 
for example, that cooperation with China would be crucial but note reluctance from their 
Chinese counterparts to do so, suggesting that the Chinese response is to encourage Laos to 
control their borders better. Other government respondents argued that cooperation between 
neighbouring countries through ASEAN for example is crucial to address the threat of poor-
quality medicines and harmonize regulatory efforts for pharmaceuticals: 
[There are] many benefits from ASEAN cooperation – there is a common 
standard / technical dossier. It is a platform for knowledge sharing and 
harmonizing efforts within ASEAN. ASEAN is the only one organization with 
the capacity for people to survive. (STK20) 
A law enforcement representative added that there are also common working guidelines for 
border control through the ASEAN Agreement on Customs (2012), which encourage all 
counterparts from ASEAN nations to meet twice a year (STK26). This mechanism, the 
respondent argued, could provide crucial support to border control efforts in Laos. On the other 
hand, many respondents also argued that ASEAN cooperation has been slow to date, with 
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certain countries slowing down the process. The same customs representative explained the 
challenge of cooperating with their Thai counterparts: 
On cooperation with Thai border towards a single stop inspection, Thai law at the 
moment is slowing down the process, while in Lao they are ready to start 
cooperating. Thai law does not allow Thai customs officials to work outside of 
Thai soil. (STK27G_LEA20150409) 
Other respondents explained that, in practice, cooperation is difficult, with some countries such 
as China refusing to cooperate on tracking or tracing uncovered poor-quality medicines, for 
example. Another respondent mentioned that varying political priorities across countries 
makes cross-border cooperation a challenge: 
In practice cooperation across borders is hard, countries do not have the same 
politics in general (not just on drug management), and there is also a language 
barrier. (STK34NG_Academia20150410) 
Government respondents, while being adamant about the benefits of more regional 
cooperation on the regulation of pharmaceuticals, were sceptical about the current state of 
cooperation efforts. Some highlighted the lack of benefits of such cooperative efforts for Laos 
to date. The fact that Laos is ‘lagging behind’, government respondents argued, is also a 
challenge for the harmonization of regulatory frameworks among ASEAN countries. An 
official stated:  
Our country is a new member of ASEAN and in terms of socio-economic 
development it still lags behind in comparison to the old member state countries. 
(STK30G_MoH20150410) 
Another respondent from the BFDI expressed concern with regards to the harmonization of 
registration procedures: 
How to harmonize the registered products for example… that seems a bigger 
challenge for us. (STK23G_NRA20150508) 
This same respondent further explained that, so far, ASEAN and INTERPOL meetings 
attended by the agency have not brought much change or support to Laos’ inspection efforts. 
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7.3.5 Medical Frame 
Few respondents framed the problem of poor-quality medicines in Laos as a medical issue. 
The only few references that fit under this frame, among government level respondents, were 
concerns of rising resistance to artemisinin exacerbated by the circulation of Oral Artemisinin 
Monotherapies. Various respondents expressed concern towards the weak enforcement of the 
ban on oAMTs: 
Counterfeit and substandard medicines have reduced. We are now fighting oral 
monotherapy – which is banned, but can still be found. 
(STK24G_NRA20150508) 
Respondents also expressed concerns at the irrational use of medicines in general. Most of 
these arguments, however, were framed more as a health systems issue, as will be detailed in 
the next section. Respondents argued that the irrational use of medicines is driven, first and 
foremost, by poor distribution practices and poor accessibility to good quality medicines in 
remote parts of the country.  
7.3.6 Health Systems Frame 
Under this frame, both non-government and government level respondents alluded to the 
health system infrastructure and the poor organization of people and resources to deliver health 
services to meet the population's health needs.  
7.3.6.1 Access to medicine 
Both government and non-government respondents explained that patchy access to quality 
medicines in Laos is due to a weak supply chain of medicines. These challenges to accessibility 
potentially fuels the trade in poor-quality medicines through unlicensed or mobile itinerant 
vendors. It is argued that stock-outs of AMLs are an issue, as well as unregistered and 
substandard. This, they added, is linked to the weak application of licensing requirements and 
poor reporting methodology. A government respondent, working closely on the malaria 
program, argued that the distribution of AMLs is suboptimal, especially in the more remote 
areas of the country:  
[It is] easy [to oversee the distribution of medicines] from the government to the 
central to the district, but not easy to [do so at] the health centre and village 
[level]. Our supply chain has some issues; in the health centre, they are far away. 
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Sometimes we have reports of stock outs. This is a big challenge for us. 
(STK37G_NCMP20150413) 
Additionally, reporting systems for quantification purposes and to prevent stock-outs are not 
operated efficiently. Stock-outs are considered very common in remote villages. One 
government-level respondent mentioned that guaranteeing access to quality medicines in 
villages in rural areas of the mountainous parts of Laos, is a challenge due to poor road systems. 
This is especially true, they noted, during the monsoon season when torrential rains make the 
roads impassable. These same communities are also the least aware of the risks posed by those 
medicines; either because of a lack of information altogether, because of higher illiteracy rates 
or because of a language barrier:  
In rural remote areas where there are [different] ethnicities, where people are 
illiterate, where people do not read Lao you see. We have to do something that 
can access [reach] them in their dialect, in the language of these ethnicities [ethnic 
groups]. (STK36NG_Academia20150413) 
The problem of poor-quality medicines seems to affect the poorer, vulnerable populations first 
and foremost. A respondent from the BFDI posed the question:  
[P]eople in remote areas…how do we care for them if they are encountering 
poor-quality medicines? (STK23G_NRA20150508) 
Additionally, accessibility is hindered by the fact that most wholesalers are in or around 
Vientiane and are often too far from rural villages to guarantee a continuous supply of good-
quality medicines:  
In the Southern provinces of Laos, therefore, the big pharmacies (which are 
mainly in Vientiane Capital) are too far to reach as so it is easier to get medicines 
from other side of the border or from mobile merchants. 
(STK34NG_Academia20150410) 
Pharmacies near the border, respondents argued, may find it easier to purchase their medicines 
from unlicensed distributors or from mobile drug vendors. Respondents here referred to 
situational factors and more specifically to Laos’ position as a transit country in the region, 
increasing instances of smuggling of all kinds of illicit products, including of poor-quality 
medicines produced in neighbouring countries with greater pharmaceutical production 
capacity.  
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This theme bridges onto the medical frame, whereby respondents explained that patchy access 
to medicine due to poor infrastructure may also lead to the irrational use of medicines and 
potentially fuel the trade in poor-quality medicines.  
It is like for antibiotics, sometimes people don’t take a full dose, or maybe they 
take a fake, but we don’t know yet. (STK37G_NCMP20150413) 
Other respondents added that MMPs working on hydro-dams, rubber plantations or other 
development projects in Laos may also lack adequate access to the right medicines or to health 
services in general. These workers may therefore bring their own drugs, thereby encouraging 
the irrational use of medicines. 
7.3.6.2 Distribution practices and unlicensed outlets 
Non-government respondents referred to the problem of medicine distribution and dispensing 
practices specifically. They argued that challenges in medicine distribution contribute to the 
irrational use of medicines and possibly to the circulation of poor-quality medicines. 
Respondents reported that unlicensed pharmacies and health providers still proliferate in rural 
parts of Laos, thereby complicating patients’ access to quality-assured medicines. The high 
number of unlicensed outlets, they argued, is partly due to the lack of enforcement of licensing 
procedures. Respondents explained that while pharmacies outside the PPM scheme are not 
allowed to sell AMLs, some of them still do. A government official admitted that some 
unregistered private sector outlets have been found to sell unauthorized oAMTs, including 
poor-quality ones (STK30G_MoH20150410). A respondent from academia further explained 
that while pharmacists apply for a license for their pharmaceutical outlets, those are sometimes 
operated by a relative or friend who does not necessarily possess the correct qualifications 
(STK34NG_Academia20150410). Other respondents added that there exist unlicensed foreign 
pharmacies for the Vietnamese or Chinese communities in Laos selling their own 
pharmaceutical products, most of which are not registered in Laos. These unlicensed vendors, 
respondents noted, could provide an outlet for poor-quality medicines that escape inspection. 
This may in turn contribute to the irrational use of medicines and fuel the trade in poor-quality 
medicines. 
One non-government respondent from an implementing partner organization argued that 
pharmacists in Laos tend to buy left-over medicines from individuals such as tourists, to 
complete their stock and have more to offer to their clients, without concern for the source or 
expiration dates of those medicines (STK26NG_INGO20150409). This respondent implied 
 179 
that pharmacies operated by untrained professionals may be tempted to purchase cheaper 
stocks from mobile itinerant vendors (STK26NG_INGO20150409). Such medicines are 
thereafter inappropriately distributed to patients. Additionally, the fact that prescription 
requirements are rarely followed was perceived as another challenge by non-government 
respondents. 
[T]here is no such thing as a prescription medicine here, so maybe that's another 
problem because we don't have tight controls on who can get what product, you 
just go to a pharmacy and ask for what you want. (STK26NG_INGO20150409) 
Finally, another challenge identified is the distribution of medicines as cocktails of drugs or 
‘yaa chud’ as they are referred to in Laos. In such packages, it is not uncommon to find a mix 
of drugs including anti-infective in the wrong dosage or poor-quality medicines. Such 
practices, it is perceived, not only perpetuate the irrational use of medicines, but could create 
an opportunity for the sale of poor-quality medicines without the possibility to trace them back 
to their source.  
7.4 Frames and the policy process 
A few observations can be made on how the problem of poor-quality medicines is framed by 
policy actors in Laos and their implications for policy making in this country. The results 
suggest that poor-quality medicines are still perceived as a challenge for Laos. Although there 
is evidence that falsified AMLs are no longer the main concern, it is believed that substandard 
AMLs and other essential medicines remain a threat. One key observation is actors’ openness 
to evidence-based policy making, with policy makers demonstrating strong links with the 
LOMWRU team, for example.  
The common thread between the dominant themes from the semi-structured interviews is an 
emphasis on uneven development and economic disparities within the region. Respondents 
shared a common perception of Laos as the ‘underdog’ of the Mekong region. In this regard, 
respondents also defended the value of external aid and international development support to 
its pharmaceutical regulatory framework. Most government-level respondents concurred that 
ASEAN regional harmonization efforts would provide undeniable support for Laos’ drug 
regulatory authority and alleviate pressure on its pre-marketing regulatory efforts. This 
openness to regional harmonization efforts and to external support, echoes Phase I of the policy 
process and is a legacy of international aid efforts to build Laos’ health systems from 1993 
onwards. Some government representatives expressed concern as to what appears to be a 
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catch-22 situation, stating that despite the encouraging news that Laos’ GDP is on the rise, 
once it reaches a certain threshold, the country will no longer be eligible for all types of 
external funding which might hinder drug quality monitoring efforts. 
One clear policy challenge to the effective enforcement of rules and regulations, is the vested 
interests of regional investors, including Chinese business owners in the North of Laos. 
Government-level respondents explained that inspections are rarely conducted on privately 
owned hospitals run by foreign nationals – including Chinese businessmen. This suggests a 
parallel health delivery system and supply chain of medicines that escape quality control or 
any other form of official regulation, leaving room for the infiltration of unauthorized, 
unregistered, and even substandard or falsified pharmaceutical products. This is testimony to 
a lack of transparency in the health system and in the regulation of medicines. We have yet to 
observe whether the 2012 Law on Making Legislation, introduced to encourage more 
transparency in policy making, will have repercussions on fair implementation of existing 
regulations to monitor drug quality. 
Results suggest a strong awareness among policy makers of the threat of poor-quality 
medicines for infectious disease control in Laos and beyond. Government respondents 
demonstrated a willingness to resolve this challenge through joint cross-sectoral and cross-
border efforts. The results suggest that the majority of government respondents involved in the 
regulation of pharmaceutical are committed to the fight against poor-quality medicines. Most 
government respondents, as noted earlier, demonstrated a thorough awareness of existing rules 
and regulations.  
Most non-government respondents argued, however, that there is still a lack of concrete 
political commitment to this aim among government-level agencies. While the current 
regulatory framework strongly encourages international cooperation for the exchange of 
expertise and information, as well as cross-sectoral cooperation between government agencies, 
no policy document proposes a mechanism institutionalizing cooperation to support efforts 
against counterfeit, falsified or substandard medicines. Results suggest a lack of a strong policy 
subsystem to facilitate cross-sectoral cooperation against poor-quality medicines. It appears 
that, besides the network LOWMRU as an epistemic network of knowledge sharing informing 
policy making, there is no other systematic network in place in Laos to facilitate cross-sectoral 
cooperation. This arguably translates into limited accountability towards the policy problem 
of poor-quality medicines. Instead, government-level officials emphasized the need to 
cooperate across-borders to address a challenge that was essentially a regional problem.  
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Policy actors also argued that considering the weak capacity to enforce the current regulatory 
framework, the government’s priority is first to secure the supply chain of medicines so as to 
reduce the number of unregistered and substandard medicines, before engaging in post-
marketing surveillance activities to track and trace falsified medicines. This corresponds with 
the emphasis on drug safety and efficacy throughout the policy development process, and the 
more recent focus on tackling the problem of substandard medicines and of oAMTs. Despite 
the recognition of the threat of falsified medicines by respondents, there are few concrete 
mechanisms against the crime of medicine falsification. The FDD explains that, in light of the 
challenges to accessibility resulting from inequitable growth, the priority for the government 
is first to strengthen supply chain management and to prevent the irrational use of medicines. 
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Chapter 8 Thailand 
8.1 Background 
 
Figure 15 Map of Thailand (Source: United Nations Map available at www.un.org) 
Thailand, officially known as Siam until 1949 and thereafter as the Kingdom of Thailand, has 
never endured the oppression of a colonized power, in contrast to its Southeast Asian 
neighbours (Strate 2015). The country switched from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional 
monarchy following the 1932 democracy revolution (Connors 2003). Following this 
revolution, Thailand was predominantly ruled by military dictatorships (Baker & Phongpaichit 
2014). Since the establishment of the constitutional monarchy, there have been 8 coup d’états 
and 20 constitutions. In 2014, the military took power and proposed a referendum on a new 
constitution, for which the population voted in favour in August 2016 (BBC 2016). The 
political climate in Thailand, however, remains tense and unstable (Chachavalpongpun 2015).  
As illustrated in the map above (Figure 15 page 182), the Mekong River follows the Thai-Lao 
border along the north-east of the country. The border between Thailand and Burma has been 
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regularly closed to traffic due to clashes with rebel insurgents (Ganesan 2015), while relations 
between Cambodia and Thailand have been strained since 2008 over the Preah Vihear temple 
dispute in the East – where both countries claim the territory and historical heritage, despite 
an international court of justice decision in 1962 ruling that the temple (a World Heritage Site) 
belonged to Cambodia (St John 1994). The capital City of Bangkok is surrounded by 76 
provinces which are geographically grouped into 6 regions and are subdivided into 877 
districts (Bureau of Vector Borne Diseases 2011). The Thai population is largely homogenous, 
with 96% of Thai ethnicity and the remainder 4% including minority communities of Chinese, 
Mala and Khmer origin, as well as Hill Tribe populations (Pongpisut et al. 2015).  The 
International Organization for Migration in Bangkok estimates the presence of approximately 
1.8 million registered migrants and between 1.8 and 4 million irregular migrants, with up to 
80% from Myanmar, 10% from Cambodia and the rest mainly from Laos 
(STK54NG_INGO20150910). 
Indicator Value Year (Source) 
Total Population (million) 68 2015 (WB) 
Gross Domestic Product – Purchasing 
Power Parity (International $) 
16,305 2015 (WB) 
Human Development Index 0.726  
(Rank 93) 
2014 (UNDP) 
Table 15 Thailand economic and development indicators 
Thailand has been a member of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) since 1966, and a 
member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since its inception in 1967. 
It is part of the World Health Organization (WHO) South East Asian Regional Office 
(SEARO), headquartered in New Delhi. Despite political instability, Thailand has experienced 
rapid economic development40 through various stages of recovery and re-growth. Poverty rates 
have reduced from 67% to 11% between 1986 to 2014 (WB 2015). Challenges to economic 
growth have included regional economic crises, political tensions, inequality and an ageing 
population (ADB 2015). The 1997 Asian financial crisis, for example, had a considerable 
impact on the Thai economy, as the Thai Baht fell sharply leading to high rates of 
unemployment (International Monetary Fund 2000). The 2008 global economic crisis also led 
to uneven economic growth in subsequent years. The average growth rate was at 7.5% in the 
1980s and 1990s (WB 2015). While the growth rate was forecasted at 7%, for 2016 it was only 
                                                     
40 Thailand is categorized as an Upper Middle Income Country by the World Bank since 2011. 
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3.2% (ADB 2017). Thailand’s economy is driven predominantly by the mining of natural 
resources in the mountainous areas of the north and tourism in the south, while the north relies 
considerably on manual labour by migrant workers.  
Thailand also has a strong pharmaceutical sector with over 172 local manufacturers. The 
domestic pharmaceutical industry in Thailand grew rapidly since 1943 when the Thai 
Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO), a state enterprise that manufactures and 
supplies affordable generic medicines for the Thai government and directly to public hospitals, 
was established. By 2013, the value of the drug market was estimated at 4.5 billion US$ 
(PharmaBoardroom 2015). Due to its strong generic production industry, Thailand has 
previously made use of Compulsory Licensing as a flexibility clause to the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), to bypass patent laws and 
locally produce more affordable alternatives to expensive medicines. This was the case in 
2007, when Thailand entered in a dispute with Abbott pharmaceuticals over the compulsory 
licensing of an HIV Drug, Kaletra (Steinbrook 2007). The value of imported medicines, 
however, remains higher than that of locally-produced medicines, as over 650 different types 
of medicines are still imported into the country. Another growing strength of the Thai health 
sector is the number of private sector providers and for-profit hospitals (Teerawattananon et 
al. 2003). 
8.1.1 Thai health sector 
Indicator Value Year (source) 
Total Health Expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
6.5 2014 (WB) 
Health Expenditure Per Capita 
(Current US$) 
360 2014 (WB) 
Out-of-pocket Health Expenditure 
(% of Total Health Expenditure) 
7.9 2014 (WB) 
Physicians per 1,000 population 0.4 2010 (WB) 
Pharmacists per 1,000 population 0.12 2004  
(Thai Health Resource Survey) 
Life Expectancy 74.4 (WB) 
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Table 16 Thailand health indicators 
The public health sector has grown steadily since the establishment of the Thai Ministry of 
Public Health (MoPH) in 1942. By 1956, every province had a hospital with a referral centre 
(Thaworn 2015). Public hospitals now represent between 75 and 79% of all hospital beds in 
Thailand (Pongpisut et al. 2015). The first focus of the health sector reforms in the 1980s, was 
to invest in the infrastructure of health facilities in rural areas (Pongpisut et al. 2015). 
Subsequently, reforms addressed health financing and social security schemes41. Coverage of 
all health insurance funds went from 92.48% in 2002 to 97% by 2007 (Thaworn 2015). 
Registered migrant workers are also included in the social security schemes and have access 
to health facilities in Thailand. Universal health coverage (UHC) in Thailand was achieved by 
2002 with the 30 baht scheme42 (Pongpisut et al. 2015). This system has worked to increase 
access to health for the poor and reduce mortality rates (Gruber et al. 2014). Mortality rates in 
Thailand have been declining since the 1980s. The main causes of mortality since the end of 
the 20th century have been non-communicable diseases (NCDs), although HIV/AIDS and 
tuberculosis still largely contribute to the Thai health burden (Bundhamcharoen et al. 2011) 
along with an ageing population (UNDP 2011). To address these health challenges, the Thai 
government continues to invest in its public health sector at 6.4% of its Gross Domestic 
Product (WB 2014). Per capita total expenditure on health is above the WHO SEARO regional 
average. Out-of-pocket payments have considerably reduced at 7.9% of THE in 2014, 
compared to 44.5% in 1994 (WB 2014).  
8.1.2 Regulating antimalarial medicines in Thailand 
The main law regulating pharmaceuticals in Thailand is the Drug Act B.E. 2510 (1967) which 
outlines the regulation for pre-marketing authorization, licensing as well as post-marketing 
surveillance. This Act has been revised four times since 1967 – the latest revision dating back 
to 1987. Appendix 17 Page 380 summarizes the results of my analysis of the Act, its 
amendments and one other policy document relating to the regulation of pharmaceuticals in 
Thailand. The MoPH is responsible for the health sector including the regulation of health 
                                                     
41 There are three Social Security Schemes available to support Universal Health Coverage in Thailand, 
including the Social Security Scheme for employed staff, the Civil Servant Medical Benefit Scheme 
funded by the Ministry of Finance and the Compulsory Migrant Health Insurance Scheme. Uptake of 
the latter is unknown but is estimated at 4 million, amongst those migrants who possess a work permit. 
Most social security schemes, however, only cover essential medicines (available for free) and  reach 
out to an estimated 74% of the population (Holloway 2012). 
42 Registered users, including registered migrant workers, contribute a flat fee of 30 Thai Baht (60p) per 
consultation to access public health services (Coronini-Cronberg et al. 2007). 
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products43, and consists of four main clusters as illustrated in Figure 16 (page 189). Under the 
Cluster of Public Health Development, and the Cluster of Public Health Services Support, 
three departments are involved in the control of medicine quality; namely the Department of 
Disease Control (DDC) the Department of Medical Sciences (DMS), and the Thai Food and 
Drug Administration (TFDA).  
The process of decentralization of the public health sector since the late 1990s, provides an 
opportunity for the MoPH to improve oversight over the pharmaceutical sector and supply 
chain in more remote parts of the country. Below the central level of the MoPH in Nonthaburi 
are the regional health offices, the provincial public health offices (PPHOs), the district health 
offices, and the health centres. The 1999 Decentralization Act called for decision-making 
powers, as well as financial powers to be delegated to PPHOs. The TFDA (previously named 
Food & Drug Division) was established in 1937 as the drug regulatory authority, to monitor 
the efficacy and quality of health products in Thailand.  The TFDA is the main actor raising 
awareness and harnessing expertise across MoPH departments to improve access to quality 
essential medicines in Thailand. The central TFDA delegates many aspects of pharmaceutical 
regulation to the PPHOs such as the licensing of manufacturers, and works with its provincial 
counterparts in monitoring the quality of medicines. Since 2003, the TFDA is made up of 10 
divisions summarized in Table 17 below (page 187). The Drug Control Division (DCD) of the 
TFDA is responsible for pre- and post-marketing regulatory functions. For more information 
on Thailand’s pharmaceutical regulatory system, refer to Appendix 15 on page 369. 
Health Product Control Division Group Support Division Group 
Bureuau of Cosmetic and Hazardous 
Substances Control 
Public and Consumer Affairs Division 
Drug Control Division Rural and Local Consumer Health Products 
Protection and Promotion Division 
Food Control Division Technical and Planning Division 
Medical Devices Control Division Office of the Secretary 
Narcotics Control Division  
Import and Export Inspection Division  
                                                     
43 The policy actors present in the pharmaceutical regulatory space in Thailand are summarized in 
Appendix 16 Page 373. 
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Table 17 Structure of the Thai Food and Drug Administration 
The Malaria Program is managed by the Malaria Cluster of the Bureau of Vector Borne 
Diseases (BVBD), located within the MoPH’s Department of Disease Control (DDC). The 
Program has been funded by the Thai government and the Global Fund (GF) since 2004. The 
BVBD oversees the procurement and distribution of AMLs, through a parallel system. AMLs 
are purchased through manufacturers, including the GPO.  Most AMLs are purchased through 
the government budget (4-5 million baht each year), while the rest are procured through the 
voluntary pooled procurement mechanism of the Global Fund (GF) and destined mainly to 
non-governmental organizations, or migrant camps in border areas 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603). Figure 17 (page 190) shows that malaria treatments are procured 
and supplied differently for malaria posts (MPs) or clinics (MCs) (Thumm 2009). Since 1995, 
AMLs are under strict distribution control aimed at minimizing the irrational use of AMLs, 
and it is therefore illegal for private sector outlets to dispense AMLs. BVBD cooperates with 
the Bureau of Drugs and Narcotics (BDN) under the DMS on sample testing for the quality 
control of AMLs. 
Malaria incidence rates in Thailand have considerably reduced to meet the Millennium 
Development Goal of a 75% incidence rate reduction target between 2000 and 2015. In 
Thailand, malaria is also a forest-related disease found predominantly in border areas, and 
more specifically along the Thai-Burmese, Thai-Cambodian and Thai-Malaysian borders 
(Thumm 2009; Bureau of Vector Borne Diseases 2011). Both Plasmodium falciparum (42%) 
and Plasmodium vivax (58%) can be found in Thailand. Malaria remains a burden 
predominantly among Mobile Migrant Populations (MMPs) (Bhumiratana et al. 2013) and 8% 
of population are reported as still living in high transmission areas. The reported number of 
cases in 2015 was 24,850 (MEI UCSF 2016), while the estimated total number of cases is 
double that amount. Thailand is nevertheless on track for malaria elimination to meet a 2024 
national target, and participates in efforts to reduce the risks of antimicrobial resistance (Thai 
National Malaria Elimination Strategy 2017-2026). Possible challenges to elimination in 
border areas include artemisinin resistance, particularly at the Thai-Cambodian border – the 
same area where resistance to mefloquine was first spotted in the 1990s (Bhumiratana et al. 
2013; Thumm 2009). The BVBD acknowledges the presence of markers of artemisinin 
resistance in 6 border provinces and, as a result, treatment recommendations change regularly 
in line with emerging resistance to artemisinin. ACTs were introduced in 1998 and the current 
recommended first line treatment for malaria recently changed to DHA Priperaquine, instead 
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of Mefloquine and Primaquine. Second line treatments include Quinine and tetracycline, and 
third line treatments include artesunate and artemether.  
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Figure 16 Overview of Ministry of Public Health structure 
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Figure 17 Public sector malaria services and supply system (Thumm 2009)
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8.2 Policy developments against poor-quality AMLs 
From my analysis, I discern four phases of policy around regulating the quality of medicines. 
These four phases stretch over a period of 80 years since the establishment of the TFDA. The 
first phase sees an initial emphasis on consumer protection from inefficacious medicines and 
on the protection of trade interests for a rapidly growing domestic pharmaceutical industry. In 
the second phase, the focus of regulatory efforts is on improving access to health services in 
general, with an emphasis on establishing a stronger social security system towards Universal 
Health Coverage. This is perceived as one tangible effort to reducing the demand for cheaper 
medicines from unlicensed outlets that may contribute to drug resistant malaria. The third 
phase marks a turning point, with the drafting of a New Drug Act aimed in part at improving 
penalties against the production, sale and distribution of poor-quality medicines. With the 
process of promulgation of the New Act coming to a stall, the government switched its 
attention in the fourth phase of the policy process to strengthening the pharmacovigilance (PV) 
system.  The timeline available on page 192 (Figure 18) provides a chronological overview of 
the laws and policies introduced over time to regulate pharmaceuticals and their quality in 
Thailand. 
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Figure 18 Timeline of policy developments for pharmaceutical regulation in Thailand 
 193 
 
8.2.1 Phase I: Trade and the Thai pharmaceutical sector (1937-1997) 
8.2.1.1 Consumer protection and pharmaceutical efficacy 
The language used to outline the mission of the TFDA and The Drug Act also places most 
emphasis on consumer protection, drug safety and efficacy 44 . The Drug Act states, for 
example, that all drugs that are not ‘scientifically efficacious’ will be withdrawn from the 
market. At this initial stage in the regulation of pharmaceuticals, the problem of poor-quality 
medicines is perceived as a problem only in so far as medicines do not fulfil their medical 
purpose, therefore putting patients at risk of Adverse Drug Reactions (ADR). The definition 
of poor-quality medicines in the Drug Act 1967, as well as in the 1987 amendment (Drug Act 
B.E. 2530,  1987) uses neither the term ‘counterfeit’ nor ‘falsified’, but instead refers to ‘fake’ 
‘deteriorated’ or ‘substandard’ medicines. This definition focuses predominantly on the lack 
of medical efficacy of the drug rather than the criminal intent of medicines falsification. It 
does not make a distinction between poor-quality drugs manufactured with the intent to 
deceive and drugs that are substandard because of manufacturing errors. The definition is 
predominantly focused on the sub-optimal characteristics of ‘fake’ drugs and the medical 
repercussions for the patient.  
The definition of ‘fake drug’ in Section 74 of the 1967 Drug Act, more specifically, defines a 
‘fake drug’ as one which ‘falsely shows it is in accordance with a formula which has been 
registered’ or one ‘with active substances which quantity or strength lower that the minimum 
or higher than the maximum standard’ (by more than 20%). The Drug Act adds that if the 
threshold is less than 20%, it will fall in the category of ‘sub-standard drugs’ defined in Section 
74 as ‘drugs produced so that their purity or other characteristics which are important to their 
quality differ from the standards prescribed in the registered formula…’ By defining this 
efficacy threshold, the definition of a ‘fake drug’ uses pharmacovigilance language. 
Additionally, the Drug Act refers to prescription-only medicines, such as antibiotics as 
‘dangerous drugs’. This choice of terminology suggests a strong focus on the health 
implications of the irrational use of medicines or sub-standard drugs for consumer health. As 
Teerawattananon and colleagues (2003) point out, the emphasis on consumer health protection 
apparent in the 1967 Drug Act is reinforced in the 1997 Thai constitution. 
                                                     
44 Appendix 17 page 380 provides an overview of the definition of poor-quality medicines in Thailand 
from eight legal and policy documents. 
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This phase of the policy process also marks the start of efforts to control and guarantee the 
quality of essential medicines for patients. The Drug Act 1967 plans for all new drugs that 
have successfully passed the registration assessment to receive provisional market 
authorization (MA) for two years, during which the products are part of a safety-monitoring 
program (SMP). During the SMP, the drug can only be sold through public health facilities 
(not pharmacies) and dispensed by medical professionals. Adverse Drug Reactions (ADRs) 
are monitored closely during this two-year period. If the product’s benefits are verified, it will 
receive an unconditional approval for its distribution through other channels. Secondly, 
Thailand’s National Drug Testing Laboratory45 (NDTL) was established in 1974. The NDTL 
received a fixed government budget allocation in support of its activities, which include testing 
the quality of pharmaceutical products. By 1986, the NDTL was a designated WHO 
Collaborating Centre for Quality Assurance of Essential Drugs, meaning that it serves as a 
drug testing facility for essential medicines in the region46. The 1967 Drug Act also stipulates 
penalties against the production and sale of poor-quality medicines47.  
8.2.1.2 Growing Thai pharmaceutical sector 
Another main observation in this early phase of the policy process, is the emphasis on 
pharmaceutical trade and protecting the interests of a growing domestic pharmaceutical 
industry. The official definition of ‘fake drug’ encompasses drug counterfeiting and refers 
directly to brand infringement. Despite not using the term counterfeit, a ‘fake drug’ is defined 
as ‘an imitation for a genuine drug’ or a drug that ‘shows the name of another drug’ or that 
‘shows a name or mark of a producer, which is false’ (Section 73, Drug Act 1967). The 
definition of poor-quality medicines in the Drug Act does not differentiate between counterfeit 
or falsified medicines with no emphasis on the challenge of pharmaceutical crime. The Drug 
Acts focus instead on regulating the local generic industry, imports and exports of 
pharmaceuticals, emphasising on the requirements for Thai manufacturers to get ‘up to speed’ 
on the production of affordable, quality and generic medicines fit for export. The Drug Act 
includes various clauses on registration procedures for generic medicines, which is the biggest 
share of the pharmaceutical industry in Thailand according to a respondent from the 
Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers Association (PReMA). It provides detailed 
requirements on the production of pharmaceuticals, such as the testing of raw materials, batch 
                                                     
45 The NDTL is hosted by the Bureau of Drugs and Narcotics which is part of the Department of Medical 
Sciences of the Thai Ministry of Public Health.  
46 The NDTL is ISO 17025 certified since 1994.   
47 In Section 103, the Act states that any pharmacy or drug outlet that does not abide by the terms of the 
Act – including those stipulated under Chapter 8 with regards to the sale of fake, substandard or 
deteriorated drugs - shall be liable to a fine of up to 5,000 baht, renewable daily until rectification. 
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numbering and labelling (Section 25). The TFDA introduced Good Manufacturing Practices 
(GMP) guidelines48 in 1987 as an important initiative, contributing to the development of the 
Thai pharmaceutical industry and promoting the safe local production of quality medicines 
(Thai Food and Drug Administration n.d.). While focusing on the local generic production of 
affordable medicines, the Thai government also places much emphasis on patent law. Section 
51 of the Patent Act (No. 3) B.E. 2542 (1999), for example, recognizes the right of ‘any 
ministry or department of the Government’ to exercise any right conferred by the patent to 
carry out any service ‘for public consumption’. Thailand has previously reached out to the 
flexibility mechanisms of the TRIPS Agreement, including compulsory licensing 49  and 
parallel importation, thus promoting access to affordable essential treatments including HIV 
AIDS treatments (Kuek et al. 2010). In parallel, Thailand placed great emphasis on the 
development of a Thai pharmacopeia, which has become a reference in the region. 
8.2.2 Phase II: Access to quality healthcare and essential medicines (1997-2003) 
8.2.2.1 The role of evidence 
This second phase of the policy process coincides with evidence of chloroquine resistance at 
the Thai-Cambodia border (Nosten et al. 1994). Resistance to chloroquine-based treatments 
and slower parasite clearance in malaria patients, especially in migrant workers, was perceived 
as an important challenge to malaria elimination. Shakoor et al. (1997) first reported the 
circulation of poor-quality AMLs in Thailand (and Nigeria), where 40% of chloroquine tablet 
samples were found to be substandard. Subsequently, Newton and colleagues (2001) report in 
a region-wide study that 11 % of artesunate tablets samples from Thailand were falsified. In 
2002, Newton and colleagues wrote that between 38%-53% of AMLs sampled from 
pharmacies and shops in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam were counterfeit 
(Newton et al. 2002). Poor access to quality medicines and the circulation of poor-quality 
ones, was seen to exacerbate the problem of drug-resistant malaria. This evidence served to 
raise awareness about the patchy access to quality medicines in border areas, as well as the 
emerging threat of antimicrobial resistance for malaria control (Dondorp et al. 2009).  
                                                     
48  By 2001, the Thai GMP guidelines were WHO recognized and the TFDA regularly conducts 
education initiatives to encourage and promote adherence to these guidelines. 
49 Such as for Efavirenz in 2006 or Lopinavir-ritonavir in 2007, both pricey antiretroviral treatments. 
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8.2.2.2 Improving access to health  
The Thai government gradually focused on improving the social security system (including 
for migrant workers) to improve access to both health services and health commodities, 
including essential medicines. In 1997, Thailand introduced the Compulsory Migrant Health 
Insurance Scheme (CMHIS) (or the ‘30 Baht Scheme’) which facilitated access to health 
services for migrant workers. Universal Health Coverage was fully established by 2002. 
Additionally, the National Health Security Office (NHSO) established in 2002 by the National 
Health Security Act 2002, has been a key player in improving access to affordable, quality 
medicines (WHO SEARO 2013). The NHSO is mandated to operate the pharmaceutical 
procurement budget for the MoPH (Holloway 2012), allowing all of the medicines on the 
National Essential Medicines List50 (NEML) to be available free of charge. The NHSO also 
runs a vertical procurement system for high priced medicines (96 of them), such as anti-cancer 
or anti-retroviral treatments. Another key partner in improving access to quality medicines for 
all is the GPO. As detailed in a report by the WHO, the GPO manufactures over 132 drugs on 
the NEML and supplies approximately 1000 products across Thailand to both public and 
private facilities, and acts as a pharmaceutical storage facility (Holloway 2012). The role of 
the GPO is crucial to reduce the price of medicines through economies of scale (Holloway 
2012). Its procurement system has contributed to improving access to affordable medicines 
and improving trust in the public health system, aiming to reduce the tendency for patients to 
self-medicate and to purchase treatments from unlicensed vendors selling cheaper medicines.  
8.2.3 Phase III: The New Drug Act (2003)  
8.2.3.1 New evidence: a turning point 
New evidence of the circulation of poor-quality antimalarial medicines re-instigated the 
government’s interest in strengthening regulations to secure the supply chain of 
pharmaceuticals. Studies by Dondorp and colleagues (2004) and Hall and colleagues (2006), 
for example, reported that between 27% and 35% antimalarials sampled were of poor-quality. 
Evidence of artemisinin resistance at the Thai-Cambodian border, supposedly aggravated by 
the irrational use of medicines and the circulation of unregistered or substandard treatments, 
was recognized as a real threat in this fourth phase of the policy process. 2003 marks a turning 
point, in which efforts were spurred to strengthen the pharmaceutical regulatory system 
through, for example, the enforcement of measures against unlicensed online pharmacies. 
                                                     
50 This list is revised annually with a panel of 17 experts (Holloway 2012). 
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Since 2003, the TFDA added two divisions to bring the total to ten. As part of its post-
marketing surveillance (PMS) operations, the TFDA is mandated to conduct annual planned 
inspections of newly established premises (pharmaceutical outlets, warehouses etc.) and 
follow-up inspections, as well as conduct routine inspections of pharmaceutical product batch 
samples at ports of entry. TFDA inspectors from the Import and Export Inspection Division 
are stationed at these ports of entry and work alongside customs officials. In addition, the 
TFDA conducts inspections on request to investigate suspect cases and to gather information 
for the administration of legal sanctions.  
8.2.3.2 Stalled reforms: The New Drug Act 
A New Drug Act (B.E. 2546,  2003) was drafted and aimed to reinforce GMP compliance for 
manufacturing licenses and increase penalties for the production and sale of substandard and 
falsified medicines. This New Drug Act, however, remains in the promulgation stage, stalled 
by a lack of agreement among the various stakeholders involved in pharmaceutical regulation 
on the content of the document, especially with regards to the penalties incurred for the 
production, distribution and sale of poor-quality medicines. Its content is currently still being 
debated at the National Assembly. The first element of controversy around this Act is the 
proposal that government-owned enterprises or agencies will no longer be exempt from the 
requirements of licensing and product registration. This shift translates the desire to tighten 
registration guidelines. Despite noted efforts to combine two proposals in this Act from the 
public sector and from the industry, respondents alluded to continuous and unsuccessful 
negotiations regarding its content – between members of the MoPH, civil society, as well as 
domestic industry representatives.  
According to the TFDA website, the New Drug Act plans to considerably increase the 
penalties51 for the production, sale and import of fake, substandard or deteriorated drugs to 
better reflect the severity of the crimes. The revision of the penalties has led to much debate, 
as confirmed by various respondents from the industry, academia and government institutions, 
especially over Section 38 of the New Drug Act, which proposes capping the fine and prison 
time (to 20,000 baht and 5 years) for manufacturers who produce fake drugs that are not 
‘harmful’ to the user. Adding this differentiation between poor-quality drugs that are ‘harmful’ 
and those that are ‘not harmful’ to the consumer, however, is dangerous, as it implies that not 
all pharmaceutical crimes are as serious. In practice, proving this differentiation may also be 
                                                     
51  A summary of penalties incurred is available in Appendix on further information on the Thai 
pharmaceutical regulatory system (Appendix 15, page 369). 
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challenging and respondents added that this point causes friction among experts in 
negotiations for the New Drug Act (2003), especially between industry and government 
representatives. Despite the policy controversy over the revision of the Drug Act, 2003 marked 
a shift of focus, with an initial intention to address evidence of circulation of poor-quality 
medicines. Efforts to increase penalties and strengthen post-marketing surveillance, as well as 
the penalties for the circulation of poor-quality medicines, have had limited success thus far. 
8.2.4 Phase IV: Strengthening pre-marketing and pharmacovigilance (2003-2016) 
8.2.4.1 Further evidence of the risks of poor-quality medicines  
This fourth phase of the policy process demonstrates a renewed emphasis on strengthening PV 
activities, potentially in response to reports of ADR across drug categories but also to evidence 
the irrational use of medicines and the associated risks for artemisinin resistance. Since 2006, 
there has been a lack of data on prevalence rates for poor-quality AMLs in Thailand, however, 
some studies suggest that evidence of artemisinin resistance at the Thailand-Cambodia could 
be related to the continued circulation of poor-quality artesunate (P. Newton et al. 2008). A 
number of findings across the Mekong Region have drawn increasing attention to the problem 
of poor-quality AMLs, including in Thailand. Other studies provide evidence of the circulation 
of different types of poor-quality pharmaceuticals in Thailand, such as Erectile Dysfunction 
treatments. According to a study in Eastern Thailand conducted by Homhuan (2013), for 
example, 88% of erectile dysfunction drugs surveyed had a sub-standard API dose. Such 
evidence prompts general concern about ADR across therapeutic categories. With malaria 
incidence rates sharply reducing in central Thailand, respondents suggest a shift of attention 
within the TFDA from malaria control and the surveillance of poor-quality AMLs, towards 
efforts to strengthen PV for lifestyle medicines and herbal supplements.  
8.2.4.2 New mechanisms for post-marketing surveillance 
Despite efforts to strengthen pre-marketing and PV efforts, however, reports suggest 
continuous concern with regards to the smuggling of poor-quality medicines and the need to 
strengthen post-marketing surveillance (Fotiou et al. 2009). Thailand is prone to the online 
sale of pharmaceuticals through illegal internet pharmacies, for example, exacerbated by the 
use of social media (such as Facebook) to advertise products (Homhuan 2013). The TFDA 
estimated that 30 million US$ worth of falsified medicines are sold yearly in Thailand (World 
Health Professionals Alliance 2011), although the reported percentage of failed sample testing 
by the Bureau remains low at approximately 5% between 2013 and 2015. The TFDA set up a 
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Centre for Combating Counterfeit Drugs in 2008, encouraging consumers to provide 
information about poor-quality medicines to the authorities. This centre is first and foremost 
an information sharing platform, however, its website has not been updated since its launch. 
TFDA also publishes the results of its quality assurance inspections annually in a Green Book 
and hospitals use this book to guide their purchases.  
In response to the perceived international threat of smuggling of poor-quality medicines, the 
Thai government has favoured inter-sectoral cooperation. A Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) was signed in 2009 by nine government agencies including, the TFDA, the Ministry 
of Information and Communication Technology (MICT), the Ministry of Industry (MoI), the 
Ministry of Commerce (MoC), but also Customs (CUST), Police (POL), the Association of 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers (PReMA), the Department of Special 
Investigation, the Central Institute of Forensic Science, and the Office of the Attorney General 
for Intellectual Property Department. The available documents and the interviews conducted 
in Thailand, however, provided little information on the extent or the nature of collaborations 
between these nine institutions. Judging from the composition of this lose partnership, the 
emphasis seems to be first and foremost on protecting the industry interests and tackling the 
problem of ‘counterfeit’ medicines, as suggested in the title of the MoU, rather than the 
challenge of poor-quality medicines at large. Results do, however, suggest that the MICT is 
involved because of its expertise with website technology through which e-pharmacies sell 
their products. Customs and police officials and the Police Consumer Protection Unit (CPU) 
are involved in enforcing the licensing requirements of the TFDA. Customs officials and 
TFDA inspectors work jointly at border checkpoints to verify the quality of pharmaceutical 
imports. Industry representatives also actively train customs officials to recognize genuine vs. 
falsified (or counterfeit) product batches at formal border checkpoints. Arguably, the 
Ministries of Industry and Commerce are involved in supporting the growth of Thailand’s 
growing pharmaceutical industry by regulating the imports and export of pharmaceutical 
products.   
8.2.4.3 Cross-sectoral collaboration 
As partly demonstrated by the mechanisms described above, the particularity of the Thai 
policy development process is the inclusion of representatives from the pharmaceutical sector, 
the academic sector and from civil society (Teerawattananon et al. 2003; Nwokike et al. 2013). 
The Health Promotion Foundation Act encourages the participation from all sectors in finding 
innovative solutions to tackle national health challenges (MoPH 2012). Results from the 
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interviews suggest that the MoPH meets with both academia and industry associations on a 
regular basis to discuss policy revisions. The TFDA conducts regular seminars and workshops 
with both public and private sector stakeholders. The TFDA also actively cooperates with 
university laboratories for post-marketing control activities. The Chulalongkorn University 
Faculty of Pharmaceutical Sciences Quality Control Laboratory and the Mahidol University 
Faculty of Pharmacy serve as regional expertise centres in the quality control of medicines 
and in GMP, and form part of the Asian Network of Excellence in Quality Assurance of 
Medicines in Thailand (Lee et al. 2015). Chulalongkorn supports neighbouring countries in 
training their laboratory staff to test the quality of essential medicines. Non-governmental 
(NGOs) and international organizations (IOs) also play an important role in this policy space. 
Some IOs, such as Management Sciences for Health (MSH) or USP, work with Chulalongkorn 
to conduct surveys on the quality of medicines. Phrared, a Thai NGO, is involved in raising 
awareness about the problems of poor-quality medicines, and in sharing information about 
such threats, thereby encouraging the rational use of drugs. IOs such as INTERPOL or the 
United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC) have also played a role in building 
capacity and expertise among customs and police officials to enforce existing laws against 
poor-quality medicines. The UNODC supports the Thai customs in their efforts to prevent 
smuggling of illegal foods, including of falsified or unregistered medicines through training 
programs, such as those planned under the Container Control Program. Finally, INTERPOL 
has worked actively with Thailand since 2008 through the STORM operations I- IV, leading 
to the yearly arrest of drug manufacturers and sellers involved in the circulation of poor-quality 
medicines.  
8.2.4.4 Strengthening pre-marketing and pharmacovigilance functions 
Despite an elaborate institutionalization of cooperation across sector and institutions to support 
the process of pharmaceutical regulation and the revision of rules and regulations, the 
existence of the policy subsystem has not favoured the finalization of the New Drug Act to 
this day. A more tangible priority in efforts to strengthen the pharmaceutical regulatory system 
in Thailand, remains the enforcement of pre-marketing guidelines and PV activities. 
Regarding pre-marketing activities, Thailand accessed the Pharmaceutical Inspection Co-
operation Scheme (PIC/S GMP) in August 2016, an international initiative to facilitate 
cooperation between competent authorities for issuing manufacturing licenses PIC/S GMP, 
and encourage the harmonizing of inspection procedures to improve mutual confidence in 
GMP guidelines across countries and facilitate exports in the region. This is a crucial step 
towards regulatory convergence in the region on pre-marketing regulations. Furthermore, the 
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industry, including GPO, cooperates with the MoPH in the development of regulation against 
the illegal advertising of medicines – with the aim of discouraging the irrational use of 
medicines or online purchasing of medicines through unlicensed e-pharmacies.  
Efforts to strengthen pharmacovigilance (PV) activities include improving laboratory testing 
capabilities, and strengthening ADR monitoring. As pointed out in a report by USAID, 
Thailand regularly publishes information about drug safety in the form of bulletins. Reporting 
rates have been high with approximately 57,573 reports in 2011 (Nwokike et al. 2013).  
Results also suggests a gradual increase in the rate of prosecution and revocation of licenses 
for ADR cases. A Surveillance and Complaint Centre within the National Centre for 
Pharmacovigilance (NHPCV) (since 1983) was set up in 2009 to monitor complaints or reports 
of ADR. The NHPCV oversees information dissemination and releases alerts, information 
about product recalls, and annual reports on adverse drug reactions. The laboratory performs 
confirmatory tests on AML samples coming in from the region, in collaboration with United 
States Pharmacopeia (USP) in Thailand. Additionally, The New Drug Act plans to implement 
a product liability mechanism, whereby consumers will be able to sue drug manufacturers 
should the product not satisfy its intended purpose or if serious harm results from its use.  
8.3 Perceptions of the problem of poor-quality medicines 
In this section, I present the findings from 17 stakeholder interviews conducted in 2015 in 
Bangkok with representatives from the government, law enforcement organization, non-
governmental organizations, academia, from international organizations, as well from the 
pharmaceutical industry. These findings are summarized in Table 18 on page 2001. The 
process of data collection in Thailand was time-consuming as there were various bureaucratic 
hurdles, both in terms of obtaining ethical clearance and formally requesting interviews with 
government institutions. Although lengthy, the procedure was well organized and steered by 
staff members at the National Research Council of Thailand. Despite the sensitivity of the 
topic, the response rates to my invitations for interviews was high. The backing of the Malaria 
Consortium in Thailand, as well as of the National Research Council of Thailand, was helpful 
in this regard. After being granted approval from senior members of the TFDA, two 
pharmacists working within the TFDA accepted to meet after receiving the topic guide. 
Responses to my set questions were pre-approved by senior members of staff. I was 
subsequently able to interview representatives from the BVBD and from the DMS within the 
MoPH in Nonthaburi. Unfortunately, I was not able to visit PPHOs across the country to obtain 
their insights on the circulation of poor-quality medicines in the region.  
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Frame Observations 
Medical Government respondents argue that due to the lower malaria burden, poor-quality AMLs are no longer an issue 
but the problem might still affect other categories of medicines as well as food supplements. 
Health 
Systems 
Both categories of respondents explain that there remain gaps in the distribution of medicines, especially in 
remote areas and among MMPs, despite the migrant insurance scheme.  
Regulatory Government respondents highlight the strength of the regulatory framework while non-government respondents 
point to loohopes, including weak post-marketing surveillance efforts and the patchy enforcement of rules and 
regulations in border areas, as well as inappropriate penalties for medicine falsification. 
Security Government respondents frame the problem of poor-quality medicines as a threat to Thailand linked to the the 
MMPs, the circulation of people and goods along porous borders and weak cooperation with neighbours with 
weaker regulatory capacity. 
Economic Both categories of respondents agree that the strength of the domestic pharmaceutical industry and the health 
infrastructure development in Thailand, promotes access to quality health products. Trade liberalisation and 
disparities in economic development in the GMS, however, contribute to the influx of illegal goods into Thailand 
from neighbouring countries. 
Political Few respondents alluded to themes under this frame, but some note that the political sensitivity around the 
problem of poor-quality medicines hampers cross-sectoral and cross-border cooperation to reduce the circulation 
of falsified and substandard medicine. 
 Table 18 Summary of frames detailing stakeholder perception of factors contributing to the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Thailand
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8.3.1 Medical Frame 
8.3.1.1 Health priorities 
The main term used to qualify poor-quality medicines among the respondents in Thailand was 
‘fake’ – a term which encompassed discussions on both ‘counterfeit’ and ‘substandard’ 
medicines. Although there might be a noted discrepancy between the original Thai version of 
the definition and its English translation, my analysis of the available translated documents 
suggests that this use of terminology is consistent with the choice of terms in the Drug Acts. 
Government-level respondents regularly highlighted the importance of safety and efficacy of 
medicines to meet the needs of Thai patients, while placing less emphasis on the crime of drug 
falsification. This is consistent with the way that the problem of poor-quality medicines is 
presented in the Drug Acts. The general opinion among government officials was that poor-
quality AMLs specifically were no longer an issue in Thailand. This viewpoint was supported 
by respondents from academia: 
We have the least number of fake antimalarial drugs. It's not that many anymore 
compared to other countries. (STK41NG_Academia20150605) 
Some respondent argued that the reduced circulation of poor-quality AMLs is due to the 
reduction in malaria prevalence in Thailand and the reduced demand for AMLs in general. A 
respondent from the BVBD further explained that malaria is perceived as the ‘disease of 
mobile migrant people’ in border areas and is no longer a concern in central parts of Thailand. 
This is another reason why, it is suggested, malaria is no longer considered a national health 
priority. 
The priority of malaria is less and less […] it is not ranking as a high priority 
since a long time ago because, in the past 10 years we got 150,000 cases 
(annually) and now we have 32/33,000 cases per year. 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603) 
Most respondents, including representatives from the industry, agreed that the threat of poor-
quality medicines is still relevant for other essential medicines categories; such as antibiotics 
or treatments for non-communicable diseases (NCDs). The medicines targeted for falsification 
in Thailand today, they added, tend to be more widely used expensive medicines to treat NCDs, 
as NCDs represent the real health burden of the Thai population. One industry respondent 
mentioned a lack of awareness among policy makers, law enforcement officials as well as the 
public, on the threat of poor-quality medicines. This lack of awareness echoes the notable 
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emphasis at the policy level on other more tangible activities, such as PV activities and ADR 
reporting, and on the enforcement side – on clearer targets against the circulation of narcotics. 
8.3.1.2 Traditional Medicine 
Government-level respondents also alluded to traditional medicinal practices and patient 
preferences in response to questions about poor-quality medicines. Some explained that 
western or ‘modern’ drugs (as they are referred to in the Drug Acts) are perceived among Thai 
people as being ill-adapted to the ‘Asian body’. One law enforcement official suggested just 
that:  
Sometimes in Asia if you use for Asia body, you cannot use the full dose. 
(STK43G_LEA20150605) 
It is argued that Thai citizens tend towards traditional medicines and food supplements to self-
medicate. Respondents, including representatives from the government, law enforcement and 
from academia, reported that the main threat to the health of Thai citizens are not poor-quality 
essential medicines, but rather, contaminated traditional medicines and food supplements that 
are illegally spiked with pharmaceutical components or with steroids. Steroid contamination 
is the second priority of the Royal Thai Police unit dealing with smuggled poor-quality 
medicines.  
The problem in Thailand is not about fake drugs actually but the food 
supplements that are mixed with the drugs. (STK43G_LEA20150605) 
A respondent from Academia confirmed that contaminated supplements are dangerous and 
can be illegally purchased through online pharmacies. 
I think one thing that I found really problematic it’s not only poor-quality drugs, 
it's also the intentionally contaminated dietary supplements with dangerous 
drugs, and we find that on the internet. (STK51NG_Academia20150916) 
The threat posed by e-pharmacies was a pervasive topic throughout all interviews conducted 
in Bangkok with both government and non-government respondents, who suggest that the high 
demand for traditional medicines and food supplements in Thailand has created an opportunity 
for dangerous, poor-quality products to be sold through pharmacies. 
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…[O]nline purchasing is a problem, it's very difficult to assess the extent of it. 
(STK48NG_LNGO20150907) 
An additional factor said to promote the sale of such medicines online, is the illegal and 
unregulated advertising through social media of medicines and traditional supplements which 
make unsubstantiated claims. Under this theme, respondents mentioned the socio-cultural 
habit of self-medicating. As this frame suggests, respondents seemed to have a different 
perception of medicine quality, with a greater emphasis on poor-quality lifestyle drugs and the 
contamination of legitimate products, including food supplements, rather than on medicine 
falsification.  
8.3.2 Health Systems Frame 
8.3.2.1 Access to medicines 
Under this first theme, both categories of respondents concurred that the challenge of poor-
quality medicines is intrinsically linked to issues of access to medicines and the general health 
system. A respondent form a Thai NGO explained that despite efforts to improve health 
coverage across Thailand, some remote hill tribe communities in the northern part of the 
country still have limited access to hospitals and to medicines:  
People in the border areas, don't have access to many health facilities. Access to 
any health services is difficult. In Thailand, we have malaria clinics scattered near 
the border but it's not as close to each other as here in Bangkok between hospitals. 
It's quite a distance. (STK48NG_LNGO20150907) 
This gap in access to medicines might create a demand for medicines from alternative sources. 
It is perceived that MMPs working in the forests of Thailand’s border provinces who may not 
have access to the free malaria clinics (due to their geographical location and despite the 
migrant insurance scheme), are tempted to purchase their medicines from itinerant drug 
vendors as illustrated in the quote below: 
People with a backpack, with certain kinds of drugs (illegal) travel around 
seeing those guys in the forest and provide care and sell drugs. 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603) 
Substandard, fake drugs for antimalarials is not really a problem, but it is a 
problem for those who stay in the forest and have difficulty of accessing drugs. 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603) 
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Government respondents explained that drugs that are both expensive but also hard to obtain 
often end up being sold on the black market – as is the case for abortion pills. The latter are 
often purchased from the internet by teenagers, as they have no other legitimate means of 
getting them without being stigmatized.  Providing essential medicines for free is perceived as 
key to improving access to quality medicines and helping to reduce the circulation of poor-
quality medicines: 
One of the methods is making sure there is access to the quality ones 
everywhere so that nobody has to go buy it from dubious sources. 
(STK49G_NRA20150911) 
This corresponds with the emphasis on improving universal health coverage in Phase II of the 
policy process. Regardless, not all MMPs register to be treated in the Thai public health system 
and despite initiatives to achieve Universal Health Coverage, some MMPs continue to work 
and live in Thailand without declaring their presence and are unable to access malaria 
treatment for free (USAID 2014). As a result, some may seek treatment for malaria through 
alternative sources, thus fuelling a black market of essential medicines of dubious quality. 
8.3.2.2 Distribution of essential medicines 
Both government and non-government respondents also linked the problem of poor-quality 
medicine to the distribution of medicines. Some respondents highlighted the strength of the 
Thai health care system in this regard. Respondents from academia, for example, explained 
that current regulations do not allow pharmacies to sell AMLs, therefore implying that all 
AMLs found in pharmacies are potentially of illegal source and could be of poor-quality. 
There are regulations saying that all AMLs have to be used in healthcare facilities 
only. It's not legally available in the drug stores. That is one good initiative from 
Thailand, to restrict this drug to health care facilities but not to pharmacies. 
(STK42NG_Academia20150605) 
The BVBD added that Village Health Workers (VHWs) help secure a continuous supply of 
treatments to patients in the more remote areas of Thailand, ensuring that no one is required to 
purchase treatments from unlicensed sources. 
Despite such measures, however, other respondents explained that distribution guidelines are 
not always enforced adequately. For example, ‘special-controlled drugs’ or prescription-only 
medicines are often dispensed without prescription.  
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In theory, you get prescription but in reality, the prescription system in Thailand 
doesn't work so much. (STK50G_NRA20150911) 
Reports confirmed that prescription-only drugs, including antibiotics, are still available over-
the-counter in Thailand, despite efforts to enforce dispensing guidelines and improve the 
rational use of medicines (Lee et al. 2015; Pongpisut et al. 2015). Medicines are still being 
distributed in the form of ‘ya-chuut’ or ‘cocktails of drugs’. As discussed in the previous 
chapters, this could be evidence of poor distribution practice and may contribute to the 
circulation of poor-quality medicines, as it is difficult to verify the packaging and content. 
While the New Drug Act proposes stricter rules for the dispensing of medicines, stipulating 
that issuing ‘cocktails of medicines’ in plastic bags will no longer be permitted, this Act has 
not yet been promulgated and undermined efforts to improve Good Distribution Practices. 
Respondents from the BVBD and academia also discussed the problem of substandard and 
degraded AMLs fuelled by poor distribution and storage practices, including the ‘improper 
handling of drugs in malaria posts’ with suboptimal temperature or humidity levels.  
The thing we should do is go out, look at how they handle drugs, stock drugs, 
look at the temperature they use, etc. Promote the better management of drug 
stocks. (STK40G_NMCP20150603) 
Most respondents therefore admitted that there is still room for improvement in Thailand with 
regards to the distribution of medicines. Industry representatives reported that the problem of 
poor-quality medicines lies predominantly in the illegitimate supply chain and distribution of 
medicines through illegal e-pharmacies and the black market. As a respondent from 
Chulalongkorn University pointed out, the government is currently working to improve trust 
in public health facilities and to dissuade patients from purchasing medicines from dubious 
sources, such as online pharmacies. This echoes the emphasis on strengthening 
pharmacovigilance activities in Phase IV of the policy process. 
8.3.3 Regulatory Frame 
8.3.3.1 Rules and Regulations 
Government-level respondents argued that the Thai regulatory framework for pharmaceuticals 
is well developed and that the prevalence of poor-quality medicines is relatively low compared 
to neighbouring countries. Respondents from the Ministry of Health referred to the strength of 
Thailand’s pre-marketing rules and regulations for AMLs and explained that some aspects of 
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Thailand’s vertical malaria programme have worked efficiently to prevent the circulation of 
poor-quality AMLs.  
…[E]very type of [AML] drug from procurement to distribution belongs here to 
the BVBD. It is not allowed to the free market - then it is easy to control the 
quality of the product. (STK40G_NMCP20150603) 
We don't have problems with antimalarials…because the BVBD does appropriate 
procurement for antimalarials. [The BVBD] distribute all over the country. [The 
BVBD] prove the quality before we distribute so we can reduce the problem of 
the [poor-] quality [AMLs] reaching the system. (STK44G_MoH20150609) 
Most respondents, both at the government level and among academia, added that Thailand has 
a strong medicine quality testing facility, which neighbouring countries also benefit from by 
sending samples through for quality control. Respondents from the TFDA and Department of 
Medical Science pointed out that some countries even take example on Thai GMP standards 
to update their own regulatory frameworks. Respondents from the TFDA emphasised that if 
neighbouring countries were to follow the Thai pre-marketing standards, it would help to 
reduce the problem of poor-quality medicines in the region altogether.  
Despite the strengths of the framework highlighted above, some non-government respondents 
pointed out that there remain loopholes in the system that could be exploited by pharmaceutical 
criminals. Some argued that the current penalties for the production, distribution and sale of 
poor-quality medicines are not representative of the severity of the crime. Most acknowledged 
the need for stronger penalties – currently being discussed in the New Drug Act. Industry 
representatives’ concern towards the current penalty revisions, as seen previously, suggests 
that fears of more inadequate penalties have contributed to the stalling of New Drug Act 
approval process. It is also important to note here that there are no specific clauses on the 
illegal sale of medicine in online pharmacies (Homhuan 2013). Other respondents reported 
that the main weakness of the drug regulatory system relates to Market Authorization (MA) 
guidelines currently allowing the lifetime registration of pharmaceuticals. MA certificates for 
registered medicines do not have an expiration date – meaning that no renewal procedure is 
required. There is therefore no systematic mechanism to review MAs for medicines registered 
over 10 years ago, that may today be ill-suited to the current health needs of the country. The 
revised Drug Act (2003) proposes to reduce the validity of the certificate of product 
registration to five years, however, this Act has not yet been promulgated, as previously 
explained.  
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They have to revaluate the existing registrations because our registration is for a 
lifetime, so they don't revaluate [the medicine] – [it is] registered 22 years ago or 
more like 30 years ago. We need them to get rid of those that are poor [quality]. 
(STK51NG_Academia20150916) 
A related challenge identified is the lack of regulatory measures taken to ban the sale and 
distribution of Oral Artemisinin Monotherapies (oAMTs) in Thailand. Since MAs do not 
expire, oAMTs are technically allowed to circulate in Thailand and there are no measures to 
monitor the use of such medicines by malaria patients. This poses a threat for the rational use 
of medicines and access to adequate treatment to eliminate malaria. 
As a result, the market is crowded with medicines still registered but with minimal use. It is 
suggested that this makes it more difficult to discern which products may be registered, 
unregistered, or fake. While some respondents argued that the procurement system organized 
through the GPO has improved the management of what is a crowded supply chain of 
medicines, others argue that in practice the procurement system for essential medicines 
remains very complex. A professor from academia explained that the high number of 
wholesalers who repackage and re-label medicines not only complicates the supply chain, but 
also makes it difficult to track the source and the quality of the products along the way.  
…You have rule(s) on the procurement… So, it’s a mixed process. It's not 
really centralized or decentralized, it’s a mix and it is quite complex. 
(STK51NG_Academia20150916) 
Respondents added that the logistics management system and cold supply chain system in 
Thailand still needs strengthening to effectively prevent the circulation of poor-quality 
medicines.  
8.3.3.2 Weak surveillance and enforcement capacity 
Most government-level respondents highlighted the strengths of Thailand’s post-marketing 
surveillance framework alluding, for example, to the fact that TFDA inspectors work in 
collaboration with customs officials at ports of entry – both at the central and provincial levels. 
As a result of such initiatives, the DMS highlights that the percentage of poor-quality 
medicines has considerably reduced over the years from 10% to 5%. Nevertheless, non-
government respondents and Thai academics argued that post-marketing surveillance activities 
in Thailand could be improved. Respondents explained that the sampling strategy of the DMS 
for medicine quality control is executed in an unsystematic way, implying that samples are not 
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randomly chosen across therapeutic categories and outlets for quality testing, but are often 
obtained from sources where regulators are less likely to encounter poor-quality medicines, 
i.e., large hospitals rather than border clinics. Such gaps in PMS are confirmed in a report 
which suggests that the sampling process does not effectively monitor the quality of all 
essential medicines including AMLs (Lee et al. 2015).  
One of the problems why we have so many substandard medicines is that we don't 
have a method to evaluate the quality of [all] the product[s]…Some antimalarials 
are in pharmacopoeia but a lot of them [are not], especially the 
new combinations. (STK41NG_Academia20150605) 
As seen previously, AMLs are not part of the sampling efforts of the DMS and are tested 
separately by the BVBD. The BVBD works alongside USP with funding from WHO and 
USAID to implement ad hoc inspections on AMLs. Yet, the 2011 malaria control plan provides 
no indicator for measuring the percentage of poor-quality AMLs in Thailand (MoPH n.d.). 
Respondents also argued that AMLs should be systematically included in the annual drug-
quality testing rounds, and should be collected from border provincial areas. This may not 
currently be the case because malaria is no longer perceived as a health priority, and as a result, 
respondents explained that less funding is made available for the systematic sample collection 
and quality control of AMLs.  
Most respondents across categories also argued that the enforcement of existing rules and 
regulations for the management of pharmaceuticals are particularly patchy in border areas.  
We know that for suburban areas, quite far from the capital, in some regions, we 
can't go to them. But now, in big cities we can control. In rural areas, we cannot 
control 100% but we try. (STK44G_MoH20150609) 
A customs official interviewed for this study added that there are different standards of 
enforcement from place to place between the central and peripheral areas of Thailand, 
suggesting that while pharmaceutical regulation is strong in Bangkok and its vicinity, laws are 
not always enforced as they should be in provincial border areas. According to a local NGO, 
this may be due to a lack of resources – both human and financial – to actively survey the 
situation in those areas further from the central TFDA. Respondents agreed that there is a lack 
of qualified pharmaceutical inspectors to enforce post-marketing activities. In principle, 
inspections on pharmacies and drug outlets are conducted before re-issuing licenses. In 
practice, however, although inspection responsibilities are delegated to PPHOs, reports 
suggest that there are insufficient staff members across the country to conduct inspections in 
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all outlets. Yearly renewals are said to impose a burden on the TFDA for pre-marketing 
activities. Both factors could potentially facilitate the circulation of poor-quality medicines. It 
is also reported that while online pharmacies are illegal, the closure of e-pharmacies is not 
enforced. The threat of technology and the difficulty of regulating online commerce is 
perceived as a major challenge:  
There are a lot of fake drugs like that on the internet, they just change their 
identity and it’s done. And they will always have customers. 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603)  
A respondent from law enforcement explained that some factories licensed by the TFDA 
produce substandard medicines but escape inspections because police officials assume that 
their license is a certification of quality for all their products. This, law enforcement 
respondents argued, calls for a strengthening surveillance and more awareness raising among 
law enforcement officials as well as policy makers (STK45G_LEA20150609). They also 
explained that narcotics law is better understood and receives priority attention among customs 
officials on the ground. Another respondent added that arrests against unlicensed outlets are 
only performed for ‘big cases’ that might attract more media attention, but that enforcement is 
weaker for smaller outlets where the presence of poor-quality medicines may be considered 
less consequential (STK43G_LEA20150605). 
8.3.3.3 Lack of cooperation 
Finally, many respondents argue that cross-sectoral collaboration is essential for effective 
enforcement of existing laws and policies:  
The authority is not the main player in the problem of quality of medicines. It 
should include industry, academia. Everybody should collaborate to improve the 
quality of the medicines. (STK42NG_Academia20150605) 
Most respondents explained, however, that cross-sectoral cooperation is not always optimal. 
One industry representative, for example, explained that there is a general reluctance to share 
information about poor-quality medicines for fear of insulting the regulators and damaging 
their cooperation with the government. This points to a certain level of sensitivity on the topic 
of regulatory enforcement. Interestingly, no respondent mentioned the 2009 Memorandum of 
Understanding cited in the literature. It seems that while most respondents acknowledge the 
need for cooperation; the institutionalization of such cooperation remains weak. Respondents 
also highlighted the need for more communication between the TFDA and the BVBD in 
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running the malaria program, and ensuring a continuous supply of good quality AMLs to 
achieve malaria elimination by 2024. Furthermore, a representative from a law enforcement 
agency commented on the status of cooperation between customs and police over poor-quality 
medicines: 
Cooperation is not that efficient though as both parties are too busy and can’t 
concentrate on all issues. (STK45G_LEA20150609) 
On this point, a respondent from the Royal Thai Police added that to close an online pharmacy 
website, the Consumer Protection Unit must seek the help of the Information Communication 
Technology unit. In practice, the process is complicated and rarely applied, as many 
enforcement officials are afraid to infringe on the business of those website owners who may 
not be selling only pharmaceuticals. 
How to close the website; I need to arrest the website first, write down a document 
to the other police division (the ICT police). They will send the letter to the court 
to tell them about the problem. The court will decide to close the website or not. 
It takes a lot of time. Only one month or one week they sell a lot of products via 
the internet, maybe a million pieces. (STK43G_LEA20150605) 
Respondents agreed on a lack of clarity and certainty on enforcement procedures against illegal 
online pharmacies. This process, they argued, needs to be optimized together with the MoPH. 
It was also reported that Police departments require more authority to share information to the 
public on which websites have been found to sell poor-quality medicines and should be 
avoided. 
Respondents previously pointed out the need for more cross-border cooperation, however, 
government respondents and law enforcement officials mentioned unsystematic cooperation 
with neighbouring countries on the matter of pharmaceutical regulation. Despite attempts to 
cooperate with NRAs beyond Thailand’s borders, these efforts rarely lead to arrests. 
Respondents also referred to the inefficiency of harmonization and cooperation initiatives 
through ASEAN (STK45G_LEA20150609). One anonymous respondent explained that 
ASEAN’s unanimity decision-making principle means that few decisions are taken that benefit 
regional cooperation. Another respondent added that police officials in neighbouring countries 
are not aware of how to get in touch with their Thai counterparts to exchange information on 
the potential circulation of poor-quality medicines (STK43G_LEA20150605). Additionally, 
INTERPOL meetings, while useful, are rarely attended by the same members of staff in each 
unit, which does not facilitate fluid contact and cooperation across borders.  
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8.3.4 Security Frame 
8.3.4.1 Dynamics of migration  
Under the security frame, government-level respondents referred to the cross-border 
movement of MMPs and the threat of illegal smuggling as factors potentially contributing to 
the circulation of poor-quality medicines in Thailand. Respondents perceived MMPs seeking 
health care in Thailand as posing a threat to the system. Because of the social security schemes 
in place for MMPs, this influx of MMPs seeking jobs in Thailand’s border provinces places a 
high burden on Thai hospital and strains the health care system, leading to budgetary cuts 
which it is argued can affect access to free essential medicines for Thai citizens. The overuse 
of Thai health facilities, they argued, might make it more difficult to overcome stock-outs of 
medicines. Yet, despite efforts from the Thai government to facilitate MMPs’ access to health 
services and despite the signature of an MoU between Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and 
Myanmar on the issuance of a health insurance cards for migrants registered to work in 
Thailand, some are still unregistered and without proper access to health 
(STK55NG_INGO20150910). Some of those are involved in illegal logging activities, for 
example. Despite efforts to provide standard health kits for access to basic health commodities 
for unregistered forest-goers such as illegal loggers, their access to quality healthcare is 
compromised (STK54NG_INGO20150910). It is reported that unregistered MMPs drive the 
demand for poor-quality medicines by purchasing commodities from itinerant sellers at the 
border. Other respondents added that certain migrant communities prefer to bring their own 
medicines they are familiar with, thereby favouring the cross-border trafficking of medicines 
that may not be registered in Thailand.  
They [poor-quality medicines] are manufactured somewhere else and they come 
in through migrants to the border areas. (STK42NG_Academia20150605) 
Other respondents explained that migrants may be afraid of using Thai healthcare services if 
unregistered, for fear of being sent back home. Registered migrants may also not be aware of 
their entitlement to free or subsidized healthcare in Thailand. These factors may drive migrants 
to self-medicate and purchase medicines such as AMLs from unlicensed outlets, possibly 
fuelling the trade in poor-quality medicine. The other challenge highlighted by government 
respondents, is the risk of spreading artemisinin resistance through MMP movements.  
What they do is they go directly to grocery stores where they have these AMLs 
and they buy it there. They don't get a proper treatment and that's where they find 
antimalarial drug resistance. (STK41NG_Academia20150605) 
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8.3.4.2 Regional threat  
The second theme under this frame, addressed by both categories of respondents, was the 
perceived threat posed by neighbouring countries such as Myanmar, Laos, or Cambodia where 
poor-quality medicines is thought be more of a problem. A customs representative argued:  
…[R]aw materials [for the unlicensed production of pharmaceuticals] usually 
trace back to China or India. Assembly wise, they've seen it take place in 
Cambodia. I mean the packaging of raw materials. Now it's shifting as Cambodia 
has stepped up on their enforcement. Some of it shifted to Myanmar. 
(STK47NG_20150915) 
One anonymous respondent from an IO reported that the border with Myanmar is of concern 
especially due to weak regulation capacity on the other side of the border, the political 
instability and rebel activity at the border, as well as the geography of what is a highly 
mountainous or with rives and few formal checkpoints. A respondent from a Thai NGO 
expressed scepticism at the government’s capacity to control every area of Thailand’s long 
and porous border, where there are both formal checkpoints and numerous informal entry 
points, such as along the Mekong River.  
The river is very easy to cross you can just take a boat and go. and sometimes 
you can just walk. (STK54NG_INGO20150910) 
In view of the porosity of the borders and the establishment of the ASEAN Economic 
Community, respondents concur that cross-border cooperation between Mekong countries is 
necessary to address the threat of poor-quality medicines, especially at border check points. 
We need to improve cross border cooperation in view of AEC 2015 – this will 
represent an additional challenge due to the free flow of goods. 
(STK54NG_INGO20150910) 
8.3.4.3 Organized Crime 
The third theme brought forward by both government and non-government respondents is the 
regional challenge of organized crime and the smuggling of illegal products into Thailand – 
all phenomena that potentially contribute to the circulation of poor-quality medicines. 
Respondents from the industry, from an IO and from the TFDA mentioned the strong link 
between the trade in narcotics in the region and the trade in fake medicines. One respondent 
argued that both have similar distribution channels and modus operandi. Respondents added 
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that the low penalties incurred for the falsification of medicines has attracted narcotics 
criminals into the business of medicine falsification. While there is no proof of links between 
the two criminal networks, respondents argued that the falsification of medicines may be a 
more resilient option than narcotics trade, with fewer risks of prosecution.  
A customs official noted that the perception of law enforcement officials hinders efforts 
against poor-quality medicines, as many law enforcers still consider the narcotics trade as ‘a 
more important crime’ (STK45G_LEA20150609). This, the respondent argued, may be partly 
due to their familiarity with the implementation process of existing regulation against the 
narcotics trade. Another law enforcement respondent suggests that there is a lot of sensitivity 
around reporting pharmaceutical organized crime run by ‘big businesses’ or organized 
criminal enterprises. This fear may also impede on efforts to address the circulation of poor-
quality medicines: 
They don't want to make a problem with anybody. I mean people who have big 
businesses – businessmen make this and sell people around that area. 
(STK43G_LEA20150605) 
The second main point brought forward is the high level of smuggling of different types of 
fake goods along the Thai border, from fake cosmetics from China, narcotics, to motorcycles 
or unregistered medicines.  
Viagra (unregistered) is a big issue here. Most of those come from Pakistan or 
India and are smuggled in. (STK56G_20150914) 
Respondents argued that falsified medicines are brought into Thailand in the same way that 
narcotics, or fake DVDs may be smuggled in. A respondent from Chulalongkorn University 
added that addictive substances are smuggled into Thailand to be added to traditional 
medicines – which is one other example of how the narcotics and the poor-quality medicines 
trade are intertwined (STK51NG_Academia20150916). The intensity of this illegal trade, 
respondents argued, is too much for law enforcement officials to deal with. A respondent from 
a Thai NGO added that despite cooperation efforts and the help of the World Customs 
Organisation, the routes are hard to trace back using the information on the packaging, seeing 
as the labels can be just as fake as the contents of the medicine (STK48NG_LNGO20150907). 
Another respondent explains that despite cooperation efforts through the Joint Mekong River 
Patrol against smuggling of illegal products in the region, cross-border cooperation efforts are 
once again mainly focused on the narcotics trade (STK46NG_IGO20150610). Finally, a 
customs official added that this illegal trade is an essential part of the Golden Triangle’s 
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economy and that cracking down severely would affect the whole economic cycle of the region 
(STK45G_LEA20150609). This links to the next Frame on the economic determinants of the 
trade in poor-quality medicines. 
8.3.5 Economic Frame 
8.3.5.1 Industry 
On numerous occasions, and across respondent categories, the threat of poor-quality medicines 
was dismissed and discussions re-directed to the strength of the domestic pharmaceutical 
industry, presented as one reason why poor-quality medicines are no longer a major threat in 
Thailand. Respondents explained that the GPO produces a wide array of medicines across 
therapeutic categories at affordable prices and the fact that most medicines can be supplied 
through the domestic pharmaceutical industry, they added, means that less imports are required 
thereby reducing the risk of poor-quality medicines entering Thailand. Others argued that 
pharmaceutical companies have an important role in efforts against fake medicines as they 
offer trainings to customs officials on quality assessment for batches of their products. 
Members of the GPO framed the ASEAN Economic Community 2015 efforts towards the 
harmonization of pharmaceutical registration procedures as an opportunity for Thailand to 
export its medicines, first and foremost, besides offering prospects for securing medicine 
quality across the region. In their answers, other respondents re-iterated the importance of 
GMP and the recent application of Thailand to PICS as an incentive for domestic drug 
manufacturers to improve their facilities. Both government and non-government respondents 
placed a strong emphasis on IP protection in Thailand, thus discussing the threat of poor-
quality medicines as a trademark infringement and a peril to the industry. In their accounts, 
law enforcement officials also regularly confounded the problem of fake medicines with that 
of ‘counterfeiting’. On many occasions, efforts to improve access to quality medicines were 
regularly equated to the development of the pharmaceutical industry and the preservation of 
business interests. 
Other respondents explained that despite regulations against the inappropriate advertising of 
pharmaceutical products, it is common to find adverts for unregistered, poor-quality 
supplements, or medicines of dubious origin, especially in social media. They explained that 
the main target for this industry are young people, who are sensitive to advertising through 
Facebook, for slimming pills or other lifestyle medicines. These marketing tricks, they argue, 
drive the trade in poor-quality medicines of all categories:  
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Young people they don't understand they don't see the news; they don't read the 
newspaper. But they use telephone or the internet [technology and health seeking 
behaviour] they Google 'cheap fat burning supplement' 'cheap supplement for 
white skin'. They see many products. (STK43G_LEA20150605)  
According to respondents from GPO, TFDA and academia, enforcing regulation against these 
advertising techniques (as was done against the promotion of tobacco products) is one of the 
current priorities of the MoPH. Another challenge noted by respondents, was the lack of 
cooperation in terms of information sharing by pharmaceutical companies, arguing that most 
companies ‘don't want to cause panic in a particular market’, and would chose to deal with 
uncovered stocks of poor-quality medicines quietly rather than alert the authorities 
(STK47NG_20150915). This alludes to fears of interfering with business, the same fears that 
are said to impact enforcement efforts.  
8.3.5.2 Development and infrastructure 
Respondents from both categories also referred to infrastructure development as both a support 
for efforts against poor-quality medicines and as further evidence of the development gaps 
between neighbour countries, that lead to variations in in access to quality services and health 
commodities. Firstly, respondents discussed the positive aspects of Thailand’s infrastructure 
development. Better health facilities and road networks across the country have dramatically 
improved access to health services and to medicines. Malaria clinics and posts in the more 
remote areas of the country are a testimony to this. A respondent from the BVBD added that 
in Thailand, most malaria endemic villages do have access to electricity and are not as remote 
or secluded as they may be in other less developed malaria endemic nations 
(STK40G_NMCP20150603). It is economic growth that drove social development in Thailand 
and engendered a demand for higher quality health services, leading to the introduction of the 
social security scheme in the 1990s, as explained in the literature (Teerawattananon et al. 
2003). On the other hand, respondents pointed out that in neighbouring countries where there 
may be fewer resources for infrastructure development and a lack of health facilities, access 
to health and to medicines suffers. This is one aspect, respondents agreed, that may continue 
to drive the region’s trade in poor-quality medicines and why such products might find their 
way into Thailand’s border provinces. While transportation routes, such as the East-West 
Economic Corridor, have facilitated trade, economic and social development across the 
Mekong region, weak regulation and poor customs control, especially in the lower-income 
countries, creates an opportunity for the smuggling of illegal goods of all kinds, including 
poor-quality medicines. One respondent explained that there are concerns with the trade routes 
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that go through Myanmar, for example. This links back to the security frame, as detailed in 
section 8.3.4.  
8.3.5.3 Trade liberalization 
In their accounts, non-government respondents referred to the income disparity between 
economics of a region in transition, as an obstacle to securing the supply chain of good-quality 
medicines. Respondents referred to regional investments as exacerbating the economic gap 
between Mekong countries, increasing disparities and fuelling the illegal movement of goods 
and people. In fact, globalization and the cross-border movement of goods and people, is 
acknowledged in the 11th National Health Development Plan 2012-2016 as one of the main 
health challenges for Thailand. A respondent from Chulalongkorn University suggested that 
too much emphasis on economic development and trade in the region has overlooked social 
priorities for improving the health and wellbeing of Mekong citizens 
(STK51NG_Academia20150916). The respondent added that poor communities suffer from 
inequitable regional investments, and urged that growth be more inclusive to support access 
to medicines for all. Respondents from IOs stated that this region in transition offers many 
opportunities for money laundering in the form of hotels or shopping centres, as witnessed in 
Myanmar or Laos. They added that the health landscape of the Mekong is changing with 
wealthier countries in the region building hospitals across their borders for their own citizen. 
This, they argued, offers opportunities for a parallel trade of medicines that NRAs might be 
ill-prepared for. Respondents also argued that trade liberalization in the wider region of 
Southeast Asia and Free Trade Zone has increased opportunities for smuggling, due to poor 
regulation of cross border movement. While Free Trade Zones should be free of tariffs they 
are too often free of customs control altogether, facilitating the movement of illicit goods 
including, potentially, of poor-quality medicines. 
8.3.6 Political Frame 
Few of the themes that emerged from respondents’ accounts in Thailand fell under the Political 
Frame. One main observation can be made from the narratives, however, that alludes to the 
political sensitivity in Thailand and in the region around the problem of poor-quality 
medicines. An industry representative noted that at a luncheon held on access to safe medicines 
with ASEAN countries, there was reluctance to join, on the pretence that poor-quality 
medicines were not considered an issue for Thailand due to its development nation status 
(STK47NG_20150915). A respondent from a law enforcement agency explained that for fear 
of upsetting working relations with Thailand, policy officials from abroad are reluctant to share 
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information about fake medicines at border areas, for fear of uncovering sensitive information 
that would place blame on one country or another. 
I've tried to tell the police abroad that if they have information about fake 
medicines from Lao or Myanmar or Cambodian people, let me know and I will 
check myself in Bangkok, I will follow the information. They don't want to make 
a problem with anybody [sensitivity]. (STK43G_LEA20150605) 
Respondents rejected the possibility of poor-quality AMLs still being in circulation in 
Thailand, emphasizing the fact that the demand for AMLs has considerably reduced, that 
malaria is a low public health priority and is now mainly a disease of the MMPs and of 
neighbouring countries. There was notable sensitivity when addressing the problem of access 
to medicines among MMPs and the possibility of poor-quality medicines still circulating in 
border areas.  When asked to develop on this point, one respondent from a local non-
government organisation asked me to turn off the microphone. In fact, respondents from 
Academia mentioned that the problem of ‘fake medicines’ is addressed sporadically only when 
the news picks up on large case: 
 When there is news on fake medicines, it brings attention to this issue for a while 
and people say they want to combat counterfeit drugs but I don't think the issue 
is that big in Thailand that it secures an established process, a regular process. 
(STK41NG_Academia20150605) 
A respondent from law enforcement added that the problem of contaminated or poor-quality 
cosmetics and food supplements, received more political attention; impeding law enforcement 
officials’ ability to invest time and resources into the problem of poor-quality pharmaceuticals: 
Activities focus on cosmetics and supplements. Cooperation [between customs 
and policy] is not that efficient though as both parties are too busy and can’t 
concentrate on all issues. (STK43G_LEA20150605) 
8.4 Frames and the policy process 
The problem of poor-quality AMLs is not perceived as an issue of the highest political priority 
in Thailand, mainly because malaria no longer accounts for much of the disease burden in the 
country. Results suggest a different understanding of the problem of medicine quality among 
regulators, with a focus on the issue of substandard pharmaceuticals including contaminated 
traditional medicine and food supplements. The results also suggest that Thailand is faced with 
a new kind of challenge; one that may be equated to a more developed economy where the 
disease burden is predominantly related to NCDs, where the demand for lifestyle medicines is 
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high and where many consumers have access to the internet and prefer purchasing their 
medicines through illegal online pharmacies. The online sale of medicines in a growing health 
sector of an upper-middle income nation with widespread access to the internet, is indeed 
recognized as an important challenge to accessing good quality medicines. This observation 
seems to echo the government’s emphasis lately on tightening regulations against illegal 
advertising of medicines, and a focus on PV activities to monitor ADR, as described in Phase 
IV of the policy development process.  
The regulatory challenges of tomorrow in Thailand, triggered by economic development and 
the rise of technology and e-purchasing, appear to be different to those faced by neighbouring 
countries. Most respondents agree, however, that while poor-quality AMLs may no longer be 
the main priority in Thailand, new challenges require the regulatory system to adapt; which 
might explain the urge to agree on the New Drug Act revision. While the reasons for the delay 
in promulgating the New Drug Act are unknown, recent political turmoil in Thailand could 
have slowed the revision process and submission to parliament, as might the level of 
bureaucracy incurred in large drug regulatory agencies such as the TFDA. Regardless, the fact 
that the promulgation process for the New Drug Act may have triggered regulators to focus 
first and foremost on PV activities and ADR monitoring; an area where activities are less 
politically sensitive and in which regulators can achieve tangible results.  
The results also suggest that the region-wide threat of drug resistant malaria could have 
contributed to the government’s effort to improve UHC. It was suggested that concerns that 
poor access to quality AMLs in border areas might exacerbate the risk of chloroquine and 
subsequently of artemisinin resistance spreading in Thailand, may have prompted efforts to 
include migrant workers in a compulsory health insurance scheme. Additionally, because of a 
rapidly growing public health sector, a high number of medical tourists from neighbouring 
countries now seek treatment in Thailand’s hospitals. This, respondents suggested, has placed 
a considerable burden on the health system and could also have formed part of the 
government’s motivation to improve UHC for its own citizens and residents as well. The 
pressure exerted on Thailand to guarantee the health of its residents and of MMPs, as a middle-
income economy, may also have motivated these efforts. This testifies to a strong policy 
response to improve access to quality-assured medicines.  
Despite a reportedly comprehensive pharmaceutical regulatory framework (Teerawattananon 
et al. 2003) and despite the government’s considerable efforts to improve access to quality-
assured medicines, results also suggest room for improvement in terms of both pre- and post-
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marketing regulatory activities. While government-level respondents emphasized the fact that 
the Thai regulatory framework is an example from which neighbouring countries can gain 
expertise (for example, Thailand positions itself as a reference laboratory for quality testing 
pharmaceuticals), most non-government respondents suggest that more could be done to 
optimize the enforcement of existing rules and regulations. It appears that despite the existence 
of a large policy subsystem to debate health regulation and reforms among stakeholders from 
various sectors, cooperation between the concerned parties when it comes to the 
implementation and enforcement of rules and regulations is more challenging. Respondents 
explained that the decentralization of PMS activities to peripheral areas has not been 
implemented optimally. Additionally, respondents suggested that law enforcement officials 
have a better understanding and training for monitoring the illegal circulation of narcotics 
rather than medicines, as the narcotics trade remains a priority national health and security 
concern in Thailand.  
Another particularity of the Thailand context is the importance of the pharmaceutical industry 
and of trade interests. The economic frame seems to be a common thread from Phase I to Phase 
IV of the policy development process. The prevalence of industry has been suggested as one 
of the potential reasons why the process to finalize the New Drug Act (2003) has stalled, in 
view of disagreements with industry representatives. However, greater trade opportunities 
between ASEAN countries also create opportunities for the circulation of illegal goods through 
established trade routes. This makes effective border control more challenging, and heightens 
the risks of poor-quality medicines circulating in Thailand. Respondents contended that the 
impact of economic development on countries’ capacity to regulate is undeniable and that 
Thailand has comparatively more capacity to regulate and manage the quality of medicines in 
its supply chain. Thailand’s current focus on PV and ADR activities is commensurate with 
policy actors’ concerns for resolving the problem of contaminated supplements, improving 
ADR report and keeping a low statistical prevalence of poor-quality medicine. 
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Chapter 9 Discussion 
The global issue of poor-quality medicines is a multi-faceted and complex challenge. Results 
show that how the challenge of poor quality antimalarials (AMLs) is framed, influences the 
way in which policy actors in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand formulate policy responses and 
implement rules and regulations to improve access to quality medicines. The introduction to 
this thesis laid out four main goals for this research: 1) to examine the policy developments 
against poor-quality AMLs in these countries; 2) to explore how the problem of poor-quality 
medicines is framed by stakeholders in these same countries; 3) to compare the similarities 
and differences in how this issue is framed; and 4) to reflect on the implications of research 
findings for future policy developments and cross-border coordination against poor-quality 
medicines in Southeast Asia. In this chapter, I first compare how the policy issue of poor-
quality AMLs is framed across national settings and reflect on the implications of variations 
in the problem definition for pathways of policy response. Because of the importance of the 
socio-economic and political context, the politically charged nature of the issue of poor-quality 
medicines and the varying governance structures and differences in regulatory capacity 
between the countries studied, I reflect on the benefits of a tailored approach to strengthening 
regulatory systems. This can still be facilitated by a regional governance framework to foster 
regional cooperation and promote policy coherence. 
Examining varying interpretations of the problem among policy actors in three different 
national settings, and how these interpretations relate to the policy development against poor-
quality AMLs, led to some interesting empirical findings. Three main findings emerge from 
the comparative analysis of the frames and policy processes in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand: 
1) Despite variations in the terminology used to define poor-quality medicines, there are three 
dominant and common frames (the security, health systems and regulatory frames) among 
policy actors that presuppose a shared understanding of the threat of falsified and substandard 
medicines across the three national settings, based predominantly on the security paradigm. 
This provides some insights as to what narrative might trigger or sustain political will towards 
the ATM goal. 2) These frames are articulated differently in each country leading to different 
policy outcomes, shaped by policy actor mobilisation and specific contextual factors. 3) 
Results suggest that there is room for addressing variations in pathways of policy response by 
pushing the regional health security agenda to encourage broader health systems strengthening 
and, where relevant, to harness regional cooperation.  
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9.1 Problem definition: Framing poor-quality medicines 
One main observation from the results of this study is that poor-quality medicines are defined 
differently across national settings in official policy and legal documents. These variations in 
definition influence how frames resonate among groups of actors and policy environments. 
The inconsistency of official definitions across national settings, however, means there is no 
common legal or medical understanding of the challenge posed by poor-quality medicines. 
This reduces opportunities for cross-border coordination of policy responses (Attaran, Barry, 
et al. 2012). The terminology used to define poor-quality medicines in official legal and policy 
documents is inconsistent across the three countries (as summarised in Table 19 page 223). In 
the official English translations of policy documents, the terms used interchangeably are 
‘counterfeit’, ‘fake’, ‘substandard’, ‘non-standard’, and ‘deteriorated’ medicines 52 . Most 
policy and legal documents, however, refer to ‘counterfeit’ medicines or offer definitions of 
poor-quality medicines that centre around trademark infringement (such as those in Thailand 
or Cambodia). In Thailand, the term used most frequently is ‘fake’ rather than ‘counterfeit’, 
but the matching definition centres on trademark infringement. This confounds the public 
health priority of consumer and patient protection with intellectual property protection. There 
is rarely a distinction made in official definitions between substandard and falsified (or 
counterfeit) medicines. Laws for the management of pharmaceuticals in Laos, for example, 
refer to counterfeit, substandard and deteriorated medicines, as well as unqualified, banned or 
prohibited medicines interchangeably. Additionally, the notion of ‘intent’ which is an essential 
legal differentiation between ‘falsified’ from ‘substandard’ medicines (Attaran et al. 2011), is 
rarely part of official definitions of poor-quality medicines (except for the Laos’ Amended 
Law on Drugs (2011, article 3.3)). This amalgam of terms complicates the development of 
adequate national policy responses to each category of poor-quality medicines. Official 
definitions of poor quality medicines lack clarity and consistency. In most cases, these 
definitions fail to address the complexity of the issue of poor-quality medicines as multi-
faceted challenge, requiring different policy responses for substandard and falsified medicines. 
  
                                                     
52 These observations are based on English translations of official documents which I did not review in 
their original languages. The original terminology in Thai, Lao or Khmer may therefore differ slightly 
from those put forth in English translations. This represents a limitation to this study, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  
 224 
 
Country Document Definition  
Cambodia 
Amendement of Law 
on Management of 
Pharmaceuticals 
(2007)  
Article 2.2 
‘A counterfeit pharmaceutical is a medication which 
may contain inactive ingredients or inappropriate 
quantities of active ingredients, or may not contain 
enough active ingredients as mentioned on the label, 
or has the packaging, design, identification similar 
to or the same as the original products or may be 
produced or packaged without licensing from the 
Ministry of Health.’ 
 
Laos 
Amended Law on 
Drugs and Medical 
Products 07/NA 
(2011)  
Articles 3.3 and 3.4 
(Article 3.3) ‘Counterfeit drugs and medical 
products refer to any modern drugs, traditional 
medicines, medicinal natural resources, cosmetics, 
health supplement, medical devices, controlled 
chemicals and dangerous chemicals which are 
intentionally falsified or imitated or copied from the 
products which are produced, distributed and legally 
registered.’  
(Article 3.4) A ‘Sub-standard drug refers to a 
modern drug or traditional medicine, the 
composition of which is not consistent with its 
registered formulae.’ 
 
Thailand 
Drug Act 1967 
(Section 74) 
A Fake Drug is a drug that ‘falsely shows it is in 
accordance with a formula which has been 
registered’ or one ‘with active substances which 
quantity or strength lower that the minimum or 
higher than the maximum standard (20%).’  
Substandard drugs are ‘...drugs produced so that 
their purity or other characteristics which are 
important to their quality differ from the standards 
prescribed in the registered formula…’  
Table 19 Official definitions of poor-quality medicines in each country 
This research also underlies the value of exploring perceptions of a policy issue to understand 
variations in policy developments and implications for cross-sectoral and cross border 
cooperation. As previously argued, the definition and interpretation of a policy problem forms 
part of its drivers and its solutions (Parsons 1995). Understanding how the problem of poor-
quality medicines is framed across the three countries and between categories of respondents, 
informed my analysis of policy responses to improve access to quality medicines. The 
dominant frames across institutional and national settings were the security, the health systems 
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and the regulatory frames. Despite the salience of these three frames, each is articulated 
differently between policy actors Cambodia, Laos and Thailand.  
Frame Security Health Systems Regulatory 
Cambodia 
Migration  Access to Medicines  Enforcement capacity 
Drug-resistant malaria Unlicensed outlets Stakeholder cooperation 
Regional Threat   
Laos 
Victim of smuggling  Access to Medicines  Enforcement capacity 
Geographical position 
Poor infrastructure 
Stakeholder cooperation 
Inequity in access to 
health services 
Thailand 
Migration 
 
Access to medicines and 
e-pharmacies 
Post-marketing 
surveillance capacity 
Regional threat  Stakeholder cooperation 
Organized Crime   
Table 20 Summary of main themes for each dominant frame across the three case country 
studies. 
As demonstrated in the results chapters (6-8), both government and non-government 
respondents developed county-specific themes in their interpretations of the challenge of poor-
quality medicines within these frames (See Table 20, page 225). Although the security 
paradigm appears to be the dominant one, there is rarely just one paradigm at work (Rushton 
& Williams 2012). Beyond these three dominant frames, I discuss relevant findings under the 
three other frames: the political, medical and economic frames. The thematic variations within 
these frames also serve to differentiate how the challenge of poor-quality medicines is 
understood across institutional and national settings, and inform my observations on prospects 
for the coordination of regional policy responses (in section 9.4). 
9.1.1 Security frame 
9.1.1.1 Securitisation of health issues 
The dominant frame among government level respondents across the three national settings 
was the security frame. This was apparent in the repeated language used around the policy 
issue as a ‘threat’ or a ‘danger’. The use of terminology by government respondents represents 
an obvious speech act of securitization (Balzacq 2010). It was also apparent in the way that 
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anecdotes that were provided, which illustrated the sources of this threat by referencing the 
‘threat’ of migrant worker movements in border areas and the increasing cross-border 
movement of illegal goods including medicines. The security frame was prevalent because of 
the perception of importance attributed to these policy themes. Despite variations in the sub-
themes emerging from under this frame in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand (see Table 20 page 
225), the securitisation of this policy problem by government-level respondents was common 
to all interviews, irrespective of the national context. The securitisation of the problem of poor-
quality medicines among government-level respondents in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand also 
occurred around drug-resistant malaria, which was perceived to be a threat to malaria 
elimination efforts. Drug resistant malaria was interpreted as more than a medical concern, but 
as a national threat to the wellbeing of populations, both nationally and beyond borders. This 
study suggests that the securitisation of drug resistant malaria as a health security issue has 
had important policy outcomes; such as in Cambodia with the successful enforced ban on Oral 
Artemisinin Monotherapies (oAMTs). It has triggered policy action and the dedication of 
resources to initiatives aimed at reducing access to unauthorised AML treatments, which 
contributed to better access to quality-assured ACTs. 
Traditionally, a security concern is seen as a threat to the integrity of a territory and material 
stability of a nation (McInnes & Lee 2012). Beyond the traditional conception of military 
threats, health policy issues have been identified as non-traditional sources53 of insecurity 
since the 14th century. The initial focus of health security was on the challenge infectious 
diseases (Ooms & Hammonds 2016; McInnes & Lee 2012b), such as the plague epidemic, 
which were recognised to pose immediate risks to both poor and wealthier nations and 
communities (Ooms & Hammonds 2016; Labonté & Gagnon 2010). The influenza epidemic, 
for example, was among the first global health issues framed as a health security threat by the 
global community (Rushton & Williams 2012). Factors contributing to non-traditional security 
threats – such as the dynamics of migration, smuggling or the economic gap resulting in 
poverty (Emmers 2007) – have been identified by respondents as determinants of the problem 
of poor-quality medicines. This explains their perception of the problem of poor-quality 
medicines as a health security threat. Global health security issues may also be perceived as 
threats to the social wellbeing of populations, beyond an individual or a single community 
(McInnes et al. 2012). As seen in the case of anti-microbial resistance, framing a health issue 
as a security concern for the wellbeing of the population helps to raise political interest and to 
mobilise both human and financial resources towards a coordinated response. This was 
                                                     
53 Non-traditional security issues relate to the social, economic and political wellbeing of populations, 
rather than the defence of territorial integrity. 
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demonstrated by recent debate around the issue of antimicrobial resistance, particularly in the 
United Kingdom. Evidence of AMR as a threat to the wellbeing of populations across borders 
has triggered high-level interest in addressing this issue (O’Neill 2016). For this study, the 
results from the interviews demonstrate the securitisation of poor-quality medicines. 
9.1.1.2 National security threat 
As Entman (1993) suggests, frames are also defined by what they leave out. Under the security 
frame, government respondents from the three countries rarely define the security threat posed 
by poor-quality medicines as a global threat, but rather as a national security threat. This 
suggests an initial process of localization of the policy goal of access to quality medicines that 
responds to their national interests and political values, an essential precondition according the 
Acharya (2009) for the effective and gradual adoption of a policy goal. These national interests 
and concerns include, for example, the protection of populations against disease as well to 
economic wellbeing. As Labonté & Gagnon (2010) suggest, the security frame is triggered 
when national economic or political interests are engaged. For example, Thailand explains that 
poor-quality medicines pose a threat to the domestic pharmaceutical industry, including the 
sale of pharmaceuticals through online pharmacies, which are perceived as hard to regulate. 
Here, results suggest a blending of both the security and the economic frames. Smuggling of 
illegal goods (narcotics as well as poor-quality medicines) is perceived as a threat to the Thai 
and Lao economy, especially because of Laos’ geographical position as a transit land-locked 
nation. Respondents described the problem of poor-quality medicines as a threat from the 
region, coming from neighbouring countries and amplified by the cross-border movement of 
people and goods. Authors argue that the process of securitisation through framing of a global 
health issue is a political act and does not always reflect reality (Balzacq 2010; Balzacq 2005). 
The securitisation of the problem of poor-quality medicines as national security threat coming 
from neighbouring countries, strategically shifts the responsibility for addressing the problem 
beyond the national government. 
9.1.1.3 The success of the security frame  
The security frame emerged as the dominant frame arguably because of its flexibility and its 
adaptability to different contexts and their varying structural factors. The security frame was 
predominant because it aligns with the medical, as well as the economic frames. It was also 
particularly resonant among policy actors because it draws on the material world (McInnes & 
Lee 2012a); both the reality of migratory movements in the region and the emerging threat of 
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artemisinin-resistant malaria. The security frame therefore encompasses policy actors’ 
concerns around drug-resistant malaria as expressed under the medical frame. The security 
frame also bridges onto the economic frame – as demonstrated in Thailand, for example – 
where the threat of poor-quality medicines was perceived as a threat to the domestic 
pharmaceutical industry. Similarly, in Laos, respondents referred to a changing economic 
landscape of the Mekong region, the nature of regional investments and widespread money 
laundering activities, as creating a climate of fear and triggering the national security frame. 
Government respondents in Laos mentioned the threat of regional trade imbalances as 
rendering an economy that struggles to ‘keep up’ with its neighbours, even more vulnerable. 
This point was reinforced by expert respondents who commented on the general landscape of 
the region. In blending the security and the economic frames, respondents discussed issues of 
poverty and the welfare of their citizens as a threat to the integrity of the state. The security 
frame also resonated across borders because of its allusion to the context of trade between 
Mekong countries and the perceived challenges of the ASEAN Economic Community 2015, 
which has called for the reduction of barriers to trade between Southeast Asia Nations.  
9.1.1.4 From drug safety to drug security 
Despite the salience of the security frame across national settings, Thailand, Cambodia and 
Laos’ policy responses focus predominantly on addressing the threat of substandard 
medicines, omitting specific responses to drug falsification as an international criminal act. 
Results suggest a stronger focus on improving ‘drug safety’ rather than ‘drug security’. Drug 
safety relates to the protection of consumer health, the safety and efficacy of medicines and 
focuses on strong pharmacovigilance and adverse drug reporting systems (Hornberger & 
Cossa 2012). Drug security, other the other hand, encompasses strategies to combat the 
circulation of counterfeit or falsified medicines (Hornberger & Cossa 2012). Drug security 
goes beyond drug safety to include a criminal law dimension. Policy efforts to improve drug 
security would, therefore, require the cooperation of law enforcement officials.  
Why the securitisation of this issue has not translated into a robust policy response beyond 
drug safety, is an interesting question I reflect on throughout this chapter and which could form 
the focus of further study. The securitisation of the problem of poor-quality medicines is not 
reflected in current legal frameworks. Countries currently rely on trademark laws to address 
the problem of falsified medicines as those are better defined (Attaran 2015a). The limitation 
of that is it favours the protection of trade interests over public health concerns. At a workshop 
on Medicine Quality held at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in 2015, 
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Professor Philippe Guérin from Oxford University suggested the need for countries to broaden 
their definitions of the problem of poor-quality medicines (Guérin 2015). Arguably, this 
broader understanding should extend beyond the concept of drug safety to that of drug security. 
Experts agree that criminal law should be invoked to address the problem of poor-quality 
medicines, which equates to ‘attempted murder’ (EXP29_Pharma20160623). Experts also 
pointed to a need for to a clearer global definition of the international pharmaceutical crime of 
falsification as a security threat, and subsequently a differentiation of offences for the 
production, sale and circulation of substandard and of falsified medicines to improve both drug 
safety and drug security54.  
9.1.2 Health systems frame 
The health systems frame was another common frame across all three case countries, more 
specifically from the accounts of non-government respondents. The latter respondents 
perceived the problem of poor-quality medicines as linked to poorly resourced health systems. 
This frame was particularly resonant in Cambodia and Laos, where respondents regularly 
pointed to the poor state of health infrastructure (Laos) and the poor access or limited use of 
public health services (Cambodia). Under the health systems frame, respondents highlighted 
challenges in terms of the procurement, distribution and dispensing of medicine. For example, 
they explained that poor-storage conditions and recurrent stock-outs were still an issue, 
especially in peripheral areas. An expert respondent from the GF noted that cases of stolen or 
diverted AML stocks are still a risk (EXP25_INGO20150930). As an additional challenge, 
out-of-pocket payments remain high, especially in Laos, driving a demand for cheaper 
medicines, which is said to fuel the market for cheaper, potentially poor-quality medicines. 
The large amount of unlicensed private outlets selling medicines is yet another challenge 
mentioned. This problem bridges onto to the regulatory frame, as it is linked to the perceived 
poor enforcement of licensing procedures from the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs). 
Patient health-seeking behaviour, the tendency for patients to self-diagnose and self-treat and 
to purchase medicines from unlicensed drug vendors, is yet another health systems challenge. 
Despite these common themes, there are variations in the articulation of this frame between 
the three countries that draw on the specificities of each national context. Respondents in Laos 
referred to the inequitable access to medicines for vulnerable populations. In this regard, Lao 
respondents framed the problem of access to quality medicines as a blend of health systems 
and economic challenges, since vulnerable populations live in more remote areas and often 
                                                     
54 Prof Amir Attaran proposes a model law to this effect, where drug falsification is elaborated as a 
crime rather than as a regulatory offense (Attaran 2015b; Attaran et al. 2011). 
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live in poverty. Accessibility to public health facilities in Laos is compromised by the 
country’s mountainous nature and size, and its poor road infrastructure – making some 
peripheral areas inaccessible for replenishing medicine stocks during the rainy season. In 
Thailand, respondents emphasized the challenge of access to public health facilities and to 
subsidized medicines at border areas, and among Mobile Migrant Populations (MMPs) more 
specifically. Due to its economic status as an upper-middle-income country, experts suggested 
that Thailand has faced increasing international pressure to strive towards Universal Health 
Coverage (UHC), prompting policy efforts to extend UHC to MMPs in 2002 
(EXP10_Academia20150303). In Cambodia, the proliferation of unlicensed private sector 
outlets was noted as a health systems challenge, explained in part as a consequence of poor 
confidence in the public health system, which suffered during the Khmer Rouge era and has 
undergone a slow recovery since. Despite a social marketing program in place since 2004 
which has improved access to quality ACTs, stocks-outs of ACTs remain an issue as reported 
in 2011 by Shunmay Yeung (2011) and confirmed by respondents in Phnom Penh. 
Additionally, complex networks of wholesalers and pharmacy outlets also makes the supply 
chain difficult to monitor (Patouillard et al. 2011). 
9.1.2.1 Access to medicines from a health systems perspective 
The themes under the health systems frame support the wider paradigm of access to medicines 
from a health systems perspective, as introduced in the ATM model first detailed in Chapter 
3. Respondents share a wider interpretation of access to medicines that extends beyond the 
current global focus on access to affordable medicines, which translates into a constant 
pressure to produce low-cost medicines. AMLs, being available for free or at a subsidized 
price, are not directly affected by issues of affordability. Instead, results suggest a wider focus 
on improving access to medicines which should encompass health systems strengthening 
efforts.  Respondents argued that the 4As of access to medicines – availability, accessibility, 
acceptability and affordability – are dependent on adequate health infrastructure, resources and 
information. These elements all contribute to effective health service delivery. By blending 
the health systems and economic frames, respondents in Laos acknowledged the impact of 
economic factors on access to medicines. Respondents across the three countries also 
recognised the underlying importance of individuals and communities; and of understanding 
their health seeking practices and cultural preconceptions of medicine quality. These are 
important elements in understanding health systems challenges in terms of access to 
medicines, which are still largely under-explored across national settings.  
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Respondents do realise that the policy goal of improving access to quality essential medicines 
(beyond AMLs), is only possible if it is coupled with efforts to strengthen the health system. 
Advocating for health systems strengthening is seen by non-government respondents as a 
trigger for reforms to improve equitable access to quality health services for all, and to quality 
medicines across all therapeutic drug categories, not just AMLs. The health systems 
strengthening approach may also be perceived as one angle on which to motivate government 
reforms to protect nations against emerging and re-emerging diseases, as well as to mitigate 
the potential negative impact of increased trade, the rising movement of goods and people, and 
of inequitable growth.  
9.1.2.2 Human security 
The results of this study suggest that the health systems frame extends onto the security frame, 
by combining the health and human security concepts. The health systems frame encourages 
a process of wider frame reflection55 on the concept of security (to human security) and on the 
need to acknowledge system gaps and to strengthen the system to improve access to quality 
medicines. Human security is understood as freedom from need and from want and, since its 
first 1994 definition by UNDP, includes health as one of its inherent components. Health 
policy issues have also been framed as human security concerns when they are perceived as a 
threat to a population’s welfare and threats to a populations’ freedom from want or fear 
(McInnes & Lee 2012b). Respondents in Laos alluded to this paradigm regularly when 
referring to inequity, poverty, the high out-of-pocket payments, and poor health infrastructure 
especially in the remote and mountainous areas of the country – as well as to the poor access 
to quality and affordable medicines through public health services as a result. The concept of 
the right to health which underpins this frame, therefore, acts as a value-driven principle to 
improve access to good quality medicines and supports the policy goal of ATM. Respondents 
also acknowledged that the right to health can only be achieved by strengthening health 
systems (Hammonds & Ooms 2014). This frame, and how it relates to human security, 
explains how the securitisation of the problem of poor-quality medicines prompts a debate on 
the need to strengthen health systems to reduce inequalities and improve access to medicines 
for all. 
                                                     
55 As explained in Chapter 4, ‘frame reflection’ is a process by which frame sponsors question or review 
how an issue is interpreted in response to policy controversies (Schön & Rein 1994). Frame reflection 
occurs within processes of frame competition or in response to competition from different framings of 
a similar issue, promoted by other frame sponsors. 
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9.1.3 Regulatory frame 
9.1.3.1 Frameworks  
Government and non-government level respondents across the three countries framed the 
problem of poor-quality medicines as a regulatory challenge. Under this frame, respondents 
alluded to the inadequate nature of the existing regulatory frameworks; namely, the lack of 
clear definitions and commensurate penalties against the production, sale or distribution of 
substandard or falsified medicines. Despite the common viewpoint among respondents in 
Thailand that the Thai drug regulatory system is more robust than that of its neighbours, there 
remain notable loopholes in Thailand’s pre-marketing system (e.g., the lifelong registration of 
medicines), as well as post-marketing surveillance framework (e.g., the unsystematic sampling 
of essential medicines including AMLs in peripheral areas). Thai respondents also noted that 
the current regulatory framework fails to address the emerging threat posed by the proliferation 
of online pharmacies. Regarding the distribution and sale of medicines at points of sale, various 
respondents across the three countries referred to the distribution practice of cocktails of drugs 
and the lack of enforcement of prescription requirements. Experts also noted the general 
inadequacy of existing post-marketing surveillance frameworks across the Mekong, as 
confirmed by non-government level respondents in the field. Furthermore, experts noted that 
the limitations of current regulatory frameworks, besides the lack of coherence in the legal 
definitions of poor-quality medicines, is that there are no adequate legal frameworks to address 
drug security – or the threat of falsified medicines and a crime. 
9.1.3.2 Capacity and enforcement 
In Cambodia and Laos specifically, respondents alluded to issues of capacity and capability to 
regulate poor-quality medicines. In Laos, respondents pointed to weak technical capability and 
capacity in the drug testing laboratory, as well as poor financial and human resources to 
support capacity development. In contrast, in Cambodia respondents placed more emphasis on 
the lack of financial resources. The lack of funding for regulators has repercussions on the 
availability of human resources, as many trained regulators are tempted to move to the private 
industry. Despite the existence of cross-sectoral mechanisms for cooperation against poor-
quality medicines in Cambodia and Laos, respondents noted that these bodies are not supported 
by commensurate or sustainable funding.  
Although surveillance capacity for the quality of AMLs has improved with technical assistance 
from international partners such as USP, gaps in human, technical and financial resources 
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make enforcement of existing rules and regulations to control the supply chain of 
pharmaceuticals challenging. An expert respondent stated that ‘most of countries claim to have 
comprehensive regulation on medicines and have law[s] on paper…but the enforcement part 
is missing.’ (EXP17_INGO20150716). In Cambodia, the problem of unlicensed outlets is 
partly due to the poor enforcement of licensing procedures. Non-government respondents 
explained that regulators are not incentivised to prioritise the enforcement of sampling 
procedures to verify the quality of essential medicines, as their salaries are too low in relation 
to the large scope of their activities. Existing mechanisms are not always implemented 
adequately due to insufficient staff and the over-stretched mandates of regulators and 
inspectors. In Cambodia, inspectors have operational and regulatory tasks that stretch from the 
control of food products to medicines. Respondents also mentioned that regulators are tasked 
with monitoring the compliance of numerous regulatory functions without the power or 
mandate to seize stocks or to close outlets. This largely limits their capacity to enforce 
guidelines independently and effectively, and precludes a strong coordination of efforts with 
law enforcement agencies. As the results suggest, however, this coordination is not always 
systematic, due to a lack of awareness among law enforcement officials of the problem of 
poor-quality medicines. 
The variations in how poor-quality medicines are defined in official documents, as well as the 
varying levels of capacity to regulate and enforce rules and regulations along the 
pharmaceutical supply chain, leads to many different standards of quality (Ravinetto et al. 
2016; Caudron et al. 2008). The imbalance in regulatory capacity between countries in a 
region, fuels the flow of medicines across borders. The lack of regulatory capacity is also 
intrinsically linked to weak health systems and results suggest that the regulatory and health 
systems frames overlap on various themes. This could explain the combined salience of these 
two frames across the three countries. This study suggests that strengthening health systems is 
only possible if the right rules and regulations are in place and if they are adequately enforced. 
The regulatory frame also bridges onto the political frame, whereby weak transparency and 
poor accountability of regulators is perceived as impeding the effective enforcement of 
regulatory provisions for access to quality medicines.  
9.1.4 Political frame 
9.1.4.1 Governance 
The issues raised by policy actors under the political frame extend to the three salient frames 
described above, namely: the security, health systems and regulatory frames. In all three 
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countries, non-government respondents alluded to political and governance issues as hindering 
the enforcement of regulations to improve the quality of medicines. The level of political 
priority attributed to the problem of poor quality medicines impacts the level of efforts and 
resources dedicated to addressing it. In Thailand, respondents explained that malaria was no 
longer considered a political priority due to the low burden of the disease in central areas of 
Thailand. This impacts the level of effort and resources dedicated to the sampling and quality 
testing of AMLs by the Thai Food and Drug Administration and the Bureau of Drugs and 
Narcotics. In terms of prioritisation of efforts, law enforcement officials in Thailand also 
explained that customs and police officials are held accountable for their efforts against the 
illegal smuggling of narcotics. The narcotics trade has been a long-standing policy priority in 
Thailand, backed by a strong system of penalties and clear implementation procedures. Law 
enforcement respondents explained that this leads to the prioritisation of efforts against the 
narcotics trade rather than the circulation of poor quality medicines.  
Respondents also explained that weak enforcement is a wider governance issue linked to 
ineffective de-centralisation of regulatory functions, as well as instances of corruption and 
vested interests. Under this frame, government-level respondents described the uneven 
enforcement between central and the peripheral areas as a challenge to effective regulation 
against poor-quality medicines. This is perceived to be a result of poor cross-sectoral 
cooperation and the inefficient delegation of inspection responsibilities to regulators in 
provincial health offices. The uneven enforcement of rules and regulations was perceived as 
especially problematic in Laos, where access to remote areas to monitor implementation is 
particularly challenging. Under this frame, non-government respondents in Cambodia also 
explained that regulators’ capacity to inspect pharmacy outlets or warehouses impartially is 
potentially compromised by regulators’ vested interests in the industry. Non-government 
respondents alluded to a lack of transparency on data around poor-quality, leading to 
inaccurate interpretations of this policy problem in Cambodia and Laos. Non-government 
respondents also referred to the un-transparent management of funds in Cambodia and Laos. 
The few government-level representatives interviewed in Cambodia held a very different 
perspective from non-government partners. The results demonstrate that poor governance and 
lack of transparency impedes countries’ capacity to enforce existing regulations effectively to 
improve ATM. 
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9.1.4.2 Responsibility and Accountability 
Under the political frame, respondents also mentioned issues of responsibility and 
accountability of national regulators. Perceptions of the policy problem of poor-quality 
medicines influences who local policy actors considered as responsible. For example, 
government level respondents evoked the problem of poor-quality medicines as a threat from 
the region, actively shifting the national responsibility for the circulation of poor-quality 
medicines towards neighbouring countries. Responsibility is either placed on neighbouring 
countries, or on the consumer for purchasing medicines from unlicensed vendors. Despite a 
strong awareness of the threat of poor-quality medicines, there is an apparent lack of 
responsibility-taking around this policy challenge, demonstrated across the three national 
settings. This lack of ownership of the responsibility for the circulation of poor-quality 
medicines could explain the weak implementation of existing measures to regulate the quality 
of medicines. These observations link with the main observations made under the security 
frame across the three countries. It appears that the concept of security acts as a wider 
‘ideational paradigm’ (Rushton & Williams 2012; Acharya 2009; Payne 2001), that is used 
here as a vehicle to shift responsibility away from the national government and to neighbouring 
countries. This reference to responsibility suggests a blend of both the security and political 
frame.  
The securitisation of a policy issue is an inherently political process which can only be 
interpreted within a political context (Balzacq 2005), hence the importance of considering the 
themes under the political frame for my analysis. The political context is an important factor 
in the attribution of responsibility for a policy problem (Iyengar 1991). Non-government 
respondents explained that political commitment to address the threat of poor-quality 
medicines remains superficial. There are few mechanisms to hold regulators accountable for 
the enforcement of measures against poor-quality medicines, and insufficient capacity among 
regulators to take on the responsibility of this task. Moreover, the problem of poor-quality 
medicines remains a politically sensitive issue. Government respondents in Cambodia, for 
example, expressed concerns with regards to eroding confidence of its population in the public 
system, driving a desire to highlight successful policy moves and to frame the threat of poor-
quality medicines as coming from beyond Cambodia’s borders. In Cambodia, government 
level respondents showcasing efforts on the ban on oAMTs, drew attention to what they 
perceived as the positive work of regulators and inspectors. In parallel, it diverts attention from 
the weaker regulatory areas in the system, such as post-market surveillance activities, for 
which regulators are not held accountable. As the results under the political frame demonstrate, 
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policy actors’ perceptions of the problem of ‘poor-quality’ medicines are context-bound and 
relate both to political interests, fears related to national security and to trust in the public 
health care system. 
9.1.5 Medical frame 
While the medical frame was not the most salient among respondents, it does explain the 
challenges of expanding discussions on the problem of poor-quality medicines beyond 
antimalarial medicines or beyond the challenge posed by substandard medicines exclusively. 
Under the medical frame, respondents place more emphasis on improving drug safety over 
drug security, with a focus on pre-marketing regulatory functions as well as pharmacovigilance 
and adverse drug reporting (Hornberger & Cossa 2012). Drug Safety does not encompass 
efforts against falsified medicines from a criminal law perspective (as detailed in section 
9.1.1.4). The focus on drug safety over drug security when discussing the threat of poor-quality 
medicines suggests only a partial understanding of the policy goal of improving access to 
quality medicines, addressing the threat of substandard over that of falsified medicines. 
Respondents emphasised the threat of poor-quality medicines, including unauthorised oAMTs 
drug safety and patient protection. In all three countries, government-level respondents steered 
discussions around poor-quality medicines towards policy efforts to monitor the quality of 
medicines as conducted under the national malaria programs. The problem of poor-quality 
AMLs was framed as a concern for malaria elimination, exacerbated both by the continued 
circulation of oral artemisinin monotherapies (oAMTs) and of poor-quality antimalarials 
(AMLs). Evidence of drug resistant malaria triggered policy actors to recognise the threat 
posed by poor-quality AMLs and to acknowledge the importance of the policy goal to improve 
access to good quality AMLs. This concern drives efforts to improve the rational use of 
medicines and to enforce the ban on the sale and distribution of oAMTs to improve access to 
effective treatments and to support malaria elimination efforts. Respondents rarely referred to 
whole system efforts to improve ATM for all categories of medicines. Government-level 
respondents in particular, were less keen on discussing medicine falsification as a crime and 
seemed more comfortable expanding on the irrational use of medicines for the treatment of 
malaria. This might explain why, despite the securitisation of the problem of poor-quality 
medicines, efforts to improve ATM are focused on drug safety rather that drug security.  
Results under the medical frame also suggest that conceptions of medicine ‘quality’ are context 
and culture-bound. In Thailand, for example, respondents from government and academia first 
described the  threat of poor-quality medicines largely as a ‘contamination’ issue affecting 
traditional health supplements. Seeing as the use of traditional remedies is actively promoted 
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by the Ministry of Public Health in Thailand, this was presented as a major drug safety issue 
and a concern to consumer health. It is likely that these different concepts of medicine quality 
itself, have influenced the variations in interpretations of the problem of poor-quality 
medicines across national settings. Yet again, this observation is mitigated by the fact that the 
conceptions of quality introduced above are bound to the English translations of original 
definitions. 
9.1.6 Economic frame 
Various themes under the economic frame were invoked in line with the securitisation of the 
problem of poor-quality medicines. This frame was more resonant among Thai and Lao 
respondents – and articulated differently in both settings. Thai respondents insisted on the 
threat of poor-quality medicines for the domestic pharmaceutical industry – a national threat 
to the Thai economy. This could explain the Thai FDA’s focus on controlling pharmaceutical 
advertising, improving the rational use of medicines to prevent purchases from online 
pharmacies and its active engagement in strengthening Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), 
as well as GMP compliance in the region through region-wide standardisation. In Laos, 
respondents highlighted that poverty, exacerbated by economic disparity and inequitable 
growth between Laos and its immediate neighbours, impacts access to affordable, quality 
medicines in Laos – particularly for the more remote communities where the health 
infrastructure is weaker. In both countries, however, respondents described regional 
investments and the disparity that these investments perpetuate in the region, as a factor 
contributing to the circulation of poor-quality medicines and exacerbating the trade in illegal 
products in general. Laos respondents referred to Chinese investments including in private 
hospitals, as a challenge to the effective regulation of the entire supply chain of medicines in 
the country; seeing as Chinese-run hospitals were procured through a parallel system exempt 
from local inspections. More specifically, the liberalisation of trade and the introduction of the 
ASEAN Economic Community raised concern among government respondents regarding the 
increased movement of goods and people, and the repercussions this could have on the 
circulation of falsified or substandard medicines. This regional economic trend is picked up 
on by experts as an added challenge for the effective regulation of pharmaceutical supply 
chains in Southeast Asia (EXP18_Academia20150407; EXP09_Donor20150224). For this 
reason, it is important to be aware of the political economy of the region to understand how 
the problem of poor-quality medicines is perceived. 
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9.2 Frame sponsors 
Different configurations of policy actors and policy networks promote the six frames detailed 
in this research and actively shape the processes of policy reform and development. This 
section explores who these frame sponsors are and how policy communities and networks 
contribute to these framings. Policy actors are leaders (or sponsors) (Schön & Rein 1994) in a 
process of frame competition and alignment, whereby each policy community influences 
policy choices and decisions by promoting a specific standpoint or policy image of the threat 
of poor-quality medicines. In this regard, they act as ‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Kingdon 1995). 
These policy actors have varying levels of authority and power in influencing the policy 
process, which explains how and why certain frames prevail over others.  
9.2.1 Power and actor interactions  
The salience of a frame depends on a process of political negotiation between policy actors 
(Payne 2001 p. 44). While NRAs are ultimately responsible for formulating new policies and 
for implementing rules and regulations for drug quality control, results suggests that different 
policy actors have brought the issue of poor-quality AMLs to the attention of NRAs. Policy 
interactions actively shape the process of issue and interest formation among regulators and 
around the policy goal of access to quality medicines. NRAs and ministries of health then 
agree on definitions of poor-quality medicines and the penalties incurred for non-compliance 
of regulatory guidelines. They guide the policy making and revision process around the 
regulation of pharmaceuticals.   
‘Issue communities’ (Marsh 1998, p.15) in which actors exchange viewpoints on a policy 
issue, facilitate a process of frame reflection. These issue communities provide a space to 
debate a policy issue and present policy choices. Policy interactions across a variety of 
institutional settings – from government to academia or industry – influence framings of a 
policy issue, as well as the process of policy formulation. In Thailand, trade and industry 
representatives are actively involved in the reform process of rules and regulations for 
pharmaceuticals, as seen in chapter 8. These actors participate in the policy formulation and 
negotiation process through formal consultations with drug regulators, and within a wider 
network of cross-sectoral communication. In Cambodia, for example, the IMC has been a 
useful network for ministry representatives across sectors to gain awareness about the issue, 
and to deliberate on roles and responsibilities for addressing it. The IMC has played an 
important role as a network to mobilize efforts to enforce the ban against oAMTs. A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to fit a similar purpose between nine ministries in 
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Thailand, may have worked to encourage continued consultations between key stakeholders. 
However, it is unclear from the results whether the MoU has led to specific policy outcomes.  
Nevertheless, results suggest that the structures for formal cross-sectoral consultations and 
interactions are stronger in Thailand, where regulators from the Thai Food and Drug 
Administration engage with the industry and with academia on a regular basis.  
Results also suggest that the frequency of interactions through specialized committees, such 
as the IMC, supports the process of adoption of the ATM policy goal (Cortell & Davis 2000). 
Such structures can also facilitate the clear division of roles and responsibilities and checks 
and balances, as demonstrated in the case of Thailand. Respondents in Laos and Cambodia, 
on the other hand, where interactions between regulators and other policy actors remain ad-
hoc, still report issues in terms of division of roles and responsibilities, which in turn impedes 
the effective enforcement of rules and regulations. Where policy networks are not 
institutionalised, the debate around ATM remains more sporadic. The closer a policy actor is 
to the policy making circles the more influence this actor may have on the adoption of a policy 
goal (Stoeva 2013, p.37), and policy networks facilitate this repeated proximity to policy 
makers. 
This study demonstrates that epistemic communities (networks of experts and representatives 
from academia) also play an active role in shaping the process of interest formation, by making 
compelling evidence of the risks of poor-quality medicine available to regulators. In Laos, the 
Lao-Mahidol Oxford Tropical Medicine Research Unit (LOWMRU) plays an important role 
in the promotion of the ATM policy goal, by engaging with policy makers and supporting the 
sampling and evaluation of drug quality for the NRA. Regulators in turn demonstrate an 
openness to operational research and evidence-based policy reforms. The role of academia in 
interest and policy formulation was also noted by Thai respondents. The literature on policy 
making in Southeast Asia confirms that epistemic communities play an important role in 
driving policy coordination in Southeast Asia (Acharya 2009, p.29; Woods 1993). Academia 
plays an important role, therefore, in influencing policy choices in response to poor-quality 
medicines.  
Networks of policy actors appeared to be more inclusive of different sectors and institutions 
operating in Thailand, actively involved members of both academia and the pharmaceutical 
industry in processes of policy reform (such as for the New Drug Act 2003). Through these 
networks, the pharmaceutical industry has a strong voice in promoting the ATM policy goal.  
Respondents in Thailand frame the problem of poor-quality medicines first and foremost as a 
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threat to the domestic pharmaceutical industry and its healthy growth. The securitisation of the 
issue of poor-quality medicines triggers a different combination of policy actors in Thailand, 
including industry representatives. This is in line with the comparatively dominant focus of 
trade interests in the policy response to poor-quality medicines.  
Policy networks, therefore, play an active role in the elaboration of a security construct. As 
Caballero-Anthony & Amul note: ‘securitizing health involves not only the use of speech acts 
but also the building of political networks and the implementation of relevant policies’ (2015, 
p.32). The securitisation of a policy issue is a political act driven by policy communities that 
set political agendas according to their political interests and priorities (McInnes & Lee 2012b, 
p.133).  
9.2.2 International policy actors 
Results demonstrate that policy actors within NRAs have also been influenced in a process of 
frame reflection by international partners, including technical agencies for capacity building, 
and donor organisations. The USP and PSI, as technical agencies and implementing partners 
on the regulation of pharmaceuticals have, since the early 2000s, influenced regulators’ 
perceptions of the importance of the problem of poor-quality AMLs, by highlighting the risks 
associated with drug resistance. These agencies have also encouraged efforts to improve the 
supply of good quality treatments through various policy options, including the Public-Private 
Mechanism to distribute AMLs through licensed private sector outlets in Cambodia.  
International organisations in global health can have a significant influence on the pathways 
of policy response as demonstrated in the case of HIV/AIDS, when advocates successfully 
raised the fight against HIV/AIDS to the highest political agenda, mobilising funds to support 
countries in their implementation of policies for improved access to affordable antiretroviral 
treatments globally (Rushton 2012). Results also demonstrate that donor-organizations in the 
malaria space have a strong influence on the policy agenda for drug regulation through the 
prism of infectious disease control and elimination. International non-governmental agencies 
such as the WHO and donor organizations such as the GF, have actively driven the agenda for 
malaria elimination in the Greater Mekong Subregion. This is apparent through the normative 
influence56 of strategic documents by WHO, such as the Strategy for Malaria Elimination in 
the Greater Mekong Region 2015-2030 (WHO 2015) supplemented by the Global Technical 
                                                     
56 As an international agency, the WHO has the normative power to guide policy action and continues 
to promote efforts towards achieving universal health coverage, the right to health and improving access 
to medicines. 
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Strategy for Malaria 2016-2013 (WHO 2015a). The GF’s Regional Artemisinin Resistance 
Initiative (RAI) also encourages active quality monitoring of antimalarial medicines to reduce 
the risks of drug-resistant malaria spreading in the GMS. Funding for malaria elimination and 
artemisinin resistance containment has shaped policy negotiations and reforms to some extent, 
especially in under-resourced regulatory settings where external support from aid 
organizations is pivotal to the support health systems strengthening efforts. In a process of 
frame reflection, this may have influenced regulators to dedicate time and resources to quality 
monitoring efforts that also support the malaria elimination agenda – for instance, the 
enforcement of the ban on oAMTs, to showcase.  
A representative from a development aid organization in Cambodia discussed the difficulty of 
competing policy priorities in a crowded landscape of international partners and donor 
organizations. The respondent cited the example of WHO’s ERAR and the operations funding 
under the GF’s RAI grant (announced only a few months after ERAR). Both initiatives aim to 
reduce the spread of drug-resistant malaria while indirectly supporting efforts for access to 
quality AML treatments. Experts added that while all three countries studied are signatories of 
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which advocates for the coordination of aid efforts 
to avoid duplication and maximise efficiency of outcomes, the landscape of international 
donors remains chaotic. The crowded landscape of initiatives to improve access to quality 
AMLs is therefore largely donor-driven, with a strong incentive to focus exclusively on 
antimalarial medicines through parallel mechanisms for AML quality monitoring. Arguably, 
the focus on antimalarial medicines, while it represents a successful entry point to the policy 
goal of ATM, does not encourage efforts to strengthen the drug regulatory system at large – to 
encompass all categories of essential medicines at risk. This impacts the sustainability of 
efforts to improve drug quality monitoring processes. The ATM policy goal for essential 
medicines remains only secondary to that of drug-resistant malaria elimination.  
9.3 Pathways of policy response 
The way policy actors frame a policy issue precludes certain pathways of response over others 
(Schön & Rein 1994), and policy actors’ framings of the challenge of poor-quality AMLs in 
Cambodia, Laos and Thailand have generated different pathways of policy response. To 
explain the formulation and reformulation of policy solutions, it is crucial to consider the 
processes of frame alignment and the influence of key focusing events. In this section, I 
explore the implications of framings of the policy problem and of contextual factors for policy 
developments across the three national settings. I reflect on how perceptions of the problem 
might have shaped the adoption of the ATM policy goal, that is when the policy goal has been 
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recognised by policy makers (e.g., the ministry of health and NRAs) as being in their interest 
(Acharya 2009). This occurs when a policy goal is framed such that it resonates with the 
political priorities of that country. 
This policy development process is driven by policy actors, through frame bridging, blending 
and shifting – all contributing to a process of frame reflection. Different articulations of the 
six frames around the problem of poor quality medicines have generated different policy 
proposals and led to different policy developments. As an example: the problem of poor-
quality medicines has been officially recognised as a policy issue at different intervals in the 
policy process. Processes of issue formation have been triggered by different focusing events 
in the three national settings. Issue formation in Thailand occurred between 1991 and 1997, 
around the challenges related to access to medicines for marginalised populations, and the 
emergence of drug resistance at border areas. This prompted initiatives to improve universal 
health coverage for better access to quality assured medicines through the public health system 
(between 1997 and 2002). Issue formation around the challenge of poor-quality AMLs 
occurred at a later stage in Cambodia and in Laos, largely steered by technical development 
partners including the USP and the WHO in both countries. Results suggest that in both cases, 
evidence of drug-resistant malaria in border and forest areas triggered the interest of policy 
actors. This may have prompted the establishment of the IMC in Cambodia in 2005, for 
example. Evidence of drug-resistant malaria as a threat to national malaria control efforts has 
added pressure on ministries of health and drug regulators, prompting a process of frame 
reflection whereby government level respondents evoked the security frame to define the 
challenge as a national security concern. This may have been the trigger for policy revisions 
(such as for example the 2011 amendment to the Law on Drugs in Laos), which prompted 
changes in the definition or substandard and falsified medicines and in how the problem of 
poor-quality is framed. 
9.3.1 Frames and policy outcomes: complex causality 
Despite the above observations, my findings indicate no clear and direct causal link between 
framings of the issue of poor-quality medicines and policy responses to address the policy 
problem of poor-quality medicines. Framing analysts such as Gusfield (1991) or Jasanoff 
(2005) have argued that framings influence pathways of policy response. Others have 
demonstrated the impact of global frames on global health policy processes (Kamradt-Scott & 
McInnes 2012; Reubi 2012; Williams 2012). The body of literature on framing analysis 
suggests that framing analysis is useful to identify linkages between ideas and policy processes 
when interpreted along a framework of policy analysis (Koon et al. 2016). The interpretive 
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framing analysis approach adopted for this study suggests however that the causal link between 
framings of the policy issue of poor-quality medicines and the policy response in the three case 
studies is not linear or one dimensional. This is apparent in that despite the securitisation of 
poor-quality medicines as a policy issue among government-level respondents, there is limited 
evidence of policy efforts beyond drug safety, towards a policy response that addresses drug 
security against falsified medicines through systematic cooperation with law enforcement 
agencies and the judiciary. 
Instead, findings demonstrate that the mechanisms by which frames impact policy making 
processes are more complex than previous research and framing analysis studies might 
suggest.  The results of this study suggest that the relationship between frames and policy 
outcomes should be interpreted in line with several intervening variables including the broader 
policy context as detailed in the next section 9.3.3. To evaluate the relevance of a frame and 
its influence on policy developments, a thorough understanding of the institutional and 
structural arrangements at the national level is necessary. The findings demonstrate the 
importance of studying the influence of frames on policy responses through policy 
communities of actors and the interactions among the main frame sponsors. The case of 
Cambodia and the Inter-Ministerial Committee is one example of an institutional set up 
through which measures to improve drug safety against drug resistant malaria were pushed 
forward, as emphasised under the medical frame. This study also underlies the importance of 
considering the political economy, as demonstrated in the case of Thailand, where the health 
systems challenges identified by respondents shape a different policy response unique to the 
Thai context. In view of its GDP and a developed health infrastructure, Thailand is in a position 
to prioritise Universal Health Coverage as one way to improve access to quality medicines for 
all.   
The national and regional political context including external focusing events also impact the 
way that a frame might influence policy processes and outcomes. As will be detailed in the 
next section, both the evidence of drug resistance and the increasing movement of MMPs at 
border areas have largely shaped the securitisation of the problem of poor-quality medicines 
as a national security concern and a threat to malaria elimination efforts specifically. Cambodia 
being at the epicentre of artemisinin resistant malaria since the early 2000s for example has 
dedicated much policy attention to reducing the circulation of oAMTs and improving access 
to quality ACTs for MMPs in border areas in order to contain drug resistant malaria.  
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The findings also highlight the importance of interpreting frames in terms of their political use 
by policy actors, and to consider the audience for which they are invoked. Hawkins & Holden 
(2013) explain that framings can be used as a political tool. Findings suggest that the 
securitisation of poor-quality medicines as a threat from the region and to national security 
may be used as a tool to shift responsibility away from the regulatory authority. The 
securitisation of the problem of poor-quality antimalarial medicines might also be invoked to 
align with the broader regional narrative on drug resistant malaria as a security threat used by 
several international health (including donor) organisations in Southeast Asia. 
The results from this qualitative study do reinforce previous work by framing analysts on the 
importance of considering the various levels of abstraction of a frame. As discussed in Chapter 
4, Rein & Schön (1996, p.89) introduce two levels of frames, the rhetorical and action frames. 
Fischer (2003) explains that framing can serve to reshape a policy problem in how it is 
diagnosed. Findings suggest that the security frame may have been invoked to strategically 
reshape the policy issue as a national security concern beyond the responsibility of the state, 
and attributable to neighbouring countries. As a rhetorical frame, the security frame may also 
have been imposed by external actors, as an emulation of the global discourse around the 
security concern posed by drug-resistant malaria and exacerbated by poor-quality 
antimalarials. This frame may be invoked for the international community in the aim of 
obtaining capacity building support to address a threat that national regulators do not wish to 
be held accountable for. 
Despite the lack of a direct causality link, it is clear from the findings of this study that studying 
frames on the problem of poor-quality medicines has been useful to understand parts of the 
process around the ATM goal. The frames that emerged from the results of this study may not 
have triggered policy change as would be expected but they help understand the underlying 
beliefs that could lead to policy change (Béland & Cox 2011; Koon et al. 2016). Results 
suggest that understanding how ideas are taken up along the policy process (Shiffman 2009), 
even as rhetorical frames that don’t necessarily lead to the matching policy response, is useful 
to inform future policy developments to address the problem of poor-quality medicines.  
“Framing research does not predict change or advocate for a particular way of 
seeing the world. Instead, it seeks to provide an explanation for human 
behaviour in the policy process and how this collectively structures subsequent 
interactions.”  (Koon et al. 2016, p.7) 
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Building on the conclusion by Koon and colleagues (2016) therefore, the analysis of frames in 
this study accounts for the processes of contestation and the debate of ideas in the policy 
process around the ATM goal. This next three sections explore this in further detail; from 
processes of policy formulation to policy developments in context, followed by a reflection on 
the adoption of the ATM goal as a secondary policy goal. 
9.3.2 Processes of policy formulation 
To explain what drives the policy development process and how frames may influence policy 
developments, I refer to March & Olsen’s logics of action, namely, the logic of consequences 
and the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1989, 1998). Both logics are not mutually 
exclusive and both can explain policy decisions (March and Olsen 1998). Both logics also 
relate to the notion of actor responsibility to explain policy choices. The responsibility of 
policy makers is triggered by the material consequences of not acting to protect the security or 
wellbeing of the nation (logic of consequences). Similarly, policy decisions can be triggered 
by a sense of duty linked to the normative obligation of striving for the right to health (logic 
of appropriateness). Both logics can explain the mechanisms by which frames shape policy 
developments, based on a specific reasoning and cognitive processes. 
The ‘logic of appropriateness’ is triggered when actors take a normative stance which is in line 
with their preferences and political identity, or because of a shift of political priorities due to 
an external norm of behaviour. Under this logic, the global policy goal of improving access to 
affordable, quality, safe and efficacious medicines, as well as the overarching norm of striving 
towards the right to health, can be a powerful normative incentive for policy change. The logic 
of appropriateness could explain Thai policy actors’ emphasis on Universal Health Coverage 
to improve access to health services and commodities, including AMLs for all. The logic of 
appropriateness with regards to poor-quality medicines could also explain the motivation of 
law enforcement officials to actively participate in INTERPOL’s yearly STORM operations 
against falsified medicines – to be part of a broader movement against international organised 
crime. However, despite the benefits of such enforcement operations to raise awareness, these 
operations are one-off interventions with limited long-term and sustainable impact on 
improving access to quality medicines. Results suggest that the logic of appropriateness is 
insufficient to explain evidence of weak local ownership of this policy problem across the 
three national settings. The responsibility to improve regulatory efforts against poor-quality 
medicines lies in the hands of NRAs and it is the responsibility of the government to protect 
its population against the threat of poor-quality medicines. As explained previously however, 
by framing the challenge of poor-quality medicines as a threat from the region, policy actors 
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choose to shift the responsibility for this policy problem onto neighbouring countries. In light 
of these observations, I suggest that there is still a need for country-led, sustainable efforts to 
improve the capacity for continuous monitoring of the quality of stocks of medicines. 
The logic of consequences may, therefore, more adequately explain the tendency for policy 
actors to shift responsibility for the problem of poor-quality medicines. The logic of 
consequences is based on a cost benefit calculation, when actors agree to a course of policy 
action because of the consequences of not doing so are greater, or because of the legitimacy 
gained by adhering to the policy goal. Although the reality of the situation is more complex, 
my suggestion is that if a policy problem is perceived as a national security threat, the logic of 
consequences might entice policy actors to take the necessary actions to protect their national 
interests or that of their population. Following the logic of consequences, the securitisation of 
the problem of poor-quality medicines could be considered as a strong incentive for policy 
reform. Under the logic of consequences, states may act because they do not wish to be blamed 
for not taking any action. This could explain why policy actors frame the ban on oAMTs as a 
policy success against poor-quality medicines.  
The sense of legitimisation from neighbouring countries as important trade partners within 
ASEAN, might also influence policy decisions. The prestige obtained from being part of a 
wider movement can drive political will and reform, as well as the fear of ‘lagging behind’ 
other neighbouring states or states with similar socio-economic conditions (Rushton & 
Williams 2012; Towns 2012). Being blamed for inaction or for the mismanagement of donor 
funds could negatively influence the public’s trust and the reputation of the country on the 
international scene. One anonymous respondent suggested that Thailand may refute the 
problem of poor-quality AMLs altogether, predominantly because of national pride and the 
fact that it would not want such evidence tarnishing its image as one of the more developed 
and upper-middle income countries in the region. This would not be the only potential 
explanation, however, and an alternative explanation may be that the problem of poor-quality 
medicines goes beyond countries’ means to address the problem effectively, and because 
admitting to these shortcomings may have broader implications, the least costly policy reaction 
is to frame it as a threat originating from elsewhere. The logic of consequences could also 
explain why regulators at the provincial level, at furthest distance from the central government, 
may have less of an incentive to enforce regulations for quality monitoring. Due to distance 
and stretched resources, central regulators are not able to regularly keep checks and balances 
on implementation at the provincial level. Fewer accountability mechanisms for activities at 
the peripheral level mean that the consequences of not acting are low. 
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9.3.3 Policy developments in context 
As demonstrated in the analytical framework for this study, the national and international 
contexts largely influence the framing processes around a policy problem, as well as the policy 
pathways proposed in response. At the national level, the political culture of a country, the 
degree of transparency and the structural arrangements for policy making, are important 
factors to consider when analysing the effect of frames on policy developments. The level of 
economic development and GDP also influences this process. For example, the regulatory 
frame was evoked on the common understanding that NRAs with small public health budgets 
across the three countries, lack the necessary resources to enforce the existing rules and 
regulations and to hire or train human resources to implement drug regulations fully. Both 
Cambodia and Laos have lower GDPs and smaller health expenditures than Thailand. 
Thailand, on the other hand, boasts a more developed domestic pharmaceutical industry. This 
factor could explain the politically-driven priority towards the protection of the pharmaceutical 
industry. 
The importance of structural arrangements in the implementation of rules of regulations also 
seemed relevant. Ineffective decentralization of the health system, in terms of the delegation 
of roles and responsibilities to provincial health offices and inefficient reporting system to 
central levels, results in an ineffective implementation of drug regulations in peripheral areas 
located furthest from the central government. Structural differences in health systems and 
health financing across the three countries influence the focus on either capacity or capability 
building. Laos has a comparatively less robust health system in general and it might be for this 
reason that respondents emphasised the need for wider health systems strengthening (HSS), 
aimed to improve access to health services in general. Government level respondents pointed 
to a lack of technical expertise for drug quality testing. In comparison, Thailand is faced with 
different issues linked to its status as a higher-income economy with better access to the 
internet, making e-pharmacies a new source of contention. By invoking the regulatory frame, 
respondents in Thailand explained that current measures to monitor the circulation of poor-
quality medicines are not commensurate with the structural reality of the pharmaceutical 
market, where many poor-quality products including food supplements and medicines are 
being sold online.   
The political culture in each country, as well as the inclusivity of the policy formulation 
process through policy communities and cross-sectoral consultations, also seem to influence 
policy developments. The degree of systematic cooperation and communication between the 
NRAs and customs and police officials, for example, impacts the success of inspection efforts. 
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The results suggest that proposed policy solutions are largely influenced by both the political 
stream (political culture and governance structures), as well as the problem stream (i.e., the 
framings) (Kingdon 1984). As part of the political stream, issues related to political will are 
also important to put into context. An expert respondent explained that some of the leaders in 
charge of drug regulation or the health system perceived the problem of poor-quality medicines 
as a problem of the poor and did not necessarily feel directly affected by it, as they seek 
treatment in capital cities where there is a greater guarantee of quality of service and health 
products (EXP17_INGO20150716). This could explain the low political priority granted to 
the wider issue of poor-quality medicines.  
Adding to this complex reality, patients and consumers are not always fully aware of the 
problem of poor-quality medicines and therefore are not in a position of knowledge to hold the 
government accountable. There is more awareness and political pressure in terms of the target 
of malaria elimination, however. I argue that the goal of malaria elimination could instead 
form the motivation and commitment of leaders to focus efforts on improving access to 
affordable ACTs and to reduce the circulation of oAMTs. Beyond the challenge of maintaining 
political momentum towards malaria elimination in border areas, where malaria is still present, 
the context does not seem to favour strong political will towards addressing the circulation of 
falsified medicines in these areas. These results provide valuable insights on what might 
motivate political will to dedicate time and resources towards the problem of poor-quality 
medicines. 
Despite a certain degree of openness among government respondents in admitting to the lack 
of data transparency or the weakness of the enforcement system, it was apparent, from my 
experience in conducting this study, that the problem of poor quality medicines remains a very 
politically-charged issue across the three countries. The political sensitivity is especially 
apparent in settings where mechanisms for accountability for enforcing drug regulations are 
limited. This allows policy actors to shift responsibility away. Results demonstrate that gaps 
in the governance of drug regulatory affairs remain, including vulnerabilities to corruption of 
drug regulators. This may affect compliance across regulatory functions (Mackey & Liang 
2012). Reports by the GF Office of the Inspector General in 2013 and in 2017 on Cambodia, 
shed light on some of these issues, pointing to allegations of fraud in rounds one through nine 
of GF funding for malaria. As a result, the Principal Recipient status was transferred from the 
national malaria centre (CNM) to UNOPS. A dispute over the disbursement of GF funds still 
lingers in Cambodia, since the GF tried to tighten control on the expenses for travel and 
accommodation of the CNM. Because of this dispute, Village Malaria Workers have not been 
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paid to continue with their malaria surveillance efforts, which may impede access to quality 
AMLs for remote and at-risk populations and foster the illegal underground sale of AMLs in 
border areas. It is interesting to note that sanctions against officials who are involved in the 
circulation of such products have reduced in recent years. These context-specific political 
challenges may persist unless more robust mechanisms of increased accountability are put in 
place. 
At the international level, cross border situational elements such as the reinforced economic 
integration process of the ASEAN Economic Community are also said to influence the salience 
of frames among policy actors and guide policy decisions. A dominant international factor 
common to all three case countries was the flow of MMPs, and the perceived contribution of 
this flow to the circulation of poor-quality AMLs. This was reported in Thailand with regards 
to migrant workers in border areas with Cambodia and Myanmar. Historically, Thailand has 
had to deal with complex criminal networks of narcotics triggering the formulation of tough 
penalties against illicit drug traffickers. This might explain law enforcement officials’ 
propensity to focus on the narcotics trade rather than the circulation of poor-quality medicines. 
In Laos, the threat of smuggling was particularly present in respondents’ accounts because of 
the country’s long borders and its position as a transit country of the Mekong. Another 
international factor articulated in different ways among Thai and Lao respondents, was that of 
regional investments and the inequality that these investments perpetuate in the region. The 
establishment of the AEC by 2015 might have facilitated the securitisation of the issue of poor-
quality medicines due to the heightened risk of smuggling through increasingly porous 
borders. It would be interesting in future research to explore the impact of the AEC on the 
policy issue of poor-quality medicines.  
9.3.4 Access to quality medicines: a secondary policy goal 
Different articulations of a frame can lead to similar policy outcomes. Despite variations in 
how the problem of poor-quality was framed in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, the problem is 
rarely equated with international crime across the three countries. Despite efforts to revise 
legal provisions and penalties against the production, sale and distribution of falsified and 
substandard medicines, there is limited involvement of the judiciary and law enforcement 
organizations, who are crucial partners in efforts against this threat in the three countries. 
Instead, government officials emphasised the importance of drug safety and efforts against 
substandard medicines, in response to the threat of drug resistant malaria. Despite the 
securitisation of the problem of poor-quality medicines, results suggest that there has been a 
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limited focus on post-marketing surveillance and in regulating against falsified medicines 
specifically.  
My analysis of policy developments in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand suggest a process of 
frame competition between the security frame, the health systems frame and the regulatory 
frame. Policy decisions are motivated first and foremost by the goal of reducing the circulation 
of oAMTs, strengthening efforts against substandard and unregistered AMLs and therefore 
supporting malaria elimination efforts. My observation is that the goal of improving access to 
quality antimalarial medicines becomes a secondary goal under the overarching aim of 
eliminating malaria. Evidence of artemisinin resistance as a threat to malaria elimination aligns 
the issues evoked under both the medical (artemisinin resistance and drug efficacy) and the 
security frame (the threat to national security). Through this alignment of actor priorities, the 
policy choices are aimed at protecting the state against a deadly infectious disease, as reflected 
in analyses of policy processes. Regulatory frameworks on the management of 
pharmaceuticals beyond AML commodities primarily focus on the availability and 
accessibility to affordable essential medicines, without directly targeting the circulation of 
falsified medicines. There are limited policy efforts beyond drug safety and to address the 
crime of medicine falsification, or the circulation of poor-quality AMLs in the informal supply 
chain. Based on the results of this study, I would argue that the adoption of the ATM policy 
goal would need to be reflected in revised regulatory frameworks that provide stronger 
provisions and accountability mechanisms for the enforcement of post-marketing surveillance 
activities for all categories of medicines. A clear observation, however, is that malaria 
elimination and the focus on monitoring the quality of antimalarial medicines remains a 
relevant entry point on which to engage regulators on the problem of poor-quality medicines. 
9.4 A coordinated regional policy response  
Despite some similar policy outcomes, results show that the policy problem of poor-quality 
medicines is perceived differently in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. This explains the 
variations in policy developments to monitor the quality of medicines. There is a need to 
reconcile variations in policy outcomes and to overcome the political sensitivity for a more 
coordinated policy response to what is a trans-national health challenge. While strengthening 
drug regulatory systems and improving quality monitoring activities to reduce the circulation 
of poor-quality medicines is the responsibility of national governments, respondents recognise 
the gains to collective action. A coordinated and cross-sectoral policy response is required in 
order to address all dimensions of this complex policy problem – its social, economic, political 
and legal dimensions. A coordinated cross-border response also triggers a sense of shared 
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responsibility towards the cross-border circulation of poor-quality health products, and avoids 
shaming individual countries as the source of the problem. The gains towards collective action 
and more integration may drive political will for more joint action, and encourage countries to 
commit resources towards active quality monitoring of pharmaceuticals without the weight of 
blame.  
The uneven regulatory capacity and capability between Cambodia, Laos and Thailand means 
that countries could benefit from the standardisation of processes for the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals and to promote the exchange of expertise. Promoting regulatory convergence 
could help countries strive towards being equally equipped to monitor the quality of medicines. 
This is not without difficulties, however, because of the context-specific challenges across the 
GMS. For example, the development gap between member states in the GMS means that 
processes of integration are slow and laborious, with each member state working to a different 
timeline according to its level of readiness. Other challenges arise from the nature of policy-
making in Southeast Asia and between ASEAN nations. The ASEAN decision-making process 
sometimes referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’ (Goh 2002; Acharya 1997) is defined by the 
primacy of national sovereignty, the prevalence of national interests over the common good, 
and the culture of rule by consensus (Lamy & Phua 2012; Acharya 2009; Acharya 1995). No 
legally-binding decision is taken unless it is unanimously endorsed by all ten member states. 
The ASEAN does not provide an ideal platform therefore to foster coordination on politically 
sensitive issues. The limitations of the ASEAN Way57, and context specific challenges to 
regional cooperation, mean that regional integration beyond the economic and trade realm is 
sparse. Previous efforts towards integration among ASEAN members have been centred on 
the promotion of trade and economic growth, with a comparatively limited emphasis on the 
socio-cultural community pillar of the ASEAN Blueprint under which health falls. My analysis 
of the results suggests that mobilising a regional health security frame could reconcile cross-
border efforts to strengthen health systems and to generate the political will needed to address 
bottlenecks in the drug regulatory space. 
                                                     
57 The ASEAN, as a diplomatic platform and a respected regional organization, has the potential to 
support stronger regional cooperation and concerted action against health threats by convening senior 
level policy makers. Regional coordination through the ASEAN relies predominantly on the formulation 
of non-binding measures in the form of declarations. The extent to which these declarations trigger 
policy change at the national level is questionable. The principle of non-interference, at the source of 
Southeast Asian politics, means that ASEAN nations retain the right to adopt or to reject any guidelines 
from ASEAN. The shortage of funds is another recurrent obstacle to ASEAN regional cooperation. 
 252 
9.4.1.1 Health security concept in Southeast Asia 
Based on the results of this study, it appears that invoking the health security frame may further 
align policy actors’ priorities towards the ATM goal. The concept of health security as will be 
demonstrated in this section, is not alien to the GMS or even to Southeast East Asia. In fact, 
the ASEAN was first created in 1967 as a ‘security community’ (Acharya 1995) in response 
to regional instability. ASEAN member states have operated within a traditional construct of 
security which has gradually evolved to incorporate non-traditional sources of security, 
including health threats (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006; Emmers 2004; Hyun et al. 2000). The 
focus of non-traditional security among ASEAN nations is on coordinated efforts to combat 
narcotics trafficking or other activities related to smuggling of illegal products. Such 
conceptions of non-traditional security are an ‘expression of Asian regionalism’ (Arase 2010). 
Historically, challenges linked to the cross-border movement of people have also been high on 
the agenda. ASEAN member states have engaged in regional initiatives against transnational 
crime since the 1970s. Endorsed in 1997, the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational Crime 
underscores the threat of transnational criminal activity for the regional stability (Emmers 
2003). To support regional coordination against transnational crime, several institutional 
mechanisms and action plans have been developed, such as the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting 
on Transnational Crime (AMMTC) or the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime. ASEAN nations have also developed a coordinated response to natural disasters, with 
Cyclone Nargis in Myanmar in 2008 acting as a trigger of such efforts, leading to the 
development of regional disaster preparedness plans. Issues of non-traditional security in 
relation to transnational crime or disaster response extend beyond the traditional definition of 
security. Nevertheless, the ASEAN focus on non-traditional security threats are motivated first 
and foremost by the preservation of national economic interests and regional stability and 
prosperity.  
Following the 2003 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic, infectious disease 
threats have been considered as regional non-traditional security challenges that transcend 
borders, endanger Asian economies and require a coordinated response (Labonté & Gagnon 
2010; Caballero-Anthony 2008; Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006; Emmers 2007). Global health 
issues have gained recognition as non-traditional security threats mainly because of the risks 
these pose to economic development. This was again true of the Avian Influenza A (H5N1) in 
2005 and Influenza Pandemic (H1N1) in 2009. Mechanisms implemented at the ASEAN level 
in response to regional health threats as a result are focused on a coordinated response to 
emerging infectious diseases as immediate threats to populations. Such mechanisms include 
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the Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) Task Force (2004) and the ASEAN Plus Three 
Emerging Infectious Disease Programme (2004). The ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community 
Blueprint in 2009 and the ASEAN Strategic Framework on Health Development (2010- 2015) 
represent milestones for Southeast Asian regional cooperation in health. The Blueprint and 
Framework propose a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder approach for building disaster-
resilient nations and safer communities and ensuring a drug-free ASEAN, but also encourage 
wider capability building for communicable disease control, providing access to healthcare 
and promoting healthy lifestyles. More recent global health threats such as the Ebola Viral 
Disease (Ebola), the Zika Virus and the Middle Eastern Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), have 
triggered renewed interest in the promotion of regional coordination to maximise efficient use 
of resources and expertise across borders and to improve the surveillance and response towards 
emerging health threats. Despite this momentum, ASEAN cooperation in health systems 
strengthening remains limited. While recent global epidemics have led Southeast Asian leaders 
to the realisation that health threats can have cross-border implications and require coherent 
and coordinated policy response, regional coordination remains largely state-centric. 
ASEAN efforts to improve access to quality medicines have been modest to date and largely 
limited to training and information sharing activities, such as through the underutilised 
ASEAN post-marketing alert system (PMAS), established to notify national regulatory 
agencies in the region about unsafe or defective health products (Nwokike et al. 2013). 
Regardless, the issue of counterfeit or falsified medicines has been part of recent institutional 
dialogues in the region. The first action plan to Implement the Joint Declaration on ASEAN-
China Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity included a specific commitment to 
‘strengthen cooperation to prevent production and spread of counterfeit drugs’ (ASEAN 
2004). Additionally, the ASEAN-China Conference on Combating Counterfeit Medical 
Products was held in Jakarta in 2007. It is reasonable to expect that further collaborations could 
follow (Lamy & Liverani 2015). Under the ASEAN Plus Three arrangements, stronger 
collaboration with China would be crucial, given that this country has been a source of 
substandard medicines in the Mekong region (Newton et al. 2008). To date, however, ASEAN 
collaborations with China on transnational crimes have mainly focused on narcotics. Regional 
coordination on the illegal circulation of falsified medicines is further hampered by political 
tensions between ASEAN nations of the Mekong. While the establishment of the ASEAN in 
1967 has contributed to the promotion of peace and peaceful resolution of conflicts, land 
border disputes are still a serious challenge to political stability in the Mekong region (Amer 
& Thao 2009). Recent tensions between Cambodia and Thailand over the sovereignty of the 
area around the Preah Vihear temple are just one example. Such tense conflicts may indeed 
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negatively impact efforts towards cross-border inspections, or to track the movement of 
suspicious pharmaceuticals across borders. 
The ASEAN way and the focus on the preservation of national and economic interest when 
addressing health issues, suggests limited opportunities for a coordinated response to 
strengthening health systems and drug regulatory for access to better quality medicines. Taking 
these limitations into consideration, the primacy of national sovereignty and context specific 
challenges, I argue that invoking the regional health security frame may trigger a sense of 
shared responsibility and promote policy coherence. Alternatively, introducing mechanisms to 
share best regulatory practices in each country setting may help promote more sustainable 
cross-sectoral collaboration and strengthen national health systems without impeding national 
sovereignty. 
9.4.2 Invoking the regional health security frame 
The national security frame seems to resonate in the countries studied, as it is in line with the 
ASEAN principles of non-interference and preservation of sovereignty. The understanding of 
health security in Southeast Asia is predominantly ‘state-centric’, revolving first and foremost 
on the preservation of national interests and the welfare of national populations. This was 
apparent in the framing of the problem of poor-quality medicines as a national security issue. 
As explained by Rushton & Youde (2015), the securitisation of public health issues in the 
interest of national sovereignty preservation, could have negative implications for cross-border 
cooperation. The securitisation of global health issues as national threats can lead to distortion 
of the global health agenda. In the case of poor-quality medicines, the risk of securitisation is 
an emphasis on protectionism rather than cooperation. For this reason, framing the threat of 
poor-quality medicines as a regional health security threat might encourage shared 
responsibility and foster regional cooperation. The region health security frame brings the 
issue of poor-quality medicines into the realm of health, economics and foreign policy, and 
could help raise the issue on the regional political agenda.  
The concept of non-traditional security is essentially based on an inter-subjective 
understanding of a policy issue (Lee & Chan 2007). For this reason, ideas play a role in shaping 
both processes of securitisation and of Southeast Asia integration (Acharya 2009). The concept 
of regional health security has been brought forward recently by leaders in Southeast Asia. 
This was the case at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2015 for example, where 16 
Heads of State issued a statement committing to enhancing regional health security in response 
to infectious diseases with epidemic and pandemic potential (East Asia Summit 2015). 
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Additionally, the post-2015 ASEAN Health Development Agenda calls for more resilient and 
robust health systems in response to communicable and infectious disease threats. This reflects 
the WHO 2005 International Health Regulation (IHR), a global instrument that provides 
normative guidance for inter-governmental cooperation against the global spread of infectious 
diseases (Kamradt-Scott 2015). The concept of regional health security is predominantly 
centred around the threat of emerging infectious diseases. Nevertheless, framing the issue of 
poor-quality medicines as a regional health security concern and a threat to infectious disease 
control in the region, could not only prompt national policy choices to dedicate further 
resources to the ATM goal, but it may also elevate the issue beyond national security to 
encourage regional coordination.  
9.4.2.1 Human security and regional social integration 
The challenge to invoking the regional health security frame around the problem of poor-
quality medicines, is that the official definitions of falsified and substandard medicines are not 
consistent across countries. There is a need for a common definition of poor-quality medicines 
among ASEAN states that encompasses all dimensions of this complex issue. What is required 
is a shift in how the problem of poor-quality medicines is understood – as a threat to both the 
economic and social integration of the region. One way to do so could be to link the concepts 
of regional health security and human security – advocating for the need to address the problem 
of poor-quality medicines to protect populations across Southeast Asia.  
Health and human security could also converge through regional approaches, 
which can provide a middle path by recognizing the interdependencies of systems 
involved in addressing health risks, vulnerabilities, and threats. (Caballero-
Anthony & Amul 2015, n.e-book) 
The concept of human security first emerged in the ASEAN Plus Three framework in 2001 
regarding environmental protection (Caballero-Anthony & Amul 2015; Evans 2004). Human 
security is also encompassed as a feature of the ASEAN Healthy Lives for a Healthy 
Community objective. The concept resonates with member states’ desire to protect 
populations. In fact, human security could be included within the concept of traditional 
security (Hyun et al. 2000), as an essential component of protection of a nation’s population. 
The human security concept promotes a human-centred approach to security issues that goes 
beyond the state-centric focus on the protection of material or economic interests (Caballero-
Anthony & Amul 2015; Caballero-Anthony 2008; Ogata & Sen 2003). This aligns with the 
accounts of government level respondents on the protection of national interests including of 
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populations. Government level respondents across the three countries acknowledged the 
challenge of eliminating malaria among MMPs and hard-to-reach communities due to poor 
access to quality AMLs. Promoting a human-centred approach to health security to address 
the challenge of hard-to-reach and at-risk communities, may therefore resonate well with 
regulators in this field. It could promote awareness of the problem of MMPs as a shared 
responsibility and encourage coordination of efforts to address this challenge jointly.   
9.4.2.2 Health systems strengthening as a long-term approach 
Linked to the human security concept, the regional health security frame could advocate for 
broader health systems strengthening and encourage regional coordination beyond the 
response to emerging infectious disease. As the results demonstrate, respondents note the need 
to strengthen health systems and regulatory capacity for surveillance to ensure access to quality 
medicines. Advocating for a health systems strengthening approach to address regional health 
security threats may be one way to promote the ATM goal, harness political commitment and 
push for regulatory convergence. Strengthening health systems to support health service 
delivery directly promotes access to health and to health products for all. This approach may 
resonate well with leaders in Southeast Asia and the Mekong, as it could be perceived as 
contributing to the reduction of poverty in the region and would contribute to the socio-cultural 
integration of ASEAN states. Health systems strengthening would also contribute to the 
reduction of social inequalities and support more even economic development, as more robust 
health systems across the region would make it easier for countries to protect themselves 
against emerging and re-emerging health threats.  
Health security may be perceived as a ‘global public good’ (Caballero-Anthony et al. 2006, 
p.111), and health security threats as communal challenges that engage the responsibility of 
not just states, but also non-state actors. Leveraging the regional rather than the global health 
security frame has more chances of instigating change, as noted by Caballero-Anthony & 
Amul (2015). Regional health threats are based on the same risks and challenges and 
vulnerabilities, and a security construct is inevitably built on common contextual factors. A 
regional approach to health security is more likely to resonate with policy makers and to 
encourage policy change, as it would take into account the challenges specific to Southeast 
Asia.  
Ideally, regional approaches to health security would not be so global that they 
skew the focus towards pandemics, nor so local that they neglect the potential 
spill over and transfer of the burden of health insecurities to those already 
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vulnerable. They would also be more able to address context-specific conditions 
so as to reach the poor and vulnerable members of populations most likely to be 
affected by disease. (Caballero-Anthony & Amul 2015, n.e-book) 
Nevertheless, as the results demonstrate, Southeast Asian member states are faced with 
different challenges. In view of the varying nature of their regulatory processes, political 
cultures and level of resources, tailoring responses to each country might be more suitable. 
This could occur through sharing best practices and adapting mechanisms that respond to the 
needs and gaps of each regulatory system. This may in turn encourage greater policy coherence 
and facilitate access to quality assured essential medicines across the region. 
9.4.3 Promoting policy coherence 
Health systems strengthening in response to regional security threats and to improve access to 
good quality medicines can be facilitated at the regional level by promoting policy coherence 
through the transfer of policies. This might in turn encourage greater convergence between 
drug regulatory systems. The economic disparities and gaps in development across ASEAN 
member states represent a challenge to equitable integration (Speers et al. 2016). Currently, 
less-resourced member states (particularly Cambodia, Myanmar, Lao PDR and Vietnam) need 
support to benefit from the ASEAN integration process. This is particularly relevant 
considering the changing landscape of regional investments in Southeast Asia and the resulting 
sense of uneasiness among poorer ASEAN nations.  
The increased connectivity between GMS countries and other Southeast Asian nations brings 
both opportunities and challenges. The increased trade and more porous borders between 
nations also heightens risks of smuggling and the rapid spread of diseases across borders. 
Large numbers of unregistered products routinely flow through the porous GMS borders, and 
yet we have little information on the channels through which poor-quality medicines flow into 
and out of countries. Policy coordination between countries on surveillance, detection, quality 
control and systematic sharing of information could therefore be useful to address such trans-
border challenges.  
9.4.3.1 Policy transfer and information sharing 
Policy transfer between GMS countries, including the exchange of information and policy best 
practices around drug regulation, may be one way to foster a more coordinated policy response 
against falsified and substandard medicines. Policy transfer is the adoption or application of a 
strategy, policy, programme, plan or a tool from one policy context to another because of its 
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perceived feasibility, validity and adaptability (Bissell et al. 2011; Dolowitz & Marsh 2000). 
The transfer of knowledge and expertise between regulators, members of the ministries of 
health and law enforcement officials, for example, offers the opportunity for alignment of 
policy responses across border in response to the cross-border challenge of poor-quality 
medicines. It also leads to a more efficient use of limited financial and human resources by 
drawing on lessons learned from neighbouring countries. Countries are left with the decision 
to adopt or reject specific policies, and so this approach is less likely to be perceived as 
impeding on their sovereignty. Sharing best practices between countries may also facilitate the 
scaling up and optimal use of existing mechanisms in place to target efforts against the 
circulation of falsified or substandard. It can facilitate coordination of activities between cities 
or provinces on two sides of a border. This is especially relevant in a context where borders 
remain highly porous.  
The first opportunity for alignment that would benefit a coordinated policy response, is the 
delineation of a shared definition of substandard and falsified medicines at the regional level. 
A common definition could facilitate more coherent policy responses to address both drug 
safety and security. Another opportunity may be to improve information sharing to support 
investigation of cases of poor-quality medicines. Mechanisms for information sharing can 
facilitate a more transparent and efficient coordination of efforts across borders. Information 
on drug stock seizures between customs official at border areas, for example, could support 
efforts to map the illicit trade routes of falsified or substandard health products. The currently 
limited data available on the circulation of poor-quality medicines makes it more challenging 
to convince policy makers to dedicate resources to prevent their circulation. As Philippe 
Guérin notes: ‘if you cannot quantify the problem, you do not have the problem’ (Guérin 
2015). Integrated surveillance systems and increased information sharing on poor-quality 
medicines may raise awareness about the scale of the problem and better guide future policy 
decisions. It seems like a relevant starting point that can better guide policy decisions and 
harness political will. 
On improving access to quality AMLs, respondents in this study highlighted the success of 
some key policy mechanisms showing potential for scale up. The Village and Mobile Malaria 
Workers, for example, actively support case detection, reporting and distribution of quality 
AMLs. The malaria posts in border areas of Mekong countries undertaking this work could 
also collect information on adverse drug reactions to substandard treatments, and report on the 
whereabouts and the nature of unlicensed and itinerant points of sale for AMLs. The Public-
Private Mix (PPM) programs in Cambodia and Laos also facilitate the diagnosis and reporting 
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of malaria cases and the distribution of quality assured ACTs through the private sector 
pharmacy outlets. While the PPM initiatives are managed by different institutions in each 
country, respondents noted the success of the program in improving access to quality AMLs 
by integrating private sector in the distribution chain for AMLs. Scaling up this program to 
other provinces or to neighbouring countries and involving the private sector for health service 
delivery into the malaria program, could help reduce the demand for AMLs outside of the 
formal distribution chain. As a third example, the sentinel sites under the USP’s Promoting the 
Quality of Medicines program, currently supports NRAs’ efforts to sample and control the 
quality of AMLs. These are efficient existing mechanisms that can be scaled up across 
provinces, provided the necessary financial and human resources are mobilised to do so.  
9.4.3.2 Regional regulatory convergence 
Aligning regulatory processes for better coordination between NRAs, could overcome 
shortfalls in regulatory capacity to ensure even oversight of medicine quality across borders. 
Regulatory convergence58 involves streamlining activities around the pre-market approval and 
post-market surveillance of health products, allowing for more efficient regulatory systems. 
Encouraging reliance59 between NRAs can not only improve efficiency, but can also support 
the integration process of ASEAN by reducing gaps between regulatory institutions. This is 
particularly relevant to ensure that all ASEAN member states benefit equally from the 
reduction of barriers to trade. Promoting regulatory convergence could ensure that the 
reduction of trade barriers and the potential increasing flow of illicit products across borders, 
are met with improved regulatory convergence for joint efforts to monitor the circulation of 
poor-quality medicines. Regulatory convergence directly contributes to health systems 
strengthening by improving access to priority and quality assured medicines for all. Beyond 
trade integration, it could also improve access to quality essential medicines for all, by 
facilitating the expedited approval and roll out of quality-assured medicines.  
                                                     
58 While regulatory harmonisation is the promotion of uniform guidelines, regulatory convergence is a 
procedure whereby processes become more similar rather than uniform, through the gradual adoption 
of common guidelines and standards. Regulatory convergence allows nation states to retain a certain 
degree of sovereignty over the regulatory process. Nation states are still responsible for drafting and 
reviewing national laws and policies for the regulation of health products (United States Food and Drug 
Administration 2017). 
59 Reliance between NRAs occurs when better resourced NRAs share product reviews and assessments 
with other, less endowed NRAs. The latter accept the results of these reviews and use this information 
for their own regulatory processes from market authorisation to pre-market quality controls. This can 
save considerable costs for less-resourced and ill-equipped NRAs. 
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The ASEAN Pharmaceutical Product Working Group (PPWG), set up in the 1990s, works to 
standardise technical procedures and quality requirements for the registration of 
pharmaceutical products, through the ASEAN Common Technical Dossier (ACTD) to support 
the trade in pharmaceutical goods under the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement. Standardising 
technical regulations is perceived as valuable in that it supports both the pharmaceutical sector 
and economic integration (Pettman 2013). The PPWG is an important mechanism to encourage 
reliance between national regulatory authorities and to reduce delays in the registration of new 
AMLs for treating artemisinin-resistant strains of malaria. The extent to which activities of the 
ASEAN PPWG have been successful is questionable, however. While several ASEAN 
member states have pledged to use the ACTD in their registration processes, this rarely occurs 
in practice with individual countries still requiring a different set of information to grant a 
product market approval. Furthermore, regional regulatory convergence thus far has been 
primarily focused on pre-market activities and the registration of new medicines, rather than 
on post-marketing surveillance and quality monitoring. Post-market activities could benefit 
from further regulatory convergence. Laboratory testing capacity for AMLs is a challenge in 
Cambodia and Laos, where national laboratories are not adequately equipped or staffed for the 
task. Better-resourced countries, like Thailand, could provide technical support to other 
laboratories in the region to set up Standard Operating Procedures and work towards WHO-
pre-qualification status. Networks to encourage the sharing of expertise between laboratories, 
including the NOMCOL facilitated by the USP, could be scaled up. University networks, such 
as Chualongkorn University in Thailand, may also support laboratory capacity building in the 
region through training programs. Information sharing mechanisms could also support 
regulatory convergence, for example if Thailand actively shared the Thai pharmacopeia with 
neighbouring countries. Such activities would contribute to regulatory and health systems 
strengthening. 
Regulatory convergence may only be possible if it is promoted progressively and responds 
gradually to priority regulatory gaps in each country. However, the ASEAN PPWG may not 
be the optimal platform through which regulatory convergence can be encouraged. Various 
international development partners operate in this space to promote stronger regulatory 
processes and have provided capacity building support to individual countries. NRAs should 
retain ownership of this process and request technical capacity building assistance as and when 
necessary. Capacity building support and sharing of best practices need to address specific 
context challenges and should also be tailored to country specific needs – i.e., encourage cross-
sectoral collaboration between government agencies.  
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9.5 Reflections on the global health problem of poor-quality medicines 
This section reflects on the implications of the results of this study on the global health policy 
issue of poor-quality medicines. The goal of ATM was first addressed at the global level as 
detailed in Chapter 2. As the literature reports, there is no adequate global framework to guide 
action against poor-quality medicines (Mackey 2013). Global health institutions thus far have 
predominantly focused on the prevention, surveillance and response to emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases that pose a more direct threat to both low and high-income 
countries, with access to quality assured medicines only as a tangential objective. Historically, 
the priority of these institutions has been to preserve the interests of higher income countries 
(Ooms & Hammonds 2016). Specific mechanisms to guide national efforts against poor-
quality medicines, such as the Medicrime Convention (Council of Europe 2011), propose a 
model law that is largely ill-adapted to respond to the complex challenge of both substandard 
and falsified medicines. The Medicrime convention which only recently entered into force 
(January 2016), aims to guide the formulation of rules and regulations at the national level, 
binding as the first ‘international standard for criminalising the manufacture and distribution 
of counterfeited medicine’ (The Lancet Editorial 2012). Regardless, the recommendations held 
within this convention centres first and foremost on the protection of patent rights as it refers 
to ‘counterfeit medicines’ (Attaran et al. 2011). The Medicrime Convention fails to qualify the 
falsification of medicines as a crime (Attaran et al. 2011). Authors on the problem of poor-
quality medicines argue that there is a gap in the global health governance60 space to address 
the challenge: ‘A formalized and multi-stakeholder governance mechanism is needed to 
address the issue’ (Mackey 2013), its economic, socio-cultural, legal, and political 
determinants. Here I reflect on various approaches for both state and non-state actors to 
influence the policy response to poor-quality medicines and to sustain political will and 
commitment for the ATM goal. 
9.5.1 Regional health governance framework against poor-quality medicines 
My observations while analysing the data from this study, suggest that promoting a regional, 
coordinated response to the global health problem of poor-quality medicines, portrayed as a 
regional health security concern, may promote political commitment. Since global governance 
approaches have been sporadic and ill adapted to sustaining such a commitment to the ATM 
goal thus far, a regional approach may be more successful in doing so. A regional approach 
                                                     
60 Global health governance (GHG) can be defined as a framework for policy leadership to address 
cross-border health policy problems exacerbated by globalisation (Lee et al. 2002).  
 
 262 
may have the benefit of feeling ‘closer to home’ and promoting a policy goal that is more 
relatable to leaders facing common challenges. Roggeband et al. (2014) argue that the regional 
level offers another layer of cross-border discursive opportunity around an international norm 
or policy goal. My argument would be that a regional forum for policy coordination bridges 
the gap between global and national level efforts. This regional governance agenda can be 
supported by several policy actors, that can contribute efforts to address all determinants and 
challenges of the problem of poor-quality medicines – from the socio-economic to the political 
and regulatory constraints. 
Results demonstrate that policy processes at the national level are more responsive when the 
problem of poor-quality medicines is coupled with an agenda to fight emerging and re-
emerging infectious diseases, in this case artemisinin-resistant malaria. One strategy to trigger 
political commitment could be to frame the problem as a challenge to the control and 
elimination of infectious diseases in the region. Malaria elimination offers a useful entry point 
to engage leaders on the problem of poor-quality medicines. A starting point to a regional 
health governance response would be the convergence of legal definitions of substandard and 
falsified medicines in order to promote a two-pronged policy response. One response, under 
the realm of drug security, could encourage engaging law enforcement officials and ministries 
of trade, justice and defence. Policy efforts to reduce the circulation of substandard medicines 
could focus on improving drug safety and strengthening drug regulatory systems. Both parallel 
approaches may contribute to wider health systems strengthening against shared health threats 
in the region.  
The other narrative that seems to resonate among policy actors is the health systems 
strengthening narrative. This suggests promoting the ATM alongside broader efforts to 
promote access to health services and health products for all, and advancing the right to health 
might trigger political commitment (Hammonds & Ooms 2014).  This approach is more likely 
to be successful if it is inserted within a broader regional health governance framework. As 
Caballero-Anthony & Amul (2015) point out, there are tensions between a state-centred and a 
human-centred response to a health security issue. In the case of poor-quality medicines, the 
former tends towards infectious disease control and elimination for national security, while the 
latter brings in the health systems strengthening perspective. The tension between these two 
approaches could be reconciled with the leadership of non-state regional actors and through 
mechanisms that engage the responsibility of leaders towards health systems strengthening for 
regional health security. High-level forums (such as the ASEAN Ministers Meetings) where 
leaders agree on high-level political priorities and targets determining the allocation of 
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resources, could drive political commitment towards the issue of falsified and substandard 
medicines61. As expressed earlier in this chapter, however, efforts to strengthen health systems 
need to address context specific challenge and respond to the priority needs of countries 
individually, as there is no one size fits all approach to regulatory capacity building 
9.5.1.1 Mechanisms for accountability 
The current regional health governance framework requires stronger accountability 
mechanisms for sustained political commitment and to engage the responsibility of 
governments to jointly advance the regional health security agenda. As discussed in section 
9.4, increased opportunities for policy transfer and regulatory convergence might help to 
increase political commitment and to engage government accountability by facilitating joint 
action. The ASEAN post-2015 Health Development Agenda (ASEAN 2015) proposes 
mechanisms for improving accountability and using evidence-based approaches to set health 
priorities and measurable targets, with a commitment to implementation across sectors. Other 
mechanisms to increase accountability and to track process could mirror the ASEAN 
Economic Community Scorecard, which was designed to chart progress towards economic 
integration in Southeast Asia. Issues such as access to medicines and access to health that are 
broader in scope are difficult to retain on the political agenda (Caballero-Anthony & Amul 
2015), but mechanisms to track progress and keep leaders accountable could help sustain this 
political commitment. Expert respondents noted that increased checks and balances through 
regional coordination could not only maintain political will, but also increase the transparency 
of implementation processes and limit instances of corruption with regards to the circulation 
of poor-quality medicines (EXP17_INGO20150716). 
9.5.2 Network of actors for regional health security 
A framework for health governance at the regional level could provide some of the needed 
checks and balances. At the same time, a regional framework for health governance could 
better leverage the resources and capacities of policy actors and non-state partner organisations 
in the drug regulatory space for the integration of drug regulatory efforts in Southeast Asia. 
These networks of state and non-state actors could also ensure that capacity building activities 
are tailored and adapted to each country’s needs and priorities. Global health is a dynamic 
                                                     
61 At the 2014 of ASEAN Health Ministers Meeting held in Vietnam, for example, leaders stressed the 
need for ASEAN members to strengthen health systems and reinforced the need for ‘Better Health for 
the ASEAN Community Beyond 2015’ (ASEAN 2014). They also expressed concern at the rising 
incidence of infectious diseases, including the Ebola Virus Disease, and the negative impact on the 
socio-economic development of the region (ASEAN 2014). 
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space for global governance (Youde 2012), through which agencies can engage with a plethora 
of actors – from global health institutions and international donor organizations to technical 
agencies and civil society organizations (CSOs). In this regard, non-state actors such as CSOs 
and donor organisations could provide stronger mechanisms to hold governments accountable 
to a common agenda for policy change. The mobilisation of a regional health security frame 
around the problem of poor-quality medicines could also leverage the resources and expertise 
of a multitude of partners in this ‘action arena’62, from CSOs at community level, to non-
governmental global health institutions. My observation from this thesis is that non-state 
policy actors form a strong network that can support the integration of efforts for malaria 
elimination, as an entry point into a wider objective for health systems strengthening. 
9.5.2.1 Inter-governmental organisations 
Various organisations have been mentioned in this study as promoters of the ATM goal. The 
WHO, as an inter-governmental organisation, has the authority to elaborate and promulgate 
laws (such as the IHR institutionalising the right to health) and is perceived as a having the 
normative power to guide governments’ policy reforms and decisions to improve access to 
quality medicines or to strengthen regulatory systems. As an example of its normative 
influence in the global health arena, the WHO promulgated the Framework Convention for 
Tobacco Control (FCTC), which provides guidance for states to review their rules and 
regulations to reduce tobacco consumption. Some of the measures in the FCTC regulate 
against the smuggling of illegal tobacco substances as products harmful to health. These 
measures set a relevant precedent for similar regulation against other illegal harmful products 
– such as falsified and substandard medicines. Attaran et al. (2011) argue that a Model Law 
should be created under the auspice of the WHO as the sole institution with the mandate to 
promulgate international laws. At the national level, WHO country offices can support 
capacity building efforts through technical assistance. The opportunities for regional 
coordination by the WHO on the problem of poor-quality medicines in the GMS, are limited 
by the fact that member state countries are split member between the WHO South-East Asia 
Regional Office (Thailand) and the WHO Western Pacific Regional Offices (Cambodia and 
Lao PDR) – with limited coordination of agendas between the two offices. The WHO’s 
Emergency Response to Artemisinin Resistance initiative (ERAR), for example, has had 
limited success with few positive outcomes over the three years of operation. Mackey (2013) 
argues that while the WHO has a role to play in raising normative awareness about the problem 
                                                     
62  ‘Action Arena’ is based on the definition by Ostrom and Aligica, who refer to the policy space where 
stakeholders with an interest in access to medicines comes together through meetings or common 
programs of action (Ostrom 2009; Aligica 2006). 
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of poor-quality medicines through research and analysis, other organizations like the United 
Nations Office for Drugs and Crime are better positioned to deal with the issue of falsified 
medicines. The WHO plays an important role, however, in driving the policy response for 
increased drug safety – through capacity building of regulatory systems and by setting 
standards and guidelines to facilitate regulatory convergence.  
Another international organization that has provided in-country support in the fight against 
poor-quality medicines including AMLs is INTERPOL. The role of INTERPOL is particularly 
relevant to push for the coordination of law enforcement agencies against the circulation of 
falsified medicines and in support of the regional security agenda. In this regard, INTERPOL 
is an important player in pushing the drug security agenda forward. INTERPOL supports 
cross-border investigations and the regional operations clearly showcase the trans-border 
nature of trafficking routes. While INTERPOL has provided some training assistance to allow 
customs and police officials to conduct such operations more systemically, such training 
activities remain ad hoc and INTERPOL’s activities do not directly promote sustainable and 
long-term commitment by law enforcement officials to the goal of ATM.  
9.5.2.2 Technical agencies as implementing partners 
Another observation from this study is that CSOs also have a role to play in shaping the 
regional and global debate around a policy goal of access to quality medicines, and in 
supporting the effective implementation of existing rules and regulations at the community 
level. There is a need to harness the expertise and resources of existing implementing partner 
organizations in this policy space, for greater regulatory convergence and to contribute to 
health systems strengthening through capacity building activities. As the results demonstrate, 
the USP and the PSI have largely supported the process of interest formation around the policy 
problem of poor-quality medicines. They have also been partners in the implementation of 
rules and regulations to address this problem for AMLs and in strengthening the capacity of 
NRAs to monitor the quality of medicines. Technical agencies, through capacity building 
activities for sustainable support, contribute to building ownership of these processes by 
national governments. The United National Office for Drugs and Crime, through its Container 
Control Program, has also provided valuable technical capacity building support (in 
cooperation with INTERPOL) to customs officials for the verification of incoming containers 
containing pharmaceuticals and spotting potential fraud in documentations.  
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There are limitations to relying exclusively on inter-governmental bodies and non-
governmental technical partners for policy change and to strengthen health systems 
effectively. As suggested by respondents in this study, the current regional governance space 
for policy coordination on the quality of medicines is highly fragmented. Several technical 
agencies operate in this space, often leading to duplication of capacity building efforts and 
with inadequate processes to identify priority areas for regulatory support. The various 
information sharing platforms such as the ASEAN Post-Market Alert System (ASEAN 
PMAS) or the USP Build Regional Expertise in Medicines Regulation, Information Sharing, 
Joint Investigation and Enforcement Mechanism (BREME), remain largely under-used. 
Regulators expressed confusion as to which mechanism to report the identification for poor-
quality medicines through. Another limitation relates to the sustainability of these initiatives 
to support regional health cooperation. International health partners and technical agencies’ 
operation is dependent on the sustainability of external funding (Liverani et al. 2012). The lack 
of continuity in funding for existing initiatives means that some efforts are discontinued. 
Relying on external funding for building regulatory capacity means that efforts are not always 
integrated within national structures to ensure a sustainable health systems strengthening 
approach. 
9.5.2.3 Donor commitments towards malaria elimination 
Renewed funding commitment towards malaria elimination through, for example, the 
Regional Malaria and Other Communicable Disease Threats Trust Fund (RMTF) in December 
2013 or the Regional Artemisinin Resistance Initiative (RAI) (to renewed at the end of 2017), 
encourages multi-country, cross-border and multi-sector responses to the disease including 
strengthening drug regulatory systems. This supports the argument that malaria elimination 
remains a strong entry point in the Mekong region for the promotion of the goal to improve 
access to quality medicines. The malaria elimination agenda horizon up to 2030 in the Asia 
Pacific Region (Asia Pacific Leaders Malaria Alliance 2015) includes drug regulatory and 
health systems strengthening as a priority. In this manner, efforts to strengthen the drug 
regulatory space for access to quality AMLs could eventually benefit other therapeutic drug 
categories. It is by harnessing the expertise and resources of all actors in this space that a strong 
regional health governance framework can support the coordination of responses to improve 
access to quality AMLs and other essential medicines in the region.  
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Conclusion  
Concluding thoughts 
As demonstrated in this study, interpretations of the policy problem of poor-quality medicines 
vary across national settings. This is due to varying conceptions of quality and the differences 
in terminology used to define poor-quality medicines across countries. It is important to bear 
in mind, however, that the definitions reviewed in this thesis are English translations of official 
documents originally written in Lao, Khmer and Thai. The translations may have distorted the 
original meaning of the terms used and described, which is one of the main limitations of my 
analysis.  
The determinants and drivers of the policy issue of poor-quality medicines are also perceived 
differently across categories of respondents. This has led to different pathways of policy 
response and limited evidence of cross-sectoral or cross-border cooperation to improve ATM. 
Reconciling pathways of policy responses requires, first and foremost, a common regional 
definition of poor-quality medicines in policy and legal documents. To avoid confusion of 
terms, this definition would have to be clarified in a common language (such as English). The 
availability of English translations of documents on medicines regulation is important as it 
reflects governments’ willingness to share information on regulatory frameworks and 
processes. It is also a necessary pre-requisite to achieve policy coherence across borders and 
cross-border cooperation. 
While policy actors demonstrated heightened awareness of the problem of poor-quality 
medicines, many highlighted limitations derived from the lack of data on the prevalence of 
substandard or falsified medicines. Respondents showed a strong inclination to evidence-based 
policy making. For this reason, further evidence and information sharing through regular and 
systematic post-market sampling of medicines, could fuel political will and inform policy 
decisions towards a more pro-active approach to improving ATM. In view of the 
discontinuation of GMS-wide data collection projects on the distribution of AMLs through 
unlicensed outlets such as ACT Watch project (under PSI), it appears even more crucial for 
regulatory systems strengthening activities to prioritize systematic sampling procedures and 
data collection. 
Results also demonstrate that political will towards the ATM goal may be best harnessed 
through the alignment of the ATM goal with the security paradigm. The security paradigm can 
be used to raise attention towards a policy issue and place it on the policy agenda (Labonté & 
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Gagnon 2010; Balzacq 2005). The problem of poor-quality medicines, portrayed as a shared 
responsibility to protect the wellbeing of populations across borders, raises the importance of 
medicine regulation onto the political agenda. Beyond addressing the specific gaps and needs 
of national regulatory systems, good governance is primordial. Regulatory systems 
strengthening, encompassed within wider health systems strengthening objectives, should 
address issues of transparency and the effective management of limited resources. Policy 
actors need to be held accountable across sectors and beyond border for delivering on these 
objectives. Framing the problem of poor-quality medicines as a regional health security 
concern, engages policy actors in a discussion on improving cross-border coordination and 
promoting policy coherence. For fear of lagging behind, this could encourage policy actors to 
dedicate the necessary resources for the effective enforcement of existing rules and 
regulations. 
As part of high-level advocacy among policy makers, the economic benefit of investing in 
regulatory strengthening and greater convergence across the region, could also trigger political 
commitment. This case should be made clearer. Beyond mechanisms for guaranteeing drug 
safety, regulatory capacity should be enhanced and needs to be geared towards improving drug 
security as well as drug safety. This requires cooperation across sectors, from regulators to law 
enforcement officials. It also requires greater synergy with non-state actors, including the 
pharmaceutical industry (in part for its financial resources and expertise in track and tracing 
of their own products) and academia (with further operational research to advice policy 
developments, for example).  
To improve regulatory capacity and streamline efforts towards the ATM goal, innovative 
approaches to scaling up existing initiatives and mechanisms are crucial. For example, 
platforms or committees for substandard and falsified medicines may facilitate coordination 
between different sectors of government. Other mechanisms to connect development partners, 
national agencies and the private sector (such as the PPM programs), may be helpful to support 
better health service delivery and access to quality health products. Such initiatives could be 
scaled up and introduced in new settings. Technology (although it poses a risk in the form of 
e-pharmacies) is yet another tool that could be used to support the ATM goal, by facilitating 
the reporting of evidence of substandard or falsified medicines from the national, regional to 
the global level (feeding into the WHO Rapid Alert System, for example). Authentication and 
serialisation of quality-assured products is another way to harness technology for ATM, but 
may be too costly at this stage. In the meantime, introducing tools to empower consumers also 
has a role; the SMS for Life program for patients to verify the quality of AMLs by text 
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messaging (a project piloted in Tanzania) is one such example.  Informing the public of their 
right to receive safe medicines and of the dangers of purchasing medicines through unlicensed 
outlets, should form an essential component of advocacy campaigns. 
Contribution of this study 
The findings from this study are useful to inform the future development of effective 
interventions at the national and regional level, to prevent the illicit trade of poor-quality 
medicines and to promote access to quality medicines in the GMS. This study provides an 
overview of how the problem of poor-quality medicines is perceived among policy actors and 
from this information, provides insights on what drives policy decisions. This study also offers 
a new application of framing analysis in health policy. Framing analysis has been a useful 
method to understand policy choices and to analyse the role of ideas in policy. It has also been 
particularly relevant in a comparative context to acknowledge variations in interpretations of 
a common policy problem and to inform the study of international relations, regional 
cooperation and cross-border policy making. This study adds to the body of literature on the 
application of framing analysis to policy analysis. It also proposes a three-part method for 
doing so – based on a stakeholder analysis, a document analysis and of semi-structured 
interviews. The combination of these methods elucidates the value of quality research in 
interpretive policy analysis – where ideas and inter-subjective interpretations of policy form 
an inherent part of policy making.  
For the dissemination of the results, I have shared the main findings with key respondents from 
each country, and in the form of a report with the ethical committees of the research institutions 
that approved my research project. I presented the results of this thesis at three international 
conferences and seminars during my PhD – in Bangkok and London. I have also been given 
the opportunity to apply this acquired knowledge as a consultant to a development project 
funded by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and as implemented by the Centre of 
Regulatory Excellence in Singapore on improving the regulatory capacity of NRAs in the 
GMS.   
Acknowledging limitations  
Several limitations to this study must be acknowledged. Firstly, this study was conducted 
independently as a PhD candidate and did not benefit from the parallel coding of an associate 
researcher. This incurs some risk for research bias. To mitigate these risks, I sought the advice 
and help of my supervisors and advisory committee to cross check the data and my analysis. 
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As explained in Chapter 5, I also cross-referenced my findings by validating quotations with 
respondents themselves.  
As a French researcher in Southeast Asia, my legitimacy to conduct these interviews may have 
been questioned by respondents themselves. Fortunately, my previous experience conducting 
qualitative interviews at ministerial level in Southeast Asia was helpful to navigate these 
challenges. During my fieldwork, government-level respondents sometimes inquired about my 
ability to seek funding from donor organisations on their behalf. This was a culturally 
challenging development during the fieldwork. In response to such situations, I made sure to 
emphasise my role as an independent researcher affiliated to LSHTM throughout the 
interviewing process. I referred to the interviewing process and anonymity requirements to re-
center the discussion as an academic interview. The language barrier constituted another 
limitation during my research. Although most respondents were comfortable speaking in 
English or French and I did not require the support of a translator, opinions were at times not 
expressed as clearly as they might have been if they were expressed in their mother tongue.  
There are other important limitations to conducting a qualitative study as an independent 
researcher. Opinions and perceptions are hard to measure and analyse objectively. As regularly 
as was required throughout this study, I made sure to remove any pre-conceived notions of the 
topic of poor-quality medicines so as not to let any previous knowledge hinder the 
interpretation of the data collected from the semi-structured interviews. This was crucial to 
allow for new themes to emerge from the data. To support the qualitative data analysis process, 
the use of field notes and memos was crucial to record elements of the respondents’ discourse 
that would inform my analysis of political sensitivities and potential gaps in interviewees’ 
responses.  
The potential for biased opinions due to political influences is another limitation of this 
qualitative study (Robson 2011). Information has been suppressed or removed from the data 
due to withdrawal of consent or by indirect political pressure to hide certain facts. Some 
respondents did not address or respond to my questions directly. To mitigate this challenge, I 
reviewed my questions iteratively throughout the interviewing process to guide the discussion 
to be as open and relevant to the topic as possible. It was essential in this respect to cross-
reference information from interviews with non-government respondents to identify any 
potential sensitivities. From the findings of this study, it is important to note that there are 
various dimensions of the topic that I did not explore thoroughly, due to the limited resources 
available. For example, the analysis of documents was centred almost exclusively on public 
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health policies and laws. I did not explore criminal laws. I also did not conduct an in-depth 
exploration of regulatory gaps, although this came out as a strong theme in all three countries. 
Observations made from the data collected in Cambodia, Lao PDR and from Thailand may 
not reflect what is happening in the rest of the GMS (i.e., Myanmar, Vietnam, or the south-
western provinces of China) where the problem of poor-quality medicines may be interpreted 
very differently. Furthermore, observations on regional cooperation for this study are drawn 
exclusively from the accounts of respondents based in three of ten ASEAN countries only and 
from a document analysis. The interviews conducted included specific questions on 
respondents’ experience and perceptions of the role and position of ASEAN on the issue of 
medicine quality. I did not have the opportunity for example to interview representatives from 
ASEAN at its headquarters in Jakarta. The observations articulated in this study are therefore 
conceptual generalisations only, intended to introduce a way of thinking about the problem 
poor-quality medicines in the GMS, rather than to extrapolate on factual interpretations of this 
policy problem for the whole region (Green & Thorogood 2014). Throughout this study, I 
acknowledged the importance of context and how this influences my analysis across the three 
case studies. This is to be taken into consideration if the conceptual framework is to be applied 
to a different regional setting. While the thematic categories drawn from the literature can 
guide research in a different setting, these themes should be analysed with a strong reference 
to contextual specificities.  
Also, in terms of the generalisability of my findings to the problem of poor-quality medicines, 
I note throughout this study that I explore interpretations of the problem of poor-quality AMLs 
first and foremost. This generated conversation on the status of national malaria control efforts 
and the distribution of AMLs, which is conducted predominantly through vertical health 
programs. For this reason, the applicability of findings to other essential medicines is limited. 
Nevertheless, studying the case of AMLs served as a great entry point into the topic of 
substandard and falsified medicines. 
Questions for further research 
From the findings of this study, I have identified some relevant questions for further empirical 
research on the challenge of poor-quality medicines. Firstly, the proposed conceptual 
framework could be applied to a different regional setting to explore how the problem of poor-
quality medicines is framed by policy actors. Secondly, in view of the salience of the security 
frame, it would be interesting to explore why the securitisation of the problem of poor-quality 
medicines has not translated into a robust policy response beyond drug safety. This would 
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entail a deeper exploration of regulatory challenges and gaps at the national level and a 
thorough analysis of the security concept in regional politics. With regards to the GMS and 
the ASEAN context, further research on the impact of the AEC on the policy problem of poor-
quality medicines would also be relevant. Despite forecasted increases in the movement of 
people and goods, the AEC policies concern skilled labour first and foremost. Although 
respondents in this study expressed concern at the AEC as increasing the risk for the 
heightened circulation of illicit goods, including substandard and falsified medicines, the 
impact AEC may be limited, seeing as borders in the GMS are already porous. 
Reflecting on the journey 
The problem of poor-quality medicines came to my attention while working in health policy 
research on access to medicines between 2010 and 2014. While conducting a study of regional 
health policy in Southeast Asia and subsequently working for a foundation specialized in the 
supply of essential medicines in low and middle-income settings, my interest was sparked by 
the debates around falsified medicines, an issue still under-researched from a policy and 
regulatory perspective. It has been an insightful journey working on this topic from within the 
faculty of public health policy at LSHTM, although it has been a challenging topic to explore 
due to the political sensitivity and the nature of the environment in which this study was 
conducted. While the topic was not easy to navigate and many questions remain unanswered, 
below are some concluding observations from my experience conducting this study since 
January 2014.  
The policy issue of poor-quality medicines is complex and multi-faceted and weaves in 
elements of political sciences, international relations, law, as well as sociology and economics. 
Regulatory science (understood here as the development of tools and standards for the safety 
and quality of medicines) encompasses both policy development and law. It was useful to 
apply my background in political sciences, international law and international relations to 
explore the policy problem of poor-quality medicines, its determinants and drivers. During my 
time at LSHTM, I drew from the expertise of colleagues in health policy analysis and global 
health research and discussed my findings with malaria experts through my membership at the 
LSHTM malaria center. From this, it became evident that it would be beneficial for this policy 
issue to be explored from an economic perspective – to determine the economic argument for 
dedicating time and resources towards regulatory systems strengthening to promote access to 
health. 
 273 
Time and resources permitting, I would have spent longer in each country setting, to allow 
sufficient time to go through administrative processes which may have opened further doors 
to government level respondents. This would have been beneficial for a more in-depth 
understanding of the country setting as well. The fact that I was familiar with these countries 
prior to undertaking this study did help nevertheless. With more time in each country, I would 
also have worked closely with a local translator, whom I would have invited to accompany me 
throughout the interviewing process. This would have offered respondents the opportunity to 
conduct the interviews in Lao, Khmer, Thai, French or English. However, it would have 
required the support of a professional transcription service to translate and transcribe the 
recorded interviews, and would also have been more challenging to note observations from 
these interviews, should the respondent not consent to be recorded. Being accompanied by a 
local representative during these interviews might have increased my credibility towards the 
respondents. To this effect, I would have encouraged a member of each host organization to 
accompany me through this process as well. This different approach would have required more 
time to brief the participants on the process for conducting the interviews and on 
confidentiality requirements. Finally, I may also have considered hiring a local research 
assistant or translator to support a more thorough analysis of the legal and policy documents, 
in both their original versions and English translated versions. This would have permitted a 
closer analysis of the terminology used and the variations in definitions.  Regardless, I am 
thrilled with the experience and believe that the knowledge acquired will be an inspiration for 
my ongoing career in academia and beyond, both from a methodological and conceptual 
standpoint. The problem of poor-quality medicines is a fascinating and timely topic, which 
will continue to be a policy challenge globally for as long as pharmaceuticals remain a costly 
and profitable commodity, and an essential one for the health and wellbeing of populations.  
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Appendix 1 – Global stakeholders 
Institution Acronym Decription 
World Health 
Organization 
WHO The WHO works to raise awareness among the 
global health community about the need to 
improve access to quality medicines. the WHO 
first set up the International Medical Products 
Anti-Counterfeiting Taskforce and subsequently 
Member State Mechanism to spearhead these 
efforts at the national level. WHO also established 
a global Rapid Alert System to share 
pharmacovigilance information about medicine 
quality and product recalls. WHO hosts the WHO 
Prequalification Programme as a standardization 
for medicine quality. At the national level, WHO 
offices support health system development which 
in part works to improve the quality of health 
services and access to essential medicines.  
United States 
Pharmacopeia 
USP USP is a nonprofit organization that provides 
technical support to nation states, in particular the 
ministries of health and the DRAs in the form of 
capacity building. USP works to improve national 
standards for the quality of medicines by monitoring 
quality in ley sentinnel sites with the use of the 
minilab, supporting the development of Standard 
Operating Procedures and working towards ISO 
certification for national pharmaceutical testing 
laboratories. USP also contributes to  raising 
awareness about the risks of poor-quality  medicines. 
United Nations 
Office for 
Drugs and 
Crime 
UNODC As an inter-governmental oragnization, UNODC 
tackles organized crime including the illicit trade in 
'fraudulent' medicines. Initiativess spearheaded by 
UNODC include the Container Control Programme 
(CCP) where UNODC works with national 
customs offices at ports of entry to verify the 
quality of the merchandise and reliability of the 
documentation. UNODC also worked to develop a 
model law against the pharmaceutical crime with 
the support of IRACM (see below). 
International 
Criminal 
Police 
Organization 
INTERPOL An international law enforcement organization 
working with police and customs officials across 
national settings. Its department of pharmaceutical 
crime works against the illicit trade in falsified 
medicines. INTERPOL conducts yearly raids on 
these organized criminal networks working hand in 
hand with national law enforcement bodies. It track 
and arrest criminal networks of poor-quality 
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medicines in Southeast Asia among other regional 
settings. 
International 
Federation of 
pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers 
Associations  
IFPMA An internationals federation or associations 
representing pharmaceutical companies and based 
in Geneva. It contributes expertise to the global 
health community to improve global health 
including acccess to quality medicines. 
International 
Institute of 
Research 
Against 
Counterfeit 
Medicines 
IRACM A research organization launched in France in 
2010 and aimed at raising awareness and 
disseminating information about the threat of poor-
quality medicines among government officials 
worldwide. IRACM conducts trainings with policy 
and customs officials on request.  
World Trade 
Organization 
WTO A global International organization establishing 
rules for trade between countries. It also acts as a 
forum for countries to negotiate trade 
arrangements. Member states of the WTO signed 
an international Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) 
establishing rules and regulations for patent 
protections for pharmaceutical products. This has 
been perceived as a challenge to acccess to more 
affordable, generic medicines. Subsequently, WTO 
introduced flexibility tools around the TRIPS 
agreement to support access to medicines. 
World 
Intellectual 
Property 
Organization 
WIPO WIPO is a global forum for intellectual property 
services of products operating under the United 
Nations as a self-funding agency. It also covers IP 
services for  pharmaceutical products. 
Global Fund to 
Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
GF A global health partnership organization 
established to mobilize financial resources to 
support efforts agains three infectious diseases - 
Aids, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Through its 
financing mechanisms, the GF  broadly supports  
health systems strengthening including efforts to 
improve the regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
Table 21 Global Stakeholders 
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Appendix 2 - Statistics on prevalence of substandard and falsified 
medicines in the GMS 
Antimalarial drugs have been knowingly falsified in Southeast Asia since 1998 (P. N. Newton 
et al. 2008). It has been estimated that fake anti-malarials contribute to nearly 450,000 
preventable deaths every year (Karunamoorthi 2014). In China, between 200,000 and 300,000 
people die each year due to counterfeit or substandard (Primo-Carpenter 2004). This trend 
however is not new; Tabernero and colleagues (2014) mention that there have been reports of 
falsified cinchona bark in the 1600s and falsified quinine from the 1800s. While data remains 
scarce and we do not have a clear idea of the magnitude of the problem of falsified antimalarial 
drugs today (Tabernero & Newton 2012; Tabernero, Fernández, et al. 2014), some studies 
suggest that the problem exists and represents an important public health challenge (Newton, 
Amin, et al. 2011). Recent estimates for that the total prevalence of falsified antimalarial drugs 
in the GMS range between 33% and 53% (P. N. Newton et al. 2008; Nayyar et al. 2012; 
Dondorp et al. 2004). However, it is crucial to interpret these figures critically and to 
understand how data is collated and the surveying strategies used in the relevant studies.   
Nayyar and colleagues (2012) review existing data on the prevalence of falsified antimalarial 
drugs in African and Southeast Asia between 1999 and 2010. Out of a sample of 939 
antimalarial drugs from six studies in the GMS that carried out both chemical and packaging 
analysis, it appears that 448 (or 47.7%) were classified as falsified. The review offered by 
Nayyar et al. however is not extensive and only looks at six studies. Furthermore, the authors 
only include in their calculation samples where measuring falsification was done by both 
chemical and packaging analysis. The authors note that for various studies, packaging analysis 
was not always possible due to the difficulty of obtaining genuine samples of the original drug 
packaging.  
Another review of evidence on the presence of falsified antimalarial drugs was conducted by 
the Antimalarial Quality Scientific Group between until 2014. The Antimlarial Quality 
Scientific Group systematically reviewed a series of scientific and lay reports on poor quality 
antimalarial drugs at the global level. The data is represented in an interactive map available 
online at the Worldwide Antimalarial Resistance Network; the Antimalarial Quality Surveyor 
(AQ Surveyor63), “an open access, web-based visualization tool that tabulates and maps 
                                                     
63 The AQ Surveyor available at http://www.wwarn. org/aqsurveyor/ is “an open access, web-based 
visualization tool that tabulates and maps published reports on the quality of anti-malarial medicines” 
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published reports on the quality of anti-malarial medicines” (Tabernero, Fernández, et al. 
2014; Tabernero & Newton 2012; Worlwide Artemisinin Resistance Network n.d.). Figures 
on the existence of poor-quality antinalarials in the AQ surveyor can be viewed according to 
quality classification, whether substandard or falsified. For this study, I have reviewed the data 
available on the AQ Surveyor for falsified antimalarial drugs64. At the global level, the AQ 
surveyor assesses 130 studies. Out of the 9,348 anti-malarial samples tested, 30.1% failed 
chemical and packaging quality tests and were thus qualified as falsified (Tabernero et al. 
2014).  
For the GMS only, Tabernero et al. systematically review 19 studies that provide evidence of 
the presence of falsified antimalarial drugs in the, (this is including the Southern provinces of 
China). The 19 studies sampled six different kinds of antimalarial drugs including Artemether, 
Artesunate, Chloroquine, Mefloquine, Primaquine, Quinine. Global data on ACT falsification 
is scarce and there is only one report in the AQ Surveyor that accounts for the seizure of fake 
ACTs produced in China for sale in Africa (Newton et al. 2011; Tabernero et al. 2014). The 
types of studies reviewed include NRA seizures, lab collections, case reports, convenience 
sampling and random sampling surveys. To obtain a valid estimate of the total percentage of 
falsified antimalarial drugs in the GMS, I removed data from NRA seizures – thereby 
excluding one report of the seizure by INTERPOL of 56,000 fake artesunate tablets in the 
Yunnan Province of China which would thwart any estimate. This first result suggests that 
55.4% of antimalarials are falsified. When removing data collated from lab collections as well 
as DRA seizures, thus keeping figures from studies with convenience or random sampling 
strategies as well as rare case reports, the percentage of antimalarial falsified is at 34.1% (See 
table 1 p. 3 for an overview of the figures from the AQ Surveyor). 
For a country overview of falsification rates, I have thereafter split the data to obtain the 
following estimates from the AQ Surveyor: Cambodia 23.1%, Vietnam 78.2%, Lao PDR 63%, 
Myanmar (Burma) 30.8%, Thailand 30.4% and China (Southern Provinces) 24%. It is 
important to note here that very few studies were conducted in Vietnam (3 studies and 82 
samples) and Myanmar (2 studies and 99 samples). Furthermore, the data available on the 
prevalence rates in the Southern Provinces of China are based mainly on case reports except 
for the convenience sample survey by Phanouvong (2005). Nevertheless, data from drug 
seizures in the Southern China are interesting in that they provide some evidence of these 
provinces being a hub for fake medicine production. Chow reinforces this statement by 
                                                     
(Tabernero, Fernández, et al. 2014; Tabernero & Newton 2012; Worlwide Artemisinin Resistance 
Network n.d.) 
64 As of January 2015. 
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suggesting that most counterfeiting including pharmaceutical counterfeiting occurs in the 
South western China (Chow 2003) and thus conveniently very close to the borders with the rst 
of the GMS member states. In fact Newton and colleagues (2008) in a collaborative forensic 
investigation into fake antimarial drugs in the region, traced some falsified artesunate batches 
back to the Yunnan province of South China where a large marjority of fake antimalrials 
originate from, often bearing the fake hologram of the manufacturer ‘Guilin Pharmaceutical’ 
(Hall et al. 2006) (Dondorp et al. 2004).  
Tabernero and colleagues (2014) note that 5-15% of member states regularly report such cases 
to the WHO. Although growing awareness about the problem has encouraged more scientists 
since 1998 to conduct studies on fake antimalarial drugs, there is still a general lack of 
reporting from member states and thus, we still possess insufficient data for accurate estimates. 
While the data collated by in the AQ Sruveyor offers some useful evidence of the existence of 
the problem in certain regions, there are many inconsistencies worth acknowledging regarding 
the existing pool of studies. Firstly, studies vary in terms of the sampling strategies used. As 
Tabernero and colleagues note; “estimates vary greatly depending on the sampling 
methodology and the technique used, probably greatly influencing reported failure rates.” 
(2014, p.9). Few reports are based on randomized sampling strategies which is considered the  
“gold standard” in measuring disease prevalence for example (Tabernero et al. 2014, p. 9). Out 
of the studies available for the GMS on the AQ Surveyor, only half were either convenience 
sampling65 or random66 sampling surveys. Furthermore, there are many inconsistencies in the 
existing studies with regards to the definition of ‘falsified’ vs. ‘substandard’ drugs and how 
the two categories of drugs are differentiated in each survey. Classifying a drug as falsified as 
opposed to substandard is important however, as it implies different policy. In total, 74% of 
the 251 of studies reviewed for the AQ Survey did not offer a definition (Tabernero et al. 
2014). In order to classify a drug as falsified however, both chemical analysis and packaging 
analysis are required. This is one way to discern a criminal intent as opposed to a 
manufacturing error.  At times however, the possibility of obtaining a sample package of the 
original drug proves too difficult, and drugs are classified as falsified based on the lack of or 
incorrect amounts of API – this may lead to some inaccurate estimates (Tarbernero et al. 2014; 
Nayyar et al. 2012). We do not as of yet possess data from a systematic, comprehensive, 
region-wide random sampling surveys available for an accurate estimate of prevalence of 
falsified antimalarial drugs in the region (Johnston & Holt 2014). Nevertheless, the data 
                                                     
65 Convenience sample surveys: (Dondorp et al. 2004; Lon et al. 2006; Newton et al. 2001; Phanouvong 
et al. 2005; Shakoor et al. 1997; Rozendaal 2001b) 
66 Random sample surveys: (Sengaloundeth et al. 2009; Phanouvong, Raymond, Krech & Dijiba 2013) 
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available on the AQ Surveyor provides a good indication that falsified antimalarial drugs are 
a problem in the GMS. 
Table 22 Results from AQ Surveyor on % Falsified antimalarial drugs in the GMS member 
states 
Country Study 
(authors) 
Survey type Antimalarial Sample % 
falsified 
No. of 
falsified 
Cambodia Aldhous 2005 Case 
Reports 
Mefloquine 1 100 1 
Cambodia Bagozzi D 
2003 
Case 
Reports 
Artesunate unknown 100 unknown 
Cambodia Dondorp A.M. 
2004 
Convenience Artesunate 22 23 5.06 
Cambodia Hall K.A. 2006 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate  6 50 3 
Cambodia Lon 2006 Convenience Artesunate 81 20 16.2 
Cambodia Lon 2006 Convenience Chloroquine 94 1 0.94 
Cambodia Lon 2006 Convenience Mefloquine 39 8 3.12 
Cambodia Lon 2006 Convenience Quinine  85 71 60.35 
Cambodia Newton 2001 Convenience Artesunate 26 25 6.5 
Cambodia Newton 2008 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 48 100 48 
Cambodia Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Artesunate 32 25 8 
Cambodia Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Chloroquine 54 2 1.08 
Cambodia Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Mefloquine 21 5 1.05 
Cambodia Phanouvong S 
2013 
Random Artesunate 25 12 3 
Cambodia Phanouvong S 
2013 
Random Quinine 25 20 5 
Cambodia Rozendaal 
2000 
Case 
Reports 
Mefloquine 3 100 3 
Cambodia Rozendaal 
2001  
Convenience Artesunate 3 66 1.98 
Cambodia  Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Quinine 25 44 11 
China 
(Dongxing) 
People's Daily 
Online 
Case 
Reports 
Chloroquine unknown 100 unknown 
China 
(Dongxing) 
People's Daily 
Online 
Case 
Reports 
Primaquine unknown 100 unknown 
China 
(Guangzhou) 
Faucon B. 
2013 
DRA Seizure Artemether 600 100 600 
China 
(Yunnan) 
Newton et al. 
2008 
DRA Seizure Artesunate 56000 100 56000 
China 
(Yunnan) 
Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Artesunate 18 17 3.06 
China 
(Yunnan) 
USP 2004 Case 
Reports 
Artesunate 3 66 1.98 
Lao  Alter K. 2004 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 16 100 16 
Lao  Dondorp A.M. 
2004 
Convenience Artesunate 46 54 24.84 
Lao  Newton 2001 Convenience Artesunate 8 38 3.04 
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Lao  Newton 2008 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 115 100 115 
Lao  Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Artesunate 8 37 2.96 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate 2 100 2 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate 4 100 4 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate 4 75 3 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate 11 100 11 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate  3 100 3 
Lao  Sengaloundeth 
2009 
Random Artesunate  1 100 1 
Myanmar Dondorp A.M. 
2004 
Convenience Artesunate 48 21 10.08 
Myanmar Hall K.A. 2006 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 2 50 1 
Myanmar Ministy of 
Health 2001 
DRA Seizure Artemether 1 100 1 
Myanmar Newton 2001 Convenience Artesunate 51 40 20.4 
Myanmar Newton 2006 Case 
Reports 
Artesunate 1 100 1 
Myanmar Newton 2008 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 137 100 137 
Thailand Dondorp A.M. 
2004 
Convenience Artesunate  11 27 2.97 
Thailand Newton 2001 Convenience Artesunate 8 11 0.88 
Thailand Newton 2008 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 16 100 16 
Thailand Shakoor 1997 Convenience Chloroquine 5 60 3 
Vietnam Dondorp A.M. 
2004 
Convenience Artesunate 61 92 56.12 
Vietnam Hall K.A. 2006 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 2 60 1.2 
Vietnam Newton 2001 Convenience Artesunate 11 64 7.04 
Vietnam Newton 2008 Laboratory 
collections 
Artesunate 75 100 75 
Vietnam Phanouvong 
2005 
Convenience Artesunate 10 10 1 
 
  
 311 
Appendix 3 – Literature Review Chapter - List of References 
1. Ahmed, E., 2013. Safety of medicines with respect to drug counterfeiting in 
developing countries. Cardiff University. 
2. Akinyandenu, O., 2013. Counterfeit drugs in Nigeria: a threat to public health. 
African Journal of Pharmacy and Pharmacology, 7(36), pp.2571–2576. Available 
at: http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPP/PDF/pdf2013/29Sept/Akinyandenu.pdf. 
3. Aldhous, P., 2005. Counterfeit pharmaceuticals: Murder by medicine. Nature, 
434(7030), pp.132–136. Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/434132a. 
4. Alfadl, A.A., Ibrahim, M.I.B.M. & Mohamed Azmi, A.H., 2013. Scale development 
on consumer behavior toward counterfeit drugs in a developing country: a 
quantitative study exploiting the tools of an evolving paradigm. BMC Public Health, 
13(829). Available at: http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2458/13/829/abstract. 
5. Alfadl, A., Hassali, M. & Ibrahim, M.I., 2013. Counterfeit drug demand: perceptions 
of policy makers and community pharmacists in Sudan. Research in social & 
administrative pharmacy : RSAP, 9(3), pp.302–10. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22835708 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
6. Ambroise-Thomas, P., 2012. The tragedy caused by fake antimalarial drugs. 
Mediterranean journal of hematology and infectious diseases, 4(1), p.e2012027. 
Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3375661&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
7. Amon, J.J., 2008. Dangerous medicines: unproven AIDS cures and counterfeit 
antiretroviral drugs. Globalization and Health, 4(5), pp.1–10. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/7848b9dd8a2846ca84a62112d7d8244d. 
8. Andreotti, F., 2005. Substandard life-saving drugs: a global concern. European 
Heart Journal, 26(9), pp.858–860. Available at: 
http://eurheartj.oupjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/eurheartj/ehi219. 
9. Attaran, A., Bate, R. & Kendall, M., 2011. Why and How to Make an International 
Crime of Medicine Counterfeiting. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 9(2), 
pp.325–354. Available at: http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jicj/mqr005 
[Accessed October 17, 2014]. 
10. Bate, R. et al., 2008. Antimalarial drug quality in the most severely malarious parts 
of Africa - a six country study. PloS one, 3(5), p.e2132. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2324203&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed September 10, 2014]. 
 312 
11. Bate, R., 2012. Phake: the deadly world of falsified and substandard medicines, 
Washington D.C.: Rowan and Littlefield. 
12. Bate, R. et al., 2009. Pilot study of essential drug quality in two major cities in India. 
PLoS ONE, (June), p.e6003. Available at: 
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0006003. 
13. Bigdeli, M. et al., 2012. Access to medicines from a health system perspective. 
Health Policy and Planning, 28(7), pp.692–704. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3794462&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed September 15, 2014]. 
14. Bikoff, J.L. et al., 2015. Fake it ’til we make it: regulating dangerous counterfeit 
goods. Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice, 10(4), pp.246–254. 
Available at: http://jiplp.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jiplp/jpv016. 
15. Binagwaho, A. et al., 2013. Combatting substandard and falsified medicines: a view 
from Rwanda. PLoS Medicine, 10(7), p.e1001476. Available at: 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.100
1476. 
16. Bird, R.C., 2007. Counterfeit Drugs: A Global Consumer Perspective. Wake Forest 
Intellectual Property Law Journal, 8(3), pp.387–406. 
17. Blouin, C., 2007. Trade policy and health: from conflicting interests to policy 
coherence. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 85(3), pp.169–173. 
18. Brhlikova, P. et al., 2011. Trust and the regulation of pharmaceuticals: South Asia in 
a globalised world. Globalization and health, 7(1), p.10. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3104379&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
19. Buowari, O. V, 2012. Fake and Counterfeit Drug: A review. AFRIMEDIC Journal, 
3(2), pp.1–4. Available at: http://www.ajol.info/index.php/afrij/article/view/86573. 
20. Burns, W., 2006. WHO launches taskforce to fight counterfeit drugs. Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, 84(9), pp.689–690. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/9995611b45d5407e8c4f7a1004079f85. 
21. Cahoy, D.R., 2007. Addressing the North-South Divide in Pharmaceutical 
Counterfeiting. Wake Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal, 8(3), pp.307–406. 
22. Caudron, J.-M. et al., 2008. Substandard medicines in resource-poor settings: A 
problem that can no longer be ignored. Tropical Medicine and International Health, 
13(8), pp.1062–1072. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18631318 
[Accessed September 30, 2014]. 
23. Chaudhry, P.E. & Stumpf, S. a., 2013. The challenge of curbing counterfeit 
 313 
prescription drug growth: Preventing the perfect storm. Business Horizons, 56(2), 
pp.189–197. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0007681312001590 [Accessed 
September 4, 2014]. 
24. Chika, A. et al., 2011. The menace of fake drugs: consequences, causes and possible 
solutions. Research Journal of Medical Sciences, 5(5), pp.257–261. Available at: 
http://www.medwelljournals.com/abstract/?doi=rjmsci.2011.257.261. 
25. Christian, L. et al., 2012. The Problem of Substandard Medicines in Developing 
Countries, Madison, USA. 
26. Clift, C., 2010. Combating Counterfeit , Falsified and Substandard Medicines : 
Defining the Way Forward ?, London. 
27. Cockburn, R. et al., 2005. The global threat of counterfeit drugs: why industry and 
governments must communicate the dangers. PLoS medicine, 2(4), p.e100. Available 
at: https://doaj.org/article/1e6bf0b13293438bb304c07b169b16f6 [Accessed October 
20, 2014]. 
28. Cohen, J.C., Mrazek, M. & Hawkins, L., 2007. Corruption and Pharmaceuticals: 
Strengthening Good Governance to Improve Access. In E. Campos & S. Pradhan, 
eds. The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level. 
Washington D.C.: World Bank, pp. 1–37. 
29. Cohn, J. et al., 2013. When falsified medicines enter the supply chain: description of 
an incident in Kenya and lessons learned for rapid response. Journal of Public 
Health Policy, 34(1), pp.22–30. Available at: http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/jphp/journal/v34/n1/abs/jphp201253a.html. 
30. DeCola, P.R., 2010. Nursing and Health Policy Perspectives - We need to get real 
about counterfeit medicines. International Nursing Review, 57(3), pp.275–276. 
31. Dégardin, K. et al., 2014. Understanding and fighting the medicine counterfeit 
market. Journal of pharmaceutical and biomedical analysis, 87, pp.167–75. 
Available at: http://serval.unil.ch/?id=serval:BIB_86F872A6032A [Accessed 
September 9, 2014]. 
32. DeKieffer, D., 2006. Trojan drugs: Counterfeit and mislabeled pharmaceuticals in 
the legitimate market. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 32(2–3), pp.325–
349. Available at: http://vlex.com/vid/trojan-counterfeit-mislabeled-pharmaceuticals-
61550736. 
33. Dorlo, T.P.C. et al., 2012. Universal access to quality medicines: prioritisation of a-
priori solutions. The Lancet. Infectious diseases, 12(11), pp.829–30. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23099080 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
 314 
34. Edwards, I.R., 2011. Fraudulent and substandard medicines: getting away with 
murder? Drug safety : an international journal of medical toxicology and drug 
experience, 34(6), pp.445–8. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/21585218. 
35. Eisend, M. & Schuchert-güler, P., 2006. Explaining counterfeit purchases: A review 
and preview. Academy of Marketing Science Review, 2006(12), pp.1–25. Available 
at: http://www.amsreview.org/articles/eisend12-2006.pdf. 
36. Erhun, W.O., Babalola, O.O. & Erhun, M.O., 2001. Drug regulation and control in 
Nigeria: the challenge of counterfeit drugs. Journal of Health & Population in 
Developing Countries, 4(2), pp.23–34. 
37. European Alliance for Access to Safe Medicines (EAASM), 2008. The 
counterfeiting superhighway, Available at: 
http://www.eaasm.eu/cache/downloads/dqqt3sge9hwssgcgcos440g40/455_EAASM_
counterfeiting report_020608(1).pdf. 
38. Feldschreiber, P., 2009. Public health issues with counterfeit medicines. Clinical 
medicine (London, England), 9(1), pp.63–64. 
39. Foster, S., 1991. Supply and use of essential drugs in sub-Saharan Africa: some 
issues and possible solutions. Social Science & Medicine, 32(11), pp.1201–1218. 
40. Fried, M., 2011. Is this pill safe? Substandard medicines, mistaken solutions. 
Canadian Medical Association journal, 183(8), p.984. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3091912&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
41. Gastrow, P., 2013. Policy brief: transnational organised crime the stepchild of crime 
combating priorities. Intstitute of Security Studies Policy Brief, (46), pp.1–4. 
42. Gaudiano, M. et al., 2007. Medicines informal market in Congo, Burundi and 
Angola: counterfeit and sub-standard antimalarials, BioMed Central Ltd. Available 
at: https://doaj.org/article/206cf6f1e9624b689c77489f58bf5ad8. 
43. Gautam, C.S., Utreja, A. & Singal, G.L., 2009. Spurious and counterfeit drugs: a 
growing industry in the developing world. Postgraduate Medical Journal, 85(1003), 
pp.251–256. Available at: http://pmj.bmj.com/cgi/content/abstract/85/1003/251. 
44. Gillespie, K. & McBride, J.B., 2013. Counterfeit Smuggling: Rethinking Paradigms 
of Diaspora Investment and Trade Facilitation. Journal of International 
Management, 19(1), pp.66–81. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1075425312000580 [Accessed October 
17, 2014]. 
45. Glass, B.D., 2014. Counterfeit drugs and medical devices in developing countries. 
 315 
Research and Reports in Tropical Medicine, 2014(5), pp.11–22. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/0354c160076046b3acc14af82e217fbb. 
46. Gostin, L.O., Buckley, G.J. & Kelley, P.W., 2013. Stemming the global trade in 
falsified and substandard medicines. Jounrnal of the American Medical Association, 
309(16), pp.1693–4. Available at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23579391 
[Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
47. Gupta, P., Singhal, K. & Pandey, A., 2012. Counterfeit (Fake) drugs & new 
technologies to identify it in India. International Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences 
and Research, 3(11), pp.4057–4064. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/e870e04de3044c2696bd0357dc98176a. 
48. Hall, K.A. et al., 2006. Characterization of Counterfeit Artesunate Antimalairal 
Tablets from Southeast Asia. American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 
75(5), pp.804–811. 
49. Hamburg, M., 2015. The Global Pandemic of Falsified Medicines: Laboratory and 
Field Innovations and Policy Implications. American Journal of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene, 92(6 Suppl), p.1. Available at: 
http://www.ajtmh.org/cgi/doi/10.4269/ajtmh.15-0046. 
50. Hosseini, S.A.R. et al., 2011. Counterfeit medicines: report of a cross-sectional 
retrospective study in Iran. Public Health, 125(3), pp.165–171. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00333506. 
51. Interpol, World Health Organization & International Medical Products Anti-
Counterfeiting Taskforce, 2008. Operation Storm Final Report, Available at: 
http://www.interpol.int/Crime-areas/Pharmaceutical-crime/Operations/Operation-
Storm. 
52. Jack, A., 2012. Faking it. BMJ, 345, p.e7836. Available at: 
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/doi/10.1136/bmj.e7836 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
53. Johnston, A. & Holt, D.W., 2014. Substandard drugs: a potential crisis for public 
health. British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 78(2), pp.218–243. Available at: 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1365-2125 [Accessed 
September 24, 2014]. 
54. Kamal Smith, M. & Tickell, S., 2003. Debate that “this house believes the essential 
drug concept hinders the effective deployment of drugs in developing countries” The 
essential drugs concept is needed now more than ever. Transcations of the royal 
society of tropical medicine and hygiene, 97, pp.2–5. 
55. Karunamoorthi, K., 2014. The counterfeit anti-malarial is a crime against humanity: 
a systematic review of the scientific evidence. Malaria journal, 13(1), p.209. 
 316 
Available at: http://www.malariajournal.com/content/13/1/209 [Accessed October 
20, 2014]. 
56. Kelesidis, T. et al., 2007. Counterfeit or substandard antimicrobial drugs: a review of 
the scientific evidence. The Journal of antimicrobial chemotherapy, 60(2), pp.214–
36. Available at: http://www.jac.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jac/dkm109 
[Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
57. Kelesidis, T. & Falagas, M.E., 2015. Substandard/Counterfeit Antimicrobial Drugs. 
Clinical Microbiology Reviews, 28(2), pp.443–464. Available at: 
http://cmr.asm.org/lookup/doi/10.1128/CMR.00072-14. 
58. Khan, M.H., Okumura, J., et al., 2011. Counterfeit Medicines in Cambodia: Possible 
Causes. Pharmaceutical Research, 28(3), pp.484–489. Available at: 
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11095-010-0289-1. 
59. Khan, M.H., Akazawa, M., et al., 2011. Perceptions and practices of pharmaceutical 
wholesalers surrounding counterfeit medicines in a developing country: a baseline 
survey. BMC Health Services Research, 11(306), p.306. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3225320&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 4, 2014]. 
60. Krech, L.A. et al., 2014. Cambodian Ministry of Health Takes Decisive Actions in 
the Fight against Substandard and Counterfeit Medicines. Tropical Medicine & 
Surgery, 2(2), pp.1–7. Available at: 
http://www.esciencecentral.org/journals/cambodian-ministry-of-health-takes-
decisive-actions-in-the-fight-against-substandard-and-2329-
9088.1000166.php?aid=23778 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
61. Kuehn, B.M., 2013. IOM : Curbing Fake Drugs Will Require National Tracking and 
Global Teamwork. JAMA, 309(13), p.1333. Available at: 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jama.2013.2376. 
62. Lalani, M. et al., 2015. Substandard Antimalarials Available in Afghanistan: A Case 
for Assessing the Quality of Drugs in Resource Poor Settings. Available at: 
http://researchonline.lshtm.ac.uk/2160256/. 
63. Lewis, K., 2009. China’s counterfeit medicine trade booming. CMAJ : Canadian 
Medical Association journal = journal de l’Association medicale canadienne, 
181(10), pp.E237-8. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2774384&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
64. Liang, B. a, 2006. Fade to black: importation and counterfeit drugs. American 
Journal of Law and Medicine, 32(2006), pp.279–323. 
 317 
65. Liberman, J., 2012. Combating Counterfeit Medicines and Illicit Trade in Tobacco 
Products: Minefields in Global Health Governance. The Journal of Law, Medicine & 
Ethics, 40(2), pp.326–347. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1748-
720X.2012.00667.x. 
66. Liu, R. & Lundin, S., 2016. Falsified Medicines : Literature review. Working Papers 
in Medical Humanities, 2(1), pp.1–25. Available at: 
http://journals.lub.lu.se/index.php/medhum/index. 
67. Lon, C.T. et al., 2006. Counterfeit and substandard antimalarial drugs in Cambodia. 
Transactions of the Royal Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene, 100(11), 
pp.1019–1024. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00359203 [Accessed October 20, 
2014]. 
68. Mackey, T.K. et al., 2015. Counterfeit drug penetration into global legitimate 
medicine supply chains: a global assessment. J. E. Herrington, G. M. L. Nayyar, & J. 
G. Breman, eds. Special Issue: The global pandemic of falsified medicines: 
laboratory and field innovations and policy perspectives., 92(6, Suppl.), pp.59–67. 
Available at: http://www.ajtmh.org. 
69. Mackey, T.K. & Liang, B.A., 2011. The global counterfeit drug trade: Patient safety 
and public health risks. Journal of Pharmaceutical Sciences, 100(11), pp.4571–
4579. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/jps.22679. 
70. Mackey, T.K. & Liang, B. a, 2012. Combating healthcare corruption and fraud with 
improved global health governance. BMC international health and human rights, 
12(23), pp.1–7. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3519514&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract. 
71. Marini, R.D. et al., 2010. Reliable low cost capillary electrophoresis device for drug 
quality control and counterfeit medicines. Journal of Pharmaceutical and 
Biomedical Analysis, 53(5), pp.1278–1287. Available at: 
http://orbi.ulg.ac.be/jspui/handle/2268/69970. 
72. Moken, M.C., 2003. Fake pharmaceuticals: how they and relevant legislation or lack 
thereof contribute to consistently high and increasing drug prices. American journal 
of law & medicine, 29(4), pp.525–542. Available at: 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/12059594/fake-pharmaceuticals-how-
they-relevant-legislation-lack-thereof-contribute-consistently-high-increasing-drug-
prices. 
73. Morris, J. & Stevens, P., 2006. Counterfeit medicines in less developed countries: 
 318 
Problems and solutions, London. 
74. Mukhopadhyay, 2007. The Hunt for Counterfeit Medicine. Analytical Chemistry, 
79(7), pp.2623–2627. 
75. Nayyar, G.M.L. et al., 2015. Responding to the pandemic of falsified medicines. The 
American journal of tropical medicine and hygiene, 92(6 Suppl), pp.113–8. 
Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=4455086&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed November 26, 2015]. 
76. Newton, P. et al., 2011. Poor quality vital anti-malarials in Africa - an urgent 
neglected public health priority. Malaria Journal, 10(352), p.352. Available at: 
http://www.malariajournal.com/content/pdf/1475-2875-10-352.pdf. 
77. Newton, P.N. et al., 2008. A collaborative epidemiological investigation into the 
criminal fake artesunate trade in South East Asia, Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2235893&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 6, 2014]. 
78. Newton, P.N., Green, M.D., et al., 2006. Counterfeit anti-infective drugs. Lancet 
Infectious Diseases, 6(9), pp.602–613. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal14733099. 
79. Newton, P.N. et al., 2014. Falsified medicines in Africa: all talk, no action. The 
Lancet Global Health, 2(9), pp.509–510. Available at: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S2214-109X(14)70279-7. 
80. Newton, P.N., McGready, R., et al., 2006. Manslaughter by fake artesunate in Asia - 
will Africa be next? PLoS Medicine, 3(6), p.e197. Available at: 
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/perlserv/?request=get-
document&doi=10.1371/journal.pmed.0030197. 
81. Newton, P.N. et al., 2006. Manslaughter by fake artesunate in Asia--will Africa be 
next? PLoS medicine, 3(6), pp.752–755. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1475657&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
82. Newton, P.N. et al., 2002. Murder by fake drugs - time for international action. BMJ 
open, 324(7341), pp.800–801. 
83. Newton, P.N. et al., 2011. The primacy of public health considerations in defining 
poor quality medicines. PLoS medicine, 8(12), pp.1–5. Available at: 
http://www.plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.100
1139 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
84. Nsimba, S.E.D., 2008. Problems associated with substandard and counterfeit drugs 
 319 
in developing countries: a review article on global implications of counterfeit drugs 
in the era of antiretroviral (ARVs) drugs in a free market economy. East African 
journal of public health, 5(3), pp.205–210. 
85. Outterson, K. & Smith, R., 2006. Counterfeit Drugs: The Good, The Bad and The 
Ugly. Albany Law Journal of Science and Technology, 16, pp.525–543. 
86. Oxfam, 2011. Eye on the Ball. Oxfam Briefing Paper, (143), pp.1–51. 
87. Palafox, B. et al., 2014. Understanding private sector antimalarial distribution 
chains: a cross-sectional mixed methods study in six malaria-endemic countries. 
PloS one, 9(4), pp.1–13. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=3974780&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
88. Park, P., 2010. Lethal Counterfeits. World Policy Journal, 27(2), pp.35–40. 
89. Park, P., 2010. Lethal Counterfeits. World Policy Journal, 27(2), pp.35–40. 
90. Pecoul, B. et al., 1999. Access to essential drugs in poor countries: a lost battle? 
JAMA, Journal of the American Medical Association, 281(4), pp.361–367. 
91. Po, A.L.W., 2001. Too much, too little, or none at all: dealing with substandard and 
fake drugs. The Lancet, 357(9272), p.1904. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0140673600050923. 
92. Reynolds, L. & McKee, M., 2010. Organised crime and the efforts to combat it: a 
concern for public health. Globalization and health, 6(1), p.21. Available at: 
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=2996357&tool=pmcentre
z&rendertype=abstract [Accessed October 4, 2014]. 
93. Rierson, S.L., 2007. Pharmaceutical counterfeiting and the puzzle of remedies. Wake 
Forest Intellectual Property Law Journal, 8(3), pp.432–457. 
94. Rudolf, P.M. & Bernstein, I.B., 2004. Counterfeit Drugs. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 350(14), pp.1384–1386. Available at: 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/abs/10.1056/NEJMp038231. 
95. Seear, M., 2013. The need for coordinated action against falsified. International 
Journal of Tuberculosis and Lung Disease, 17(3), p.1. 
96. Shah, N.A. et al., 2015. Counterfeit drugs in India: significance and impact on 
pharmacovigilance. International Journal of Research in Medical Sciences, 3(9), 
pp.2156–2160. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/8c53a594362d411d9730577cf6e328fa. 
97. Sipahi, H., Peltekoglu, K. & Sencan, N., 2014. Adverse effects of counterfeit drugs 
on public health. Journal of Faculty Pharmacy, 44(1), pp.89–99. Available at: 
http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iujfp/article/view/5000091823. 
 320 
98. Skerrit, J. et al., 2014. Access to Quality Medicines and Other Technologies Task 
Force, 
99. Smith, G., Smith, J. & Brindley, D., 2014. The Falsified Medicines Directive: How 
to secure your supply chain. Journal of Generic Medicines: The Business Journal for 
the Generic Medicines Sector, 11(3–4), pp.169–172. Available at: 
http://jgm.sagepub.com/lookup/doi/10.1177/1741134315588986. 
100. Stevens, P. & Mydin, H.H., 2013. Fake medicines in Asia Producers of fake 
medicines are evolving from basement operations to manufacturing on an industrial, 
101. Swaminath, G., 2008. Faking it - I The Menace of Counterfeit Drugs. Indian 
Journal of Psychiatry, 50(4), pp.238–240. Available at: 
http://www.indianjpsychiatry.org/text.asp?2008/50/4/238/44743. 
102. Tipke, M. et al., 2008. Substandard anti-malarial drugs in Burkina Faso. 
Malaria journal, 7(95), pp.1–9. Available at: 
https://doaj.org/article/55afa05972e949139fc47e90fec6068f. 
103. Traynor, K., 2010. Counterfeit drugs pose growing health threat. American 
Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, 67(22), pp.1896–1898. Available at: 
http://www.ajhp.org/cgi/doi/10.2146/news100076. 
104. United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime, 2010. The Globalization of 
Crime - A Transnational Organized Crime Threat Assessment, Vienna. Available at: 
https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/TOCTA_Report_2010_low_res.pdf [Accessed December 3, 2015]. 
105. Vastag, B., 2003. Alarm sounded on fake, tainted drugs. JAMA, 290(8), 
p.1015. Available at: 
http://jama.jamanetwork.com/article.aspx?doi=10.1001/jama.290.8.1015. 
106. Wertheimer, A.I. & Norris, J., 2009. Safeguarding against 
substandard/counterfeit drugs: mitigating a macroeconomic pandemic. Research in 
social & administrative pharmacy, 5(1), pp.4–16. Available at: 
http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S1551741108000478 [Accessed October 
20, 2014]. 
107. World Health Organization, 2010. Growing threat from counterfeit 
medicines. Bulltin of the World Health Organization, 88(4), pp.1–5. Available at: 
http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/88/4/10-020410/en/. 
108. World Health Organization, 1999. Guidelines for the development of 
measures to combat counterfeit drugs, Geneva, Switzerland. Available at: 
http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/1999/WHO_EDM_QSM_99.1.pdf?ua=1. 
109. World Health Organization, 2003. WHO Expert Committee on specifications 
 321 
for pharmaceutical preparations, Geneva. Available at: 
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42613/1/WHO_TRS_908.pdf. 
110. Worsley, A.J. & Wong, I.C.K., 2013. Raising the ante in anti-counterfeit 
drug legislation. Hong Kong Medical Journal, 19(4), pp.284–5. Available at: 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/23918510 [Accessed October 20, 2014]. 
111. Young, D., 2004. Counterfeit drugs lawsuit points finger at wholesaler, 
pharmacy. American journal of health-system pharmacy, 61(19), p.1978,1980,1984. 
Available at: http://www.ajhp.org/content/61/19/1978.long. 
112. Yuk, L.Y. et al., 2015. Collaborative Health and Enforcement Operations on 
the Quality of Antimalarials and Antibiotics in Southeast Asia J. E. Herrington, G. 
M. L. Nayyar, & J. G. Breman, eds. The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and 
Hygiene, 92(6 Suppl), pp.105–112. Available at: 
http://www.ajtmh.org/content/92/6_Suppl/105.abstract. 
113. Zhang, J. & Zhang, R.Q., 2014. Supply chain structure in a market with 
deceptive counterfeits. European Journal of Operational Research, 240(1), pp.84–
97. Available at: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S037722171400544X 
[Accessed September 25, 2014]. 
114. Zimmerman, A., 2013. Contending with Chinese counterfeits: Culture, 
growth, and management responses. Business Horizons, 56(2), pp.141–148. 
Available at: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S0007681312001565 
[Accessed October 17, 2014]. 
 
  
 322 
Appendix 4 – Topic Guide 
 
 
Project Title: Framing the challenge of falsified and substandard medicines: the case of 
poor-quality antimalarial drugs in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. 
Topic Guide 
 
General Questions 
- How do you understand the problem of fake drugs? 
- What do you think is the main reason why we can find fake antimalarial drugs in this 
country? 
- Do you think it is an important issue to tackle today? 
- Do you think that it is particularly urgent in the GMS and why? 
 
Country Specific Questions 
- What are the main initiatives in this country to tackle the problem of fake drugs 
- What is your opinion on the work of this country to tackle fake medicines?  
- What is the role of the National Regulatory Authority? 
- What is the role of the police? 
- What is the role of customs organizations 
- Do these organizations work together? 
- Are there any recent prosecutions or seizures you can think of? 
 
Questions on access to medicines and consumer behavior  
- How does access to medicines work in this country - and do you think any of these 
elements impact the trade in fake drugs? 
- How do patients obtain antimalarial drugs in this country? 
 
Questions on regional initiatives 
- Is there any regional initiative you can think of that is relevant to curbing the trade in 
fake drugs 
- What is the role of ASEAN in all of this? 
- Do you think free trade with neighboring countries has an impact on the trade in fake 
drugs? 
- What will it be in 2015, after the ASEAN Economic Community is set up? 
 
Closing question 
- In your opinion what would be the best way forward to tackle the problem of fake 
antimalarial drugs in this region? 
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Appendix 6 – Information sheet and consent form  
Participant Information sheet 
 
 
 
Project Title: Framing the challenge of falsified and substandard medicines: the case of 
poor-quality antimalarial drugs in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. 
My name is Marie Lamy, I am a graduate student at the London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine, doing research in the Department of Global Health and Development. I am 
conducting a study about fake antimalarial medicines in the Greater Mekong Subregion, 
including (insert relevant country here). The aim of this study is to better understand why fake 
antimalarial drugs are present in this region. Hopefully, the outcome of this research project 
can inform the development of new policies and legal mechanisms to guarantee the safety of 
malaria patients. I hope this project can also help other researchers understand more about the 
fake medicine market in other regional settings.  
I will be interviewing stakeholders in the Greater Mekong Region during two fieldwork 
sessions; one this month (March 2015) and another in September 2015. I will be speaking with 
a variety of people ranging from policy makers, policy and customs officials, and researchers, 
to members of international organizations.   
I am conducting this study independently, and no other organisation is directly involved in this 
research. All data collected during my fieldwork will remain anonymous and confidential.  If 
you agree to proceed with this interview, I will ask if it is possible to record our conversation 
today. If you are not comfortable with this, please let me know and I will not turn on the 
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recorder. The information I gather from the interviews is stored securely and remains fully 
confidential.  
If you agree to proceed, this interview will take approximately one hour. You can decline to 
answer a question at any point during the interview. You are also free to stop the interview at 
any time. If you wish to withdraw your participation from this study you can do so at any time, 
even after this interview. Finally, if you want to continue to discuss any of the issues that come 
up during our conversation, you are free to contact me by email or by telephone. My contact 
details are available below. 
Thank you for your time,  
Marie Lamy 
Email address: Marie.Lamy@lshtm.ac.uk 
UK number: +44 (0)7909 671 754 
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Informed consent form 
 
Project Title: Framing the challenge of falsified and substandard medicines: the case of 
poor-quality antimalarial drugs in Cambodia, Laos and Thailand. 
Informed Consent Form 
Study Title: Understanding and Explaining the high prevalence of falsified antimalarial drugs 
in the Greater Mekong Subregion, Southeast Asia 
Researcher: Marie Lamy (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine) 
Name of Respondent:  
Respondent ID:  
 Please 
initial box 
1. I have read and understood the attached information sheet giving 
details of the project. I have had the opportunity to consider the 
information, ask questions and have had these answered fully. 
 
2. Marie Lamy has explained to me the nature and purpose of this 
interview. 
 
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
4. I understand that the collected data as audio records and transcripts 
will be stored in secure storage. 
 
5. I understand that data gathered in this project may form the basis of a 
report or other form of publication or presentation, and that my 
personal information will be protected by strict adherence to 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
 
6. I agree to take part in the above study  
 
If you agree to take part, please tick (only) one box as appropriate: 
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[  ] I agree to take part in this interview, and for quotes and other material arising from my 
participation to be used and attributed by name.  
(Note, individual statements can still be requested to remain anonymous during the interview) 
[  ] I agree that material from my interview may be quoted, but I would like my name to be 
anonymised. 
[  ] I agree that material from my interview may be quoted, but I would like my name to be 
anonymised as well as any other information that might be used to identify me, including the 
organisation that employs me and my position within it. 
[ ] I do not agree that any material from my interview may be quoted, but the researchers may 
use information from my interview to inform their analysis. 
 
Attachment: Information Sheet 
Respondent Name: 
Signature: 
Date: 
 
Researcher Name: 
Signature: 
Date: 
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Appendix 7 – Coding framework 
Economic determinants 
• Demand and supply  
• Globalization and trade liberalisation  
• Development status (Low and middle-income countries)  
• Profit making business 
Socio-cultural determinants 
• Attitudes towards counterfeit products 
• Consumer behaviour / health-seeking behaviour 
Legal challenges 
• Complex organised crime 
• Lack of targeted laws 
• No global definition 
• Rule of law and enforcement 
Regulatory challenges 
• Lack of cooperation among stakeholders 
• Capacity and capability of NRAs 
Socio-economic drivers  
• Globalization and trade 
• Demand and supply 
• Consumer perception and awareness of risk 
Political drivers 
• Power dynamics 
• Lack of political will and corruption 
• Donor priorities 
Health systems issues 
• Health service delivery and infrastructure 
• Health-seeking behaviour  
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• Supply chain of pharmaceuticals 
Note that some of these sub themes were included as free nodes in Nvivo, or themes that 
emerged progressively from the data. 
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Appendix 8 – List of respondents 
Locally based policy actors 
Respondent Code Category Organization Type Recorded Date Location Consent 
STK01NG_INGO20150330 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Oragnisation 
No 30/03/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK02NG_INGO20150331 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Oragnisation 
Yes 31/03/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK03NG_Consult20150331 Non-government Consultant Yes 31/03/2015 Phnom Penh 2 
STK04NG_INGO20150321 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Oragnisation 
Yes 31/03/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK05NG_IGO20150401 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes 01/04/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
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STK06NG_Donor20150401 Non-government Donor Organisation Yes 01/04/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK07G_NRA20150401 Government National Regulatory Agency No 01/04/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK08NG_LNGO20150402 Non-government 
Local Non-governmental 
Organisation 
Yes 02/04/2015 Phnom Penh 1 
STK09NG_LNGO20150402 Non-government 
Local Non-governmental 
Organisation 
Yes 02/04/2015 Phnom Penh 3 
STK10G_NMCP20150402 Government 
National Malaria Control 
Program 
No 02/04/2015 Phnom Penh 4 
STK11NG_IGO20150403 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes 03/04/2015 Phnom Penh 3 
STK12NG_Donor20150403 Non-government Donor Organisation No 03/04/2015 Phnom Penh 3 
STK13NG_Donor20150403 Non-government Donor Organisation No 03/04/2015 Phnom Penh 4 
 335 
STK14NG_IGO20150404 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
No 04/04/2015 Phnom Penh 2 
STK15NG_INGO20150404 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
Yes 04/04/2015 Phnom Penh 3 
STK16NG_INGO20150404 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
NA NA Phnom Penh NA 
STK17NG_INGO20150406 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
No 06/04/2015 Phnom Penh 3 
STK18NG_Donor20150406 Non-government Donor Country No 06/04/2015 Phnom Penh 4 
STK20G_NRA20150407 Government National Regulatory Agency No 07/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK21G_NRA20150408 Government National Regulatory Agency Yes 08/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
STK23G_NRA20150508 Government National Regulatory Agency Yes 08/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
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STK24G_NRA20150508 Government National Regulatory Agency No 08/04/2015 Vientiane 2 
STK25G_NRA20150508 Government National Regulatory Agency Yes 08/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
STK26NG_INGO20150409 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
Yes 09/04/2015 Vientiane 2 
STK27G_LEA20150409 Government Law Enforcement Agency No 09/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK28NG_Pharma20150409 Non-government 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer 
No 09/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK29G_NRA20150410 Government National Regulatory Agency No 10/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
STK30G_MoH20150410 Government Ministry of Health Yes 10/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
STK31NG_IGO20150410 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes 10/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
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STK32NG_IGO20150410 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes 10/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK34NG_Academia20150410 Non-government Academia No 10/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK35NG_Donor20150410 Non-government Donor Organisation No 10/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK36NG_Academia20150413 Non-government Academia Yes 13/04/2015 Vientiane 1 
STK37G_NCMP20150413 Government 
National Malaria Control 
Program 
Yes 13/04/2015 Vientiane 4 
STK38NG_Academia20150413 Non-government Academia No 13/04/2015 Vientiane   
STK39NG_Academia20150417 Non-government Academia No 17/04/2015 Singapore   
STK40G_NMCP20150603 Government 
National Malaria Control 
Program 
Yes 03/06/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK41NG_Academia20150605 Non-government Academia Yes 05/06/2015 Bangkok 1 
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STK42NG_Academia20150605 Non-government Academia Yes 05/06/2015 Bangkok 2 
STK43G_LEA20150605 Government Law Enforcement Agency Yes 05/06/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK44G_MoH20150609 Government Ministry of Health Yes 09/06/2015 Bangkok 2 
STK45G_LEA20150609 Government Law Enforcement Agency No 09/06/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK46NG_IGO20150610 Non-government 
Inter-governmental 
Oragnisation 
No 10/06/2015 Bangkok 2 
STK47NG_20150915 Non-government 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers Association 
Yes 15/09/2015 Bangkok 3 
STK48NG_LNGO20150907 Non-government 
Local Non-governmental 
Organisation 
Yes 07/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK49G_NRA20150911 Government National Regulatory Agency Yes 11/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK50G_NRA20150911 Government National Regulatory Agency Yes 11/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
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STK51NG_Academia20150916 Non-government Academia Yes 16/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK52NG_Pharma20150910 Non-government 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer 
Yes 10/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK53NG_Pharma20150910 Non-government 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer 
Yes 10/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
STK54NG_INGO20150910 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
Yes 10/09/2015 Bangkok 3 
STK55NG_INGO20150910 Non-government 
International Non-
governmental Organisation 
Yes 10/09/2015 Bangkok 3 
STK56G_20150914 Government Law Enforcement Agency No 14/09/2015 Bangkok 1 
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Expert Respondents 
Code Category Recorded Interview Type Date Location Consent 
EXP01_Other20151027 Other No Email 01/27/2015 London 2 
EXP02_Academia20150203 Academia No In Person 03/02/2015 London 2 
EXP03_IGO20150411 Inter-Governmental Organisation Yes Skype  11/04/2015 France 2 
EXP04_INGO20150224 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes Skype 24/02/2015 Washington D.C. 2 
EXP05_Academia20150318 Academia Yes In Person 18/03/2015 France 2 
EXP07_Academia20150616 Academia No Skype 16/06/2016 Paris 2 
EXP08_INGO20150224 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes Skype 24/02/2015 Washington D.C. 2 
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EXP09_Donor20150224 Donor Organisation Yes Skype 24/02/2015 Washington D.C. 2 
EXP10_Academia20150303 Academia Yes Skype 03/03/2015 Australia 2 
EXP11_Academia20150410 Academia No Skype 10/04/2015 Unknown 1 
EXP12_INGO20150317 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes Skype 17/03/2015 Netherlands 2 
EXP13_Academia20150416 Academia Yes Skype  16/04/2015 Japan 2 
EXP14_IGO20150331 Inter-Governmental Organisation Yes Skype  31/03/2015 Beijing 2 
EXP15_INGO20150624 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes Skype 24/06/2015 Washington D.C. 2 
EXP17_INGO20150716 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes in Person 16/07/2015 Washington D.C. 2 
EXP18_Academia20150407 Academia No in Person 07/04/2015 London 2 
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EXP21_Pharma20150624 Pharmaceutical Industry Yes Skype 24/06/2015 Paris 2 
EXP22_Pharma20150629 Pharmaceutical Industry Yes Skype 29/06/2015 Basel 2 
EXP24_Pharma20150720 Pharmaceutical Industry No in Person 20/07/2015 London 2 
EXP25_INGO20150930 
International Non-governmental 
Oragnisation 
Yes Skype 30/09/2015 Geneva 2 
EXP26_Donor20150806 Donor Organisation No Skype 06/08/2015 Seattle 2 
EXP28_Pharma20151021 Pharmaceutical Industry Yes Skype 21/10/2015 Geneva 3 
EXP29_Pharma20160623 Pharmaceutical Industry No in Person 23/06/2016 London 2 
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Appendix 9 – Cambodia pharmaceutical regulatory system 
Procurement of medicines 
For the procurement of medicines, Operational District Medical Stores (ODMS) assess the 
need for medicines through a process of quantification and relay the information to the 
Essential Drugs Bureau of the DDF at the central level where all the information is 
consolidated and forwarded to the Central Medical Store (CMS). CMS also manages the 
storage and distribution of medicines. The procurement of essential medicines follows the 
treatment guidelines set by the national therapeutic committee and its expert sub-committees 
for specific diseases (including malaria). The supply chain of antimalarial medicines operates 
in parallel to the regular supply chain.  Medicines are also distributed in public health facilities 
(such as health centers, hospitals or health posts), through community health workers including 
VMWs, and in private for-profit health facilities (including hospitals, cabinets and clinics). 
Pre-marketing authorization and licensing 
Registration of pharmaceuticals 
Registration of pharmaceutical products falls under the 2007 Amendment and is dealt with by 
the Registration and Cosmetics Bureau of the DDF.  Registration procedures should take up 
to three months for innovator products and six months for generic drugs. A fast-track 
registration scheme is available in since 2009. It is unclear however where ACTs subsidized 
by the Global Fund are eligible for fast-track registration.  
Licensing of manufacturers 
The guidelines for the licensing of manufacturers are outlined in the Amendment 2007. As 
most pharmaceutical products in Cambodia are imported from abroad, the Prakas on 
Procedures and Conditions of the Submission of the registration of Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers from Overseas (2013) is of particular relevance. According to this Prakas, 
manufacturing permits are valid for five years. Article 8 states that this permit is revoked in 
the event that the manufacturer is “accused on drug quality” by a local or international 
regulatory authority. This clause however provides very little information on what constitutes 
a breach of ‘drug quality’.  
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Licensing of importers and wholesalers  
Most pharmaceuticals circulating in Cambodia are manufactured overseas, and for this reason, 
the licensing procedures for wholesalers and distributors (including importers and exporters) 
are also of crucial importance. Both the DDF’s Narcotic and Pharmaceutical Trade Bureau and 
the MoC regulate the wholesale and distribution of pharmaceutical products. The 1996 Law 
and its 2007 Amendment stipulate that the distribution and wholesale of pharmaceuticals 
should be under the responsibility of a technical pharmacist of Khmer nationality and member 
to the Cambodian Pharmacist Council. Approval to import medicines are usually granted for 
6 months and must be renewed thereafter. Whether these guidelines are implemented 
systematically in practice however is unknown.  
Licensing of Pharmacies and drug outlets 
The licensing of pharmacies and drug outlets is regulated by the 2007 Amendment and the 
(2009) Prakas on the Formalities and Conditions for Opening /Closing /Relocation of a 
Pharmaceutical Selling Establishment. There are three types of public sector pharmaceutical 
outlets in Cambodia including Pharmacies, Depot A an Depot B outlets. Each have different 
licensing requirements. For example, Pharmacies must be owned by a pharmacist while a 
Depot B can be set up by a retired midwife or nurse. Depot A and B outlets can be smaller in 
size than Pharmacy outlets. Owners of all three however must hold a membership from the 
Cambodian Pharmacist Council.  
Post-marketing surveillance and quality control 
Pharmacovigilance and product recall  
The Amendment (2007) grants the MoH a mandate to recall batches in case of reported adverse 
drug reactions. Cambodia also has a dedicated Pharmacovigilance Centre since 2008 with a 
Medicines Safety Advisory Committee that meets regularly. Cambodia is also a member of 
WHO International Drug Monitoring Programme. The 2010 Medicines Policy calls for a 
strengthening of the pharmacovigilance activities in Cambodia and encourages health workers 
to report adverse drug reactions. There is no known mechanisms for patients or consumers to 
report adverse reactions, treatment failures themselves.  
Regulatory inspections and enforcement 
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Quality monitoring inspections fall under the authority of the Drug Regulation Bureau. 
Inspections for quality control are conducted by ‘Control Agents’ whose activities are 
regulated by the 2007 Amendment and most significantly, the Prakas (2011) on Roles and 
Responsibilities of Control Agents. Control agents have a wide scope of responsibilities 
ranging from enforcement of manufacturing regulation, import and export rules as well as the 
opening / closing of pharmacies. The role of control agents is decentralized and central level 
inspectors monitor the implementation of activities every trimester at the municipal and 
provincial levels. Control agents use pre-defined check-lists to conduct their inspection 
activities and there are clear reporting guidelines. Whether this occurs in practice however is 
unknown. The main functions of the medicines quality control laboratory of Cambodia (the 
National Health Product Quality Control Centre (NHQC)) include; testing pharmaceuticals, 
participating in registration activities, inspecting industry quality control laboratories and 
collaborating with inspectorate to test collected samples.  
Beyond health law 
The Law on The management of Quality and Safety of Products and Services (2000) also 
offers opportunities for sanctions against drug falsification and provides a larger scope to 
regulate against such “fraudulent” activity. Article 3 states that product information on 
ingredients, composition and usage needs to be available in Khmer on the packaging. This 
provides an opportunity to regulate against medicines deemed falsified and coming from 
abroad that do not possess the right labelling requirements. It also legislates against the 
production or storage of poor-quality products (articles 17 and 19) and addresses the sell/resale 
of machinery that could be used in drug falsification activates (article 20). The law concerns 
products that can cause “grave or imminent danger” to consumers (article 22) however, the 
penalties incurred here are lower for falsification from 5 -10 million riels in fine and up to one 
year in prison (Article 63). This law provides greater scope for regulating against 
pharmaceutical crime but evidence of its implementation for pharmaceutical products is scarce 
and the extent to which the penalties above have been applied in the past is unknown as 
respondents suggest, there is not written evidence of convictions to date.   
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Appendix 10 – Stakeholder map Cambodia 
 
Stakeholder Acronym Type Mandate Description Alliances 
Department of 
Food and Drug 
DDF Government 
Regulation of the 
supply chain of 
pharmaceutical 
products and devices 
Operates under the MoH and acts as national 
medicines regulatory authority. Responsible 
for management of supply chain of essential 
medicines 
IMC; MoH; CNM; 
WMWs; UNOPS; 
GF (Funding for 
AML sampling and 
quality control) 
Inter-Ministerial 
Committee to 
Fight against 
Counterfeit & 
Substandard 
Medicines (IMC) 
IMC Government 
Committee gathering 
cross-ministerial 
support for efforts 
against poor-quality 
medicines 
Key mechanism against poor-quality 
medicines. Operates in decentralized manner 
with central, municipal and provicincial 
commissions with representatives from all 
ten ministries: the Ministry of Health,  of 
Agriculture, of Commerce, of Defence, of 
Economy and Finance, of Education, of 
Forestry and Fisheries, of Information, of 
Interior,  of Justice and the Ministry of Youth 
and Sport. 
MoH; MoF; MoI; 
MoA; MoE; MoD; 
DDF 
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Ministry of Health MoH Government 
Health service 
delivery in Cambodia 
Ministry in charge of pharmaceuticals. 
IMC; DDF; CNM; 
VMWs; WHO 
National Centre 
for Entomology, 
Parasitology and 
Malaria Control 
CNM Government 
Management of 
Malaria Control 
Program in Cambodia 
Operates semi-indepdendently to MoH. 
Reports to Director of General health 
Services. Principal Reciptient of Global Fund 
grants for procurement of antimalarials until 
2013. 
UNOPS; CAP-M 
Village Malaria 
Workers 
VMWs Government 
Provides key human 
resources to improve 
acces to quality 
government AML 
treatments in rural 
areas of Cambodia. 
Conduct Rapid 
Diagnostic Tests 
(RDTs) and refer 
severe cases to 
hospitals. Keep 
records. 
Introduced in 2011 by CNM and WHO 
Cambodia first piloted in Northeast and 
expanded gradually until 2008. Extension of 
public health service delivery arm of MoH. 
MoH; CNM, CAP-
M; GF (Funding) 
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World Health 
Organization 
Cambodia Office 
WHO 
International 
Organisation 
Support health system 
improvement in 
Cambodia and 
improve quality of 
health services as a 
strategic priority 
including essential 
medicines and 
products. 
Respondents  confirmed the  role of the 
WHO in highlighting the need to secure the 
supply chain of AMLs and strengthen the 
medicine regulatory system. The WHO acts 
as oordination hub for health-related 
activities in Cambodia. The WHO plays an 
important role here as a steering committee 
to align donor priorities to the needs of the 
country and promote the sustainability of 
those collaborative approaches. WHO is 
Lead Donor Facilitator of the Technical 
Working Group on Health to facilitate the 
relationship between the public and private 
sector and to facilitate governance and 
decentralization efforts (WHO, 2011). 
MoH; BMGF; 
USAID (Funding); 
DFAT (Funding); 
GF (Funding) 
Population 
Services 
International 
PSI/PSK 
Implementing 
Partner 
Improve access to 
health services 
International non-profit organization. Works 
with CNM and DDF to implement the Public 
Private Mix Strategy. Provides subsidized 
malaria commodities (Malarine and 
Malacheck) through private sector program 
since 2003. Runs quality assurance program 
verifying quality of antimalarials and 
prescription habits in private outlets 
BMGF; ACTw; 
MC; CNM; DDF 
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United Nations 
Office for Project 
Services 
UNOPS 
Implementing 
Partner 
Efficient procurement 
and distribution of 
antimalarial 
treatments in 
Cambodia 
Current Principal Recipient (PR) for Global 
Fund grant 
GF (UNOPS is 
Principal 
Recipient); CNM; 
DDF 
United States 
Pharmacopeia 
USP 
Implementing 
Partner 
Improve standards for 
the quality of 
medicines by 
monitoring quality  in 
12 sentinnel sites with 
the use of the minilab, 
providing technical 
support for national 
laboratory and raising 
awareness about the 
quality of medicines. 
Non-profit organization working with DDF 
since 2003 and funded predominantly 
throguh USAID's President Malaria Intiative. 
Runs the USP Promoting the Quality of 
Medicines Program in collaboration with 
DDF 
USAID; DDF;  
MoH; CNM 
Interpol INT 
International 
Organisation 
Track and arrest 
criminal networks of 
poor-quality 
medicines in 
Southeast Asia 
Since 2005 conducts yearly short-term 
operations with customs and police 
representatives in Southeast Asia including 
Cambodia to to disrupt transnational 
pharmaceutical crime networks by 
uncovering routes and  handing those 
responsible to justice. Raise awareness 
through media about problem of poor-quality 
medicines. 
MoI; MoH; POL; 
CUST;  
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ACT watch ACTw 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Research for malaria 
control, prevention 
and treatment 
Multi-country project addressing gaps in 
evidence related to antimalarial medicines 
and case management. Also conducted 
surveys on private sector outlets and oAMT 
availability in Cambodia to inform policy 
PSI/PSK 
CAP-Malaria CAP-M 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Working for the 
prevention and control 
of Malaria in the 
Mekong Region 
Oversees VMWs and works in collaboration 
with URC-C to reduce morbidity and 
mortality from malaria in the region of the 
Mekong. Also operates in Mynamar and 
Thailand. 
USAID; URC-C; 
VMWs; DDF 
Malaria 
Consortium 
MC 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Working for the 
prevention and control 
of Malaria in the 
Mekong Region 
International non-profit organization in 
Cambodia since 2009 providing tehcnical 
support to government for malaria control 
efforts. Conducts operational research in 
rural areas. Not working on circulation of 
antimalarial treatments per se but indirectly 
supports access to good quality treatments 
PSI; CNM; DDF 
Medicam MEDICAM 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Upholding network of 
NGOs working on 
access to health in 
Cambodia 
Non-governmental association for local 
organizations working in health - helps 
coordinate health projects across the sector 
All NGOs 
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Univeristy 
Research Co 
Cambodia 
URC-C 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Improve equitable 
access to health care 
in Cambodia. 
Improving health infomration management 
system and logistics information 
management systems. 
USAID; CAM-M; 
VMWs; DDF 
Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation 
BMGF 
Donor 
organisation 
Supporting efforts for 
the prevention and 
control of Malaria 
Funding for PSI activities to support access 
to affordable quality antimalarial treatments 
in the private sector. 
PSI; WHO 
Fonds de 
Solidarité 
Prioritaire 
Mekong (France) 
FSP 
Donor 
organisation 
Financial support and 
diplomatic action to 
harness capacity 
against trafficking of 
poor-quality 
medicines 
Project ended in 2015, mainly cooperating 
with Ministry of Defense to gather political 
support against the trade in poor-quality 
medicines in the Mekong region, including 
Cambodia. 
MoI; MoD 
Japanese 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturers 
Association 
JPMA 
Donor 
organisation 
Support efforts to 
improve 
pharmaceutical 
regulation 
Little information available. MoH; DDF 
The Global Fund 
to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 
GF 
Donor 
organisation 
Supporting efforts for 
the prevention and 
control of Malaria 
since 2003 
Round 9 of funding for the support of malaria 
control efforts 2010-2015. Country 
Coordinating Mechanism as a multi-
stakeholder partnership with public and 
private representatives working on malaria, 
HIV AIDS and Tuberculosis. 
UNOPS; VMWs; 
CNM 
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United States 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
USAID 
Donor 
organisation 
Working for the 
prevention and control 
of Malaria in the 
Mekong Region 
through the President's 
Malaria Initiative 
Supports most implementing partner 
organisations in the fight against malaria, 
support capacity building efforts in 
particular. Works through USP, Cap Malaria 
in Cambodia. 
USP; CAP-M; 
URC-C; WHO 
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Appendix 11 – Document analysis Cambodia 
Title Type Sector Body Date Objective Scope Observation 
Guidelines for the 
Regulatory Agency 
Department of 
Drugs and Food 
Cambodia 
Official 
Guidelines 
Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2009 
General guidelines 
on main activities 
of the DDF 
Broad 
General guidelines, relevant to 
understand functions of the DDF 
Ministry of Health 
Procurement 
Guidelines for 
GFATM (version 8) 
Official 
Guidelines 
Government 
Ministry of 
Health  
2006 
Management of 
procurement 
activities 
Broad 
General guidelines, relevant to 
understand procurement process 
Royal Kram on 
Management of 
Pharmaceuticals 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly of 
Cambodia 
1996 
Management of 
Pharmaceutical 
Sector 
Targeted 
First general law to deliniate the 
role of pharamcists and penalties 
incurred if rules are not 
respected. 
Decision on 
Establishment of 
Committee for 
Eliminating 
Counterfeit 
Medicines, and 
Decision Government 
Royal 
Government 
of Cambodia 
2005 
Inter-sectoral 
cooperation against 
counterfeit 
medicines 
Targeted: dealing 
with counterfeit 
medicines 
specifically 
Encourages cooperation across 
ministries. Cooepration 
decentralized in two separate 
commissions.  Linked to the 
reduction of poverty.  
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Illegal Health 
Services for Poverty 
Reduction 
Pharmaceutical 
Products Recall 
Guideline 
Official 
Guidelines 
Government 
Department 
of Drugs and 
Food, MoH 
Cambodia 
 Pharmacovigilance 
and product recall 
Targeted: 
Pharmacovigilance 
and regulation 
against harmful 
and dangerous 
medicines 
Recall procedure does not refer 
to terminology of falsified 
medicines but discusses 
pharmaceutical products that are 
dangerous to health and 
discusses what to do in case 
those are found. 
Good Pharmacy 
Practices Guide 
Official 
Guidelines 
Government 
Department 
of Drugs and 
Food, MoH 
Cambodia 
2006 
Guidelines for 
pharamacists 
Targeted 
Provides instructions on quality 
of pharmaceutical products on 
sale from labelling instructions to 
adequate warehousing and 
storage facilities. Alludes to how 
to deal with poor-quality 
products without providing 
specific definition. “spurious” or 
“expired” medicines – to be kept 
separately for destruction. It does 
not however define what 
constitutes a “spurious” 
medicine.  
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Law on the 
amendment of Law 
on Management of 
Pharmaceuticals 
Amendment 
to Law 
Government 
National 
Assembly of 
Cambodia 
2007 
Management of 
Pharmaceutical 
Sector 
Targeted 
Revision of 1996 Law. Revision 
of penalties incurred for sale and 
import of poor-quality medicines 
at Articles 10-13 
Health Strategy Plan 
2008-2015 
Plan Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2008 
Strategy for 
improving health 
sector delivery 
(broad spectrum) 
Broad spectrum, 
strategy fo 
improving health 
sector delivery 
Strengthening health system at 
large. 
The National 
Strategic Plan for 
Elimination of 
Malaria in the 
Kingdom of 
Cambodia 2011-2025 
Report Government 
Royal 
Government 
of Cambodia 
2011 
Strategy for 
Malaria control and 
elimination 
Broad spectrum, 
focus on malaria 
control and 
elimination. 
Information on distribution of 
antimalarial commodities. 
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Medicines Policy Policy Government 
Royal 
Government 
of Cambodia 
2010 
Strengthen 
pharmaceutical 
sector through 
development of 
appropriate 
legislation and 
regulation of 
medicines 
including quality 
control and 
registration 
procedures 
 
Reinforces the Kram 1996 and 
amendment 2007. More of a 
strategic plan with a focus on 
improving quality control.  
Law on The 
management of 
Quality and Safety 
of Products and 
Services 
Law Government 
Royal 
Government 
of Cambodia 
2000 
Quality control for 
all goods and 
services. 
Not pharma 
specific but on 
general 
management of 
quality of goods 
and services 
Opportunities for sanctions 
against drug falsification 
activities. Larger scope to 
regulate against such fradulent 
activity. This law also 
encourages inter-ministerial 
cooperation. This law is not 
specific to pharamceutical 
products. 
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Prakas On 
Procedures and 
Conditions of the 
Submission of the 
registration of 
Pharmaceutical 
Manufacturer from 
Oversea 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2013 
Registration of 
foreign 
manufactureres 
selective - 
upstream available 
- production and 
manufacturing of 
medicines 
Manufacturing permits are valid 
for five years. Article 8: permit is 
revoked in the event that "it is 
accused on drug quality from 
local and international competent 
authorities". This clause however 
provides very little information 
on what constitutes a breach of 
‘drug quality’.  
Sub-Decree on the 
Orgnization and 
Functioning of the 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
Law Government 
Royal 
Government 
of Cambodia 
1997 
Functions of the 
Ministry of 
Commerce 
targeted : Focuses 
only on activities 
under the Ministry 
of Commerce 
Interesting approach and 
departments for dealing with 
international porganizations an 
intellectual property. 
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Prakas on Roles and 
Responsibilities of 
Control Agent for 
Pharmaceutics, 
Foods, Medical 
equipment, and 
Comsmetics and 
Private Medical, 
Paramedical and 
Medical Aid Services 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Health  
2011 
Role of Control 
Agents in 
Cambodia. 
targeted and 
comprehensive - 
specifically 
against counterfeit 
medicines and 
enforcement of the 
Law on 
Management of 
pharmaceuticals. 
Although it also 
includes Food and 
Hygiene. 
Wide scope of responsibilities 
for control agents. 
Responsibilities includes Food 
and Hygiene, as well as 
Comestics. Decentralized 
approach to implementation and 
control activities. 
Prakas on the 
Formalities and 
Conditions for 
Opening / Closure or 
Relocation of a 
Pharamceutical 
Selling 
Establishment 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2009 
Registration and 
administrative 
requirements for 
pharmceutical 
selling 
establishments 
Targeted on 
pharmaceutical 
establishment and 
management of 
licensing and 
operations 
There are three types of public 
sector pharmaceutical outlets in 
Cambodia including Pharmacies, 
Depot A an Depot B outlets. 
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Appendix 12 – Laos pharmaceutical regulatory system 
Procurement of medicines 
Medicines for the public sector are funded through the national budget. A tendering committee 
within the MPSC is responsible for the budget for the procurement of medicines registered in 
the Lao National Essential Medicines List (NEML). The MPSC only does the procurement for 
the national budget, not for the Global Fund (GF) and mainly procures medicines from local 
generic manufacturers (50-60%). The rest of the medicines are imported from abroad. 
Provincial officers are in charge of quantifying the needs and requirements per therapeutic 
category, with the help of the village and district level offices of the MoH. The budget of the 
Food and Drug Department relies on fees for the evaluation and registration of medicinal 
products, fees for the licensing of establishments as well as surveillance activities on request 
of the manufacturers. Funding from donor organization supplements the government budget. 
Pre-marketing authorization and licensing 
Registration of pharmaceuticals 
The registration procedure for modern drugs is overseen by the Drug Registration Unit under 
the FDD’s Drug Control Division and by a Drug Registration Committee of experts. Standard 
application forms are available through the FDD, first to submit a sample for verification and 
subsequently to apply for product registration. Both manufacturers and importers can submit 
applications. A decision is typically made within six months and is signed off by the Director 
of the FDD.  Fees are incurred at various stages of the registration process as highlighted by 
section 5 of the Regulation Governing Drug registration (2003). The FDD decides which 
medicines to approve based on the current National Essential Medicines List. The 8th version 
of this the Lao NEML is available on the FDD website and uploaded in June 2016. The FDD 
is mandated by the NMP (2003) to publish a Food and Drug Bulletin to inform of registration 
decisions. The list of currently registered medicines (1,449) is available on the FDD website. 
Drug registration certificates are valid for three years and can be renewed subject to 
reapplication. There is no fast-track registration process available in Lao PDR, even for AMLs.  
Licensing of manufacturers 
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The (2011) Amended Law on Drugs and the revised NMP (2003) currently regulate the 
licensing of manufacturers. Applications are reviewed and licenses granted by the licensing 
unit of the Drug Control Division of the FDD. There is a list of seven requirements that 
manufacturers must fulfil before being granted a license to manufacturer medicines (Law on 
Drugs 2011, article 14). For example, manufacturers are required to have at least five years of 
experience as pharmacists before applying for a license to manufacture. The applicant must 
have “appropriate premises, necessary facilities, standardized warehouse and transportation 
vehicles” as well as adequate safety and environment protection measures in place. Finally, a 
list of all licensed manufacturers, both domestic and international pharmacies for import 
purposes, is available in Lao on the FDD website.  
Licensing of wholesalers and distributors 
The conditions for the licensing of wholesalers and importers or distributors are the same, as 
listed in the Amended Law on Drugs (2011, article 14). Further requirements stipulated in the 
Law on Drugs state that wholesalers, distributors, and importers cannot be licensed if they hold 
a criminal record and must employ a pharmacist of Lao nationality. Pharmaceutical traders 
must also comply with legislations under the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, such as the 
Law on Enterprises and Labor Law, to conduct business in Laos. Prior to importing any 
pharmaceutical product, the importer must register the product with FDD. The MoH conducts 
sample tests upon the first import batch before issuance of an import certificate. Conditions on 
facilities meant for the import and export of medicines are detailed in the Provision 1442/MoH 
(2003, Article 4) and include guidelines on hygiene, restrictions on location, regulation on the 
use of special signage, and equipment requirements such as glass cabinets as well as an 
adequate warehousing system. For storage of imported medicines and medicines ready for 
distribution in Laos, four regional warehouses and one central warehouse in Vientiane were 
built with the support of the  Japan International Cooperation Agency (Tabernero et al. 2015).  
Licensing of pharmacies and drug outlets 
All licenses are issued by the licensing division of the Drug Control Division at the FDD. 
According to the most recent information on the FDD website dating back to 2013, a total of 
2,093 pharmacies are registered in Laos. The pharmacy license is valid for one year and needs 
to be renewed three months before expiration. The current legal framework prohibits 
pharmaceutical outlets from selling counterfeit, subs-standard, deteriorated or expires drugs, 
to participate in false advertising, or to assign any person not fully qualified to the dispensing 
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of medicines. Additionally, the Law on Health Care (2005, article 27) encourages the strict 
application of prescription requirements stating that “drugs shall be issued by pharmacists, 
nurses or midwives, who shall strictly comply with the prescriptions made by the physician or 
dentist and shall provide the patients with a detailed explanation of their use.”  
Post-marketing surveillance and quality control 
Pharmacovigilance and product recall 
The 2000 and 2011 Law on Drugs, as well as the 2003 NMP provide guidelines on 
pharmacovigilance activities and product recall. According to the 2003 NMP, products that 
have been proven unsafe or ineffective will be recalled. In accordance with the 2000 Law on 
Drugs, the MoH established a Toxicology Information Center mandated to disseminate 
information about drug toxicology, to issue recommendations in case of chemical toxicity, and 
to collect and disseminate information on Adverse Drug Reactions (ADR). Finally, according 
to the 2011 Amended Law on Drugs (Article 42) the MoH has the duty to handle propositions 
relating to drug quality standards. 
Regulatory inspections and enforcement 
According to the Amended Law on Drugs (2011) the organizations in charge of enforcing the 
above rules and regulations and conducting regulatory inspections include the FDD at the 
central level, as well as the Departments of Heath of Provinces, and District Health Offices. 
Since 2014 however, the BFDI conducts all inspections independently.  
Beyond health law 
Also of relevance is the revised Customs Law (2011) which does not specifically refer to poor-
quality or ‘fake’ medicines, but refers to “Prohibited Goods” and “Controlled Goods” (at 
article 31). This law also stipulates measures to protect IP rights on the initiation of the 
trademark owner (Article 32) and outlines measures to prevent smuggling of illegal goods 
across the Mekong River (Article 71). Such guidelines are also relevant in the fight against the 
illegal circulation of poor-quality medicines. The customs law also offers the possibility to 
penalize importers for the smuggling in of illegal goods, which is considered here as a ‘serious 
offense’ and is punishable by a fine valued at 30%-50% of the total value of goods in fine 
(article 91). While article 95 of this law does not state that the owner of these illegal goods 
holds criminal responsibility in civil law, chapter 3 outlines strict procedures for the 
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submission of a case to court. The extent to which these provisions are enforced however is 
unknown. 
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Appendix 13 – Stakeholder map Laos 
Stakeholder Acronym Type Mandate Description Alliances 
Ministry of 
Health 
MoH Government Health service delivery 
in Laos 
Principal Recipient of GF grant - through the 
Communicable Disease Control Department. Ministry 
in charge of regulating pharmaceuticals. 
GF; FDD; 
BFDI; 
CMPE; 
MPSC; 
LOMWRU 
Food and Drug 
Department 
FDD Government Regulation of the supply 
chain of pharmaceutical 
products and devices. 
Operates under the MoH and acts as national 
medicines regulatory authority. Responsible for 
management of supply chain of essential medicines 
from pre-marketing registration to post-marketing 
surveillance. 
MoH; USP; 
BFDI; 
LOMWRU 
Bureau of Food 
and Drug 
Inspection 
BFDI Government In charge of drug quality 
control activities 
through the inspection 
of pharmaceutical 
outlets. 
Operates under the MoH and as an independent quality 
control agency. Receives  funding from the GF and 
technical support from USP. Meets occasionally with 
police, customs and trade authority. In charge of 
inspection activities. 
GF; FDD; 
MoH; MoC; 
POL; CUST; 
LOMWRU 
Medical 
Products Supply 
Center 
MPSC Government Procurement of essential 
medicines in Laos. 
Operates under the MoH and is the main procurement 
agent for essential medicines in Laos. 
MoH; FDD 
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Centre for 
Malaria 
Parasitology and 
Entomology 
CMPE Government Management of Malaria 
Control Program in 
Laos. 
Operates semi-indepdendently to MoH. Reports to 
Director of General health Services. Trains VMWs for 
distribution of medicines and administering Rapid 
Diagnostic Testts, 
MoH; 
VMWs; GF; 
LOMWRU 
Village Malaria 
Workers 
VMWs Government Provide human 
resources to improve 
acces to quality AMLs 
in rural areas of 
Cambodia.  
Extension of public health service delivery arm of 
MoH. Conduct Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) and 
refer severe cases to hospitals. Keeps records. 
MoH; CMPE 
Customs CUST Government Law enforcement of 
trade and import and 
export laws on all 
products including 
pharamceuticals. 
Involved in anti-smuggling activities. Participates in 
INTERPOL Operations STORM.  
BFDI; POL; 
INT;  
Police POL Government Law enforcement for 
pharmaceutical and 
trade laws 
Participates in adhoc meetings with BFDI on quality 
control of pharmaceuticals and enforcement of 
licensing and registration requirements. Participates in 
INTERPOL Operations STORM. 
BFDI; 
CUST; INT 
United States 
Pharmacopeia 
USP Implementing 
Partner 
Improve standards for 
the quality of medicines 
by monitoring quality  
in all provinces with the 
use of the minilab, 
Non-profit organization working with FDD since 2003 
and funded predominantly throguh USAID's President 
Malaria Intiative. Runs the USP Promoting the Quality 
of Medicines Program in collaboration with DDF. 
FDD; MoH; 
BFDI; 
LOMWRU 
 365 
providing technical 
support for sampling 
and testint activites. 
Main implementing partner for technical capacity 
support. 
World Health 
Organization 
Lao PDR Office 
WHO International 
Organisation 
Support health system 
improvement in Laos. 
Supports the establishment of Standard Operating 
Procedures for pharmaceutical sector, and Good 
Manufacturing Practice. Also supports efforts to 
promote  the rational use of medicines in Laos. 
MoH 
ACT watch ACTw Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Research for malaria 
control, prevention and 
treatment. 
Multi-country project addressing gaps in evidence 
related to the supply of antimalarial medicines and 
case management in Southeast Asia. First survey 
conducted in 2015 in Laos. 
PSI; MoH 
Lao-Oxford-
Mahosot 
Hospital 
Wellcome Trust 
Research Unit 
LOMWRU Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Building evidence base 
for prevalence of poor-
quality including 
falsified and 
substandard medicines 
in Laos since 2000. 
Research on medicine quality epidemiology in Laos 
and in Southeast Asia. Participates in the Worldwide 
Antimalarial Resistance Network. 
FDD; BFDI; 
MoH; 
CMPE; USP 
Swedish 
International 
Development 
Cooperation 
Agency  
SIDA International 
Organisation 
Support regulatory 
framework for 
management of 
pharmaceuticals 
Supported MoH and FDD in the drafting of first 
National Medicines Policy in 1993 and establishing 
first drug quality control center. Phased out in 2008. 
MoH; FDD 
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The Global Fund 
to Fight Aids, 
Tuberculosis and 
Malaria 
GF Donor 
Organisation 
Prevention and control 
of Malaria. 
Main donor to  malaria programme in Laos. Budget (5 
million US$) to train inspectors at detecting poor-
quaity antimalarial medicines. 
MoH; CMPE 
United States 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
USAID Donor 
Organisation 
Prevention and control 
of Malaria in the 
Mekong Region through 
the President's Malaria 
Initiative. 
Supports USP PQM Activities in Laos, PSI and ACTw 
surveying activities. 
USP; PSI; 
ACTw;  
Asian 
Development 
Bank 
ADB Donor 
Organisation 
Improve health care in 
Southeast Asia to 
support economic and 
social development in 
the region. 
Supports national malaria programme in 12 provinces 
by expanding malaria surveillance systems. Working 
with MoH. 
MoH 
World Bank WB Donor 
Organisation 
Promote growth for 
economic and social 
development. Supports 
the development of the 
health sector. 
Promotes social development by supporting efforts to 
improve maternal and child health, and nutrion. Also 
supports health services implementation to increase 
utilization of public health service and improve the 
quality of the servics offered. 
MoH 
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Appendix 14 – Document analysis Laos 
Title Type Sector Body Date Objective Scope Observations 
National 
Medicine 
Policy  
Policy Government 
Food and Drug 
Department, 
MoH 
1993 
Policy aimed at 
strenghtening equitable 
access to quality, safe 
and efficacious 
medicines, and  
improving their 
rational use. 
Targeted 
Drafted with international partners including 
SIDA, and approved in 1993. reviewed in 
2003 (see below). New NMP is now the main 
reference policy. 
Revised 
National 
Medicine 
Policy  
Policy Government 
Food and Drug 
Department, 
MoH 
2003 
Policy aimed at 
strenghtening equitable 
access to quality, safe 
and efficacious 
medicines, and  
improving their 
rational use. 
Targeted 
(Section 8) on quality assurance of 
medicines. Pokicy calls for more data to 
guide policy making.Pharmacovigilance: 
Products that have been proven unsafe or 
ineffective will be recalled. (Article 1.4) 
encourages cross-sectoral cooperation, 
especially with law enforcement agencies; 
“FDD will cooperate closely with other law 
enforcement agencies in enforcing this 
legislation”.  
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Law on Drugs 
and Medical 
Products 
01/NA 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly 
2000 
Outlines general 
principles of drug 
management and 
ensure  registration, 
distribution, and supply 
of quality medicines. 
Targeted 
Outlines registration procedures through the 
FDD drug registration units under the Drug 
Control Division and with the help of a Drug 
Registration Committee of experts. Law 
revised in 2011 which is now the main 
reference law. 
Amended Law 
on Drugs and 
Medical 
Products 
07/NA 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly 
2011 
Outline general 
principles of drug 
management and 
ensure  registration, 
distribution, and supply 
of quality medicines. 
Targeted 
(Article 14) Sets conditions for licensing of 
businesses involved in the production, 
distirbution, wholesale, import/export of 
pharmaceutical prodcuts - list of 7 
requirements. (Article 39.3) Prohibitions on 
‘business operators’  to sell drugs that are 
‘counterfeit, substandard, deteriorated or 
expired’. (Article 47) Efforts to enforce rules 
and regulations are rewarded: “Individual, 
legal entities or organizations with 
outstanding achievements in implementing of 
this Law, such as: business operation of 
drugs and medical products with good 
quality; manufacturers, companies and model 
pharmacies shall receive rewards and other 
policies in accordance with the laws and 
regulations.” (Article 52) on 
pharmacovigilance states that the MoH has 
the duty to handle propositions relating to 
quality and standards of the drugs. in terms 
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of post-marketing surveillance this law states 
that the FDD is responsible for inspections. 
Since 2014 however the BFDI is the main 
inspections agency. This would need to be 
reviewed in subsequent laws.  
Law on Health 
Care 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly 
2005 
Outlines the rules that 
regulate health services 
and the health sector at 
large. 
Broad 
(Article 27) Enforces the prescription of 
drugs. (Article 62) Efforts to promote the 
implementation of this law are rewarded. 
This is intented to encourage effective 
implementation of the law throughout the 
health sector.  
Regulation 
1441/MOH 
Governing 
Drug 
Registration 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2003 
Outlining rules and 
regulations with 
regards to the 
registration of modern 
and traditional 
medicines in Laos. 
Targeted: 
Pre-
marketing 
authorizat
ion only 
Highlights procedure to apply for a 
marketing aurhotization for medicines. 
Document states that there should be an 
annual audit on the procurement of 
pharmaceuticals conducted by the Laos 
Ministry of Finance. Document plans 
incremental penaltis for individuals or 
businesses who sell 'counterfeit' or 
'unregistered' medicines include: First 
violation: warning and confiscation; Second 
violation: fine at 100% of total value and 
temporary closure of 1 year. Third violation: 
fine at 200% and permanent closure of 
facility.  
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Provision 
1442/MOH On 
the 
establishment 
of drug and 
medical 
equipment 
import-export 
companies 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Health 
2003 
Outlines rules and 
regulations pertaining 
to the import and 
export of 
pharmaceutical 
products in laos. 
Targeted 
Stipulates measures against importers who do 
not respect the current regulations. On the 
case of smuggling, importing or exporting 
bad quality, banned or counterfeit drugs. First 
violation: warning and a fine at 200% of the 
price of all goods. Secnd violation:  fine at 
400% and temporary closure for one year. 
Third violation: afine at 600%,  permanent 
closure and case sent to court.  
Revised 
Customs Law 
04/NA 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly 
2011 
Outlines principles, 
policies, rules and 
measures on export-
import, transit and 
movement of goods 
within  Lao PDR.  
Broad: 
Focus on 
customs 
control 
Focused on supporting the country's social 
and economic development by strengthening 
reuglating on the import/export of all 
products. Law includes guidelines on 
customs declarations, statements on origin or 
valuation of products etc. (Article 32) on the 
protection against IP infringement. (Article 
56) states that goods obtained through 
donations or grant aid are exempt from 
customs duties. (Article 31) Refers to 
'Controlled Goods' and 'Restricted Goods' the 
latter category does not include falsified 
medicines  'Controlled Goods' likely to 
encompass pharmaceuticals for which other 
state authorities (i.e. the FDD) are also 
involved in the regulating their circulation. 
(Article 71) on the prevention of smuggling 
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across the Mekong river, boats must be 
registered with customs authorities.  
Law on 
Making 
Legislation 
Law Government 
National 
Assembly 
2012 
Guidelines to ensure 
the transparent 
development and 
amendment of 
legislation across 
sectors in Laos. 
Broad 
Encourages transparent revision of current 
laws. Aims to support regional harmonisation 
of regulatory frameworks, wherever possible.   
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Appendix 15 – Thailand pharmaceutical regulatory system 
Procurement of medicines 
The 1967 Drug Act divides medicines in different categories: household drugs, dangerous 
drugs (prescription-only drugs such as hyper-tension drugs or antibiotics), specially-controlled 
drugs (costly medicines such as anti-cancer drugs or corticosteroid) and non-dangerous. The 
category determines how these medicines are distributed. In line with this categorization, 
pharmacies are divided into those allowed to sell prescription-only drugs where a pharmacist 
is present at all times, and those for over-the-counter drugs only (Holloway 2012). The price 
of medicines is determined in collaboration with the Ministry of Commerce (Teerawattananon 
et al. 2003).   The procurement of medicines is organized by province; hospitals join into this 
system to negotiate cheaper prices. 
The TFDA today operates with 96 members of staff centrally and up to 500 members of staff 
across its provincial divisions. While the main laws and regulations emanate from the central 
TFDA, the implementation of these laws is the responsibility of PPHOs. The TFDA regulates 
a sector of over 17,000 drug stores, wholesalers and distributors, approximately 150 
manufacturers and about 30,000 pharmaceutical products (Holloway 2012).   
The National Drug Committee, now known as the NDSDC was first set up in 1991 with 14 
members appointed by the Minister of Public Health every two years since then. This 
committee meets on a monthly basis to discuss registration approvals, withdrawals and 
suspension of licenses. This committee appoints six subcommittees overseeing more specific 
activities such as the review of applications for registration, the establishment of GMP 
requirements, or licensing approvals for manufacturers, importers, distributors or drug stores.  
Pre-marketing authorization and licensing 
Registration of Pharmaceuticals 
Applications for drug registration are submitted to the Drug Control Division of the TFDA. 
Processing of registration procedures is divided between the central office and the PPHOs. 
There are two different application processes; one for generic and another for New Original 
Drugs. First an application is made to submit a drug sample for quality testing. This can take 
up to two weeks. For generic drugs, the application is followed by an application to the TFDA 
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for a Certificate of Drug Quality & Standard Control Method. Samples are transferred to the 
Medical Sciences Department’s Drug Analysis Division before approval can be issued. For 
New Original drugs, application procedures follow the ACTR and ACTD format for innovator 
drugs. Standard review for a new drug takes between 210 and 280 days. There is a fast track 
process for both new and generic drugs lasting approximately 100-130 and 70 days 
respectively.  A number of essential medicines including antimalarial treatments are eligible 
for fast track marketing authorisation. A list of approved medicines is communicated regularly 
and updated every 3 to 6 months (Cite CoRE). 
Licensing of manufacturers 
Manufacturers within Bangkok submit an application for a license to manufacture medicines 
to the central TFDA’s Drug Control Division directly. For manufacturers based in any other 
province, application are submitted to the relevant PPHOs. A license to manufacture medicines 
is only granted to Thai citizens or Thai enterprises. Another condition is for at least 2 
pharmacists to be employed and at least one to be on duty during all business hours. Drug Act 
1967 (Section 38) details the role of the pharmacist in 6 parts. Before granting a license to 
manufacture, the TFDA inspects the premises to assess compliance with Thai Good 
Manufacturing Practices (GMP) Guidelines. Drug Act 1967 (section 25) encourages 
manufacturers to arrange for an analysis of the raw materials used in the production of the 
drugs, with evidence of such analyses kept for at least 5 years. Once issued, the manufacturing 
license is valid for one year. This license can be revoked if the manufacturer is found in breach 
of the Drug Act. 
Licensing of importers and wholesalers 
Applications for a license to import are submitted to the Drug Control Division of the TFDA 
for businesses operating in Bangkok and its adjacent territories. Licensing procedures beyond 
the Bangkok province are delegated to the PPHOs as above. The application requires clinical 
trial reports and a Marketing Authorization from the country of origin. If the application is 
successful, importers receive an Importer Authorization License after which, the company 
needs to send samples for registration of the product to the TFDA. A successful product 
registration thereby acts as a license to import. This license is valid for one year. A 
pharmaceutical company that is licensed to import or to manufacture drugs is also licensed to 
wholesale. Again, a pharmacist needs to be present at all times during business hours of the 
wholesale enterprise. Section 26 of the Drug Act 1967 also regulates the export of medicines. 
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Licensing of pharmacies and drug outlets 
Licenses to sell medicines are issued by the TFDA and are valid for 1 year. These are subject 
to renewal each year although the business can continue operating as long as the application 
for renewal has been submitted. With the exception of special-controlled drugs which require 
a prescription for sale, all other medicines are sold over-the-counter. Pharmacies that can sell 
special-controlled drugs however are obliged by law to have a pharmacist present on the 
premises during all business hours. One respondent adds that Good Pharmacy Practice 
guidelines are now in place and require all drug stores to have a pharmacist present on the 
premises at all times of business. Drug Act 1967 (Section 39) details the role of the pharmacist 
at points of sale in 6 parts. Finally, according to section 33 of the Drug Act 1987 amendment, 
all licensed outlets should have qualified staff present during business hours. 33bis calls of a 
replacement of staff in case of long absences. For all licensing procedures detailed in this 
section, section 18 of the Drug Act 1967 allows for the applicant to appeal to the licensing 
authorities within thirty days of receiving a notice, in case of a negative answer. 
Post-marketing surveillance and control 
Pharmacovigilance and product recall 
Aside from the 2-year safety-monitoring program, during which all medical professionals are 
encouraged to report ADRs or concerns regarding the quality and safety of a pharmaceutical 
under temporary registration to the TFDA, there is a dedicated center for pharmacovigilance 
activities in Thailand with its own separate budget; the National Centre for Pharmacovigilance 
(NHPCV) since 1983. The NHPCV is a member of the WHO International Drug Monitoring 
Program since 1984 (Nwokike et al. 2013). In case of serious safety concerns, the products are 
sent for re-evaluation leading to the possible withdrawal of its marketing authorization and to 
product recalls. During the application for marketing authorizations all pharmaceutical 
companies submit a ‘recall commitment’ document guaranteeing that they will abide by the 
recall procedures if triggered to do so by the TFDA. All serious ADRs must be reported within 
24 hours. Unexpected ADRs can be reported within 7 days and can take up to 60 days for non-
serous ADRs (Nwokike et al. 2013). By encouraging the registration of drug formulae by 
producers or importers, section 79 of the Drug Act 1967 lays the ground work for the 
development of a Thai Pharmacopeia. Regulatory inspections and enforcement.  
The TFDA is keen on consumer education and regularly shares information about adverse drug 
reactions or poor-quality medicines via its website. Section 76 of the 1967 Drug Act empowers 
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the Minister to issue a Government Gazette with information on pharmacopeia. The TFDA 
has previously issued information leaflets and conducted information campaigns on these 
priority topics.   
Regulatory inspections and enforcement 
TFDA inspectors conducting post-marketing surveillance activities are pharmacists by training 
or scientists with relevant technical expertise. They follow pre-determined standard operating 
procedures to conduct these inspections. These inspectors are mandated to conduct sample 
testing on the spot through portable test-kits or to select samples to be sent for laboratory 
analysis at the Medical Sciences Department. The NDSDC appoints a sub-committee to 
evaluate the quality of registered products. Inspectors within this sub-committee are mandated 
by the Drug Act 1967 to enter premises to inspect outlets, factories, wholesale enterprises, or 
storage facilities and evaluate their compliance with existing legislation. TFDA inspectors 
have the authority to sample products, seize goods if those are suspected of being of poor-
quality as well as to imitative product recalls. 
Penalties 
as stipulated in the Drug Act 1967, violations of the rules and regulations are penalized by a 
combination of monetary fines and imprisonment. Section 72 explains that it is forbidden to 
produce, sell or import. The production of fake drugs is liable to 3 years to life in prison, and 
to a fine of 10,000 – 50,000 baht (section 117). The production of substandard or unregistered 
medicines is liable to 2-5 years in prison and a fine of 4,000 to 20,000 baht (Section 118). 
Penalties for selling and importing a fake medicine is 1 to 20 years imprisonment and a fine 
of 2,000 to 10,000 baht (Section 119). The penalty for selling or importing a substandard or 
unregistered medicine is 6 months to 3 years and 1,000 to 5,000 baht (section 120). There are 
also penalties for selling or importing deteriorated drugs at up to a year in prison and up to 
3,000 baht (Section 121). 
Beyond Health Law 
There are malaria sections in 12 Offices of Disease Prevention and Control at the regional 
level, 39 Vector-Borne Disease Centers (VBDCs) at the provincial level, and 302 Vector-
Borne Disease Units (VBDUs) at the district level (BVBD 2011). At the sub-district level, the 
program delivers diagnostic and treatment services through 650 Malaria Clinics, as reported 
in 2009 (Thumm 2009). 
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Appendix 16 – Stakeholder map Thailand 
Stakeholder Acronym Type Mandate Description Alliances 
Ministry of 
Public Health 
MoPH Government 
Health service 
delivery in 
Thailand. 
Main health authority responsible for formulating and 
implementing health policy. Ministry in charge of 
regulation of pharmaceuticals. 
TFDA; DCD; 
DMS; VHVs; 
NHSO; MoIT; 
Mo 
Drug 
Committee 
DC Government 
Control of 
pharmaceutical 
products. 
Advising Minister of Public Health on regulatory and 
technical aspects of administration and control of 
pharmaceutical products. Provides guidance on national 
policies for regulation of pharmaceuticals. Appointed by 
the Cabinet every two years with new members, 
approximately forteen. Authorised to approve/withdraw 
pharmaceutical registrations and licenses. 
MoPH; TFDA 
Thaid Food 
and Drug 
Administration 
TFDA Government 
Protection of 
consumer health 
and ensuring the 
safety, quality and 
efficacy of health 
products. 
Acts as drug regulatory authority of Thailand. 
Established in 1974 and restructured in 2003. Now 
operates under the MoPH as a department. Responsible 
for management of supply chain of all medicines. 
MoPH; DCD; 
GPO; USP; 
CHULA; POL 
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Drug Control 
Division 
DCD Government 
Under the TFDA, 
this is the devision 
responsible for pre- 
and post-marketing 
activities related to 
medicines. 
In charge of the pre- and post-marketing control 
activities for medicines, as well as the general 
administration and development or revision of policies. 
Main focus is on infectious diseases. 
TFDA; DMS 
Department of 
Disease 
Control 
DDC Government 
Sets standards and 
guidelines to 
address main 
disease threats in 
Thailand; including 
Malaria. 
Hosts the Malaria Control Program under the BVBD. 
Develops laws and policies to combat key priority 
diseases and implements those through a network of 12 
regional offices of and provincial offices 
MoPH; BVBD 
Bureau of 
Vector Borne 
Diseases 
BVBD Government 
Under the DDDC, 
hosts malaria 
program. 
Repsonsible for all vector-borne diseases, including 
malaria. Operates the surveillance system, oubtreak 
control, and developmentof pilot programs. Working 
through Provincial Public Health Offics as well. 
Operates under the Department of Disease Control and 
works in collaboration with the BDN for quality control. 
MoPH; DDC; 
BDN; GF; USP 
Department of 
Medical 
Sciences 
DMS Government 
Oversees 
laboratory services 
for public health 
institutions. 
Improves standards for the quality of medicines by 
monitoring quality. Supports policy development for 
post-marketing surveillance in Thailand.  
MoPH; TFDA; 
BDN; BLQS 
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Bureau of 
Drugs and 
Narcotics 
BDN Government 
Medicine 
surveillance. 
Works in coperation with Thai FDA for enforcement of 
drug quality controls. Testing of medicines. Integral part 
of post-marketing sureillance activities of TFDA. Works 
with BVBD on tesitng the quality of AMLs. Also 
cooperation with USP. Confirmatory testing laboratory 
in the region with USP - tests samples from Cambodia, 
Laos, Vietnam for confirmatory tests. Total number of 
staff is 137, including 68 pharmacists, 14 scientists, and 
12 laboratory assistants. BDN samples approximately 
2,500 drugs annually. 
MoPH; TFDA; 
BVBD; USP; GF 
Bureau of 
Laboratory 
Quality 
Standards 
BLQS Government 
Testing quality of 
pharmaceutical 
samples. 
Works under the DMS and the BDN to provide technical 
expertise in testing the quality of sampled medicines. An 
essential player in post-marketing surveillance activities 
of the TFDA. 
DMS; BDN; 
TFDA; BVBD 
Government 
Pharmaceutical 
Organization 
GPO 
Government/ 
Industry 
Supply of locally 
produced quality 
generic medicines 
including 
antimalarial 
medicines and 
other essential 
drugs. 
State entreprise that produces and supplies medicines for 
the Thai government and directly to public hospitals. 
Also manages stocks of medicines. Main procurer of 
locally produced generic medicines in Thailand. 
MoPH; TFDA 
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Village Health 
Volunteers 
VHVs Government 
Provides key 
human resources to 
improve acces to 
health services and 
medicines at the 
village level in 
Thailand. 
Extension of public health service delivery arm of 
MoPH.  Participate in basic drug quality testing for 
essential medicines through visual (paper) tests. 
MoPH; BDN 
National 
Health Security 
Office 
NHSO Government 
Financing of 
medicines in 
Thailand. 
Responsible for the budget for drugs and vaccines under 
the Universal Health Coverage Scheme (formerly known 
as the 30 Baht scheme) which covers 74% of the 
population. 
MoPH; TFDA 
Royal Thai 
Customs 
CUST 
Law 
Enforcement 
Law enforcement 
of trade and 
import/export laws 
on medicinal 
products. 
Law enforcement to prevent smuggling of illegal goods 
through active border control, including 
pharamceuticals. Participates in INTERPOL Operations 
STORM. Cooperates with Thai FDA at the border with 
presence of health inspectors. 
TFDA; MoPH; 
UNODC; 
INTERPOL; 
POL; MoC; MoI 
Royal Thai 
Police 
POL 
Law 
Enforcement 
Law enforcement 
for pharmaceutical 
and trade laws. 
Responsible for law enforcement of licensing 
requirements in pharmacies. Main division is the 
Consumper Protection Division (CPD) and the 
Information Technology Division (ITD) dealing with 
internet pharmacies. Participates in INTERPOL 
Operations STORM. 
TFDA; MoPH; 
INTERPOl; 
CUST; MoC; MoI 
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United 
National 
Industrial 
Development 
Organization 
UNIDO 
Implementing 
Partner 
Support in 
establishment 
laboratory facilities 
for drug testing. 
Provided support to Chulalongkorn University while 
setting up a quality control laboratory and prto improve 
laboratory capacity in neighbouring countries such as 
Myanmar. 
CHULA; MoPH 
United Nations 
Office for 
Drugs and 
Crime 
UNODC 
Implementing 
Partner 
Capacity building 
to improve 
customs control 
against 'fraudulent' 
medicines. 
Works in collaboration with Royal Thai Customs and 
builds capacity (programme management, evlaluation) 
through the Conainer Control Program (CCP) since 
2004. CCP is operated with the World Customs 
Organization. Supports STORM operations.  
CUST; WCO; 
INTERPOL 
United States 
Pharmacopeia 
USP 
Implementing 
Partner 
Improve standards 
for the quality of 
medicines by 
monitoring quality. 
Supportpolicy 
development for 
post-marketing 
surveillance in 
Thailand.  
Non-profit organization working with TFDA and 
Chulalongkorn university. Funded predominantly by 
USAID's President Malaria Intiative. Runs the USP 
Promoting the Quality of Medicines Program. 
TFDA; CHULA; 
BDN; DMS 
Management 
Sciences for 
Health 
MSH 
International 
Organisation 
Research on supply 
chain of 
pharmaceuticals 
and quality control. 
Worked with Chulalongkorn on a survey evaluating the 
pharmceutical supply chain in Thailand as well as in 
other countries of Southeast Asia.  
CHULA; MoPH 
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Chulalongkorn 
University 
CHULA 
Non-
governmental 
organisation/ 
Academia 
Research for 
improving 
pharmaceutical 
regulation. 
Collaborates with USP since 2008 for medicine quality 
control in Thaialnd. Conducts training on anaysis of 
antimalarial medicines. Also trains neighboring 
countries and their laboratory staff in medicine quality 
testing, through trainer-the-trainor programmes. 
TFDA; MoPH; 
MSH; USP; 
UNIDO;  
Pharmaceutical 
systems 
research and 
development 
doundation 
PhaRed 
Non-
governmental 
organisation 
Working to 
improve access to 
medicines. 
Provides medicine information on online database for 
free in Thai. Supports basic access to 'household 
medicines' in schools. 
MoPH; TFDA 
PReMA PReMA Industry 
Association of 
pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in 
Thailand. 
Bangkok-based industry association representing the 
pharamceutical industry in negotiations towards policy-
making with the MoPH and the TFDA. Involved in the 
discusisons towards the draft new Drug Act (2006). 
Raises awareness among manufacturers of the dangers 
of poor-quality medicines. 
MoPH; TFDA 
World Health 
Organization 
WHO 
International 
Organisation 
Working with 
BVBD on 
resistance to 
artemisinin issues. 
Supports MoPH in coordination of Malaria Programm 
and in efforst against other diseases. Supports efforts 
against the rising resistance to artemisinin at the Thai-
Cambodian border. 
BVBD; DDC; 
MoPH 
The Global 
Fund to Fight 
Aids, 
GF 
Donor 
organisation 
Supporting efforts 
for the prevention 
and control of 
Fund efforts for malaria control, and not for malaria 
elimination since 2004 in Thailand (since Round 2). 
Provides funding for procurement of AMLs. 
BVBD; DDC; 
MoPH 
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Tuberculosis 
and Malaria 
Malaria since 
2003. 
United States 
Agency for 
International 
Development 
USAID 
Donor 
organisation 
Working for the 
prevention and 
control of Malaria 
in the Mekong 
Region through the 
President's Malaria 
Initiative. 
Finances the main activities of USP in Thailand. 
USP; TFDA; 
MoPH 
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Appendix 17 – Document analysis Thailand 
Title Type Sector Body Date Objective Scope Observation 
Drug Act  Law Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
1967 
Comprehensive 
law outlining 
general 
guidelines on 
main activities 
of the TFDA 
and MoPH. 
Broad 
27 pages of rules and regulations outlining functions of 
the TFDA. From registration procedures, licensing 
requirements, manufacturing requirements, the role of 
pharmacists in all licensed outlets, and penalties incurred 
if clauses of the Drug Act are not respected. Medicines are 
divided in four categories: household drugs, dangerous 
drugs, specially-controlled drugs and non-dangerous 
drugs. The Drug Act also outlines the role of TFDA 
inspectors and their mandate while conducting inspections 
on licensed outlets and products on sale. Section 79 lays 
the ground for the development of a Thai pharmacopeia 
by encouraging all domestic drug manufacturers to 
register their drug formulae. Chapter 8 of the Drug Act 
outlines rules and regulations pertaining to fake, 
substandard, deteriorated and unregistered medicines. 
 384 
Drug Act 
Amendment 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
1987 
Amendments to 
Drug Act 1967 
per seciton. 
Broad 
Latest revisions to general guidelines stipulated in Drug 
Act 1967. Section 27bis calls for the insepction of modern 
drugs (imported) at all ports of entry into Thailand. 
Section 33 states that all licensed outlets should have 
qualified pharmacists present during business hours. 
Section 38 proposes a differentiation between fake drugs 
that are “harmful” to consumers and those  that are not. 
This differentiation is dangerous and hard to implement in 
practice. 
National 
Health 
Security Act 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2002 
Improving 
access to health 
services for all. 
Broad 
Reshapes the health financing system of the MoPH to 
sustain Universal Health Coverage. 
New Drug 
Act (draft)  
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2003 
Revision of 
Drug Act 1967 
and 
Amendments. 
New guidelines 
on main 
activities of the 
TFDA and 
MoPH and 
pharmaceutical 
regulation in 
Thailand. 
Broad 
Still in promulgation stage and currently being debated at 
the National Assembly. Suggests revision to existing Drug 
Act. For example the New Drug Act is said to reinforce 
GMP compliance for issuing manufacturing licenses 
within Thailand. It also plans to tighten the rules on 
dispensing of medicines. The New Drug Act also plans to 
implement a product liability mechanism whereby 
consumers will be able to sue drug manufacturers if the 
medicine causes harm. The New Drug Act proposes to 
review the current penalties for the production, 
distribution and sale of fake, substandard, deteriorated and 
unregistered medicines. 
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National 
Health Act 
Law Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2007 
Strategic 
guidelines for 
the developemnt 
of the health 
sector in 
Thailand. 
Broad 
Focused on notion of developing general “well-being” in 
Thailand. Stronger focus on preventive medicine and 
other alternative medicines.  
National 
Drug Policy 
(2012-2016) 
Policy Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2011 
Guidelines on 
access to 
medicines and 
rational use of 
medicines. 
Targeted 
Goal is to promote “universal access to medicines for all, 
rational use of medicines and national self-reliance”. 
Policy developed by the National Drug System 
Development Committee and introduced alongside the 
National Strategic Action Plan 2012-2016.  Promotes 
access to medicines and rational use of medicines by 
providing further guidelines to strengthen the regulatory 
system in order to ensure quality, efficacy and safety or 
registered medicines. Promotes the development of the 
domestic pharmaceutical industry.  
National 
Strategic Plan 
for Malaria 
Control and 
Elimination 
(2011-2016) 
Guidel
ine 
Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2011 
Guidelines for 
the 
implementation 
of malaria 
control 
programme 
through the 
Bureau of 
Targeted 
One of the main objectives of this plan is to “ensure 
access for all to early diagnosis and affordable, safe, 
effective and prompt antimalarial combination treatments 
through active public and private sector initiative”. 
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Vector Borne 
Diseases. 
11th National 
Health 
Development 
Plan (2012-
2016) 
Guidel
ine 
Government 
Ministry of 
Public 
Health 
2012 
General strategy 
for the 
development of 
the Thai health 
sector and 
pharmaceutical 
indsutry. 
Broad 
Highlights health priorities for Thailand between 2012-
2016, mentions the need to strengthen the services 
provided by sub-district health promoting hospitals in 
order to support the decentralization of the health sector. 
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